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ABSTRACT
Title of the Thesis Incentive Zoning in New York City:
Managing the Urban Spatial Environment,
An Interactive and Incremental Process.
Name of the Author Romin Koebel
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
The emergence of incentive zoning is closely linked to
overcoming the detrimental effects on the spatial environment
of New York City's 1916 zoning resolution. Initially,
building bulk regulation, advocated by developers of early
tall office buildings, was resisted on the grounds that it
would create a monopoly position for such developers.
Competition spurred advances in building technology allowing
for ever taller buildings with superior environmental attri-
butes at key locations, but at the cost of impairing light
and air to existing buildings in an increasingly densely
built-up environment.
With overbuilding and growing unrest as new values were
created by destroying existing values, building bulk regula-
tion became a priority issue. The zoning resolution was
primarily a partisan and narrow response to a problem of
managing the marketing of space as perceived by key -private
commercial interests. Its effects on the urban spatial
environment are traced.
Adaptive responses to the constraints of the 1916 geo-
metric rules fall into accommodations through modifications
of building shapes within the basic envelope and innovations
such as air conditioning and fluorescent lighting; and efforts
to change the rule framework.
The agenda for change is dictated primarily by key
developmental interests rather than by considerations of the
public interest. For instance, in the 1920's vocal public
opposition to the poor public environment promulgated by the
code's provisions characterized by congestion in subways, on
streets and sidewalks, by poor light and air, by noise and
air pollution, was without avail. But, as toward the end of
the 1920's, the market for space became more competitive,
there was a trend toward towers on large sites utilizing the
25% tower coverage provision. To avoid rentable space further
than 30 feet from a window, allowed deep space at the base was
cut back above a low podium.
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The acute shortage of space, the new availability of air
conditioning and fluorescent lighting that reduced the need
for natural light and air, interrupted the trend toward the
tower in the initial post-war years. High density structures
were shoehorned into small and medium sized sites. Subse-
quently, as tenants became more demanding, the investment
building community again desired to build towers. In the
early 1950's it resisted a proposed zoning change which was
not conducive to the postulated freestanding tower and which
reduced densities. By the end of the 1950's opportunities
to build 25% coverage towers on large sites had been exhausted
and basic change was seen as imperative by the investment
building community.
Incentive zoning, the key to fulfilling the specifications
of the investment building community, evolved out of an
extended and interactive process in which investment builders
were the dominant force. Bulk controls and incentive formulas
ministered to their needs by increasing tower coverage to
40%, thus providing a way to exchange deep space on lower floors
for more valuable space on higher floors, by providing an
incentive for assemblage and high density development of large
sites, and a corollary disincentive for development of small
or medium sized sites where achievable densities were one fifth
lower. A combination of incentive zoning formulas, bulk
controls and mapping patterns was applied to overcome the
negative effects of the 1916 code's envelope on residential
buildings and of the rue corridor on the residential environ-
ment.
Although the 1960 comprehensive zoning amendment was
primarily addressed to the then current situation in the market-
ing of space, it provided a framework within which changing
exigencies could be more readily accommodated than under the
previous code. Shifting demand situations for space offered
specific opportunities to shape the urban spatial environment.
As opportunities to develop large sites were availed of and
demand for space continued to be strong, incentive zoning
formulas were augmented and adjusted to meet the new exigencies.
The advent of special district incentive zoning in the
late 1960's is attributed to new exigencies of space marketing
characterized by more specialized demand situations.
The experience of Special District incentive zoning to
date is reviewed and its impact on the management of the
urban spatial environment assessed. The thesis concludes
by discussing some possible policy alternatives.
iv
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Chapter 1
The 1916 Zoning Resolution
And the Context Within Which It Was Enacted
This chapter begins by describing the circumstances in
which demands for regulating the bulks of office buildings
were first raised. It then describes how the issue of build-
ing bulk regulation gradually grew to be a priority issue and
how finally restrictive legislation was enacted. The chapter
concludes by assessing the significance of the experience.
Until the development of geared hydraulic elevators in
the 1870s, many New Yorkers believed that Wall Street would
have to be abandoned as the city's financial center because
of shortage of space.
In 1870, the founder of the Equitable Life Insurance
insisted on a 7 storey structure instead of a 5 storey
structure for its new building at 120 Broadway. The building
was fitted with an elevator and its architect, George B. Post,
rented a suite on one of the top floors for a rental twice
that of the best offices on Broadway. Subsequently he sold
2
his lease at a profit.
Numerous new elevator buildings were subsequently
erected, several existing buildings were converted to elevator
buildings and storeys were added. Since the conventional
structure carried all its weight on masonry bearing walls,
much of the prime ground level space was lost if the building
was particularly tall. Chicago's 16 storey Monadnock Building
- 2-
(1889 - 1891) had carried the limits of masonry bearing wall
construction to their logical conclusion. Had New York's
first steel frame building, a 10 storey structure on a 20
foot wide lot, been, instead, of masonry, then there would
have been virtually no rentable space at ground level.
With improved elevators, still taller buildings of up to
20 storeys became possible. By 1881, plate glass, necessary
for high-up windows, was being mass-produced. Electric light
3
rapidly displaced gas illumination. The telephone became
available and by mid-1890, 150,000 calls a day were the
average in New York.
In mid-February, 1896, the New York Times reported the
filing of a spate of building plans for the erection of tall
buildings:
Several of the plans in contemplation are to be followed
by immediate work...Others are gotten up doubtless in
anticipation of the possible passage of the ridiculous
bit of attempted legislation against tall buildings.
The Times intimated that some persons had a personal interest
4
in having a bill passed to limit high buildings:
These persons include those who have put up tall
buildings for light and air in case similar structures
are built on an adjoining property. Among these are
some very wealthy persons and corporations. It is to
their interest that buildings as high or higher than
their own should not be built alongside. Should this
happen, the rental value of their property will be
materially reduced.
Six weeks previously, on January 2, 1896, the New York
Chamber of Commerce had taken action in favor of legislation
5
to restrict the height of buildings in the city. In noting
that in Berlin, the height of buildings was limited to the
width of the street, in Paris to about 50% over such width,
in Chicago to 130 feet, and in Boston to two and a half times
the width of the street, its Committee on Internal Trade and
Improvements called for passage by the State Legislature of
laws to limit the height of buildings in the city in proportion
to the width of the street. Subsequently, also in January
1896, the City Club moved to secure the introduction in the
State Legislature of a bill drawn up by George B. Post, a
leading architect, to limit the height of buildings to no
more than 15 times the square root of the width of the street
6
in which it was located. At corner locations a building
could not be built along the narrower street more than 100
feet at the height permitted for the wider street. Buildings
on public squares were to be excepted, but their designs were
to be subject to approval by the President of the Health
Department, the Superintendent of the Building Department
and the Council of the Fine Arts Federation. The bill had
been endorsed by the firm of McKim, Mead and White and other
prominent architects.
The Chamber of Commerce based its initiative on a report
7
by its Committee on Internal Trade and Improvements. It made
- 4 -
the following points in its report:
- Lack of proper ventilation and sunlight would be harmful to
the health of occupants of the lower floors of tall buildings
and of ordinary houses in their immediate neighborhood.
- Should the number of tall buildings materially increase,
"these conditions would become aggravated and the eyesight of
those tenants would suffer by the compulsory use of artificial
light."
- As light and ventilation deteriorated with the erection of tall
buildings, owners of office buildings might use their buildings
for "mercantile or manufacturing purposes," in which case the
buildings safety might "become impaired by weight of merchandize
or vibration of machinery.'
- A tall building "situated opposite a combustible structure
might be threatened in the case of fire."
- There was a lack of data and experience as to the safety of
steel frame construction.
- It was difficult to render assistance in the case of fire
above 150 feet.
In December 1896, the Board of Trade and Transportation
Committee on High Buildings held a series of meetings to collect
evidence with a view to legislative action in regard to a limit
8
in height of buildings in the city. In the course of the hear-
ings, a number of proposals were put forward:
- 5.-
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- One architect suggested that any building higher than 100 feet
should have an "unobstructed environment on all sides of 10 ft.
for every additional 50 feet or part thereof above the 100
foot level." However, a new building might be erected against
and to the full height of an existing building, with a dead
party wall, provided the conditions were met on the remaining
boundaries. "In no event should any structure be erected to
greater height above the curb than five times its narrowest
facade."
10
- The Chief of the Fire Department in questioning the non-
combustibility of "fire-proof" buildings that had been built
to a height of 300 ft., recommended that office buildings
should not exceed 12 storeys in height, and not be on streets
less than 70 ft. wide.
Under another plan, a street 35 feet wide might have buildings
8 storeys high, a 60 foot street ten to eleven storeys, and
a 80 foot street fourteen storeys. The limitation on Broadway
would be thirteen storeys.
Superintendent of Buildings Stevenson Constable believed
in limiting the height of a building to 175 feet or 200 feet at
11
the most.
The President of the Health Board said high buildings
restricted sunlight, "the most efficient sanitary agent known.
They make it necessary to use artificial light, and if gas light
- 6-
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is used, the air is vitiated by the products of combustion."
The representative for the Otis Elevator Company, in
stating that "in the future he thought there would be some-
thing in the nature of a menace to New York's supremacy as a
commercial center if people are denied from concentrating these
business centers in some part of the city," suggested that in
a city like New York, limited by natural barriers in its
financial and commercial centers, there might well be.set apart
a portion of it in which these high structures could be
13
erected."
In representing real estate interests, a Mr. Levy took
issue with the views expressed by Chief Bonner of the Fire
14
Department and the President of the Board of Health:
- In claiming that "a conspiracy in the interest of certain
tall buildings had existed for the prevention of other
high structures in this city," he called on the Fire
Chief to resign.
Chief Bonner, an official of the city, has made a
statement here, after which I do not think he should
remain as an official.- His action is either through
ignorance, or it is done with a purpose. He knows
that since we have had tall buildings in New York
there was less fire and he knows that every first
class high building has its own fire department.
- In stating that the gentlemen of the Board of Health were
paid to benefit the city and not to ruin it, he said:
They know that the statement of every physician of
prominence in New York is that the people have better
health and more air space than before in these first
class buildings.
- 7 -
High buildings had improved the value of property and increased
the city income, he said. "There was no prettier effect any-
where than around City Hall Park, where these buildings are.
Everybody coming here admired them."
Although the Superintendent of Buildings suggested that
the Board of Trade and Transportation should recommend "a
single short bill to the legislature limiting the height of
buildings," no affirmative action on the question of limiting
heights of buildings was taken for more than a decade and
a half.
Tall buildings continued to be erected, and by the turn
of the century there were numerous 20 storey tall skyscrapers
in Manhattan's financial district. The first towers were
located in Lower Manhattan not only because of the great
demand for space, but also because elevator speeds could only
be satisfactorily controlled with motors operated by direct
current, available only in Lower Manhattan.
With tall buildings clustered closely together along
narrow streets, even high-up light and air were impaired. The
invention of the direct gearless electric elevator and the
availability of Caisson-type foundations made it suddenly
possible to substantially increase the height of office
15
buildings. In this manner, once again access to light and
air could be achieved by erecting yet taller structures.
16
The Singer Building, completed in 1908, located on
Lower Broadway at the corner of Liberty Street on a 24,003sq.ft.
- 8 -
lot, rose 47 storeys to a height of 612 feet. Although the
building had 110 feet of frontage on Broadway and 220 feet on
Liberty Street, the tower portion of the building was quite
slender, only 70 feet square. In other words it covered only
approximately 25% of the site.
By pulling the tower portion back towards the center of
the site Ernest Flagg, the building's architect, had sought to
secure a degree of permanency of light and air for the tower
floors, even though this meant a less than optimal ratio
between the core portion of the tower floor and its usable
rentable area. In part this was also offset by the advertising
value that the Singer Sewing Machine Company could derive from
the tower. For 18 months it was to be New York's tallest
office building. But in 1909, the Metropolitan Life Insurance
17
Company built a 50 storey tower 700 feet tall. It was
located at Madison Square to the north of the financial
district.
On April 24, 1913, several blocks to the north of the
Singer Building, the Woolworth Building was opened. Facing
City Hall Park, it was to remain at 742 feet the tallest
office building until the 1920's.
Louis Horowitz, President of the Thompson-Starett Co.,
18
the contracting firm that built the tower, told Mr. Woolworth
that he thought the project a poor investment because he did
not think Woolworth could get enough rent from the tenants to
pay a profitable return on an investment of seven or eight
million dollars. But Mr. Woolworth said the Woolworth Building
- 9 -
was going to be like a giant signboard to advertise around the
world a spreading chain of 5 and 10 stores. Such an enormous
hidden profit would outweigh any loss, he told Horowitz.
By 1913, the overproduction of office building skyscrapers
in Lower Manhattan had led to a deterioration of the rental
19
situation. There had been a slight improvement in spring
and summer of 1912 following two poor preceding years of 1910
and 1911. Coincident with the deteriorating rental situation,
plans were announced for four major new office buildings, one
on Broadway south of Rector Street and two on Broad Street.
But the greatest threat was posed by Coleman du Pont's proposal
to erect the world's biggest office building at 120 Broadway,
on the site of the old Equitable Building that had burned down
20
in 1912. In an effort to stop the building, owners of the
21
adjacent properties implored Louis Horowitz, whose Thompson-
Starett Co., was to erect the building, to use his influence
with General du Pont to stop the project. The opposition was
led by George T. Mortimer, vice-president of the United States
Realty Company, which owned two tall buildings across the
street from 120 Broadway.
"Look," said one of the committee that visited Horowitz,
"you have influence with General du Pont, and you can
stop this job...you use your influence and you can get
him to complete the purchase of the land and dedicate
this block for a park. Such a place would make a lovely
breathing spot that would brighten the lives of those
who work in this congested region." 22
- 10 -
But Horowitz thought the proposition preposterous. "Oh," said
one of the callers, "it's not preposterous; the city needs a park
down here and this block is just the thing." Horowitz would
only agree to urge du Pont to abandon the project on the condition
that the plot be bought at cost by the adjacent property owners
and dedicated as a park. "That stopped all chatter; nothing more
was said about a park," Horowitz recalled.
An alternate proposal for the owners of existing neighboring
office buildings to co-operate in building a low building on the
site with the upper storeys set well back did not materialize.
Such a building would have protected the light of the adjoining
properties, and "left undisturbed the rental conditions in
23
buildings for blocks in all directions."
Each new office building, typically built vertically from
its lot lines, meant in addition to the increased amount of space
the darkening of buildings already erected nearby; and as light
and air then commanded higher rentals than location, the effect
was viewed with apprehension.
In the case of the new 36 storey Equitable Building, location
as well as (unobstructed) light and air would be secured above
approximately the 18th floor. With the new 1,200,000 million
square foot structure rising on all four sides without setback
for 36 storeys, the following consequences were anticipated for
existing space facing the Equitable block:
- 11 -
- Curtailment of light and air;
- As a result, drastic drops in rent per sq. foot per annum;
loss of tenants to the new environmentally superior space
of the adjacent structure.
Moreover, the vacancy rate in the whole surrounding area would
increase as tenants relocated to the new building.
Loss of tenants and concomitant loss of rents could not be
compensated for by curtailment of operating expenses through
cutting elevator service and maintenance costs, if the remaining
tenants were to be held. Horowitz, in citing the depression and
the competition with the Woolworth Building, the City Investment
Building along with several others, said for a while the 1,200,000
square feet seemed "almost like a new continent, so vast and
24
vacant were its many floors." It was not until the outbreak
of WWI when J. P. Morgan and Co. rented a floor in connection with
their activities as buyers of munitions for the allies that the
vacancies started to decline.
On February 27, 1913, coincident with this low point in the
rental situation, Manhattan Borough President George McAneny, in
25
finding that there was:
...a growing sentiment in the community that the time has
come when an effort should be made to regulate the height,
size and arrangement of buildings...in order to arrest the
seriously increasing evil of the shutting off of light and
air...to prevent congestion and to reduce the hazards of
fire, presented a resolution to the Board of Estimate,
calling for the appointment of a Committee on City Planning,
- 12 -
- to study existing conditions,
- to find whether height, size and arrangement of buildings
should be regulated,
- to study the legality of such regulations and whether
for the purposes of such regulations, the City might be
divided into districts or zones.
The Committee was to submit in advance of a general
report recommendations on limiting the height of buildings
on Fifth Avenue. The Committee was empowered to appoint an
advisory commission representing real estate interests, the
architectural and engineering professions. The resolution
was adopted.
On March 29, 1913, at a luncheon of the Club, Borough
President McAneny predicted that the time was coming when
there would be no more skyscrapers built in the city, and
26
when that type of architecture would be regarded as a curiosity.
Dr. Werner Hegeman, a Cerman city planner, contrasted the
freestanding tower of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Building
at 23rd Street and Madison Avenue with the "horrible" skyscrapers
27
of Lower Manhattan. "Give us towers, make them as high as the
Metropolitan if you wish, and you will have clean and healthy
28
conditions,," he urged.
Within days Ernest Flagg, the architect of the Singer
Building diagonally across from 120 Broadway, in taking issue
- 13 -
with McAneny said it was too late to get rid of skyscrapers.29
Instead, he proposed:
- establishing a general height limit at once the width of the
street;
- allowing a building to any desired height on a certain percentage
of each plot, say 25 to 30%;
- setting back the tower portion from the front lot line so as
not to darken the street;
- allowing owners to transfer their right to build high t6
adjacent plots (..."this would be a valuable privilege and
would serve to compensate one for any damage the increased
size of the building might occasion him.")
Flagg did not object to tall buildings: "standing singly
and isolated, there is little to be said against high buildings..,."
but he considered it desirable that "the main cornice line of
the street facade be restored to some degree of order," an objective
that could be achieved under the proposal.
30
Just days later, Flagg's theme was expanded upon. The
following proposals were made:
- A limit should be set to the number of skyscrapers to be allowed
in the future,
- skyscrapers should be built at considerable distances from
each other,
- 14 -
their boundary walls should slope inward, from groundline to
top, "so as not to deprive adjoining buildings of their fair
share of necessary sunlight and ventilation."
Moving swiftly, the Committee on City Planning had by mid-
31
April 1913 completed its appointments to the Advisory Commission.
Of the initial nineteen commission members there were more realtors
than men from any other calling. Among them was George T.
Mortimer of the United States Realty Company, owners of two
major buildings vis-a-vis 120 Broadway. Flagg was not included.
32
Toll notes that there were only two groups involved:
- The private commercial interest and the reformer-planners.
Only the private commercial interest, the group with a stake in
the ownership of the property which might be affected, had its
hands on the levers of municipal power, he writes.
The reformer-planners, however, were essentially in sympathy
with the objectives of the owners: "Their pioneering work turned
out to be an exercise in drafting the will of a handful of New
York property holders."
The Fifth Avenue Association which had been founded in 1907
to meet the problem posed by the encroachment of lofts on Fifth
Avenue noted in its annual report released in Spring 1913 that
it was largely as a result of the Association's agitation that
Borough President McAneny had proposed to the Board of Estimate a
limitation of the height of new buildings in Fifth Avenue and
33
100 feet east and west of it to not more than 125 feet.
- 15 -
The Association, in endorsing the proposed legislation,
took the opportunity to call attention to the fact in its annual
report that in its May meeting of 1912 it had adopted a resolution
urging that the restrictive belt on each side of the Avenue be
extended from 100 feet to 300 feet.
Robert Grier Cooke, President of the Fifth Avenue association,
34
in answering the question how "the mere cutting down of the
height of buildings to 125 feet" would "rid the section of the
crowds of garment workers and other factory hands" explained that
it was hoped and expected that the new regulations proposed by
the State Factory Commission, making it obligatory on builders:
- to provide more and wider staircases,
- to greatly reduce the number of operatives in a room,
to provide more light, better ventilation and improved hygienic
conditions,
would "work together with the laws compelling a reasonable height
of buildings so as to make it impossible for factories to exist
in the heart of New York's best shopping section."
In 1911, George McAneny had, at the request of the leadership
of the Fifth Avenue Association, appointed a quasi-official
Fifth Avenue Commission, all of whom were members of the Fifth
Avenue Association, except the Chief Engineer of the Board of
Estimate. The Commission was to study the problem and make
recommendations that McAneny was to sponsor before the Board of
Estimate.
- 16 -
In July 1913, Arnold Brunner, chairman of the Fifth Avenue
Commission, wrote E. M. Basset, chairman of the Advisory Commission,
that his commission was considering the question of the height
35
of buildings, principally from the point of view of the street
itself, rather than from the point of view of the effect of high
buildings upon their opposite neighbors. "We believe that a
limitation of the height of the abutting buildings would prevent
Fifth Avenue from becoming a canyon." In selecting the Rue de
la Paix in Paris as a model for a successful shopping street,
the Commission reiterated its view that a maximum cornice height
of 125 ft. would be desirable, with an allowance of two extra
storeys in the mansard.
On December 4, 1913, the Advisory Commission of the Board
36
of Estimatds Heights of Buildings Committee filed its report.
The report recommended:
- limitation of building height at the street line to twice the
width of the street with a minimum of 100 feet and a maximum
of 300 feet;
- setting the street walls above such limit back one foot for
each four feet of increased height;
- allowing a tower to be erected to any height provided it did not
cover more than 25% of the lot and provided every part of the
tower was kept at least 20 feet from the lot and street lines.
In the case of a building facing a public park or waterfront,
however, such tower might be placed at the building line;
- 17 -
coverage of the entire lot up to the top of the first strey,
above which 10% of every interior lot was to be left vacant at
the rear. In the case of a corner lot, no rear court was to
be required;
- further decrease in coverage by 1% of the lot area for each
storey, except the first;
- minimum dimensions proportionate to height for main courts
other than the 10% rear court of not less than 6 feet and
not less than the number of feet equal to one and one-quarter
times the number of storeys above the first storey.
The Advisory Commission estimated that given anticipated
plot sizes, buildings would reach their "economic height" when,
through the application of the court and set-back regulations,
the area of the building had been reduced to about 60% of
the plot. This would mean, the Commission projected,
- for buildings on an interior plot on a 60 foot street a
height of about 14 to 17 storeys,
- for corner plots on a 100 foot street, a probable height of
between 16 to 20 storeys.
The recommendations would have had widely varying impacts
on the Woolworth Building and the Equitable Building, two key
representative buildings. The setback of the Woolworth Building
would have been at the 23rd floor rather than at the 27th, but
greater tower coverage would have been allowed, and no limit would
- 18 -
have been set to its height. The Equitable Building, on the
other hand, would have been severely impacted. Instead of rising
vertically from the lot line for forty storeys, it would have
been interrupted by two setbacks and its upper half would have
been squeezed into a tower.
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Ernest Flagg took a critical view of the proposals. After
listing the disadvantages of tall buildings, the chief causes
of complaint against high buildings, he asked:
- "Can any one point to a single disadvantage of high buildings,
which would be overcome by the adoption of that plan?"
Then he asked which positive features of high buildings could be
retained by the adoption of the plan? The implication was that
there were none.
In February 1914, enabling legislation was enacted by the
state lesiglature in Albany to empower the Board of Estimate to
regulate the heights and uses of buildings.
In May 1914, hearings were held on the subject of establishing
a Second Commission to recommend the "boundaries of districts and
38
appropriate regulations to be endorsed therein."
At the first hearing some opposition was registered;
- Robert F. Dowling, in stating that he was interested in three
of the skyscrapers, said he didn't believe "for that reason
that the city authorities should stop anybody from erecting
a building as big or bigger than any other if they see fit."
-19 -
- Another speaker said:
To me, the American skyscraper is the embodiment of a
great industrial progress, and has made the cities what
they are. You can't stop this without reversing the
wheels of progress and no man ever did that. We have
a city that is the wonder of the world and its biggest
wonder is the high building.40
However, at the second hearing on May 22, 1914, supporters
completely dominated the proceedings and the Board of Estimate
voted unanimously o appoint a "Commission on Building Districts
and Restrictions." On June 26, 1914, little over a month
later, the Second Commission was appointed. Veiller, the
housing reformer, was dropped. The position of private commercial
42
interests was strengthened.
The Commission held its first round of hearings in January,
1915. Charles F. Noyes, a real estate broker representing many
realty owners in the downtown insurance district, argued that
with the two times height limitation, buildings on narrow downtown
43
streets 40 to 60 feet wide would be limited to 8 or 9 storeys.
In order to avoid confiscating values, he suggested that where,
before enactment, property had sold or was valued at $50 per sq.
ft. or $125,000 a lot (25 ft x 100 ft), a building 150 feet might
be erected or if the value was $75 per sq. ft. a building 200 feet
high might be erected.
One speaker observed that the ordinance would give a monopoly
44
of the air to those already in possession of skyscrapers.
- 20 -
The representative of the Allied Real Estate Interests,
who was also a member of the Commission, said that the only
fault he had to find was that the limit for buildings was not
sufficiently low, the height regulations would actually allow
some of the city's skyscrapers to mount still higher.
Ernest Flagg said the ordinance "would not do what many
of its advocates expected it to do, namely limit height and
area of buildings to check the evils which our present methods
45
of building are causing."
"The Heights of Building Commission was appointed to study
the situation and suggest a remedy. Now, we have the
proposed remedy, and lot It is a regulation to permit
the erection of the very kind of buildings which are
causing the mischief."
Representatives of real estate interests, architects, tax-payers'
associations, the Fire Underwriters, the Lawyers Title Guarantee
Company and the Factory Investigating Committee spoke in favor
46
of the plan. The work of the commission continued. Early
1916, in a series of luncheon meetings held at the rooms of the
Merchants Association, members of the commission explained their
47
work. Particularly staunch support came from key mortgage and
insurance companies.
- The President of the Lawyers Title and Trust Co., noted that
in lending money it was exceedingly difficult to guess how long
any section would remain stable.
- The President of the Title Guarantee and Trust Company said
there had been "too much doing as the individual owner pleases,"
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- The President of the Lawyer's Mortgage Company said that
very likely the speculative builder might be the only opposer.
On March 8, 1916, two days before the Commission delivered
its tentative report to the Board of Estimate, fifty three
financial institutions had signed a supporting statement after
Basset had spoken at a conference organized by the Advisory
48
Council of Real Estate Interests.
On March 10, 1916, the report was submitted and hearings
49
scheduled for March and April.
Under the proposed zoning law, the city was divided into
use, height and area districts.
In most of Manhattan, the height of the allowed street
wall, i.e. the cornice line, was set at twice the width of
the street, as had been originally proposed by the first
Commission. There was, however, one significant exception.
In the office and financial section of Lower Manhattan the
permitted height had been increased to two and one half times
the street width. According to Basset the two and one half times
and two times districts were created because those districts
were partly built up with skyscrapers of great height and it
appeared discriminatory to impose a lower height limit on the
rest of the same area.
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Above the street wall, the building might be carried higher
provided it did not penetrate a prescribed sky exposure plane.
No rule against skyscrapers was proposed. Provided the plot
was large enough, an owner could go up as high as he saw fit
on 25% of the plot.
At the hearing on March 27, 1916, Manhattan Borough President
Marks said that tragedies in real estate could have been averted
if the city had followed some such plan as was proposed and that
50
tragedies will be averted if plans went through.
Robert Anderson Pope, a landscape architect, raised a number
51
of objections:
- There was no evidence that the health of the citizens had been
affected by high buildings;
- the proposed height restrictions were arbitrary, unscientific
and uneconomic;
- the time was coming when all traffic in Wall Street and the
financial district would be pedestrian;
- unless the commission had anticipated the economic development
of the city, the proposed regulations might prove very
detrimental.
Another speaker opposed the restricting of the heights of
buildings on the grounds that the courts would hold such a law
to be discriminatory and unjust. There should be one limitation
to building over the entire city, he said. "In Staten Island,
- 23 -
for instance?" enquired Chairman Basset. "All over the city,"
was the reply.
The Fifth Avenue Association urged a reduction in building
52
height to one and one half times the width of the Avenue (later lt).
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At a subsequent hearing Park Commissioner Cabot Ward said
the plan accomplished nothing toward restricting buildings
adjacent to parks and that it jeopardized the small park, which
was a center in the life of the neighboring community. The
representative of the Women's Municipal League urged that
buildings on Columbus Circle be restricted in height so as not
54
to spoil the skyline of Central Park.
Another speaker, a builder, said "the craze for apartment
houses was greatly overestimated" and urged the setting aside of
55
a section of the West Side for private houses.
The Commission submitted its final report to the Board of
Estimate on June 2, 1916. The final round of hearings was
scheduled to begin on June 19, 1916. There was still considerable
opposition. One owner claimed that a building zone system would
benefit only the minority "as to limit in any considerable
degree the height of buildings is to create a monopolistic
value in favor of existing buildings."
George T. Mortimer, a member of the Commission, stressed
that one of the important underlying factors behind the whole
zoning proposition was the stabilizing of real estate values.
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It will be remembered that Mortimer, as Vice-President of the
United States Realty Co., had led the opposition to the Equitable
Building. Subsequently, when Horowitz resigned as president
of the Equitable Office Building Corporation, Mortimer became
its manager. Mortimer's insightful and revealing observation
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drew an irate response from one owner, who, in referring to
Mortimer's interest in the Equitable Building, said that
Mortimer, in order to be consistent, ought to request the Board
of Estimate to reduce the height of the Equitable Building to
about 20 storeys, and the heights of all similar structures,
which were detrimental to their neighbors or to the community
at large. This should be done without compensation under the
police power that Mortimer claimed for the city.
On June 20, 1916, timed to coincide with the opening of
the hearings, the New York Times published an editorial entitled
"New York City's Final Form," in which high hopes were pinned
on the enactment of the resolution. "We shall not see again
such wholesale making of new values by the ruin of old values."
One final hearing was held on July 5, at the conclusion of
which the Zoning Resolution was adopted by a vote of 19 to 1.
Although ostensibly aimed at providing an adequate spatial
environment for all areas, the 1916 Zoning Resolution did not
succeed in achieving this objective. In large part the failure
is attributable to the fact that a solution that was devised to
solve the specialized problems of two specific and highly confined
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areas was applied on an area-wide basis. It was applied in
areas in which the problems that had initiated the search for
the initial solutions had not been experienced. Such application
was to create further serious problems.
The model of the environment embraced by the Fifth Avenue
Association was one of a rue corridor with a low street wall, of
uniform height. This model was primarily adopted, in conjunction
with other measures, as a means to prevent encroachment by loft
buildings. Only in second instance was it thought of as a measure
to enhance such environmental attributes as light and air.
Nevertheless, the model was valid and had it been subsequently
applied in those areas yet to undergo development, as it had been
formulated for Fifth Avenue, it would have largely prevented
negative environmental impacts such as were to be caused by the
application of the 1916 rules.
In lower Manhattan, the problem was different from that
of Fifth Avenue. Here the problem was ostensibly to stop high-
coverage, high-density buildings, rising vertically without set
back from their lot lines, at prime locations.
The problem of the financial district was met by modifying
and applying elements of the "rue corridor" model to that area.
Whereas along Fifth Avenue buildings were restricted to a cornice
height of one and one quarter times the width of the street, in
the financial district the allowed cornice height was twice that.
Above this height buildings could rise at a steep set back angle.
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This shape prevented straight-up office buildings rising
vertically from their lot lines to unlimited heights, such as
the Equitable Building.
The rules ensured that light and air of major straight-up
buildings completed prior to introduction of the rules would be
protected against encroachment by new straight-up buildings
rising in the vicinity, assuring superior competitive positions
for structures such as the Equitable Building.
The avowed rationale of the geometric rules may be summed
up as follows:
Nobody should be allowed to build space within an area
that was significantly better than anybody else's or
significantly better than anyone else could build.
Whereas the rules may have been suited to serve certain
limited objectives in the already highly developed financial
section for which they had been devised, they were not suited
for those large areas yet to undergo intensive redevelopment.
It is a general rule, however, that immediate pressing problems
take priority in the decision making process. Consequently,
the impacts of wider application of the solution, worked out
to meet the needs of a highly confined area, were of only limited
concern to the framers of the Zoning Resolution.
Indeed, for both classes of interests, namely the group
that through the Zoning Resolution would secure a monopoly on
desirable environmental attributes, and the group impacted by
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Equitable type structures, there was nothing to be gained by
advocating rules that would secure superior environmental
attributes in areas yet to undergo redevelopment elsewhere.
While the Fifth Avenue Association, in propagating its
"rue corridor" model, demanded that a canyon-like environment
be avoided, it was the canyon that, in fact, was legislated
in most areas to experience intensive redevelopment subsequently.
These areas were mapped as two times height districts, the median
value between the one-and-one half times height district
of Fifth Avenue and two-and-one-half times height district
of the Financial District.
By virtue of the wide streets and avenues, buildings in
the two times districts could achieve comparable heights to
those of the two-and-one-half times district. Given lot depths
of only 100 feet in such areas to undergo redevelopment, light
and air deficiencies were exacerbated through the corollary
narrow rear yards. Whereas tall tower-like buildings had
unimpeded access to light and air, the typical product of the
1916 geometric rules received its daylight over the tops of wide
and high buildings on the opposite side of the street, or worse
still on the opposite side of a narrow rear yard.
High coverage, in conjunction with buildings reaching from side
lot line to side lot line, leading to deep space, further worsened
environmental attributes.
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From the outset, then, it was understood that new areas of
intensive development would experience a serious environmental
handicap through application of the geometric rules.
With increasing motorization, noise and air pollution
was to become increasingly critical. Many of the problems
resulting from the adopted model of the three-dimensional
environment could have been avoided had, instead, the alternate
model as proposed by Flagg been adopted. His model had envisaged
towers covering 25% of the lot, rising from above a building
base built to the lot lines, but only as high as the street was
wide. Although many of the geometric rules deficiencies had
been recognized at their inception, they survived basically
unchanged until 1960. The geometric rules were enduring in
part because, once set, they conferred predictability.
Curbing overbuilding had become by 1913 a priority issue.
The process leading to the 1916 zoning resolution was an
interactive one. The process illustrates the importance of
timing. Various classes of interests can be affected in different
ways by the same set of rules depending on the timing of the
introduction.
In the financial district the geometric rules primarily
served limited private commercial interests by enhancing a
monopoly situation. Imposed earlier, the same rules could have
prevented limited private commercial interests from exerting that
monopoly situation.
- 29 -
As the question of limiting heights became a priority
issue, the intent of such proposed legislation became endangered
as major entrpreneurial opportunities began to be perceived by
certain interests, to get in under the wire with significant
amounts of space with superior environmental attributes at key
locations in economically constructed straight-up buildings.
Such structures could take advantage of a monopoly situation
because, given the typically limited parcel sizes in the financial
district and the 25% coverage limitation for towers, higher
buildings could neither encroach on their environmental
attributes, nor could new buildings provide similar superior
environmental attributes once the Resolution was enacted. This
in itself might be the prime motivating incentive behind the
efforts of key interest groups to secure more restrictive
legislation. This may conflict with the interests of those
groups that may have contributed to making the question of rule
introduction a priority issue.
Once imposition of restrictive legislation has become a
priority issue, the timing of its introduction becomes the
critical variable. Manipulation of the time span between inception
and enactment may determine whether avowed objectives will be
achieved or whether unavowed, underlying objectives, objectives
that may be contradictory to the avowed objectives, will be
furthered by the rule introduction.
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Chapter 2
The Skyscraper Era -
Effects of the Zoning Resolution on the Spatial Environment
This chapter will examine the impact of the 1916 Resolution
on the spatial environment. It will show how various adaptive
responses were tested to overcome the resolution's negative
effects on the quality of the spatial environment.
Although the zoning resolution permitted 25% of the lot
to be built to any height, little use was made of this provision
in the early years for the following reasons. Light and air
considerations made it less feasible to build structures with
deep space. Consequently, office buildings could only be built
on moderately sized lots. Such lots were not large enough to
support a tower with 25% coverage. Superimposed on a moderately
sized bulk envelope, such towers would have been, of necessity,
too spindly. When the necessary elevator and stair space had
been deducted, the remainder would have been insufficient to
warrant the cost of such towers. Nevertheless, a few were
built, e.g. the Heckscher Building. Their principal value was
seen as an advertisement.
In that towers were discouraged, the bulk envelope regulations
worked, as had been intended and anticipated by the Advisory
Commission -- at least for the first years -- as an indirect
density control.
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The Zoning Resolution had little effect on Lower
Manhattan, where streets had already largely been built up
to their maximum capacity.
It soon became evident that the Zoning Resolution was more
1
easily applied to some types of buildings than to others.
Office buildings, in which it was possible to rent not only
small sections, but also to a certain degree, artificially lit
areas, could afford to utilize the zoning envelope to a greater
degree than could hotels and apartment houses, which found it
difficult to secure sufficient light for the interior portions
of the building if these were built to the front lotline.
2
In the case of the Shelton Hotel on Lexington Avenue,
the problem was met by building only the two lowest storeys
and the flanking towers to the building line. By setting the
central tower portion back, it was possible to secure adequate
daylight and ventilation for a greater percentage of the hotel
rooms than would have been possible had the allowed envelope
been filled to the maximum.
By 1924, there was yet to be a street with an uniform cornice
3
line, a trend encouraged by the law. Little change of the
spatial environment was registered in Lower Manhattan, where
the streets had already, to a considerable extent, been built up
to their maximum capacity. Further uptown, however, at 42nd
Street, Madison Avenue and Park Avenue, the effect of the law on
- 32 -
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the streetscape was becoming increasingly more visible.
Street walls with uniform cornice lines gradually emerged, as
construction in midtown's two times height districts progressed.
In 1924, Ernest Flagg, in expressing his concern at the
quality of the environment resulting from adherence to the
bulk rules of the 1916 Zoning Resolution in those areas of
midtown undergoing rapid redevelopment, once again called for
limitation of the general building height to once the width of
5
the street. He revived his earlier proposal to allow trans-
fering tower development rights to adjacent parcels and expanded
it to allow for transfers of tower development rights between
any owner on the same block.
At the time and in the ensuing period, still little use was
made of the 25% coverage provision to build towers penetrating
the prescribed bulk envelope. Where it was availed of, the
tower portion contributed an only insignificant percentage to
a building's total rentable space. Consequently, towers were
not yet a factor in increasing an area's density.
In midtown Manhattan, most of which was mapped as a two
times height district, with its wide streets and avenues --
much wider than those of Lower Manhattan -- buildings on avenues
were reaching heights of 15 storeys and 9 storeys on side streets.
200 foot wide blocks were typically developed solidly along
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the front lot lines, in a "hollow square" fashion. With rear
courts on the typically 100 foot deep lots, only ten feet deep,
the quality of the environment of these developments with respect
to light, air, exposure and ventilation wab poor.
By 1926, the question of subway congestion was quickly
becoming a priority issue. Subway congestion was directly
attributed to the many new skyscrapers. In 1926, a Mayor's
Committee on City Planning and Survey was established. One of
its members was Henry H. Curran, Counsel of the City Club.
On June 16, 1926, Ourran said that as a member of the committee,
6
he would press for:
- a reduction of building heights on avenues from 15 storeys to
10 storeys, and on side streets from 9 storeys to 6 storeys;
abolition of the set-back privilege by which skyscrapers were
permitted to ascend in steps.
"Unless this were done, the subway problem was incurable," he
said in observing that "the more subways the city built, the
more skyscrapers were built to monopolize the new capacity."
- "If the skyscrapers did not cluster along the spine of
Manhattan, as they do, we should not need the underground spinal
cord of subways to minister to the needs of the skyscraper
monsters." He concluded, "We have reached the limit of municipal
stupidity, the skyscraper must go."
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Thomas Adams, General Director of the Regional Plan of
New York, asked what will happen to Manhattan when the number of
7
skyscrapers is multiplied by 10 or 20? "0ontinue to erect
skyscrapers and fill them with more people and it means more
trucks, more automobiles, more movement, and the condition becomes
a hazard to life and health," he said.
While agreeing with Mr. Curran "in principle," namely that
some restrictions should be placed upon the building of new
skyscrapers, he warned against setting an arbitrary limit to
the height of building. Rather, he urged that heights should be
studied in connection with the whole problem of uses and street
spaces. "Skyscrapers are not any more objectionable than low
buildings, provided they have around them sufficient space."
Such a skyscraper could be beautiful, he continued. However,
a series of them, packed side by side, was "neither beautiful
nor healthful. The air deteriorates; artificial lighting
becomes the rule."
In quoting Ruskin, who said of Edinburgh that its buildings
were well displayed, Adams said the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Building owed its beauty to the space of Madison Square; the
Telephone Building, a recent office building, to the background
of the North River (Hudson), the Shelton Building to the vista
of Lexington Avenue.
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But in September 1926, E. M. Bassett in expressing his
doubt that more restrictive height limitations could be imposed
in the Central Business District because this would be discrimin-
ating, called attention to the percentages of the various
height districts in relation to the entire city: 2j times 0.5;
8
2 times 4; ij times 9.6; i times 12.4; 1 time 63.5. This
schedule, he said, given such inalterability of districts of
great allowable heights to lesser heights, showed that nearly
the same thing could be accomplished if Boards of Estimate
rigorously refused to increase the area of existing intensive
districts. Such refusal would be equitable to owners.
The argument of landowners that height limits should be
raised, because land values had increased, was a false one, he
asserted:
Land values will take of themselves if owners become
convinced that Boards of Estimate will not increase
the height limits. If, however, such boards supinely
increase the height limits, congestion of living and
working conditions will surely increase, along with
street congestion and sooner or later, it will be
demonstrated that the city was unable to save itself.
In November, 1926, the inventor, Thomas Edison, expressed
the belief that the building of skyscrapers in congested parts
of New York and other cities would have to be prohibited to
9
avoid traffic strangulation. He predicted disaster, if the
construction of buildings each housing the population of a small
city were continued.
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Thomas Adams, in agreeing with Edison that traffic was
becoming more difficult as a result of skyscrapers, said in
his opinion what counted was not the restriction of skyscrapers,
10
but their reduction in height. "Furthermore, there must be
more street space around high buildings."
Adams, in advocating limiting heights of buildings to street
widths, said this would not do away with skyscrapers because:
"Many of our avenues are so wide that very tall buildings could
be constructed on the basis of street widths," while still
higher buildings might be built on plots facing public parks
and squares. Adams remarks show that penetration of the sky-
exposure plane by means of 25% coverage towers was still not
seen as a critical factor in the question of densities. And,
again, at the end of November 1926, the indefatigable Flagg
offered his proposal that tower development rights be traded within
a block. Since 1924 he had, however, become convinced that a
general height of once the width of the street was impracticable.
It should not be above five storeys at most, he said.
By this time, some of the zoning resolutions had become
increasingly apparent to have negative effects on built form:
- A lopsided distortion of the Babylonianziggurat became the
trademark of the New York Office building;
- the restriction to 25% of the lot made towers so spindly they
were hardly worth building;
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- coverage of non-tower portions of buildings was still extreme.
In consequence, much poor space was built. The usuai
arrangement was to have private offices along the windows.
Reception and clerical work space was located in the secondary
area next to the corridors towards the interior of the building.
Such space was difficult to light and ventilate.
In offices deeper than 25 feet, artificial light had to be
used to supplement "borrowed" daylight. With electricity still
quite expensive, many tenants used as little as possible.
Lighting technology was poor. Electric light as installed in
most offices provided 4 - 6 foot candles of lighting, as opposed
to today's lighting standards of 50 to 100 foot candles.
Moreover, artificial light in generating significant amounts of
heat exacerbated the ventilation of deep space.
Rents rapidly decreased with increasing building depths.
Shallow space commanded comparatively much higher rentals.
An indication of the relationships between rental values and
11
various depths is given by the following table. Although it
reflects 1923 rent levels, the message is clear.
Distance from Window Rent per sq. ft.
15 3.00
20 2.80
25 2.60
30 2.40
35 2.1540 1.9545 1.80
50 1.65
Lift
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In the late 1920's, in Manhattan's financial district in the
vicinity of the Stock Exchange, space 50 to 60 feet from the
nearest window rented at $3.50 a sq. foot per year as opposed
to $5 to $8 for space closer to windows. By the end of the
1920's, space over 25 to 30 feet from a window would, if at
all rentable, command a rental rate of only a third to a
quarter of the rate that was obtainable for shallower space.
An examination of a typical office building in which
- 80% of the excess depth over 25 ft. was in the lower half, and
- 66% in the lowest third, revealed that
- although 49% of the total office space was in the building's
lower third, that portion of the building earned only just
over 35% of the building's income;
- whereas the top one sixth of the building containing 6.84%
of the total net area earned approximately 8% of the total
revenue;
- in the sixth of the building just above the half-way mark, the
percentage of income was balanced by the percentage of the
12
total area.
George Ford concluded from this data that the bulky lower
storeys of the typical skyscraper were much too heavy to row
their own weight, were a drag on the building, and tended markedly
to cut down the net return on the equity for the whole project.
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Since the construction and operating costs per square foot
would be about the same for both the deep and the shallow
parts of the building, an increasing advantage was seen in
shallow buildings. How was the problem met? The difficulties
generated a number of adaptive responses within the constraints
of the Zoning Resolution.
In the case of the Empire State Building, initial plans had
been to provide a significant amount of deep space in lower
13
parts of the building. When it was found that here, too,
space close to windows might bring $3 to $4 per sq. ft. while
poorly lit space further back would not bring over $1 to $1.50,
it was decided to cut cubage in the lower parts of the building
by generously setting back above the fifth floor. Above this
level rose a tower, taking advantage of the 25% lot coverage
sky-exposure plane penetration privileges. Stores, banks, and
insurance offices were expected to take the first, second and
third floors, while bank clerical help would probably absorb
the fourth and fifth.
George Ford point out in 1930 that it might well be a
good strategy to bring tower portions of buildings down to as
low as the top of the second or third floors, unless there was
an obyvous market for the first four or five storeys for
department stores, speciality shops, banks, brokers offices
and insurance offices, with their work rooms directly over
14
their sales rooms and their public rooms.
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The evolution of the plans for the Rockefeller Center sheds
light on the shifts in the type of space in demand. In December
1928, the Metropolitan Square Corporation was formed to develop
the three block sites between 5th and 6th Avenues, 48th and
15
51st Street property owned by Columbia University. Originally
conceived around a planned new home for the Metropolitan Opera,
initial schemes had envisioned:
- large stepbacked skyscrapers arranged around a centrally
located plaza to be donated by John D. Rockefeller,
- an Opera House, facing the plaza on the west side of the
middle block,
- the skyscrapers to the east of the plaza, rising from the
Fifth Avenue lot line, in order to maximize avenue retail
frontage continuity and office space with avenue location.
Under the plan, view of the plaza from the Avenue would have
been blocked. Although the site was a three block superblock,
no advantage was taken of the possibility to provide a sub-
stantial amount of space in tower-like structures.
When the Opera withdrew from the project because its
centrally located site was too costly, drastic alterations
were made to the site plan. It became possible to relocate the
major office building to the middle of the center block and
locate low buildings on Fifth Avenue. The shift away from
the originally contemplated ziggurat building shapes with their
deep floors to the open plan layout of slender towers rising
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from ground level reflected the increasing demand for light,
air, exposure, view, quiet, improved ventilation, removal from
air pollution of street traffic. The towers were spaced far
apart, because the managers knew that a few big towers with
plenty of light and air would rent better than many small ones.
The RCA building, the central building, stepped its side back
from the east end to avoid building unprofitable deep space
as the elevator banks dropped off with height. Said Manager John
16
R. Todd: "I have never collected an extra dollar of rent for
space more than thirty feet from a window." As a result, the
group of big office towers -- the smallest 8,200 sq. ft., the
largest 17,000 sq. ft. net -- was surrounded by less than 25%
of the additional lower floor oubage permitted by the zoning
envelope. This space was largely used for stores, theaters,
garages, or radio studios, soundproofed and without windows.
Still, the restriction to 25% lot coverage made towers so
spindly that it was uneconomical to erect them except in extremely
large plots. Rockefeller Center's three-block superblock was the
rare exception.
Increasingly, the perceived need of the builder-owner was
for office towers rising above lower buildings. The specifications
were difficult to fulfill. In large part this was due to fragmented
ownership patterns. A number of projects, such as the planned
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Larkin Building, which was to have been the world's tallest, did
not materialize in large part because of difficulties encountered
in assemblage. The difficulty and cost of assemblage increased
in proportion to the demand for space at key locations. The two
most notable developments in this period did not require any
assemblage. In the case of the Empire State Building, advantage
could be taken of an already available large site, that of the
old Waldorf Astoria Hotel. But this site was far to the south
of the hub of developmental activity which, at that time, was
at 42nd Street and Grand Central. It took years for the building
to be rented. True, this was also due to the general lack of
demand for office space after 1930. Subsequently, however,
when development did pick up again, it was to the north.
The developers of the Empire State Building traded-off
superior environmental attributes against the locational
advantages of transit access and proximity to the existing
growth pole at 42nd Street and Grand Central.
This trade-off was made at Rockefeller Center, too. The
trade-off was further emphasized when the decision was made to
shift the bulk of office space away from an immediate Fifth
Avenue location even further west to a location approximately
midway between Fifth Avenue and Sixth Avenue, where it had
been initially intended to build the opera house. Several
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blocks north of 42nd Street and west of Fifth Avenue, this
was, from the point of view of office development, still virgin
territory.
Whereas the isolated Empire State Building failed to
trigger further development, Rockefeller Center was to sub-
sequently become a growth pole in its own right. The premium
on superior environmental attributes at the time, then, was
such that it was thought that improvements of these attributes
could be advantageously traded-off against disadvantages in
other key criteria.
The difficulties of assembling large enough sites to
build 25% coverage towers in face of the demand for improved
environmental attributes, had a number of effects:
- In 1930, there was a general feeling on the part of building
managers and leading architects that the 25% of the lot area
permitted for towers should be increased somewhat in exchange
for less bulk in the lower portions of buildings. Had
adjustments been made along the recommended lines, then more
locations and site configurations would have lent themselves
for tower redevelopment than under the 25% coverage provision.
More intensive development closer to hubs of redevelopment
could have occurred.
- Major tower developments took advantage of existing assemblages
and assemblages that could be brought under control at a
satisfactory cost. These were often on the extreme periphery
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of nodes of developmental activity, e.g. Rockefeller Center
or separated from these entirely, e.g. Empire State Building.
Adherence, in the face of revised demands for space, to the
stringent coverage rules, then, tended to encourage development
to spread, to locate at the periphery of developing areas, to
go where it otherwise would not have been likely to go. These
large developments were often poorly served by transit and
were at a considerable distance from transportation centers.
- By the early thirties, the air conditioning industry was able
17
to serve all types of buildings except the skyscraper.
Under conventional methods, conditioned air was distributed
from central station equipment through bulky ducts along walls
and ceilings.
- The need to improve environmental attributes of space built under
the zoning resolution led, in addition, to the articulation of
the free standing 25% coverage tower, to vigorous attempts to
perfect air conditioning technology for skyscrapers. The
rationale of the skyscraper was to provide large amounts of
floor space on small but expensive lots. The principle need
then was to eliminate bulky ducts which consumed valuable cube
footage.
Development of air conditioning technology progressed during
the thirties, but it was not until after 1945 that air-conditioning
was to become a major factor in New York City office building.
By 1935 ten of Rockefeller Center's buildings had been completed.
"*mugs -
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In 1936 the Time and Life Building was designed. In that all
cubage was cut away from the building's base, the building
reflected future trends in office tower construction. With
its base setback sufficiently on both the 49th Street and
Rockefeller Plaza lot lines, it rose 33 storeys without setback.
On March 21, 1936, the Regional Plan Association proposed
a zoning revision to limit bulk of buildings for New York City
19
business districts. In claiming that it was obvious that the
financial and midtown sections of Manhattan -- as well as the
downtown business district of Brooklyn -- "had developed a much
greater intensity of business buildings than is economically
and socially desirable," it noted that even though this was the
case, legally achievable densities were still far in excess of
the average obtained over a considerable number of adjoining blocks.
More stringent restrictions, therefore, RPA argued, could still
be effectively applied to prevent further unjustified concen-
tration of density.
The principle innovation was the concept of establishing
a limit to the amount of cubic footage of built space allowed
per square foot of lot area:
- Within existing skyscraper districts a limit of 120 cubic feet
for each square foot of lot area,
- for less important business centers, a limit of 85 cubic feet
for each sq. ft. of lot area.
-Nift- - I - , NO--
- 46 -
Tower coverage was to be reduced from 25% to 20%. A standard
first setback was to occur at 60 feet above the street level,
along both front and rear lot lines, at which level the wall
was to set back 25 feet. The set back at side lot lines was
10 feet. In central business districts, buildings could cover
90% of corner lots and 80% of interior lots, in less important
business centers, 85% on corner lots and 70% of interior lots.
No action was taken on the proposals. With cessation of
office building, changing the bulk envelope regulations ceased
to be a priority issue.
Within the confines of the 1916 geometric framework
various responses to its negative impacts were tested. These
responses often tended to create, in and of themselves, new
problems. For instance, when developers sought to provide
structures with superior environmental attributes on large
sites in 25% coverage towers, they found that the only suitably
sized sites were at secondary locations. The generating of
an accompanying separate subset of locational problems contri-
buted to the accelerated exploration of alternate avenues of
relief. These were air conditioning and fluorescent lighting.
Air conditioning and fluorescent lighting were to reduce
the dimensions of the problem of light and air. Oonsequently,
as will be seen in the next chapter, the necessity to develop
away from the hub of development was reduced.
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Chapter 3
The 1944 Pre-Building Boom Attempt to Upgrade the
Quality of the Future Spatial Environment
This chapter reviews the varied reactions to a proposal
to modify the 1916 Zoning Resolution and explains the reasons
for its rejection by real estate interests. It analyses the
shift of the factors impinging on office building construction
in the post-war period.
Zoning amendments that would require all new buildings
throughout the city except manufacturing and industrial structures
to comply with more stringent height and area restrictions than
those in force were proposed by the City Planning Commission
1
on June 14, 1944. The purpose of the proposed changes, which
were sponsored by City Planning Commissioner Robert Moses, was
"to increase the open space, light and air about buildings here-
after erected by raising zoning standards as applied to the
height and bulk of structures." The Commission declared that
restrictions in the original zoning resolution of 1916, which
was intended to prevent excessive building density, had proved
insufficient. Overcrowding of land in the last twenty-five
years "has far exceeded anything imagined when the zoning
regulations were originally drawn." The Commission found that
this phase of zoning had lagged far behind the restrictions of
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the Multiple Dwellings Law in many areas of the city.
"There is enough land in New York City -- even in Manhattan --
to enable all buildings to have adequate light and air," the
Commission declared. "Nor has it been demonstrated that non-
residential buildings of great height and bulk are more
profitable than those which have sufficient space around them."
They commented:
Much of the overcrowding of land in New York took place
after the last World War (WWI) and helped accelerate
blight in many sections. This, in turn, caused great
shifts in population with corresponding losses in realty
values.
It is hoped that the present war will be followed by
substantial rebuilding of old areas and it seems to the
Commission that every effort should be made at this time
to facilitate such redevelopment along sound lines and
without encouraging congestion and blight.
The amendments proposed by the Commission with respect to
open areas on building sites would raise standards by requiring
new structures to meet the requirements of the class above
that in which they would be listed under then existing rules.
The same progressive stiffening of restrictions was proposed with
2
respect to building heights.
In zones where buildings were then allowed to rise to the
exact width of the street, without setbacks, it was proposed to
reduce the maximum heights to seven-eighths of the width of
the street. In those sections, which included most residential
districts, where buildings could rise to one-and-one-half times
the width of the street before they must be set back, the
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maximum height before set back would be cut to one-and-one-fourth
3
times the width of the street.
In an editorial, "For More Light and Space," published on
the day that CPC hearings were scheduled, the New York Times
4
urged support of the proposals.
In a letter to the CPC Edward M. Basset (father of zoning)
urged that the Commission put the proposals into effect at
once. "There was too much congestion when zoning started," he
wrote, and "there is too much now. New congested construction
can be continued after the war if the zoning resolution is not
amended. Now is the time to make another step ahead. The future
welfare of the city demands it."
While the Citizens Union urged immediate action, the
representatives of savings banks and builders associations,
Citizens Budget Commission and the Commerce and Industry
Association wanted time to study the impact of the proposed
5
restrictions upon land and building values. One builder
suggested that it was unfair to put new restrictions on height
and density of buildings into effect on short notice and
inflicting hardship on persons who had paid for plans for new
buildings to be constructed under existing restrictions.
During the hearing, Mr. Moses was tireless in pointing
out that light and air requirements in public housing were at
least four times as great as those inherent in the proposed
6
changes in the zoning resolution. He also called attention
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to the fact that the light and air requirements of the Multiple
Dwellings Law were greater than those the Commission was
suggesting for new structures.
On the second day of hearings, Wednesday, July 12, an
August 1 deadline was fixed by which all objections, memoranda
and suggestions not heard at the two hearings be submitted to
7
the Commission. In doing so, the Commission disregarded the
requests of spokesmen for many civic organizations, real estate
groups and banking interests for additional time to study the
proposals and their effects upon property values and development.
Among those seeking more time were Clark G. Dailey, chairman
of the Planning Committee of the Real Estate Board of New York,
Harold M. Lewis, consulting engineer for Borough President
Edgar J. Nathan Jr. of Manhattan, and Sidney Strauss, president
of the New York Society of Architects.
Commissioner Moses in defending the proposed restrictions
on height and bulk repeatedly indicated his belief that "the
general welfare of the public and not the individual welfare
of real estate owners and banking groups should be the prime
consideration in making zoning changes."
The Greenwich Savings Bank cited a hardship that it would
8
endure if the new rules became effective. It had recently
acquired by foreclosure several parcels of real estate on
Third Avenue, extending from 44th to 45th Street. The banks
foreclosure was based upon a $960,000 mortgage, representing
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a loan for that amount, made in 1929 upon property then
assessed for a bit more than $1,000,000. After asking the
bank's representative if he thought the welfare of the people
of the city should be affected by "a bum loan your bank made,"
he exclaimed, "I don't think the Planning Commission should be
a rescue expedition for your bank." Several individuals
requested that a period of grace be allowed before the new
restrictions became effective. The Commission showed little
interest in the appeal.
The period of grace would have allowed architects and
builders to make use of plans already "on the boards," for
sites already acquired with the intent of carrying out improve-
ments under the then existing regulations. The sudden impact
of the amendments, they maintained, would force many changes
in post-war building programs already being drawn up, retarding
building activity. Building values would be reduced and new
construction would be put at a disadvantage with existing
building.
Harry M. Prince, architect and former deputy commissioner
of the Department of Housing and Buildings, in calling attention
to the fact that by the proposed amendment buildings erected in
the future in New York would be more restrictively regulated in
relation to their heights, bulk and the amount of a lot that may
be covered by the structure, said: "It has been stated that the
resulting effect would be a reduction of 20% to 42% in potential
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income in certain projected types of buildings in some of the
congested areas of Manhattan, and to a lesser degree, in other
9
sections of the city." H. I. Feldman, architect, criticized
the proposal as being likely to retard post-war planning,
pointing out that many builders already have made their plans
for post-war construction of apartment houses and other improve-
ments on the basis of present rules, and would have to chuck
or revise these plans at considerable cost.
Fairness and precedent require a reasonable grace period.
Prices paid for building lots are predicated on the
utility to which the plot may be put. Had builders
known of a contemplated change in the law, they undoubtedly
would have bought land on a different basis and made
architectural commitments accordingly...The proposed
amendment will not permit greater areas to be occupied
on the first floor level than on the second-floor
level. This requirement will diminish the value of
store rentals and prevent latitude of store design
for sufficient depth such as is customary in chain
stores or large restaurants." 10
The Real Estate Board of New York, in its objections to
11
the amendment, took up the same point.
In a B district no building used for residence and no
non-residential building located in a residence district,
local retail district, a restricted retail district or in
a retail district, as designated on the amended use district
map, shall occupy at the curb level more than 65% of the
area of the lot if an interior lot, or 80% if a corner
lot, exclusive in each case of lawful garages.
Such a requirement, the Board explains, would have prevented
erection of such structures as the Macy and Altman Department
Stores and the Radio City Music Hall. It argued that such a
restriction would be detrimental unless made to apply only to
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residence buildings and non-residential building in residence or
local retail districts.
The West of Central Park Association argued that the attempt
to reduce population densities and building sizes as proposed in
the amendment would, in effect, subsidize owners of improvements
built under the existing provisions at the expense of the owners
of land previously unimproved, in that in some districts the
permissible height of a new building would be reduced by as much
as 25%. The association suggested that instead some tax
incentive be granted to a builder taking "less than the law
12
allows" in the matter of building height and site coverage.
The Board of directors of the Home Title Guaranty Company,
13
in a resolution urging caution in the adoption of the new
zoning law, said it was so drastic that it may defeat the very
purposes that are urged in its support. Their action, the directors
set forth, was prompted by their company's interest in the
maintenance of the value of the New York real estate, in the
substantial rebuilding of the city, which should occur within
the next brief period, and in the maintenance and improvement
of the real estate tax base of the city.
The resolution states that the Board:
urgently requests that this vital zoning change be not
hurriedly adopted, especially during the Summer months,
and that the final consideration of the proposed new
law be deferred for a period of time ample to give both
the members of the City Planning Commission, and
interested organizations and citizens of the city a
full opportunity to study the law and its effect upon the
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real estate and finances of the City of New York.
The Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York stated
in an interim report that in B area districts in which lies
the central and greater part of Manhattan, the proposed law,
while not affecting existing buildings, would restrict any new
building in an interior lot to 65% of the ground area at the
curb level. "The Committee believes that it is unfair to penalize
the owner of such a lot from building a retail structure under
14
such limitations.
On August 5, 1944, the Fifth Avenue Association joined the
15
ranks of the opponents. A representative of the Building
Trades Employers Association told the Commission that his organi-
zation was "concerned" about the possibility that the proposed
restrictions would discourage new private building after the
war, thus interfering with reemployment of thousands of men
in the building trades. Thomas Jefferson Miley, secretary of
the Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc., wrote
to Mayor La Guardia, calling for an abandonment of the proposed
zoning amendments, because they would cause a reduction upto
1/3 or more of the space on a plot of ground any building may
16
occupy.
With Moses pressing for swift action, adoption of the amend-
ment seemed imminent. As a result, in order to assure the
owners of maximum height and land usage under the law as it then
stood, a large number of applications for building permits were
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filed. They included plans for four new skyscrapers in
Manhattan to cost more than $20,000,000, filed by Eggers and
Higgins, architects, for different corporations representing
the City Bank Farmers Trust Company:
- A 42 storey office building, with 1,084,000 sq. ft. of floor
space, for a site on the east side of Sixth Avenue from
43rd to 44th Street. Acquired by the City Bank Farmers
Trust Company at foreclosure 1932, it was being operated as
a parking lot.
- A 35 storey office building, with 492,296 sq. ft. of floor
space, at 646-50 Madison Avenue between 59th and 60th Street.
- a 42 storey tower at Sixth Avenue and 39th Street.
- A 37 storey tower on the West Side of Broadway from 38th to
39th Street.
- A department store at Park Avenue and 53rd Street.
- 2 apartment buildings at E 35th and E 36th Street.
Arthur 0. Holden, President of the New York Chapter of the
AIA, recommended that interim regulations be applied which would
protect the public interest until a careful investigation, wide
discussion and the working out of more up-to-date principles
18
could make possible a really scientific revision.
It would be wise to set drastic restrictions now upon
individual building and later to grant liberal modifi-
cations where group plans are worked out.
The designers of too many of our skyscrapers and tall
apartment buildings in the past have acted as though
they wore horse blinders, which had shut out the rest
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of the block while the design was being worked out.
Our primary need today is good block planning and
better arrangement of groups of buildings. It will
take time to develop the alternatives which should
be the reward for good planning and good design.
Meanwhile, there ought to be open-minded and under-
standing discussion.
In endorsing the proposed amendment, Holden described it
as a tmakeshift" which would raise questions, stimulate thinking
and enlist the assistance of the public for the more detailed
revisions to the whole structure of zoning, which are long
overdue.
In a letter to the New York Herald Tribune, Holden said:
It is now an open question whether it is best to go
ahead with the interim proposals suggested by the Planning
Commission or for the Commission to take the technicians
of the city into its confidence, and by concentrated
work during the next two months produce a comprehensive
rewriting of the whole zoning ordinance.
19
To this, Moses immediately replied:
The drastic changes proposed by Mr. Holden and his friends
contemplate establishing an entirely new bulk classification,
with twenty or more subdivisions, in place of the present
height and area restrictions. Any such scheme would take
not two months to work out, as Mr. Holden so artfully
suggests, but somewhere between ten and twenty years, and
at the end of this period, I prophesy that the plan would
either not be adopted at all or would be so shot to pieces
by modifications that it wouldn't be worth adopting...
Minor changes which have been made have taken not months
but years to get through.
On August 30, 1944 the Planning Commission, responding to
pressure brought to bear in the main by midtown real estate
interests, agreed to stage a second round of hearings.
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At the hearing on September 13, 1944, Commissioner Irving
V. A. Huie outlined the elements of an alternate plan. The plan
was not an official item of the agenda. Under it different FAR
ratios were to be superimposed on existing height and area
20
restrictions. Existing envelope restrictions were to be
relaxed, so that the maximum bulk could be distributed on the
site in almost any way the developer saw fit.
- A FAR of 20 was set for business buildings in the Wall Street
and City Hall Districts in Lower Manhattan;
- A FAR of 18 was proposed for business buildings in the Grand
Central and Times Square Centers;
- A FAR of 15 was set for most other business sections.
While Huie's proposals were considerably less restrictive
in business districts than those proposed by the CPC majority,
residential controls would have been tightened. It was in the
residential districts, where little development had occurred
and land values were comparatively low, that owners could more
readily absorb the reductions in permissive bulk without un-
balancing the economy of building construction. Such inequalities
proved the need for one type of treatment for business areas,
and an entirely different formula for residential areas, Huie held.
For residential building around Central Park, along Riverside
Drive and other park neighborhoods, an FAR of 6 was to be applied
along the west side waterfront below 72nd Street, FAR 7, and in
Upper Manhattan, a FAR of 5.
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In September 1944, Robert W. Dowling, president of the
City Investing Company, joined with Lindsay Bradford, president
of the Title Guaranty Company, Robert Catharine, president of
the Dollar Savings Bank, John Adikes, executive vice president
of the Jamaica Savings Bank, Arthur A. Johnson, president of
the Arthur A. Johnson Corporation, in signing an invitation to
civic and trade organizations to form a Citizens Zoning Committee
21
to organize opposition to the city zoning plan. Among the co-
signers was Stephen F. Voorhees of the architectural firm of
Voorhees, Walker, Foley and Smith.
On September 28, 1944, a meeting was held in the offices of
Manhattan Borough President Nathan. Among those present were
representatives of the New York Real Estate Board and the Bronx
Real Estate Board. On the agenda was how to win support for
22
Huie's proposal.
The invitation of key real estate leaders to organize
opposition to the impending zoning amendments met with a strong
response and on September 29, 18 civic and trade organizations
formed the Citizens Zoning Committee. A survey of the member
organizations indicated considerable support for the Huie plan
as a subsitute for the Moses plan. Three days later, on October
2, 1944, a 10 man OZO Steering Committee was constituted and
Robert W. Dowling elected president. Bank and Insurance Company
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presidents were in the majority. Construction industry
23
interests were also strongly represented.
Frank Voorhees of Voorhees, Walker, Foley and Smith, the
architects, was also a member. Groups IV and V of the Savings
Banks of New York had retained his firm to undertake a survey
on the possible effects of the zoning plan, particularly as
it would effect midtown Manhattan. The architects came to the
conclusion that the changes would have an adverse impact.
In their first public statements, CZC said the amendments
24
before the Planning Commission were:
so sweeping in their nature they constitute in effect
a new zoning law - the first since the adoption of the
present Zoning Resolution in 1916. The amendments may
be ill advised and need more study.
The Citizens Zoning Committee convened a 5 man panel of
architects to study the zoning and to provide material that would
furnish the basis for definite scientific conclusions. Ralph
Walker represented V. W. F. and S.
When the Planning Commission met again on October 4, CZO
tried to speak on Commissioner Huie's alternate proposal. But
as the amendments were not part of the agenda, Chairman Salmon
ruled against the taking up of the matter.
In the week ending October 8, 1944, realty trading approached
a new peak of activity. This was in large part due to the
anticipated zoning changes. In anticipation of the City Planning
Commission's taking affirmative action in the question of
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reducing allowed bulk, a spate of building plans were filed in
the last weeks of October.
On November 1, 1944, the Commission met to formally approve
the plan. The way for action to be taken by the Board of
25
Estimate was clear. Commissioner Huie, although acknowledging
the need for immediate remedial action to bring the zoning
resolution into conformity with modern standards, opposed the
measure. Huie had requested that an analysis of the effects
of the proposed amendment be undertaken. When the Commission
refrained from making such an analysis, Huie undertook his
own. He listed the proposal's weaknesses in his dissenting
26
report:
- They were too drastic in the highly assessed business districts,
i.e. midtown Manhattan and lower Manhattan, in that the
amendment proposed to reduce the permitted heights and set
backs by changing each existing height district to the next more
restrictive one and similarly, each area district to the next
more restrictive one, it would seem, he explained, as though
it were one additional restrictive step all around. That,
however, was not the case, since the combination of height
restriction and area change, plus increased setback requirements,
plus the increased yard requirements, resulted in additional
restrictions not readily envisioned. As a result, and parti-
cularly in the B Area District, e.g. most of midtown, the
combined restrictive effect was unreasonably drastic. The
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permitted floor space in A and B Districts would be reduced
by as much as 45% and, in some cases, even more.
- On the other hand, however, Huie pointed out, the amendments
made no changes in the existing provisions relating to tower
construction under which 25% coverage limitation allowed
penetration of the sky-exposure or recession plane and unlimited
height.
- Moreover, the proposals nullified any possible accomplishment
in the direction of restricting ground floor coverage, he
said, by permitting as much as 100% ground floor coverage
where off-street parking or unloading facilities were provided.
Conceding that the provision of parking and unloading facilities
should be encouraged, he expressed the opinion that both
objectives could be accomplished without interfering with
each other.
Huie made note of the "most favorable public reaction"
from men of integrity and ability and responsible organizations
that his proposal had received, who had found it clearer and
better than that of the CPO majority.
Ten days later, on November 10, the OZC, whose ranks
by now comprised 51 civic trade and labor organizations, adopted
a program favoring "immedia'te, more effective zoning," and
added restrictions on residential and business buildings, but
opposing the zoning revision approved by the CPC and about to
come up before the Board of Estimate. The member organizations
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agreed on a platform objecting to the CPO's amendments on the
grounds that they "penalize the small retail businessman, would
interfere with post-war building and employment in the city
and tend to perpetuate blighted and obsolete parts of retail
districts."
The group made known that it was particularly opposed to
the principle of area restriction in retail districts, "however
great or small the limitation on area use might be," and said
it would work for preservation of existing rights for use
of full ground areas and street frontages for retail buildings.
OZO reasserted its basic support of Commissioner Irving V. A.
Hule's alternative proposals, expressing the view that they would:
produce maximum public benefit without destroying
values, constitute a more positive and simpler
method of zoning and would not discourage post-war
building activity.27
On November 13, 1944, a major rally was staged at the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, at which the Board of Estimate was
urged to approve the zoning changes. It was sponsored by the
Women's City Club of New York, the Citizens Housing Council
of New York, the Citizens Union, the Women's Trade Union League,
United Neighborhood Houses of New York and the Brooklyn Committee
for Better Housing. Four Commissioners of the City Planning
Commission spoke in support of the amendments, Edwin Salmon,
28
Chairman, Cleveland Rodgers, John C. Riedel, and Robert Moses.
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Of Commissioner Huie's alternate plan, Robert Moses said
it was highly controversial and exceedingly intricate. He
conceded, however, that the plan was worth further study.
Many of the building plans that were filed "to beat the
gun" were filed by savings banks and other banks. Moses denounced
this practice of savings banks in filing "fake plans" and
joining "unscrupulous real estate speculators," in efforts
to prevent the city from curbing the excessive height and bulk
of buildings.
The rush to file building plans to beat the gun was in
order to create a market for sour investments.
Most of those who filed, Moses said, had no money in hand or in
sight and never expected to build. Of $76,000,000 of proposed
buildings, almost #10,000,000 had been filed by savings banks,
Moses reported.
There is no provision in the law for them to build and
we have taken the matter up with the State Superintendent
of Banking. If we don't get an answer from them, we'll
get it from the Governor.29
In a letter to the Deputy Superintendent of Banks Moses
recalled his investigation of the Banking Department in 1929,
when he found:
...that the Department had ceased to protect the public
and to carry out the spirit and intent of the banking
laws. I am sure you will agree that this should not
happen again. 30
Many of the building plans were filed by representatives of the
State Insurance Department, which held a lot of property taken
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from the title companies then in liquidation. Under the name
of the State Commissioner of Insurance, plans for $17,000,000
were filed in connection with liquidation of property under his
jurisdiction. Criticizing such lack of cooperation, Moses
appealed to the State Insurance Department and the plans were
withdrawn.
On the same day as the rally, further opposition to the
zoning resolution amendment was voiced in a letter sent to
members of the Board of Estimate by the Midtown Real Estate
Association:
The roughshod attempt by the City Planning Commission
to railroad this ill-conceived and ill-advised amendment
through over the united opposition of property owners
affected is particularly reprehensible...
The Commission's deliberate intent to prevent the small
property owner from changing or improving the use of his
land or force him out of business, strikes at the very
root of the principle of ownership of private property.
We are confident that the members of the Board of Estimate
still believe and adhere to that principle.
Five days later, on November 14, 1944, most of the 50
speakers at the Board of Estimate hearing voiced their opposition.
The attack was led by spokesmen for the CZC. Commissioner Moses
and Chairman E. S. Salmon indicated their belief that most of
the opposition, although ostensibly directed against details of
the proposed changes, was designed to block any change. The
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Board of Estimate deferred taking action until November 30.
On November 21, the OZO notified the members of the Board
of Estimate that Commissioner Huie had accepted certain changes
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in his proposal made by CZC. They reaffirmed their support of
the alternate proposal.
On November 23, Mayor La Guardia issued a statement in which
he and the Planning Commission agreed that if the Board of
Estimate passed the Moses plan, the Planning Commission would
present an amendment that would afford relief to the owners of
small business properties. Under the proposed amendment coverage
on interior lots less than 5,000 sq. ft. would be increased from
65% to 75%. corner lots were to continue to be subject to the
80% restriction and larger interior blocks to the 65% restriction.
32
This was to benefit small lots of 50 feet frontage or less.
Shortly before the Board of Estimate was to take affirmative
action, it became known that the Midtown Real Estate Association
was collecting signatures in favor of the amended Huie proposal
and against the Moses plan. The Association's president,
Thomas H. Doyle, pointed out that under the City Charter, if
owners of 20% of the area affected or the owners of 20% of
the land adjacent to the area affected object, then such
resolition shall not be effective unless approved by the Board of
Estimate by unanimous vote of the entire board. The protests
were aimed in particular at the B zone retail area requirement,
which would permit only a 65% coverage of the site by stores
unless inside loading and parking facilities were provided,
because this would unduly penalize the owners of small lots and
33
stores of 50 feet frontage or less. Owners of almost
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9,000,000 sq. ft. of property in the midtown retail districts
encompassing Fifth Avenue, Sixth Avenue, Broadway and Eighth
Avenue signed.
Nevertheless, although four borough presidents -- of
Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn and Richmond -- moved to defeat the
amendments, they were overriden by the Board of Estimatels
appointed city-wide officers and Queens Borough President, by
10 to 6. Real estate interests were particularly bitter at the
voting. The president of the Real Estate Board of New York
pointed out that a few of the Mayor's appointees had the power
to pass laws although the majority of the elected officials in
34
the Board of Estimate were opposed.
In consequence of the new zoning laws, the Department of
Housing and Buildings began the revocation of building permits
it had granted prior to December 1, 1944, in cases in which the
proposed structure failed to meet the more restrictive requirement
of the new law and on which no substantial work had been under-
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taken.
Robert Dowling wrote the Planning Commission that the doubt
and confusion caused by the zoning changes had resulted in a
complete stoppage of plans for post-war building in retail areas.
Dowling and the OZO had not given up yet, though. It engaged
Paul Windel, former corporation counsel, to fight the changes
in the courts. A case against the city was brought by the
431 Fifth Avenue Corporation. Paul Windels argued that the
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City Charter required unanimous approval by the Board of
Estimate in such legislation, if protests were filed by owners
36
of at least 20% of the area affected.
On April 27, 1945, Justice Bernard L. Shientag ruled in
favor of the city. The Plaintiffs then appealed the decision.
The Appellate Division reversed the lower court by a three-to-two
decision.
In spite of the amendment cutting back allowed bulks and
coverage, no protection was afforded to residential areas, such
as Greenwich Village, from encroachment by tall buildings.
Early in 1945, a 30 storey apartment building was planned at the
foot of Fifth Avenue facing onto Washington Square. These areas
were not affected by the suit brought by the Citizens Zoning
Committee.
There was widescale neighborhood opposition to the plan.
Local citizens were supported in their stand by Robert Moses
who said:
We mean to revoke the double bonus which accrues at
present to people who put Chinese walls around New York's
little open spaces.
Moses drew up a zoning amendment which would limit the height
of buildings surrounding New York's park space to street width.
For the Washington Square area, this would mean no building more
37
than 7 or 8 storeys.
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The would-be developer's response:
I'm pretty sure Mr. Moses can't do this to me because
I saw him coming and rolled up my sleeves. I've got
the Real Estate Board in one pocket and a bankroll in
the other.
One of the first postwar skyscrapers to go up in midtown
Manhattan under the new zoning laws was the 33 storey Esso building,
designed to house and consolidate the metropolitan offices of
38
Standard Oil. Fronting on Rockefeller Center and located between
51st Street and West 52nd Street, the new building could occupy
only 65% of the land area above the second floor. Under the new
law, however, fuller land use was permitted to buildings providing
off-street parking and loading facilities. Total land coverage
on the ground floor made necessary an off-street basement parking
area. Either alternative would have ruled out such a project as
the Empire State Building, population 15,000 persons, which provides
not a single parking space. The projected structure was to be
the tallest New York office building to be completely air-conditioned
-- not merely air-cooled. Provisions were made for year round
cleaning of the air and for humidification or dehumidification
according to season, plus standard cooling and heating.
On July 23, 1946, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division's decision, declaring that the Board of Estimate of New
York City had improperly approved the zoning amendment restricting
the height and area of new buildings in retail business sections.
39
The 20% rule did apply and the vote had not been unanimous.
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Moses declared:
It is impossible for me to understand how the courts have
reached such a conclusion. The effect, of course, is to
nullify our attempt to reduce congestion in the central
business section of the city in the face of the terrific
demands for relief by the same interests that have opposed
the zoning... Apparently we were too far ahead of the
procession.
Dowling hailed the decision as of far reaching importance
to realty and investment interests through opening the way for
post-war building developments unhampered by unwise restrictions.
A CZC spokesman, in reiterating that setback and similar provisions
were sufficient to provide the necessary open space, light and
air, and to prevent overcrowding and congestion, said it wanted
to retain the right to build on the whole surface of the land.
The Commissioners of the Department of Housing and Building
said the court's decision would undoubtedly affect real estate
values.
When the zoning amendment was declared invalid by the
State Court of Appeals in 1946, many office building plans
were revised back to the more lenient pre-amendment conditions.
However, in the case of the 33 storey Esso Building at Rockefeller
Center, plans were left unchanged. Architects Carson and Lundin
41
said:
Our design is in harmony with the policy pursued when
the previous Center buildings were planned to avoid
congestion and provide maximum light and air...
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But' many other builders sought to amend their permit
applications. Architects Kahn and Jacob, in anticipation of
the zoning decision, had designed the 21 storey Tishman Building
for conversion to 100 per cent coverage by inserting additional
steel tiers. This revision achieved 175,000 feet of additional
rental space above the first floor and a substantial increase to
basement storage capacity through the elimination of the
required off-street garage. Tishman, the owner, estimated
42
that the difference came to about $375,000 in annual rents.
In another case, the 19 storey $4,000,000 Crowell-Collier Building,
the architect said:
If we could have developed plans without regard to Moses
coverage restriction, it would have been possible to get
the same square footage of space and at the same time
reduce the building by four storeys. 43
With the invention of the Conduit Weathermaster System
by Willis Carrier in 1939, the efficient air conditioning of
skyscrapers, new and old, was made possible. On August 12 1939,
he filed his patent application and in 1944, four separate
patents on the system were issued on July 11, August 15, and
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November 28, 1944.
Another parallel technological development reinforced the
mechanical possibilities for office-block air-conditioning,
namely fluorescent lighting. Of great significance was fluorescent
lighting's diminished heat output by comparison with incandescent
lighting. This was to make PSALI (Permanent Supplementary
- 71 -
Artificial Lighting of Interiors) a viable proposition.
Without such diminished heat output, illumination at the core
of very deep floor-plans would have led to loads too great on
any kind of an air conditioning system for such deep spaces
to be viable.
Of essence was the mutually reinforcing effect of the
convergence, at one point in time, of these two technologies;
i.e. without the diminished heat output of fluorescent lighting,
air conditioning technology would not have been able to cope
with deep space. The convergence of these two technologies
happened at a point in time at which:
- there was a non-existent vacancy rate;
- there had been no new construction for years;
- there was a significant pent-up demand for space.
To a considerable extent, real estate anticipated and
took into account the developmental possibilities of such a
convergence of the two separate branches of technology, when
making their dispositions for resumption of construction in the
post-war period. The parameters, then, had changed drastically
since construction of the Rockefeller Center and Empire State
Building of the 1930s. There was no longer a compelling perceived
need on the part of developers:
- to cut away bulk at the base of a building to improve light
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and air;
- to assemble large sites so as to be able to build 25% coverage
towers, set well back from the lot line;
- given sealed air-conditioned buildings to set back from the
street with the bulk of the rentable space of a building, in
order to lower the noise level, emanating from the streets, to
the tenants.
There no longer was a need to trade-off location against
superior environmental attributes. The convergence of air-
conditioning and fluorescent lighting made it possible:
- to lower ceiling heights
a) as lighting of deep space was not dependent on large
windows and the concomitant high ceilings,
b) forced air circulation reduced the needed cubic footage
of air-space per building occupant;
- to consider floor plan configurations that did not allow for
cross or diagonal ventilation.
In consequence, developers saw attractive possibilities to
lucratively build on all manner of sites. They did not need to
build the massive skyscraper with its very large increment of
space, brought in at one time, with its ever present threat of
depressing the market. (It was the massive skyscraper, as will
be recalled, that had been a prerequisite for providing superior
environmental attributes.) Consequently, the developer could
tread cautiously, i.e. test the market and bring in moderately
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dimensioned increments of space. The developer could respond
to fluctuations in the vacancy rate. Not only could the developer
build on small and moderately dimensioned sites, but he could
also, by virtue:
- of the reduced ceiling heights,
- space conserving air conditioning ducts,
- and greater coverage now possible through PSALI greatly
increase achievable densities on such sites.
From the point of view then of the Central Commercial
District's real estate interests, there was unanimous opposition
to the sweeping amendment to the bulk regulations introduced in
1944, i.e. at the very same time that the patents for the
Conduit Weathermaster System were being issued. The reasons
were the following:
- By lowering allowed cornice heights and applying a steeper
sky exposure plane, the bulk envelope of non-tower portions
of buildings would be substantially reduced. It was just
this portion of buildings that builder-owners were turning
their attention to, as it allowed them to concentrate the
mass of rentable space closer to the ground - given air
conditioning and lighting - than were they to build towers.
- While in the 1930s cutting away the base of towers was
indeed an incentive, there was, for the aforementioned reasons,
in the mid 1940s no apparent compelling necessity to do so.
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I.e. it was more economical to concentrate space close to
the ground in the kind of envelope existing, than to put the
space that would have been lost by reducing the cornice
height and applying the steeper sky exposure plane back into
a 25% coverage tower (which, as will be recalled, was neither
under the 1916 code nor under the 1944 amendment, subject
to any density limitation).
- Diseconomies of traditional tiered construction were not
yet to be felt, as large numbers of skilled workers were
released from the war effort,
- and the steel industry sought new markets.
The Universal Pictures Building completed in 1947 reflected the
45
new trends possible. It is a tiered building and although it
occupies a whole block front on Park Avenue, it does not avail
itself of a 25% coverage tower. The structure was supposedly
New York's first fully air-conditioned office block. By the
beginning of the 1950s, nine great Carrier air conditioned
46
office buildings had been erected in New York.
In 1951, 100 Park Avenue, an office building just one block
south of Grand Central Station, was completed. Occupying the
entire Park Avenue frontage between 40th and 41st Street, it
reached back along both streets -- 150 feet on 41st Street,
280 feet on 40th Street. The site was L shaped. The Office
building with an FAR 20 displaced the Murray Hill Hotel. The
prime design objective was to maximize cubage within the bulk
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envelope. The adopted solution was a 36 storey structure with
47
setbacks at the 9th, llth, 14thl5th, 17th and 21st floors.
Above the 21st floor, there rose a 25% coverage tower.
The building took full advantage of the new possibilities to
maximize bulk under the 1916 zoning resolution. Advantage was
also taken of the possibility to drape curtain walls over irregu-
larly shaped building envelopes made possible by a 1937 amendment
to the New York Building Code affecting business buildings
over 40 feet in height. Until then, such buildings were required
to have masonry spandrels. Under the change, spandrels of any
form of construction were allowed provided the materials used
had a required fire resistive rating of two hours. With the
advent of air conditioning, the continuous window module and the
curtain wall that could provide much more light than if window
piers were used in conjunction with permanent supplementary
artificial lighting of interiors, floor heights could be cut back.
Prior to air conditioning, it was considered imperative that
floor heights vary between 1l'0" and 12'6". With its advent,
heights ranged between 10'8" and 11'6" for buildings constructed
of structural steel, dependent on the nature of the space, its
typical dimensions and types of occupancy. While 8'6" was found
to be adequate for any office up to 20 feet x 24 feet, in large
open clerical spaces this height would appear oppressively low.
Thus on large lots Emery Roth & Sons provided maximum floor to
48
floor heights and in narrow smaller lots 10'8" floor to floor.
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Where large interior spaces were to be provided, they worked
with a 9'0" clear height which, with normal column spacing,
could be easily maintained with 11'4" to 11'6" floor to floor
height. The minimum clear floor to finished ceiling dimension
was 8'6". With the elimination of the environmental deficiencies
of deep space, the rental value of deep office space had risen
to around $5 per sq. ft. An additional contributing factor was
the desire of many large corporations to house their clerical
staff on large floors.
One Hundred Park Avenue, then, is an example of how air
conditioning and modern lighting upset the equation between
better urban design and improved profits that had been carefully
worked out in the open plan layout of Rockefeller Center.
The trend was, however, to be of limited duration. Again,
there was to be a reversal of the trend back to the high-rise
office building, rising perpendicularly from a low rise podium
or alternately from a plaza. New York City's investing builder's
requirements were changing. A sustained building boom was reckoned
with. No longer was the high coverage, high density, squat
building on small sites so desirable. More and more, there was
a demand for prime peripheral space, i.e. space with outlook, as
increasingly corporate headquarters sought to locate in New York
City. As in the thirties, allowable mass at the base of the
building was again cut away to allow for a sleek and slender
tower. Given the 25% coverage limitation, which only allowed for
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a relatively modestly dimensioned tower plan configuration, no
deep space necessitating permanent supplementary artificial
lighting of interiors was required.
In 1952, a new skyscraper was completed at the 48th Street
corner of Fifth Avenue at 600 Fifth Avenue, next to Rockefeller
Center. With 6,612 sq. ft. gross, 5400 net, it had the smallest
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tower floor erected anywhere in the U.S. since 1930. The
tower was atop a building bulk which almost completely filled
the allowed building envelope upto the 7th floor. Another 30%
of cubage could have been built around the base of the tower,
had there not been a special arrangement with Rockefeller Center.
Under the agreement the new building acquired 60 front feet
on 49th Street, thus gaining underground access to the Rockefeller
Center concourse and sub-basement servicing. In consideration,
the owners agreed not to block out any windows in the nearest
Center unit and to position its 25% tower close to 5th Avenue.
As a result, on the Avenue side the building's set backs had
to stop at the 7th floor, instead of staggering on to the 18th,
possible if the tower had been located further back.
Also in 1952, Lever House was completed. Its construction
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had been announced in 1950. Lever House's floor space was to
be only 6 times the land area of its plot, compared with 12
times the site at Rockefeller Center, 25 times the site at
Empire State and 20 times the site in almost all of New York's
other post-war office buildings. It differed from the prototypical
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post-war envelope-filling building in a number of significant
ways:
- At street level, Lever House created an open, partially covered
patio, thus passing up an estimated $200,000 a year that stores
would have paid for the Park Avenue retail frontage at $10 to
$12 a foot.
- Cubage was cut back to allow a slender tower to rise from above
the second floor. All the tower floors had 8,700 sq. ft. gross,
with 6,000 ft. of usuable office space.
- Most of the office space was to be within 25 feet of a window.
The advantages to the Lever Bros. were that they would have
21 floors to themselves; they would get only the finest daylighted
offices instead of bulk space up to 90 feet from a window; and
they would derive prestige and advertising value from the
distinguished building.
This brief review of representative buildings in the
immediate post-war period shows how, after the war, a completely
new office building type emerges, one quite different from its
predecessors of the prior cycle of office building activity, the
free-standing tower. The squat high-coverage high density office
building that, by virtue of the combination of air conditioning
and fluorescent lighting, did not need to avail itself of the
25% coverage tower to provide environmentally adequate space, as
the previous generation of office buildings had needed to do,
had a number of important consequences. It reduced the premium
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on the need to assemble particularly large sites, which were
needed if 25% coverage towers were to be built, i.e. small,
medium sized, as well as irregularly shaped sites could be
availed of. In consequence, it became more easily possible to
provide space with satisfactory environmental attributes, where
it was locationally more desirable, rather than at far out
locations, as had been the case in the thirties with the McGraw
Hill Building to the west of Eighth Avenue or the Empire State
Building at 34th Street. As a result more developmental opportuni-
ties became available. More entrepreneurs could participate
in the production of space. Sites that would have been
bypassed because of limited size or awkward configuration,
even though locationally desirable, became, with the new
technology, suitable for redevelopment. The premium on
assemblage was reduced. It became possible to bring in increments
of space that could be more readily absorbed by the market than
was the case with the extremely large increments of space brought
in at one time by such structures as Empire State or the RCA
Building, buildings that had much unrented space for many years.
These large amounts of space weighed heavily, particularly so
at the inferior locations of these buildings. It had become
possible to test the market. Developers could tread warily with
respect to the timing and size of increments of rentable space
to be brought in, they no longer needed to commit themselves to
very large increments of space as they needed to do when they
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were building 25% coverage towers.
In that in the generation of office buildings immediately
preceding the 1944 amendments cubage was cut away from the
base of 25% coverage towers, the same was done, except in a
more pronounced manner, as was proposed in the 1944 amendments,
in which the 25% coverage requirement for towers of unlimited
height was left standing.
The opposition to the amendments, then, is an expression of
the real estate community's reassessment of entrepreneurial
opportunities, given the large demand for new space after a
prolonged period of no building and the ability to overcome
environmental disadvantages through technological innovations
that had become available in the interim period since cessation
of construction in the thirties.
Only the more serious environmental disadvantages had been
overcome, however. The problem of lighting and air conditioning
space had been solved and in the initial period of redevelopment,
with the demand for new space great, space was readily and
profitably marketable if the two key attributes of the environment
wereavailable, namely adequate lighting and air conditioning.
As the most urgent needs for space were met, tenants became
more discerning. The market for space became more competitive.
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Tenants began to attach renewed significance to peripheral
space. This was due not so much to the need of adequate lighting
and not at all to the need of ventilation, but rather to the
increasing demand for exterior executive office space with
outlook. Whereas the Universal Building in 1947 concentrated
all of its FAR 20 in a squat tiered structure with no 25%
coverage tower, 100 Park Avenue, while maximizing deep office
space on large floors, increased its percentage of peripheral
space by surmounting the lower portion of the structure with a
25% tower. The building at 5th Avenue and 48th Street had to
cut much of the bulk around the base of an excessively spindly
tower, so as not to block light to the nearest Rockefeller Center
unit. And Lever House, completed in 1952, in placing a premium
on prime peripheral executive space, eliminated deep space
altogether. To get both types of space, large standard floor
plans were needed.
For renting reasons, it became increasingly desirable to
provide such prime peripheral space, set well back from the
avenue or street lot line. This improved the view from the
offices. Moreover, a plaza would tend to enhance a corporation's
prestige. Renting patterns and the economics of construction
began increasingly to militate against tiered construction.
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Given the 25% coverage provision, these objectives could
only be achieved on the very largest of sites. Continued
indiscriminate high-density high-coverage development of small
and moderately sized sites was directly contradictory to the
objectives of rehabilitating the quality of the environment.
Moreover, it was felt that the threat of such "inferior"
development -- poaching on values created by "superior"
development -- to the limited extent that it could occur,
and possibly undermining rental levels, needed to be averted.
This chapter has examined the reasons why legislation
to upgrade the quality of the spatial environment was not
enacted and has attributed failure to enact such legislation
primarily to the exigencies of space production and marketing
management as these were perceived by the investing building
community at the point in time in question.
- 83 -
Chapter 4
The Harrison, Ballard and Allen Plan
for Rezoning the City of New York
And Office Building in the 1950's
This chapter reviews the efforts of the key real estate interests
to get a new zoning resolution adopted that would be more in line with
the exigencies of managing the production and marketing of office
space than the 1916 Code. It identifies the key actors in the process
and explains why the proposal was not adopted.
On October 24, 1947, Robert F. Wagner, Jr., was appointed
by Mayor William O'Dwyer to the post of Chairman of the City
Planning Commission. It was agreed between the two that a
major revision of the Zoning Resolution was necessary. On January 19,
1948, Wagner, in declaring that the City's Zoning Resolution was obso-
lete in many respects, announced that the CPC had initiated steps to
bring it up-to-date. Due to the fact that any substantial change in
the city's zoning restrictions would affect property value directly,
he said the Commission would not act until it had heard all inter-
ested parties and had held public hearings on proposed changes.
Advances in architectural design and in engineering and
building techniques, together with developments within the
city in recent years, have made the Zoning Resolution obso-
lete in many respects.
... When the Zoning Resolution was originally draw, its
scope was limited to structures built within a single
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block area. Today many developments are under construction or
in the planning stage, involving developments covering many
blocks. Since the present zoning was not designed for these
large scale developments, it imposes severe limitations upon
the most promising aspect of urban growth.1
Wagner estimated that the survey would take 18 months to two years, i.e.
be ready by 1950. One month later, on February 18, 1948, Wagner
announced:
"We intend to establish a voluntary advisory committee
representative of all segments of the industry, to serve
to bring closer to the community the work of the commis-
sion."2
The planned major revisions of the zoning ordinance would help private
real estate and building investment, Chairman Wagner said. He was
speaking before an audience of 500 at a conference in the Hotel Roose-
velt sponsored by 58 organizations, including the Regional Plan Asso-
ciation, the Citizens Housing and Planning Council and the Citizens
Union. Among the speakers were the Vice President of the New York
Life Insurance Company, Otto L. Nelson, and Robert W. Dowling,
President of the City Investing Company. Dowling, who had played a
key role in the development of the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company's big housing developments, Parkchester, Stuyvesant Town,
Peter Cooper Village and Riverton, called attention to the fact that
in Parkchester and its successors, buildings had increased from
averages of nine and a half stories to fifteen stories with a corres-
ponding growth in the amount of ground space left open for play
areas and breathing spaces. In calling for twenty-six story residen-
tial buildings for the future, he argued that planned large scale
communities permitted more efficient use of valuable city land and
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made it possible for people to spend twenty-five percent less for rent.3
Robert Moses, in calling Mayor O'Dwyer's attention to the diffi-
culties sure to be encountered in any drastic changes in the controls
of private property, especially if new and complicated methods were
employed, opposed a request from the Planning Commission for funds to
retain the architectural firm of Harrison, Ballard and Allen to under-
take a comprehensive survey of the zoning regulations.4 On April 8,
1948, the Board of Estimate deferred action on the request but finally,
on May 13, 1948, after intensive canvassing on the part of Wagner,
Moses' objections were overriden and the expenditure of $160,000
authorized: "To obtain the research work, mapping and drafting work
and recommendations for new appropriate zoning districts."
On September 21, 1948, the director of the Broadway Association
told an advisory board that had been appointed by Manhattan's
Borough President, to solicit proposals from Manhattan's business
interests, that there was immediate need for rezoning the midtown
area from Herald Square to Columbus Circle.
In 1949, Wagner successfully ran for the office of Manhattan
Borough President. Late in December, following his reelection as
Mayor, O'Dwyer appointed his campaign manager Jerry Finkelstein to
the vacant post of Chairman of the CPC. In May 1950, Finkelstein
turned his attention to the zoning study. At the first annual con-
ference of the Association of State Planning and Development Agencies,
Finkelstein quoted a letter from Mayor O'Dwyer, in which "a most
careful study" of the possible effects that proposed rezoning would
have on tax assessment was urged.5 At the mayor's request,
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Finkelstein announced that he had appointed:
- Robert W. Dowling, president of the City Investing Company
- Henry Bruere, President of the Bowery Savings Bank and
- William C. Boyland, president of the City Tax Commission, to
a special committee, to fully explore the tax angle before going ahead
with a program of revising the zoning resolution.
On June 9, 1950, the special committee met for the third time in
the offices of the CPC to discuss the specific anticipated impacts of
Harrison, Ballard and Allen's proposals, on large commercial buildings. 6
The proposals had not yet been made public.
In August, the Dowling committee, in reporting on its findings on
possible effects of the rezoning as proposed by Harrison, Ballard and
Allen, on land values and assessments, said with respect to some of the
proposals restricting the bulk of buildings in the central commercial
areas that they "very likely will affect adversely the value of land
where more intensive use was intended than the new regulations would
permit."7 The committee, however, expressed the belief that this
situation and other possible technical flaws in the to be proposed
zoning code could be corrected as the result of extensive public
hearings that the city planned to hold on the suggested revisions.
Finkelstein said that formal and informal hearings on the Harrison,
Ballard and Allen plan could begin in December.
On August 12, 1950, the New York Times, in noting that for
several months the Dowling committee had been seeking to determine
what effect, if any, zoning revision would have on property assess-
ments, pointed out that:
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"The Committee believes that a few rough spots will be ironed
out before any zone change becomes final."
The Times urged no further delay in disclosing the contents of the
Harrison, Ballard and Allen plan to the public.8
Subsequent to the filing of the Special Committee's report to
the CPC, Dowling wrote Finkelstein that the Citizens Zoning Committee
would be reactivated to study the proposals and make suggestions for
possible modifications to aid the "ultimate adoption of suitable
rezoning of the city." He listed more than a score of bankers.
builders, architects and business executives to serve as members of
a steering committee.9
On August 23, a week after he had announced that he was resigning
to become ambassador to Mexico, Mayor O'Dwyer, in outlining in summary
form to a group of civic leaders the results of the two year zoning
study, stressed that H.B. & A.'s reports were not the last word, that
they would get a thorough hearing and that the people of the city should
be the final judges as to just what rezoning they wanted.10 O'Dwyer
indicated that the full report would be made public about October 1 in
time for the December hearing. He also paid tribute to Robert F.
Wagner, Jr. who was chairman of the Planning Commission when the
studies were started. Lawrence M. Orton, Planning Commissioner, who
served as the agency's liaison office to H. B. & A. during the study,
in turn praised O'Dwyer for making the work possible and for seeing it
through "in the face of determined opposition."
During the election campaign, acting mayor Impelliteri refused
to have publication and distribution of H. B. & A.'s report authorized.
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Finally, on October 26, 1950 and too late to allow for distribution
before the election, the Board of Estimate appropriated a sum of
close to $10,000 for the printing and publication of 2,000 copies
of the "Plan for Rezoning the City of New York." Each copy contained
a statement that neither the Board of Estimate, nor the City Planning
Commission, were in any way committed to its recommendations, and
that the report's printing was authorized simply for the purpose of
enabling the public to have a chance to view and study the recommenda-
tions made on rezoning. A further five months were to elapse before the
consultant's report was finally released on April 29, 1951. The
tentative date set for December hearings came and went.
With the release of the report, the nature of the objections
of major Manhattan real estate interests became evident. In no small
measure, limitations proposed for highest density commercial development
provoked opposition of sufficient strength to block affirmative
action on the plan.
Key issues around which debate between the representatives of
real estate interests and Harrison, Ballard and Allen had centered
were where maximum densities should be permitted and what the maximum
density level should be. Representatives of real estate interests,
in noting that since 1945 a number of new large commercial buildings
had been constructed in midtown Manhattan that had floor area ratios
in the vicinity of FAR 20 - e.g. the Tishman Building (FAR 18,0)
505 Park Avenue at 59th Street (FAR 19.0) and 100 Park Avenue
(FAR 20,0), urged that permitted maximum densities be in excess of
FAR 15, the maximum proposed by the consultants. Nevertheless, the
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corsultants, in referring to numerous discussions that they had on the
subject, claimed that the consensus seemed to be that the highest
density commercial district should have a maximum floor area ratio
of 15.11 FAR 15 was to be confined largely to areas where there was
a predominance of buildings with very high bulk but which were not
solidly built up at the "very highest bulks found therein," and
where property values were high. FAR 15 was recommended in order to
hold down the bulk and further congestion to what may still be an
economic level for the builder and owner.
In midtown Manhattan FAR 15 was mapped
- 100 feet deep on both sides of narrow Madison Avenue between 34th
and 56th Streets, on Fifth Avenue between 23rd and 47th Street
along 34th Street between Madison Avenue and Seventh Avenue (Penn-
sylvania Station); from 40th to 43rd Street between a point east of
Park Avenue to west of Sixth Avenue.
- In asserting that: "The extension of the highly concentrated area
with very high bulk is not likely to occur over a wide area, nor
is it desirable to extend this type of congestion over a broader
area than it affects today," the consultants proposed a commercial
district with a floor area of FAR 10 to be mapped north of the
very highest concentration of commercial bulk in midtown Manhattan on
- 5th Avenue between 48th and 58th Streets, and along
- 57th Street, from approximately east of Sixth Avenue to east of
Park Avenue.12
In both these districts a rear yard of only ten feet was required.
In calling attention to the many hotels, apartment buildings
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mixed with some office buildings surrounding the highest bulk commer-
cial center, the consultants proposed an FAR 10, and a 30 feet rear
yard requirement, in order to protect the residential use, while
at the same time not discouraging office uses. This mapping classifi-
cation was proposed north of Grand Central Station on Park Avenue
'13from 46th Street to 56th Street.
Under 1916 zoning, access of light and air into streets and
interior courts was poor. In recognizing that "light may come along
the side or sides of a thin tall building instead of over the top of
a wide building," H. B. & A. proposed to modify the regulations so
that
"a building could in effect drop one shoulder and raise the
other, or have a tower in the middle, with open space on
two sides. Or, as an alternative, one portion could be
set back to compensate for another portion located bloser
to the street."Y4
To achieve these objectives it was proposed that the regulations
merely state the appropriate angle of light obstruction for each
district and that a developer be permitted to average the angle along
the frontage. In order to safeguard against abuses of the averaging
principle it was proposed that
- in each district the regulations specify a minimum angle to be
allowed in averaging in recognition of the fact that the
"building behind on the next street will be obstructing
light below that angle in any event;"
- a minimum width is set over which a lower angle may be credited in
averaging, in order to prevent narrow slots between buildings;
- limits to be set on the width of frontage over which angles may be
averaged and on the width of the building projecting above the
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average permitted angle in order to prevent massing of bulk on very
wide lots.
The device was more conducive for application over long frontages
where large contiguous holdings were available, than it was over the
shorter 200 feet wide avenue frontages. The report included two photo-
graphs of models demonstrating how proposed averaging of angles of
light obstruction would contribute to improved light access to the
street. Both of these, however, are of coordinated development of
entire blocks of very high coverages. Only on large sites with consid-
erable lineal frontages could full advantage be taken of the averaging
principle, with wide openings reaching down low. Even where a large
"slot" was provided, there was no guarantee that a subsequent develop-
ment opposite might not seek to monopolize the "air park" blocking off
or reducing light and air to the rest of the area.
Light and air, however, were but one aspect of the total problem.
The regulations provided no incentive for increasing open space at
ground level, a major objective of subsequent rezoning endeavors.
Although the authors of the proposal claimed that a wide variety of
buildings would be encouraged, the report's illustrations indicate
a new stereotype in which slabs and towers would sit on top of a deep
street wall defining podium covering all but a 10 foot wide rear yard.
The height of the podium would have been defined by the minimum angle
allowed in averaging the angle of light obstruction.
As a result, a major percentage of a building's space would have
been on high coverage lower floors with much deep space. The regulations
would not have discouraged high density high coverage buildings on small
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sites or on interior block sites abutting 60 foot wide streets. Indeed,
higher densities could be achieved under the proposed regulations on
interior block sites than under the 1916 rules.
The bulk regulations did little for those builders alluded to in
the Dowling report, who believed in a continued tendency towards higher
tower buildings with less ground coverage, because better rents might
be obtained for space with full access to light and air, such as the
subsequent Seagram Building or the Chase Manhattan Building in Lower
Manhattan were to demonstrate. Investment builders were then not only
displeased by the bulk limitations that were to be imposed but also by
the type of structure that would have resulted from the regulations. In
disagreement, as it was, with a maximum FAR set at 15, their displeasure
and opposition were intensified in that a limit of FAR 10 was set in
those areas for which plans were being formulated for the bulk of
investment building to occur in the ensuing years. A case in point was
Park Avenue. Here an FAR of 10 was proposed which, given the width
of Park Avenue and the fact that it was in a two times height district,
would have meant a very significant reduction in potentially achiev-
able densities. Had it been implemented, the N.Y. Central Railroad's
redevelopment intentions would have been imperilled.
It seemed almost as if Robert Moses' prophesy, expressed in a
letter to an official of the New York Central Railroad in reply to a
protest against the 1944 amendments, was about to come true; namely
that if the proposal failed, there would come "a day when you will
face a confiscatory change proposed by crackpots and then you will have
something to worry about."1 5
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The ire of investment builders was further aroused in that FAR 15
was mapped (in the main) in areas where no major redevelopment pressures
were to be exerted, e.g. in the area south of Grand Central and along
34th Street. Whereas wide Park Avenue, the location of an upcoming
generation of prestige office buildings, was mapped at FAR 10, narrow
Madison Avenue, one short block to the west, was mapped at FAR 15.
Investment builders were moving into the area west of Rockefeller
Center on Sixth Avenue and also east towards Third Avenue where
assemblage was easier because of low costs attributable to compara-
tively lower profitability of residential uses, to decline of other
prevailing uses, and prevailing low bulks. Consequently, the poten-
tially achievable bulk and intensity of use differential between the
replaced structure and the replacement structure would be much
greater than in H. B. & A.'s narrowly defined maximum bulk area, where
there already were numerous high density structures of an older
vintage, preempting choice sites.
While H. B. & A.'s plan proposals would have severely cut back
achievable densities in the Central Commercial Districts, except for
some side streets where densities would have actually been increased,
they proposed exactly the opposite strategy with respect to residen-
tial densities in much of Upper Central Manhattan.16 Large contiguous
areas including both avenues and narrow side streets were proposed
for FAR 10 mapping. They included areas bounded by major open spaces,
such as Central Park, Riverside Park, the Hudson and the East River.
- From Central Park (Fifth Avenue) three blocks eastward to
Lexington Avenue between 59th and 97th Streets, with fingers
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stretching north along Central Park to 110th Street and east
along the wide crosstown streets.
- From Riverside Drive, two blocks eastward to Broadway between 116th
and W 72nd Street
- Along the East River from west of First Avenue between 43rd and
59th Streets
- Central Park South
- Murray Hill, south of Grand Central
According to H. B. & A., FAR 10 corresponded with typical floor area
ratios where the district was mapped. FAR 10 mapping was limited
entirely to areas of high income, high land values and high bulk.
Although FAR's of 10 or more were indeed typical for many avenue
locations, for the many 60 foot wide side streets included in the
FAR 10 mapping, an FAR of 3.5 was a more typical value. Under the
proposal, achievable bulks for interior residential lots 100 feet in
depth on streets 60 feet in width exceeded by a considerable margin
those attainable under the 1916 resolution, where an FAR of 7.8 was
the maximum achievable density. With an FAR of 10, then, a density
differential of 10 - 3.5 = 6.5 was achievable, which was a substantial
incentive for redevelopment on side streets.
On March 25, 1952, almost a year after the release of the plan,
the first series of five hearings began.
While endorsing the basic concepts, a RPA research group said
some provisions of the new plan
"would enable the building up of Manhattan in an overall
pattern of the general density of recent building con-
struction (45-50) which "would overwhelm the street system
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already crowded to the point of congestion, as well as
place too great a burden on such municipal services as
sewer, water and schools."1 7
C. McKim Norton, president of RPA, pointed out that increased
congestion from overbuilding might cause a transportation impasse and
said that RPA was proposing a new zoning policy for the dense group
of commercial districts that would spread commercial development over
a much wider area of the city.
A speaker at the first hearing rejected the plan outright because
it would "perpetuate the overcrowding of people in certain sections of
the city." The plan
'appears to be intended to protect the private interests
of speculative landlords and not to meet the needs of
the city and its millions of people."
The speaker was referring to those areas in upper central Manhattan that
had been contiguously mapped at highest densities at FAR 10.18
Representatives of the 23rd Street Association said on the other
hand, that the provisions on height and floor area of buildings
would hamper construction of six-story apartment buildings on typical
100 ft. by 100 ft. lots. Requirements of 30 feet deep rear yards,
and other methods of providing light and air accesses, would mean
that this type of building would have to be erected on larger lots.
Richard Roth, Sr. the architect, said if adopted, the zoning
resolution "will once more become the prototype for future zoning
of other cities throughout the United States."
Jenry J. Davenport, Chairman of the Real Estate Board of New
York, told the Planning Commission that the Metropolitan Association
of Real Estate Boards would have an analysis ready by June 1, 1952.
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Additional time for study was asked by representatives of the Citizens
Zoning Committee, the Commerce and Industry Association, the Avenue
of the Americas Association and the Brooklyn Real Estate Board.19 In
order to discuss the Metropolitan Association of Real Estate Board's
special report, the real estate boards requested that a sixth hearing
be held in the fall.
When the hearings were resumed on November 7, 1952, opposition
to the plan had further strengthened.20 Representatives of twenty-
five organizations spoke during the hearing. Those representing real
estate or allied interests rallied around the Metropolitan Associa-
tion's plea that the existing zoning law be "retained but revised to
include a number of desirable features contained in the H. B. & A.
report." The Metropolitan Association's point of view was presented
by Henry J. Davenport, chairman of its planning committee. He
maintained that the H. B. & A. plan was "basically and sadly dis-
appointing." Commissioner Orton rejected the plea for retaining the
existing zoning law. "You could no more do that than you could put
a jet engine and hydraulic drive into a Model T. Ford." Orton said
that the city's 36 year old ordinance had been amended many times.
Many major cities were making comprehensive studies leading to re-
writing of their own zoning patterns. Davenport responded that the
city's law had been the subject of innumerable interpretations and
decisions by the Board of Standards and Appeals and the courts.
Adoption of a complete new ordinance, he argued, "involves the probable
upsetting of this whole body of law" and of settled housing regula-
tions. Davenport proposed that the city use a system of two zoning
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maps, one designating use and the other bulk. H. B. & A. had recom-
mended a single map to replace the existing system of three maps,
one each for use, height and bulk.
Ira S. Robbins of the Citizens Housing and Planning Council,
urged approval of the H. B. & A. rezoning rather than the piecemeal
approach sought by real estate interests. He assailed the modifica-
tions sought in the Critical Analysis and by Davenport as "compromises"
saying that some were impractical, some undesirable and some uncon-
stitutional. At the end of the November 7 hearing, the City Planning
Commission reserved decision.
Although Robert Dowling, subsequent to his involvement on the
tax committee over two years earlier had written CPC Chairman Finkel-
stein that the Citizens Zoning Committee would be reactivated to aid
the "ultimate adoption of suitable rezoning of the City," it was
not until December of 1952 that CZC made its formal reappearance, in
time for the final round of hearings to begin in January 1953.21
Henry J. Davenport, president of the Home Title Guaranty
Company, was elected president, while Robert W. Dowling, president
of the City Investing Company, under whose sponsorship the group
had been operating informally before, was named treasurer. Dowling,
it will be recalled, had been president of the initial organization
when it was created in 1944.
"We are developing a strong, well-informed and permanent
organization to lead in the effort for good zoning in
the cityr of New York,"
Davenport said.
On January 12, 1953, almost five years after the study had begun,
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the second stage of hearings began with a hearing on the Manhattan
maps.22 Col. John J. Bennett, who had succeeded Finkelstein as
chairman of the CPC, stressed that they would be preliminary and
informal. The public was to be asked to comment on maps showing
actual application of the proposed changes in each of the five
boroughs. Expressing general disapproval of the consultant's
proposals, Henry J. Davenport, representing both the Real Estate Board
of New York, Inc., and the recently reactivated Citizens Zoning
Committee, said that public hearings on the zoning district maps were
not a proper approach to the subject. Instead, he urged that the
Planning Commission initiate a new study by a group consisting of
representatives of the Commission, the Borough Presidents, the Com-
missioner of Housing and Building and the real estate boards and
civic organizations of the five boroughs.
The proposal was not heeded.
After conclusion of the borough-wide hearings in June, 1953, no
overall action was taken. Several years later, in June, 1960, Robert
Wagner was to say that the rezoning plan had been killed by the
"Strong fight against the plan made by many groups, including several
real estate organizations."
Major buildings continued to be built under the 1916 code.
Developers found considerable latitude within the existing rule
framework to respond to perceived market demands.
In 1956, the Socony Mobil Building was completed. It occupied the
entire block (83,000 sq. ft.) between Lexington Avenue, Third Avenue,
42nd Street and 41st Street just east of Grand Central Station.23 The
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building met a variety of space needs. There were two upward steps
cutting back from a 75,000 sq. ft. second floor, the largest floor
size in New York City, to an 18,000 sq. ft. tower. Intermediate floors
were not so large as the zoning envelope would have permitted. They
were cut back to provide better quality space. The availability of an
entire block at such a prime location was, however, exceptional.
Economic tower floor sizes could be easily provided under the twenty-
24
five percent coverage rules. In the case of the Seagram Building,
located on the eastern side of Park Avenue between 52nd and 53rd Street
and diagonally across from the Lever Building, completed in 1958, by
comparison even more cubage was cut away at the base of the building.
Occupying a 60,000 sq. ft. site for which Seagram paid $5,000,000, it
could have accommodated a building of about 1,000,000 sq. ft. Ini-
tially it had been planned to make full use of the allowed bulk
envelope, but then it was decided that a building half the allowed
size would better suit the company's purposes. With its relatively
small tower floor, sizes of about 12,000 sq. ft., from the llth to
the 38th floors, the Seagram Building remained well within the 25%
coverage limitation for towers. Even the 5th to 10th floors -
18,600 sq. ft. and the second to the fourth floors of 28,300 sq. ft. -
catered to the need to provide prime peripheral space. 50 percent
of the site was left open for a plaza. On three sides the building
rose uninterrupted by set backs to the height of 520 feet (38 stories).
The tower was set back 90 feet from Park Avenue. The interrupted
space of the lower floors of the Seagram Tower puzzled many brokers.
While suitable for small tenants it discouraged big leasers. Space in
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units as small as 500 to 700 sq. ft. was offered to prestige tenants.
Had the projected Astor Plaza to the north of the Seagram Site been
built, the intersection of Park Avenue and Fifty-Third Street would
have had a clustering of office tower plazas. This, however, would
have cancelled the intended effect of a spatially defined plaza. Later,
in the 60's, Richard Roth, the architect for 345 Park Avenue, provided
spatial closure to the south by letting a 6 story portion of 345 Park
Avenue reach to the Avenue's lot line. Apparently the architects had
wished to place the bulk of the building close to the Park Avenue lot
line.25 Such action would have had a number of beneficial effects in
addition to providing more effective spatial closure. Open space, a
plaza, would have been provided on narrow Lexington Avenue which is
starved for open space. Views of and outlook from both Seagram's and
345 Park Avenue would have benefited from such staggering. Unfortun-
ately, the client insisted on the Park Avenue Plaza, because it was
considered more prestige enhancing. Vincent Scully, in asserting that
Lever House had cut the first serious hole in Park Avenue as a street
and had created its own unusable plaza, called attention to Seagram's
"fine entrance plaza" and the positioning of the tower's slab parallel
to the avenue rather than at a right angle to it as in the case of
Lever Building.
The third post war addition to Rockefeller Center, the forty seven
story Time and Life Building to the west of Sixth Avenue between W 50th
and W 51st Street, emphasized the demand for large identical tower
floors.26 At 32,000 sq. ft. they were the largest tower floors to
have been built in Manhattan by 1959. Separated from the Rockefeller
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Center Superblock by Sixth Avenue, the twenty-five percent coverage
limitation for towers posed a problem that was met by adding to the tower
space (12,000 sq. ft.) equal to twenty five percent of the plot of the
adjacent Roxy Theater, which had been acquired by Rockefeller Center. In
that it rose from an avenue level plaza without setbacks (587 ft) and
that all cubage allowed by the bulk envelope at the base of the building
was cut away, the structure resembled its predecessor, the Time and Life
Building of 1936. Whereas Seagrams and Lever House had catered solely
to prime peripheral space, Time and Life met the need for large amounts
of prime peripheral space backed up by secondary space on the same
floor. The building was considered to be a beachhead, opening up
development west of Rockefeller Center proper for prestige buildings.
The client for the Union Carbide Building on the block bounded by
Madison Avenue and Park Avenue, 47th and 48th Street, the site of the
former Marguery Hotel, had requested 60 percent peripheral working
space.27 The building was primarily to serve as a national headquarters
and window space was needed for top executives. Three alternatives
were studied by Skidmore, Owings and Merril, the architects:
- A ziggurat massing which would have covered the entire plot in its
lower stories, with the upper stories stepped back in accordance with
the zoning resolution. It provided much second rate deep space. The
repeated setbacks, entailing much lineal footage of cornices and
flashing, were uneconomical to build. The many floor sizes were less
desirable.
- A tower located at Madison Avenue so as to avoid placing columns and
footers among the N. Y. Central tracks passing underneath at the
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Park Avenue end of the site. A lower appendage would have fronted on
Park Avenue.
- Ultimately, it was decided, however, to take advantage of the prime
Park Avenue location and place the tower portion on Park Avenue over
the tracks with the lower part of the building fronting on Madison
Avenue. The 52 tower floors at 17,500 sq. ft. each were slightly
smaller than the lower floors of the nearby Socony-Mobil Building but
almost 50 percent smaller than those of the Time and Life building
completed the year before.
With a twenty-five percent coverage tower, it was possible to
provide 64% peripheral space. The twelve story lower part of the build-
ing served to secure the tower's light and outlook towards Madison
Avenue. 200,000 sq. ft. of secondary space was contained primarily in
12 annex floors each with 37,000 sq. ft. The building contained 1.5 mil-
lion gross sq. ft. of space, 1.16 million net.
The building provided numerous amenities at ground level. Forty
four percent of the 80,000 sq. ft. site was turned over to pedestrians.
A plaza along the Park Avenue frontage was provided and wider sidewalks
along Forty Seventh and Forty Eighth Street. A covered pedestrian arcade
bisected the block between tower and annex. Sidewalks were arcaded.
One year later, in 1961, another major building was completed that took
advantage of the privilege to penetrate the sky exposure plane and also
cut away cubage at the base to provide superior rental space.
In 1955, Chase Manhattan had decided to consolidate its Lower
Manhattan operations. William Zeckendorf, in a series of complicated
transactions, rather like a game of musical chairs, assembled two blocks
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in the heart of the financial district.28 Chase desired big floors but
this conflicted with the zoning provision that towers of unlimited height
must not occupy more than 25 percent of the plot. In addition, Chase
desired column free space to ensure flexibility of floor layout, but the
typical zoning-induced step-back militated against wide spans.
Initially a building was contemplated that would have covered the
entire block from Cedar to Liberty Street between Nassau and William
Street. With usual zoning setbacks the envelope would have allowed for
about 1,250,000 sq. ft. of useable space.29 Skidmore, Owings and Merrill,
the architects, experimented with a variety of bulk configurations.
They found by creating a superblock through inclusion of the adjacent
block to the south, bounded by Pine and Cedar Street, Nassau and William
Street, a tower building containing 1.7 million sq. ft. could be built.
The architects found that an economical 60 story tower with five below
grade levels could be developed on the combined site if a 30% coverage
tower were allowed instead of the usual 25%. In return for the city's
agreement to close Cedar Street and allow 30% unlimited height coverage,
the Chase Manhattan Bank agreed:
- to provide a 98,000 sq. ft. plaza above the below grade levels;
- to cede to the city a 15 ft. strip on three sides of the superblock,
eight feet on the fourth, to eliminate a jog and line up with Chase's
old building;
- to renovate existing utilities;
- to pay the city $100,000;
- to provide an arcade along Pine Street with the old Chase Manhattan
Building that was to be kept, to allow the new setback sidewalk to
continue through.
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Total size of the building is 2,400,000 gross sq. ft. with
1,800,000 sq. ft. in the 60 story tower (30,000 sq. ft. per floor) and
one fourth of the space, 600,000 sq. ft. on the 5 floors below the
plaza. The plaza is a few steps up from the levels of Nassau and Pine
Streets, but as the site slopes to the southeast, the plaza is para-
peted and raised one story at the southeast corner. The main public
banking floor was the first level below the plaza and the slope of the
site was used to provide sidewalk level entrances from the downhill
side. Natural light to the main banking floor was secured through
sunken gardens in the center of the main plaza.
In the decade from 1950 to 1960, then, numerous freestanding
towers were erected that cut all or most of the cubage away from the
base of the tower. The prediction at the beginning of the decade
contained in the report of the Committee headed by Robert Dowling,
namely that:
"Some builders believe that the tendency towards higher
tower buildings with less ground coverage will continue
because better rents may be obtained from space with
full access to light and air",
had been fulfilled.30 These buildings had FARs far in excess of the
maximum density that the H. B. & A. plan would have allowed. More-
over, many of them were situated in areas where H. B. & A. had speci-
fied a FAR of 10.
The initial framers of the resolution had not envisaged that
utilization of the twenty-five percent coverage provision, allowing
unlimited height and thus unlimited density, would substantially con-
tribute to raising an area's density level. It will be recalled that
in the '20s, the great skyscraper debate was not triggered by the
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results of excessive usage of the 25% provision, but by the great
heights - and thus densities - that could be achieved when the very
steep recession planes of the two times and two and a half times
districts were applied in conjunction with the provision that allowed
street walls to rise to twice or two and a half times the width of the
street or avenue. I argue that even when the greater percentage of a
building's space began to be in twenty-five percent towers at the
beginning of the 30's, the impact of density attributable to the utili-
zation of the 25% coverage provision on the density levels of an area
was not so acute as it was to become later, between 1950 and 1960,
because of the non-availability of suitably large sites at the hubs
of congestion where high densities were a critical issue. Rather such
25% coverage provision towers tended to be located at the extreme
periphery of hubs of development, e.g. Rockefeller Center's RCA
building, or entirely separated from them as was the case with the
Empire State Building or the McGraw Hill Building, west of Eighth
Avenue. Although these buildings individually had admittedly high
densities, the density of the overall area in which they were located
remained far below those at the hubs of developmental activity,
because the towers were few and far between.
In the post-war period, for a number of years, it was not to
be the twenty-five percent coverage provision that was to significantly
contribute to raising density levels to critical levels but rather
the newly attained ability -- with air conditioning and fluorescent
lighting -- to utilize that portion of the 1916 rules bulk envelope,
that in the preceding period had begun to be discarded because of its
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inferior environmental attributes. As, however, a combination of
outlook view, a building's setting, as well as a prime location,
began to be increasingly valued, as national headquarters of national
and international corporations were drawn to the city, specifications
for a new type of prototypical building began to be developed and
implemented. Key segments of real estate saw as their task the
creation of buildings that took a range of factors into account:
- a prime location;
- large, uniform, flexible floors with a significant percentage of
peripheral space;
- the creation of a "whole new environment", through plazas and air
parks;
- provision of much ground level space so as to increase the distance
to other buildings and thoroughfares and thus also enhance the
desirability of lower floors of office structures that had hitherto
faced onto narrow rear courts or onto canyon-like streets;
- by securing outlook and increasing privacy through reducing mutual
visual intrusion by increased spacing between buildings;
- by reducing noise through setting back from the lot line, although
this had become less critical than in earlier times because of the
non-operable windows of the curtain-walled building;
- significant amounts of ground level space served also to provide a
prestige enhancing setting, a key attribute for a corporation
headquarters building;
- the economics of construction technology militated increasingly in
favor of the straight-up building without setbacks.
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Developers were able to secure these attributes under the geometric
rules of 1916. Fulfillment of these specifications would have been
impossible under the geometric rules proposed by Harrison, Ballard and
Allen. The opposition of the key controlling segments of real estate
as represented by Dowling and Davenport to the measures is attributable
to this fact.
Only very few of the major investment builders could hope to produce
the desired prototype office structure, because of the paucity of sites
that would allow for a 25% coverage tower of economical proportions. By
the end of the decade, these few limited opportunities had mostly been
availed of. A twenty-five percent tower on a small site would have been
too slender. The ratio of building surface to enclosed space would be
too great. The amount of space taken up by the core on each floor would
have been too great in proportion to the remainder of the space available
for rent; unless the core was itself small, in which case the building
would have had to have fewer stories, and thus a much lower density than
the prescribed, postulated FAR of 18 to 20. While the 25% coverage pro-
vision had enhanced the competitive position of major developers as
providers of prime space, they increasingly had a stake in a relaxation
of the 25% coverage provision to allow for towers on smaller sites.
With only a limited amount of opportunities to develop towers,
either freestanding or on base podiums, and with the previously described
technological advances, the "baby skyscraper" on a 100' x 100' plot with
its lower 11 to 12 stories adhering to the plot line to achieve maximum
permissible bulk became the developer's usual alternative. Such
structures could fill in the interstices in the pattern of built form
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that had been left in the previous cycle of building, in large part to
ensure a minimum amount of amenity in terms of light and air. Such
small and medium sized high density structures posed a threat in a
number of ways. In that they were not demanding in terms of lot configura-
tions, sizes or locations, their indiscriminate construction could impair
light, air, outlook of existing older structures. Moreover, they could
also hope to "cash in" on the improved environment resulting from the new
generation of large structures with their plazas covering up to 75 percent
of the plot and their "air parks;" i.e. they could directly benefit from
improved light, air, and outlook if they were located next to or close to
such a plaza or airpark. They could also benefit from the enhanced
prestige of the area attributable to the new major structure, as well as
from the utility of proximity to the tenants attracted to the new major
structure. They, in turn, would, however, typically not have contributed
to the enhancement of the environment. Such structures would, to some
extent, at times to a considerable extent, be able to undermine the
rental position of such major neighborhood enhancing structures. Inex-
pensively built space could be thrown onto the market. Thus, towards
the end of the 1950s, key realtors as represented by Dowling, had two
major emerging interests:
- They were concerned, in the face of an anticipated continued demand
for space, that measures be adopted that would allow tower type
structures of similar floor-plan dimensions as the Chase Manhattan,
the Pan-Am, and Union Carbide Buildings, but on smaller sites.
- They were concerned that measures be adopted that would reduce the
comparative profitability of redeveloping smaller sites because these
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undermined rental levels and also, to a certain degree, impaired the
accomplishments of the major structure.
Post-war buildings completed by Spring 1957 had contained an average
of 280,000 sq. ft. of rentable area. Those planned in early 1957 had an
average of 500,000 sq. ft. By early 1957, 40,000,000 sq. ft. had been
added or was about to be added to New York's office space since 1945.
This represented a 40 percent increase of the city's office space in
little more than a decade since 1945. It was more office space than the
total in any other U.S. city. It equaled all the new office buildings
in all the rest of the country put together and then half as much again.
The first part of this chapter has shown how the needs of the
investing building community were not met
by Harrison, Ballard and Allen and how, in consequence, the proposal
was resisted.
The second part of the chapter has shown how the investing building
community still continued to be able to meet the new contingencies in
the markets of space by exploiting the 25% tower coverage provisions of
the 1916 Code, and how as sufficiently large sites suitably located
began to be exhausted, renewed pressure was brought to bear to change
the 1916 Code.
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Chapter 5
The Enactment of the
Comprehensive Zoning Amendment in 1960
and the Emergence of Incentive Zoning
This chapter describes the nature of the process leading to the
enactment of the 1960 Code. It identifies issues at stake, the major
actors and the key decision points in the process.
In 1953, Wagner had successfully run for the mayoralty on the
Democratic ticket, as he did again in 1957 and in 1961. Wagner, in
his role as Chairman of the CPC, had initiated the ill-fated rezoning
attempt which, by 1953, had lost all momentum. Late in 1955, still
committed to rezoning, he appointed James Felt to lead the City Planning
Commission. Robert Dowling considered James Felt "a close and affection-
ate friend." As a specialist for assembling land for large private
developments, and in relocating evicted tenants, Felt had assembled the
land for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.'s Stuyvesant Town and Peter
Cooper Village, both developments in which Dowling had played a key
role. Felt had had his own real estate firm since 1928 and had been
active in the leadership of the Real Estate Board of New York.2
Shortly after taking up his post as chairman on January 1, 1956,
James Felt said that New York City had reached a point of development
where complete rezoning could not be put off much longer.3 He described
the existing laws as outmoded and altogether inadequate, and compared
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the zoning system to a patched up old automobile that keeps running, but
hardly performs the task required of it.
"Our zoning task now would be simpler if there had been an
overall rezoning of New York City ten or fifteen years ago;
if we fail to produce an up to date plan now, think how
difficult zoning will be fifteen years from now,"
he said in an appearance on television in July 1956.4
In expressing his determination to get a new zoning resolution --
"if it is the last thing that I shall do with the City Planning Commis-
sion, we will have a new zoning resolution" -- he hastened to assure his
listeners that no radical changes would be made and that the plan of New
York as it was, would not be scrapped.
On August 30, 1956, the Board of Estimate approved $150,000 to
contract the architectural firm of Voorhees, Walker, Smith and Smith,
the firm that had played a key role in the opposition to the 1944 amend-
ments, to produce a new rezoning proposal.
In a letter to Felt, Robert Moses denounced the projected rezoning
"as a revolutionary scheme".5 In alluding to his own experience and
that of H. B. & A., he wrote:
"There are plenty of worthy limitd objectives to pursue
without heading straight for the millenium. We have
wasted enough money on previous panaceas of this kind."
In stating that the aim of the proposed study appeared to be a reclassi-
fication of every one of the 700,000 or more pieces of property in the
city on entirely new and untried theories, he said:
"I'm for making the smaller less dramatic advances
scorned by the demon planners."
At the beginning of March, 1958, almost two years later, Felt told
a newspaper reporter that he would receive the report and draft of a new
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zoning law from VWSS by the following month, but that he expected it
would take "at least one year until the Board of Estimate adopted a new
zoning resolution." This time period would be needed for "intensive
review and study" by city officials, real estate interests, builders and
other groups.6 Felt stressed that whatever resolution emerged his com-
mission would be "realistic" in dealing with conditions in a city as
largely built up as New York.
In voicing the belief that the forthcoming report would fare better
than the zoning study made for the city in 1950 by Harrison, Ballard and
Allen, he said:
"We cannot, in ivory towered or starry eyed fashion, try to
remake the city without a deep and compelling awareness of
what we have."
He continued:
"I would rather have a zoning resolution become law that is
85 percent perfect than a 100 percent resolution that winds
up on a library shelf."
Nevertheless, he would resist "watering down" what might make the new
zoning proposals ineffective, "...we will keep at it until we get a new
zoning law, if it takes one year or five years."
Although there was close collaboration between CPC and VWS&S,
responsibility for the report lay ostensibly with the consultants. This
would enable the Planning Commission to disassociate itself from any
particular part of the consultants' recommendations meeting with oppo-
sition, without loss of face. It would also facilitate flexibility in
multi-interest bargaining.
It was not until February 16, 1959, however, that the first draft
of the new zoning resolution was made public by the CPC.6 Felt said he
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expected that the resolution, with possible changes from the present
draft, would become law before the end of 1959. But because it cannot be
retroactive, no one should expect it to work an overnight miracle, he
declared.
"It may be five or ten years before we can see, even with
a little squinting, a physic-1 change through new con-
struction."
The Commission said it expected the new zoning
- to limit density of office construction in the Grand Central area;
- to provide more variety in commercial structures with fewer of the
"wedding cake" type by allowing towers to be built up to forty percent
of a site against the twenty-five percent allowed under the 1916 rules.
Such towers need not have any setbacks, otherwise required, nor be
limited by the sky exposure plane provided they were placed no nearer
to a narrow street than one-third of the tower width which faced the
(50 feet) street and no nearer to a wide street than one-fourth of
the tower's width. This would be a greater incentive for builders to
build towers, as the reduction of space for stairwells, air-condition-
ing and elevator shafts would be proportionately less than in a 25%
tower.
Perry Coke Smith, senior partner of Voorhees, Walker, Smith and
Smith in charge of the study, noted that the new recommendations went
further than those of the 1950 report of H. B. & A. in that they
encouraged more plaza and mall space inside mapped building lines by
allowing three additional square feet of floor space for each square
foot of open space in excess of a required 30 feet rear yard. A plaza
of 10,000 sq. ft. would allow a developer to receive an additional
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30,000 sq. ft. of floor space on the rest of his plot. V. W. S. & S.
anticipated only a slight increase in maximum permitted bulk resulting
from this bonus which, in their opinion, would be well justified by
the benefits of increased open space. The device was to be also applied
to the highest density residential districts where it was to encourage
the setting back of buildings from the street line in order to bring
more light and air into streets surrounded by tall buildings.
Planning Commissioner Francis J. Bloustein stressed that the new
regulations would permit buildings rising from wide plazas, such as the
Seagram Building, without sacrifice of rental area.
In announcing the proposal, Felt admitted that:
"Some people won't like all the proposed new provisions, especially
those that will end the loading of a lot to the last possible
cubic foot of construction,"
but the intention was to present a resolution that would result in a
better city in which real estate values would be sounder and higher.
Under the proposal, new apartment construction would not repeat the
"monotony of block after block of unbroken masonry, like along much of
Park Avenue and the Bronx's Concourse."
In addition, developers were offered two bulk envelope alterna-
tives that more closely resembled the envelopes they were familiar
with.7
Options offered by the interchangeable regulations included utili-
zation of
- tower provisions and the bonus increments
- the standard setback and street wall regulations in conjunction with
the tower provisions;
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- alternate sky exposure plane and tower regulations.
The floor area ratio was a major device in the proposed rezoning.8
The major objection of real estate interests to previous rezoning
proposals had been the limitations placed on highest density commercial
development. The issue was to continue to remain critical in gaining
support for the VWS&S proposal.
In that large contiguous areas, containing narrow side streets and
wide avenues alike were mapped for FAR 10, the pattern for highest
density mapping resembled that proposed earlier by H. B. & A. A base FAR
of 10 was proposed for
- all of the Upper East Side from 61st Street to 96th Street between
Central Park (Fifth Avenue) to east of Lexington Avenue;
- the Murray Hill area, south of Grand Central between 35th and 39th
Streets, Madison and Third Avenue;
- the West Side from the Hudson to east of Broadway and between 72nd
and 96th Street.
Whereas the regulations proposed by Harrison, Ballard and Allen
had not catered to the needs of those builders who believed that the
tendency towards tower buildings with less ground coverage would con-
tinue, the rules proposed by VWS&S recognized the builders' need to be
able to erect towers on smaller sites than hitherto possible. There
were also significant differences in the amount of area and location
that VWS&S and H. B. & A. had mapped at FAR 15 for highest density
commercial development.
- Whereas H. B. & A.'s most easterly boundary had run between Lexington
Avenue and Park Avenue between 40th and 46th Streets, V. W. S. & S.
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extended FAR 15 approximately two blocks to the east, to include the
eastern avenue frontage of Third Avenue.
- Whereas H. B. & A. had proposed an FAR of 10 for Park Avenue,
V. W. S. & S. proposed FAR 15 as far north as 60th Street.
- Whereas H. B. & A. had proposed FAR 15 as far south as 23rd Street
on Fifth Avenue and a two to four block wide swath along 34th Street
from east of Madison Avenue to Pennsylvania Station west of Seventh
Avenue, V. W. S. & S. did not extend FAR 15 south of line drawn along
40th and 38th Street.
- Whereas north of 48th Street, H. B. &. A. had mapped FAR 15
Madison Avenue as far north as 57th Street and Fifth Avenue to 48th
Street, V. W. S. & S. mapped both Madison Avenue and Fifth Avenue
to 61st Street, to Central Park.
- Whereas H. B. & A. had thought that the "extension of the highly con-
centrated area with many high bulk buildings over a broader area than
it then affected, was undesirable and not likely to occur over a
wide area," V. W. S. & S. argued that the proposed level of building
bulk for the FAR 15 districts was
"designed to encourage more spreading out of intensive
office development over a wider area of the Central
Bsuiness District and thus relieve the pressure on9
already overburdened transportation facilities..."
On February 22, 1959, Felt was still thinking in terms of a
fall approval of the zoning measure with whatever modifications or
changes the City Planning saw fit to recommend. Taking part in a
discussion broadcast called "Let's find out," he said that Mayor Wagner
was very anxious to see that a new modern zoning resolution was put
into effect.1 0
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On March 5, 1959, at a luncheon given in his honor by business
and professional groups representing the city's real estate men,
architects and engineers, Harris H. Murdock, chairman of the Board
of Standards and Appeals, declared that any new zoning worked out for
the city must not increase the bulk of large buildings.1 1
"No more dark canyons are wanted," he said in noting that many
high buildings had been constructed within the present zoning envelope
"without blocking out the sun and the heavens. Let us do nothing to
further restrict air and sunlight." In calling attention to a
tendency toward too restrictive zoning, he said a zoning resolution
should be clear, concise and its provisions "should be stated in
simple terms. And a zoning law should not be complicated by setting
up too many types of districts," he said.
On March, 22, 1959, Felt, in announcing that the commission would
have its own official rezoning recommendations ready for formal
public hearings in the fall, said that he expected that informal
hearings to be held in April and May would aid the planning agency
in its evaluation of the V. W. S. & S. recommendation.12
Residential real estate interests were particularly perturbed
at the extent of the cutbacks of achievable densities. On April 6,
1959, speaking at a luncheon of the Real Estate Board, David Rose,
a leading developer of apartment buildings, cited the effects of the
proposal on the 31,600 sq. ft. plot at 850 Third Avenue between 50th
and 51st Streets.13 Under the 1916 rules, a building on that site
might contain 800,000 sq. ft. of gross floor area. Under the proposed
zoning law the permissible area would be reduced to 160,000 sq. ft. or
one fifth. Another instance mentioned was the corner of Madison
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Avenue and 79th Street. There a plot of 15,000 sq. ft. produced
200,000 sq. ft. of interior floor area. Under the proposal, this
would be cut to 154,000 sq. ft. but only by virtue of the fact that
the site was mapped for an FAR of 10, the highest residential density.
If the plot were in an R 8 zone with an FAR of 4.5, the same plot
would produce only 72,000 sq. ft. or less than one half of the poten-
tial under 1916 rules. Rose said time was needed to discuss the pros
and cons of every aspect of the proposed ordinance. He warned
against throwing out the baby with the bath water in scrapping the
existing code.
Another example of the cutbacks was an apartment house in the
east sixties, completed in late 1959, which had a floor area ratio
of 18. The building was twenty stories high and occupied an entire
block front. Under the proposed code, the bulk of a new building
could only have been one quarter of that of the apartment building.
The FAR proposed for that area was 4.5.
Some builders warned that enactment of the resolution would
bring with it a drop in land values because of the reduced produc-
tivity of the site. A decline in land values and a reduced produc-
tivity of buildings that could be erected under the new code would
ultimately bring down the total value of the city's ratables with
a consequential loss of tax revenues from real estate.
On April 12, the eve of the hearing, Manhattan Borough Presi-
dent Hulan Jack made it known that he was unequivocally opposed to
the rezoning of the city as proposed, because "it would be so destruc-
tive of land values that private investment in Manhattan real estate
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and the rebuilding of outworn areas under it would come to a dead
stop."13 Picturing the failure "of hundreds of contracting firms,
widespread unemployment and distress among industries that supply
and serve the construction business," he predicted that other members
of the Board of Estimate would join him in opposition once they
became aware of the genuinely catastrophic "loss in taxes that would
hit the city." Conceding that the 1916 ordinance needed to be revised,
Jack appointed a 10 man Special Advisory Committee on Zoning.
At the hearings held on April 13 and 14, opposition continued.1 4
The Executive Secretary of the Building Industry League, Inc. whose
members were builders, architects and building supply concerns,
representing average, small and middle class builders, denounced as
"revolutionary the part of the proposal setting new limits to the
bulk and density of buildings on specified ground areas." He said
it would reduce bulk from 50 to 75 percent in some instances and would
preclude "economically feasible building." This aspect of the proposal
would bring about economic chaos in the building and real estate
fields. The representative of the United Builders Association
raised a number of criticisms as to the possible effect of the
proposals on rents, on the small builder and property owner, and
on projects to alter existing structures. Several speakers asked
for more time to study the proposals.
A statement from the civic design committee of the New York
chapter of the American Institute of Architects suggested that floor
area and bulk controls would require reexamination and revision.
In acknowledging that some were bound to be hurt, David Tishman,
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chairman of the Tishman Realty and Construction Corporation, one
of the city's largest investment builders, confidently predicted that
"we'll come up with suggestions acceptable to the City
Planning Commission" ... "the test is what is good for
our city as a whole."
Erwin Wolfson, who was planning erection of a 55 story office
tower astride Grand Central Station, said:
"While we don't know what the final new zoning ordinance
will be, we are going ahead next year with construction
based on a design which we think will be in complete
conformity with the new ordinance."
The planned structure was a 25 percent coverage tower on a very large
site.
Felt responded to the numerous criticisms in a variety of ways:
- Speaking at the April 6 luncheon, he told the realty men that the
zoning might be subjected to many changes before it would be formally
presented to the Board of Estimate for approval.15 He emphasized
that at that stage, it was strictly a proposal and nothing more and
urged organizations as well as individuals to contribute as much as
possible to evaluation of the proposal, so that it might be amended
and molded before it reached the stage of public hearings.
- Although bulk would be restricted in many cases, the new code would
not make future construction infeasible, but instead of permitting
the builder to reap his yield quickly, it would spread the gain out
over a longer period because the rezoning could be expected to prolong
the economic life of the property. Because the long range productivity
of new buildings would not be impaired, land values would not be
impaired by the code. The city's tax income would not be affected
because a building would retain its higher value and consequently,
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its assessed valuation longer than it did then.
- With regard to specific instances as cited by David Rose, where bulk
would be reduced drastically, he pointed out that such disparities
were merely flaws in the mapping of a particular block or area, not
defects of the code in general. Such disputes could be easily
resolved without amending the code's concept.
Rose, in reply, said that mapping was the heart of the zoning ordinance.
The remapping idea reminded him of the story about an American on his
first visit to Switzerland. Asked his opinion of that country, the
American remarked: "Take away the Alps and what have you got." However,
while considering an 18 to 1 FAR, as in the case of a new apartment build-
ing on the East Sixties, much too great for a residential building, the
CPC held it not necessarily too great for an office building, provided
that the structure met specific requirements on the arrangement of its
space on its lot.
In approving the proposed plan in principle, Felt conceded that
there were many details in it that he, as a practical real estate man,
did not accept in the form in which they were then proposed. Therefore
he urged the Real Estate Board to marshall all critics of the code into
one committee so that the Planning Commission would have the best
opportunity to study the protests. He compared the old code to a Model T
Ford which, held together with baling wire, might still provide trans-
portation of a sort, but hardly could keep up with the demands made
upon a modern car.
- Felt predicted that a building boom, rather than a recession as Hulan
Jack had predicted, would follow the rezoning. He predicted the building
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spurt would be particularly heavy during a year of grace on new
construction which he had had incorporated in the proposal.
- Felt said he was disturbed
"because critics were deriding proposals without waiting
to see the final plan to be brought out by the Commission."
"I do not see how any one can visualize what the final
rezoning plan will be until we bring it out, with the
certain modifications... .We don't please everyone, of
course, but we are seeking something based not just on
short-term profits, but more or less long term gains
for the city."
In response to Hulan Jack's accusation he said that "he yielded to no
one" in his love for New York City and Manhattan, and would never
recommend any zone change or policy that would jeopardize the borough's
economic growth.
Robert Dowling, president of the City Investing Co., who had
organized the forces opposing the Moses sponsored amendment in 1944,
had made no bones about his disenchantment with H. B. & A.'s proposals
in 1950. Once again, he was to assume an active leadership role in
the zoning struggle, but this time he was to throw his weight solidly
behind Chairman Felt, whom he considered "a close and affectionate
friend." Dowling was more than willing to contribute his time and
influence to advocating the rezoning proposals of Felt.1 6
On May 6, 1959, the formation of a Citizen's Committee for Modern
Zoning was announced. In calling the 1916 law "antiquated," Dowling,
in his capacity as co-chairman, said it did not intend to let this
issue die as had happened so often in the past. In a statement issued
on behalf of the committee, he said that the group
"feels deeply that under the careful consideration and
direction of James Felt and the City Planning Commis-
sion, a workable, useful and efficient new city will
emerge."
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The intended purpose of the CMZ was to provide an informal means of
communication to the financial and business communities of the city
in order to be able to promote
"certain kinds of stands, certain arguments that the com-
mission could not take itself. With access to the "inner
circles" of lots of interests and groups, it was possible
to put certain views in the right ears without seeming to
push.... It was a way of getting certain influential types
involved...men whose voices would be listened to, if you
could convince them to speak and by putting a man's name
on a letterhead, you give him a psychological commitment
to what that letterhead represents.
simply, many realtors could be persuaded by David Rocke-
feller, Tishman, Dowling, so forth, in a way that they
could not be persuaded by the Planning Commission staff.
And the same was true of the big builders."1 7
On September 16, 1959, at a luncheon meeting of the Twenty-Third
Street Association representing an area spanning Manhattan from 17th to
28th Street between the two rivers, attention was called to the variety
of residential, commercial and manufacturing building, old and new,
within that district's borders. As a result, few areas of the city
would have a higher percentage of non-conformity to the zoning regula-
tions. 18
On November 30, 1959, the Metropolitan Board of Real Estate
Associations released the results of a seven month study of the V. W. S.
& S. proposal.19 Many points raised earlier were reiterated.
The zoning plan would
- diminish greatly the value of many small parcels of real estate,
- require much higher rents in new buildings,
- mean less income for the buildings because of the limitations in
their size,
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- mean less total real estate taxes but higher real estate tax rates
overall, including the taxes on small homes.
Mr. Barrera, chairman of the zoning committee that drew up the report,
in conceding that "undoubtedly something must be done to prevent areas
of the city from becoming congested to the point where strangulation
sets in," said this could be accomplished under the 1916 rules by
changing the height, area, and use allowances of the particular
districts giving concern.
"The drastic and wholesale changes sought by the proponents
of the proposal should be accomplished through urban
development and not through zoning," he continued.
He urged the city planners
"not to subscribe to the notion that they can foresee the
total requirements of this varied city over the next
fifteen years, not to speak of a permanent plan setting a
limit on the population."
On the next day, on December 1, 1959, Felt, by way of response to
MREBA's rejection of the zoning proposal, said many of the real estate
men were shortsighted in regard to the best interests of the city and
of their profession. In assuring his former colleagues in the realty
field of his warm regard, he described the critics as
"the professional heirs of those who bitterly opposed the
adoption of the 1916 zoning resolution... .They predicted
that grass would grow in the streets and that building
would come to a halt. The 1916 zoning ordinance, as
every one knows, was followed by the greatest building
boom in New York City and unheralded prosperity in the
real estate industry. I have no doubt that adoption of
the New Zoning resolution will benefit not only the
people of the city in general, but those involved in the
field of real estate as well. I am sure that after the
passage of the new zoning resolution, the real estate
industry will acknowledge its merits, just as they now
embrace the 1916 resolution which their fathers endeavored
to obstruct."2 0
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Felt, in expressing his confidence that a new zoning law would be
enacted, despite the opposition, said that the proposed resolution
would "reflect the commission's careful consideration of the constructive
criticism" of the real estate, civic, architectural and business organi-
zations.
"I feel certain that many of the points raised by the
Metropolitan Association of Real Estate Boards will
no longer be applicable."2 1
Within two weeks of the release of the MREBA's critical analysis,
a report prepared by the zoning subcommittee of the New York chapter of
the American Institute of Architects was released.22 The New York
Chapter, representing Manhattan, was one of the five borough chapters
that were members of the Architects Council of New York City. In
enthusiastically endorsing the proposed zoning resolution, the Council's
president, L. Bancel La Farge, in referring to "a lot of twaddle" that
was rampant, that a new zoning resolution replacing the existing obsoles-
cent code would be "a straight jacket for the city," said "Civilization
progresses by means of intelligent regulation of the individual when he
comes in conflict with the public good."
The interests of major mortgage lending institutions were
represented on the Manhattan chapter's subcommittee by its head,
G. Harmon Gurney, chief architect for housing for the New York Life
Insurance Company, and by Anthony J. Daidones, chief architect for the
division of mortgage banking and housing of the Controllers. The subse-
quent head of the Board of Standards and Appeals, M. Milton Glass, also
served on the committee.
The most important of the suggested changes, the architects felt,
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was the increased bonus for plazas and bonuses for arcades for office
buildings and large apartment houses. Increases in plaza bonuses were
proposed because, as the committee argued, "detailed studies of zoning
districts to which the bonus applied showed that a bonus of three addi-
tional feet of floor space for each square foot of the plaza would" not
be sufficient incentive to the investment builder to forego the high
rentals for street level space. Moreover, the smaller plazas of Canada
House and the Corning Glass Building on Fifth Avenue indicated that it
was "worth a great deal to the public to enjoy open space at street
level." One of the examples for bulk modification cited in the report is
as follows. On a 200 by 100 foot block front avenue plot a building with
a bulk of 272,000 sq. ft. could be built under the 1916 rules without
utilizing the 25% tower coverage provision. Under the V. W. S. & S.
proposal, bulk would be cut to 200,000 sq. ft. However, the builder
would receive a bonus if he put an open plaza around the building. A
20 foot deep plaza on three sides of the building would bring the bulk
up to 221,600 sq. ft. at a one to three award ratio. With increased
bonuses for plazas - 1 : 10 instead of 1 : 3, the provision of
bonuses for arcades, colonnades and other open space at ground level,
the bulk of the building could be raised by 20% to 240,000 sq. ft.
instead of 221,600 proposed by V. W. S. & S. It was recommended that
the bonus be expressed in terms of FAR for the district, thus each
three square feet of plaza should count as two additional square feet
of "effective lot area" for the purpose of calculating floor area
allowed. In a district with an FAR of 15, this would be equivalent to
a bonus of ten square feet of floor area for each square foot of plaza;
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in an FAR 10 district, it would be equivalent to a bonus of 6 2/3 sq. ft.
A variety of additional bonusable amenities were proposed:
- arcades or colonnades at least 60 feet wide, open at least 50% of
their perimeter with 12 feet clear soffits;
- sideyards at least 30 seet wide;
- rear yards connected to the street by such side yards or colonnades;
- interior courts similarly connected to the street, but meeting
special requirements on size and area in relation to the surrounding
walls.
All of these spaces would have to be accessible at all times to the
public and would have to be properly lighted. In this manner, all open
space included would have been eligible for a bonus. This would have
been conducive to high coverage, high density structures, in contrast
to the taller, lower coverage structures encouraged through a combina-
tion of bonusable open space with a substantial percentage of required
open space. The bonus and amenity schedule would have made it possible
for sufficient amenities to be provided on smaller and medium sized lots
for the full 20 percent bulk increment to be earned. These proposals
would have especially benefited the medium sized and smaller sized
site developers, in that the space-consuming required open space would
have been eliminated and all open space, covered open space included,
would have been eligible for a bonus. It was recommended that in
order to prevent FARs becoming too large, as a result of the additional
bonusable spaces, the increase in FAR be limited to 20 percent of the
basic FAR.
Analysis, by the committee, of the 40% tower provision had shown
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that "it was of no practical benefit to the small lot. To improve the
usefulness of smaller lots and to encourage the visual opening up of
the city "for the pedestrian," it was proposed to allow increased tower
coverage up to 50 percent for lots of 10,000 sq. ft. or less.
In the high density residential and commercial districts of Man-
hattan, the limit of a zoning district parallel to the north-south
avenues should extend 150 feet back from the avenue lot line instead
of 100 feet as proposed because a lot only 100 feet deep was not very
practical for development.
No 60 foot street should be mapped by R 9 (FAR 10) because
permitted bulk would be greater under the proposed regulations than
under the prevailing regulations. As many east-west streets as
possible on the upper East Side should be mapped R 7 or if necessary
R 8 (FAR 4.5) to discourage new building, except when large sites for
large buildings can be assembled in order to preserve the residential
character and scale of the neighborhood, to allow profitable conversion
of private residences into apartments, to ensure continued access of
sunlight to all residential buildings.
However, as high buildings on the north-south avenues did not
have the same effect of shutting off the sun from neighboring narrow
side streets, and the "residential scale such as encountered on side
streets is already lost," avenues might be mapped at FAR 10.
The committee also found that the gap in scale of available
districts between R 9 FAR 10 and the next highest R8 FAR 4.5 - made for
inflexibility in the mapping of the city. Therefore they proposed that
an intermediate district be designated or, alternately, that the
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requirements of the R5, R6, R7 districts be revised upward to fill the
gap.
The adoption of the AIA proposals with respect to bonusable
amenities and their award rates would have had far reaching effects on
urban form. First, as all open space would have been bonusable, i.e.
there would have been no non-bonusable required open space, bulk incre-
ments could be won with far less open space provided. This, in turn,
would have made it possible to have greater coverage on smaller sites
than were subsequently to be typical for structures utilizing the plaza
bonus. Moreover, covered space was to be awarded a relatively higher
bonus rate than was subsequently to be the case.
The effect of these measures would have been, had they been imple-
mented, to:
- Make lower and squatter buildings possible.
- Obviate the necessity to assemble large sites in order to avail one-
self of the full plaza bonus, later a major factor.
The incentive system would have made it possible to develop smaller
and medium sized sites, while achieving the full bonus, as well as
large sites. Under the incentive system that was adopted, it was only
possible to utilize the 20% bonus increment on large sites through the
plaza bonus. The arcade bonus was too low to fill up the bonusable
envelope of 20% additional bulk. Therefore the award structure for
bonuses, as adopted, materially contributed to making assemblage more
lucrative. It militated against smaller and medium sized sites being
developed, because it was not possible for the builder to build an
economic building and at the same time avail himself of the full 20%
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bonus. I.E. the arcade bonus did not allow him to fill up the 20% bulk
increment achievable; and the plaza bonus which would have filled it up
would, on a small site, have restricted the typical floor size to
uneconomic dimensions.
Even though the arcade bonus suggested by AIA was subsequently
included in the comprehensive amendment, it could earn only a third of
what the plaza bonus could. AIA had called for approximate parity in
the award rates for covered and open space. In large part as a conse-
quence of the disproportionate bonus award structure, hardly any
arcades or public accessible covered open spaces were to be built in
the years following adoption of the comprehensive amendment. AIA's
proposed award structure would have been more conducive to achieving
the objective of street wall definition and continuity of covered
pedestrian spaces than the adopted incentive system. Buildings would
have been lower. It is suggested that the city form that was gotten
was not the result of conscious design considerations. Rather, it was
in large part the result of pressure exerted by the big builders-owners
community to have some kind of a way to favor the kind of development
that they themselves were most interested in and to exclude smaller
competing developments. By the same token, it might be argued that the
AIA scheme, although also ostensibly emphasizing amenity, simply
represented the position of a class of commercial interests with a stake
in the development of moderately dimensioned properties.
Felt, in expressing his delight at the favorable AIA report, said
many of the changes recommended in the report would be incorporated
23
in the commission's own proposal. On December 21, 1959, the City
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Planning Commission's Proposed Comprehensive Amendment of the Zoning
Resolution of the City of New York was published in the City Record.
Although changes had been made along the lines suggested by the
architect's subcommittee, a significant difference in the direction of
the thrust of the respective sets of proposals is discernible. Whereas
the New York (Manhattan) Chapter's report included numerous suggestions
that would have been beneficial to the development of moderately
dimensioned sites, the Planning Commission's proposal in using similar
elements as those suggested by the architects used them in such a way that
the principal beneficiaries would be the developers of large sites.
Whereas the CPC adopted the 20% limit, resulting in a maximum
floor area ratio of 18 in the highest bulk commercial area, they
failed, on the other hand, to recommend the kinds of measures suggested
by the AIA that would have made it possible for potential developers
of moderately dimensioned sites to have availed themselves of the
full 20 percent bulk increment to be gained through provision of
bonusable amenities. The effect of the proposals was that only the
large site could actually achieve an FAR of 18.
The initially proposed 1 to 3 award rate for plazas in conjunction
with the 30 feet non-bonusable rear yard precluded on the envisaged
prototypical large site the generating of sufficient additional floor
area through the bonus to reach the permissible FAR ceiling of 18.
To overcome this obstacle, plaza bonuses were increased in high
density commercial areas. Another indication of the preferential
treatment of large sites was that the bonuses were graduated to allow
for a greater bonus as the amount of plaza increased. Moreover,
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different award levels for the various different FAR base levels were
introduced. V. W. S. & S. had not differentiated between them. This
differentiation tended to put the highest bulk district in a relatively
even more favorable position, in that for the same amount of additional
space as the other categories, a greater bulk increment could be added
to an already larger base FAR.
In the CPC revision, the plaza definition was expanded:
"An open area of not less than 8,000 sq. ft. with a minimum
dimension of 80 ft. and which is bounded on one side by a
front lot line or which is connected to the street by means
of an arcade or by an open area not less than 40 feet wide."24
The definition of bonusable open space was broadened to include
plaza-connected open areas unobstructed from the lowest level to the
sky with a minimum dimension of 40 feet, connecting two plazas or a
plaza with a street.
Although a bonus for arcades was also introduced, it was set much
lower than the increased plaza and also much lower than the rate
proposed by the architects. Two square feet of rental space in
exchange for one square of arcade was offered. At such low award
rate, moderately sized sites could not substitute the arcade bonus
for the plaza bonus to make up the difference between an FAR of 15
and an FAR of 18.
FAR 15 mapping was extended between 48th and 53rd Street, from
a line 50 feet east of Sixth Avenue (Avenue of the Americas) to a
line 200 feet west of Sixth Avenue. In this manner 8 prime office
building sites, four on each side of the avenue, came to be located
in the highest bulk commercial district. In addition, they were
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immediately adjacent to Rockefeller Center. These sites were, at the
time, located in a one-and-one-half times height district, which
reached to within 100 ft. east of 5th Avenue. The change facilitated
even higher densities than possible under 1916 rules.
Eero Saarinen's CBS headquarters on the blockfront between 52nd
and 53rd Streets, served as a demonstration model for the new zoning,
with the Saarinen office helping to develop land coverage ratios to
permit the plaza-surrounded sheer tower.25 As such, it served as a
prototype for the typical FAR 18 sheer tower on a block-front wide
avenue site which was to be characteristic for subsequent FAR 18 office
development under the new zoning resolution. The CBS Building was
completed in 1964.
In residential districts changes included:
- raising of the plaza bonus from 1 to 3 to 1 to 5,
- introduction of a new R 9 district, an intermediate bulk
designation with an FAR around 7, to fill the gap between
R 8 FAR 4.5 and the old R 9 FAR 10 levels,
- relabeling of the R 9 designation to R 10 without changing the
base FAR of 10.
These changes were responsive to AIA's request for an intermediate
district between FAR 10 and FAR 4.5. In the question of mapping,
however, the AIA reports suggestions had not been heeded.
- On the East Side of Upper Central Manhattan R 10 with an FAR of 10
was mapped largely where R 9 had been mapped previously, i.e.
solidly between Fifth Avenue on Central Park to 150 ft. east of Park
Avenue and between E 61st Street to East 96th Street; along the wide
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cross streets stretching towards the East River - East 96th Street
to the F.D.R. Drive, 79th Street to East End Avenue.
- All North-South avenues were desigated for densities of FAR 10.
- R 9 was mapped liberally in place of the lower R 8 in interior blocks
between 2nd and 3rd Avenues and lst and 2nd Avenues. By providing a
potentially greater intensity of use differential, a greater develop-
ment incentive had been provided in areas to the east of Lexington
Avenue.
At the press briefing, Felt, in expressing his determination to get
the comprehensive resolution adopted, said: "This is the fight of my
life." He was confident that the Board of Estimate would adopt the
measure by July 1, 1960. "I sort of tingle when I think of it."
In response to the charge that the resolution would straight-
jacket construction, Felt claimed that
"About 10 to 15% would not have met the proposed new
standards and that's the kind of construction we
don't want any more of."
Felt and his associates argued that more than 60 percent of the
buildings put up since WW II could have been built exactly as they
were under the proposed ordinance as well. These included such
structures as Lever House, the Seagram Building, both corporate head-
quarters, but also 711 Third Avenue, a rental office building.26 Then,
too, they argued, there were large post war buildings that did not
conform to the proposed code, such as 2 Broadway with 1,359,800 sq. ft.
representing an FAR of 18.3 on a plot mapped for a maximum FAR of 18
provided the bonuses were availed of. In response to the Commission's
contention that the earning capacity of such buildings would not be
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significantly reduced if they were to conform with new resolution,
Richard Roth, Sr. a partner of Emery Roth and Sons, the architects
who designed 2 Broadway, explained that while the building was only
slightly larger than the bulk permitted under the proposed code, it
could have been substantially larger - perhaps 10 stories - under the
then existing code. Moreover, the slimmer base advocated by the new
code would have resulted in floors with smaller area which would have
been more difficult to rent because the demand was for large floors. 2 7
Harold Uris of Uris Brothers, major investment builder-owners
who was also president of the Investing Builders Association, suggested
that a committee of builders and architects meet with officials of
Mr. Felt's office to re-calculate figures on a score of representative
buildings.28 The Investing Builders Association's members estimated
that they erected $400,000,000 worth of office structures and apartment
houses in Manhattan each year, accounting for 90% of the Borough's new
privately financed construction. Felt welcomed Uris's suggestion.
Hearings on the CPC's revision of the V. W. S. & S. proposal
began on March 14, 1960 with Felt calling attention to the year's grace
period proposed "in deference to the genuine problems of the profes-
sionals in real estate and building." 2 9
Dr. Luther Gulick, co-chairman (with Robert Dowling) of the
Committee for Modern Zoning, chided those real estate people who
"...think they will be injured and their chances to make
a million blocked by modern zoning. This is a shallow
view. The reputable and responsible developer has
nothing to fear."
Early adoption of the resolution was urged by
- Robert Dowling, representing the Citizens Budget Commission; as
- 136 -
president of the City Investing Company, he had wide Manhattan realty
investments;
- James H. Scheuer, a major developer and president of the Citizens
Housing and Planning Council;
- William Zeckendorf, of Webb and Knapp.
The representative for the City Club asked if David Tishman (a
major investment builder), David Rockefeller and Robert Dowling all
favored the proposal, could Frank Barrera, the spokesman for the Metro-
politan Association of Real Estate Boards, who was in opposition, be
speaking for the real estate community?
During the hearing, Felt worked to cultivate an atmosphere of
cooperation. For example, he asked the speaker from the Avenue of the
Americas Association (Sixth Avenue) to come and see him, adding: "You
and I have been on intimate terms for years now."3 0
Manhattan's comment on Tuesday, March 22, 1960, was a chorus of
general approval. There was, however, one significant dissent from
the Real Estate Board of New York (Manhattan) whose representative
told the Commission hearing that, in proposing specific map changes,
it was not abandoning "in the slightest" its opposition to the resolu-
tion as a whole.
On may 1, the Mortgage Bankers Association asked that action on
the city's new proposed zoning plan be delayed "at least until next
31
fall," as more time was needed to study the plan. This request was
in direct conflict to the wish of Mayor Wagner expressed on the same
day in a speech to the Citizens for Modern Zoning, who urged speed on
adopting the zoning resolution.32
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Nevertheless on May 2, one day later, the CPC announced postpone-
ment for at least four months of the date on which it was to submit its
zoning proposal to the Board of Estimate, in order to be allowed a
second round of hearings. The reason given for the delay on the resolu-
tion was the need to republish the revised resolution and maps for the
second round of public hearings. Many changes had been made in the
original draft since the first hearing. Original plans had been to
submit the revised code on June 1.
Robert Moses still strongly opposed aspects of the zoning plan.
On June 6, in a speech in Albany, he said:
"Have you noticed how, in our periodic spasms of reform,
we turn to alphabetical agencies for panaceas? Now
there's a new one, right out of the lingo of city plan-
ning. If you have it, you have everything. It works
three ways and is better than a doctor's prescription.
It prevents congestion, promotes circulation, and makes
you feel new all over. FAR looks ahead. It's automatic." 3 3
Mayor Wagner said Mr. Moses, in deriding the proposed FAR formula
as an "alphabetical slogan, had "criticized the only phase of the pro-
posed new law that hadn't bothered anyone else." 3 4
In a letter to the New York Times, dated July 1, 1960, Robert W.
Dowling and Luther Gulick of the Committee for Modern Zoning listed the
organizers who had gone on record in support of the rezoning. They
warned that:
"any town that lets the small fry of landowners and their
agents do what they want about land uses, locations of
buildings and factories, densities, heights and streets,
will be old in a generation with narrow, crooked alleys,
smelly and noisy factories in residential areas, no sun-
shine or clean air for anybody and suicidal traffic con-
gestion. Chaos may seem attractive to a few selfish land
exploiters. But it is a bad thing for all the rest of us,
and is certainly no good for those investors who want
stable land values and a healthy town.," 3 5
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On April 19, 1960, the President of the New York Society of
Architects, in a letter to the New York Times, made note of the fact
that "The loud and repeatedly proclaimed press releases that reduction
in bulk of large buildings" as were being built then would be "hardly
perceptible," had "gained the active support of promoters and designers
of large projects who use Title I and other condemnation procedures to
obtain valuable land at public expense." He attacked the severe con-
fiscatory restrictions that the proposed zoning law would place on "the
smaller individual plot" - forcing those owners to maintain the status
quo or sell at knocked down prices to the gigantic operators.36
- In alluding to Felt he denied any appointed public official the right
to unilaterally "make such extensive transfers of our citizens' pro-
perty rights without due process and adequate public hearings."
- He predicted that the proposal would not provide more flexibility
in architectural design, but considerably less. "The present law
has permitted construction of the world's finest buildings and in no
consequent manner inhibits the work of the Planning Commission, Slum
Clearance, Urban Renewal, etc."
On August 17, 1960, the CPC released its revised zoning resolu-
tion.37 Once again the plaza bonus was increased. Ten square feet
of additional floor space were to be allowed for each sq. ft. of plaza
or plaza-connected open space over and above the mandatory open space
requirements in highest bulk commercial districts.
Although the CPC spokesman stressed that the objective of the
increased incentives was to provide more light and air for streets, it
was understood, however, that the commission wanted to encourage more
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buildings of the type of the new Chase Manhattan Building in the Wall
Street area, built on 27% of its lot, and the Lever House on Park
Avenue which covers 50% of its lot.
On the other hand the generous arcade definition as originally
proposed by the AIA in 1959 was not adopted, neither was the bonus
increased. An arcade was to be limited to a depth of not less than 10
feet nor more than 30 feet. Consequently, only a percentage of the
covered space envisaged eligible for the arcade bonus under the AIA's
proposal would be eligible. Instead of two sq. ft. of additional
rentable space as at first proposed by the CPC, 3 sq. ft. were offered
for the provision of 1 sq. ft. of arcade, the same amount as had been
initially proposed for the plaza.
The problem of bulk controls of office buildings in the highest
bulk commercial districts as perceived by major real estate interests
had been one of making it possible to provide equivalent amounts of
space as had been provided in post-war office buildings but in a more
compatible building envelope. I.E. key real estate interests had set
their sights on achieving an FAR of 18 for the prescribed, envisaged,
postulated building envelope. At the same time, the problem was seen
also as one of making it less profitable for small and medium sized sites
to be developed than large ones because development of such sites would
tend to preclude assemblage of large sites needed for large office
buildings and also, to a certain extent, because the development of
small sites with high density, high coverage and cheaply constructed
buildings would tend to undermine the market situation of major office
buildings. The effects of such construction could be considered to be
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particularly undesirable if such structures were erected subsequent to
and in the vicinity of a major structure that had contributed to the
enhancement of the environment by providing for instance, a large
plaza, as in the case of the Chase Manhattan Building. The cheaply
constructed speculative building would benefit from the amenity, while
at the same time tend to undermine the major buildings market position.
Investment builders pursued, then, an exclusionary objective.
Incentive zoning was used as a device to pursue this exclusionary objec-
tive. In a series of incremental steps, incentive zoning was gradually
fashioned into a device that would allow construction, at an FAR of 18,
of a sheer tower with standard floors of economic proportions on the
typical 200 foot block-front wide-avenue plot.
At the same time, the device worked to the disadvantage of develop-
ing small sites because the plaza bonus was designed so that advantage
could not be taken of it on the smaller site, thus making it difficult
or impossible to increase the bulk envelope above the base level of
FAR 15. Neither could the diminutive arcade bonus that was introduced
in the course of the process be used to appreciably increase the bulk
envelope above the base level of FAR 15.
To get an indication of the order of magnitude of the degree to
which the density differential could be increased, consider the case of
an existing building with an FAR of 9, where the potentially achiev-
able density differential could be increased by 50% if redevelopment
occurred at FAR 18 rather than at 15. In general then, although re-
development at an FAR 15 might be quite profitable, the prospects of
the increased rate of return at an FAR of 18 was a strong incentive for
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owners of appropriate smaller parcels to participate in an assemblage,
as it was concurrently for developers to assemble large enough plots
to full advantage of the plaza bonus.
Whereas under the 1916 rules, as will be recalled, exemption from
the requirement to adhere to the sky exposure recession plane was
granted only for twenty-five percent of the lot, under the proposal
exemption was to be granted for the total area occupied by the building,
provided it did not exceed 40% of the plot, and was set back from all
front lot lines.
With the plaza bonus increased to 1 to 10, it now became possible
to achieve the full 20% bulk increment attributable to bonuses in
exchange for a relatively narrow "plaza" wrapped around the base of
the tower.
In recognition of the unique problems of Manhattan's "central
business district," higher bulks were extended to several commercial
districts in the area.
- The C5 - 3 (FAR 15) area was extended westward along 57th Street to
Eighth Avenue and to south of Columbus Avenue
- Two new bulk categories were introduced with FARS of 15 (C6-6 and
C6-7). In the area to the west of Sixth Avenue, the CPC initially
proposed C6-4 and C6-5 districts which had FARs of 10. Now, however,
the Broadway area from 54th Street to 42nd Street was to receive a
C6-7 designation. This area reached to 200 feet west of Broadway.
The area between C6-7 Broadway area and Sixth Avenue received a C6-6
designation. With the exception of a few enclaves, all of midtown
from 48th Street to 57th Street between Broadway to the west and
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Third Avenue to the east was eligible for a FAR of 15.
The new C6-6 and C6-7 designations were applied nowhere else,
except in Lower Manhattan, where the area between the bulkhead line of
the East River and Water Street and from Fulton Street to Coenties Slip
was changed from C6-9 to C6-6.
V. W. S. & S. had offered the following rationale for having lower
bulks in C6 areas than in C5s.
"High bulks and employment densities with resulting problems
of congestion are common to bdh of these districts. However
since the general scale of land values and existing bulks is
somewhat lower in the C6 Districts, maximum permitted commer-
cial bulks are scaled down accordingly, to prevent further
extension of excessively high employment concentrations."3 9
This persuasive reasoning of the consultants was not enough to
prevent the elimination of the differential in bulk levels between the
two categories.
Most importantly, however, the new FAR 15 areas along Third
Avenue to the east and as far as Broadway to the west, had considerably
lower existing densities than the areas initially designated for an
FAR 15 focused around Grand Central, where a substantial amount of
high density construction had already gone up. Consequently, extremely
high density differentials were achievable between existing and
potentially possible new developments in many areas. Many locations
had densities beneath an FAR of 5.
In this, the final revision, a number of changes were made to
residential mapping that had been originally urged in the AIAs sub-
committee's report of December 11, 1959. They affected mapping of the
interior blocks between avenues:
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- Typically the midblock areas that had been proposed for mapping at
the new intermediate designation of R9, with an FAR between 7 and
7.5, were changed to the lower R 8 with an FAR of 4.5.
- Most of the lower R7 - 2 midblock designations were changed to the
higher R 8 classifications.
- With a few exceptions most of the many sixty-foot-wide side-streets
mapped with a base FAR of 10 were cut back. This was in accord with
the recommendations of the AIA.
There remained, however, a number of significant exceptions where
R 10 was retained:
- In the Murray Hill area, the entire block bounded by E 35th, E 36th,
Madison Avenue and Park Avenue.
- A 10 block area south of 59th Street between East River and First
Avenue.
- In the Carnegie Hill area from 86th Street to 90th Street between
Fifth Avenue and Park Avenue.
- From 94th Street to 97th Street between Park Avenue and Madison
Avenue, the block bounded by 95th Street and 96th Street, Fifth
Avenue and Madison Avenue.
By August 1960, then, the final pattern of residential mapping
had emerged. All north south avenues and wide cross streets had been
destined for densities at a base FAR of 10. All interior blocks on
the East Side had been downzoned as a deterrent to redevelopment. On
the West Side the pattern was similar.
Major investment builders had thus secured their interests over
a two year period in an interactive ongoing process in which three
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basic steps may be identified:
- In February 1959, under the V. S. S. & S. proposal, proposed achievable
densities between Lexington Avenue and Fifth Avenue were raised on an
area wide basis while at the same time, to the east of Lexington
Avenue, they were lowered below the level achievable under the 1916
rules.
- Under the CPC revision of the V. W. S. & S. plan for rezoning New York
City of December 1959, achievable bulks in both midblock and on
avenues were raised substantially east of Lexington Avenue, above the
levels proposed in February 1959.
- Under the Final Plan of August 1960, R 10 was proposed 125 feet deep
along all north-south avenues, and on wide cross streets. While with
a few exceptions, potentially achievable densities in all interior
block locations were cut back to the extent that any proposed prior
significant density differential was eliminated.
According to a former official of the Department, these were chief
bargaining concessions that had to be made to the real estate lobby to
win acceptance of the Zoning Resolution.
In this manner, then, a pattern of high-density "mountain ranges"
along the avenues, and "low density valleys" on the side streets, was
established, providing light, air, exposure and outlook to tall and
bulky buildings on the avenues at the expense of the low rise interior
blocks. In pronounced contrast to this distinctive pattern of the
areas of investment building, on the Lower East Side, both wide avenues
and narrow side streets were mapped R7.
The plaza bonus had undergone significant transitions. It will be
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recalled that initially a 1 to 3 bonus had been proposed by V. W. S. & S.
to encourage the setting back of buildings from the street in line with
those areas where narrow side streets were proposed for FAR 10 remapping,
in order to bring more light and air into streets surrounded by tall
buildings. Only a slight increase in bulk was anticipated. As
initially conceived then, the device was intended for application on
narrow side streets rather than on wider avenues because the avenues
mapped for FAR 10 at the time had already been largely developed at high
densities. Subsequently, however, inner block densities were lowered,
so that the device was no longer applicable in the initially conceived
context. However, concurrently, avenues with low existing densities
were designated for FAR 10, thus, creating on these avenues the poten-
tial to achieve a significant density differential. At the same time
a limit was set of 20% to the bonus part of the envelope. This was
significantly more than envisaged in the initial examples of V. W. S.
& S. Although set as a limit, the achievement of the 20% bulk incre-
ment was to become the rule. In order that the 20% could be fully
availed of on the typical blockfront wide avenue site and in order that
at the same time, a building could be built meeting the demands of
investment builders, it was necessary, given certain economical coverage
ratios, to increase the rate of award for the bonused open space by
100% to 1 to 6.
A similar process was also experienced in the high bulk commercial
areas (FAR 15). Here, the award rate for open space, also initially
pegged at 1 to 3, was proportionately lower than in the FAR 10 districts.
Here, too, the 20% bulk increment was subsequently applied and the bonus
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award rates for open space ultimately more than tripled, so that the
full 20% increase in bulk could be practically availed of on the proto-
typical site.
The investing building community was pleased with the proposal's
final form and took active steps in support of it.
- On September 6, 1960, 15,000 copies of the book "A City Speaks"
containing favorable statements on the proposed zoning law made at
the public hearings in March was released for distribution by Dowling's
Committee for Modern Zoning.
- The builders of Manhattan's major new office buildings and apartment
houses announced on September 7 that they endorsed "enthusiastically
and unequivocally" the City Planning Commission's final draft of the
proposed new zoning code as it applied to Manhattan. Lewis Whiteman,
executive director of the Investing Builders Association, said that
until the day before, the group had not taken a firm stand on the
proposal; and added that the endorsement applied only to those provi-
sions that related to Manhattan, because the group's studies had
been confined to that borough.4 0
- Thomas Jefferson Miley, executive vice president of the Commerce
and Industry Association, said his group now whole-heartedly supported
the resolution. He observed that it had been amended substantially
to reflect the recommendations of "other responsible groups."4 1
- A statement signed by David Rockefeller and John D. Butt, respectively
chairman and president of the Downtown Lower Manhattan Association,
said that the revised version of the code as it applied to the down-
town financial and waterfront districts would serve the best interests
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of those areas.42
- On September 8, 1960, the New York Manhattan Chapter of the AIA, in
breaking with the other borough Chapters who remained in opposition,
endorsed the revised proposal.4 3
- On September 9, 1960, the Real Estate Board of New York (Manhattan),
in breaking with the other four boards of the Metropolitan Associa-
tion of Real Estate Boards who remained opposed, reversed its
earlier firm opposition.4 4
On September. 9, 1960, the influential New York Times, in noting
that the "big builders.. .could undoubtedly have defeated it", hailed
the Investment Builders Association's endorsement in an enthusiastic
editorial entitled "Big Builders Back Rezoning."
"The Investing Builders Association represents practical
men. If they thought this new resolution would ruin them,
they could undoubtedly have defeated in the Board of
Estimate. Instead they are happy to endorse the proposed
zoning resolution."
At a Planning Commission hearing held on September 12, 1960,
strong objections to rezoning continued to come from real estate and
architect groups in Brooklyn and the Bronx, and the Queens Chamber of
Commerce, who argued that the new law would favor Manhattan builders
over those in the other four boroughs. Nevertheless, on October 18,
the CPC unanimously adopted the proposed rezoning. The Board of
Estimate had now 60 days in which to act.
In the ensuing period, Robert Dowling, as co-chairman of CMZ,
continued his active leadership role in support of the new zoning. He
led a group including David Rockefeller, vice chairman of the Chase
Manhattan Bank, and Earl B. Schwulst of the Bowery Savings Bank, in a
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joint letter to Mayor Wagner, asking prompt approval of the forward-
looking and long-needed zoning reform. Nevertheless, substantial opposi-
tion continued to be directed at the proposed Comprehensive Amendment.
On November 15, 1960, the Architects Council of New York City, composed
of the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island Chapters of the AIA,
the New York Society of Architects and the Brooklyn Society of Archi-
tects, but not including the New York (Manhattan) Chapter of the AIA,
again attacked the proposed new zoning resolution.4 5
- By making it economically unfeasible for builders to replace existing
structures, it would cause old buildings to remain standing and thus
contribute to deterioration of the city;
- It would not in practice provide the light, air and open space its
sponsors promised;
- It would lead to an esthetically monotonous city;
- It would favor the large land owner over the small;
- It was so complex as to threaten paralysis of new construction;
- It would give the Planning Commission dictatorial power, making it
more difficult for a dissatisfied property owner to object to a
Commission decision.
At the Board of Estimate hearing on November 20, 1960, Dr. L.
Gulick, co-chairman of CMZ, speaking immediately following Barrera of
the Brooklyn Real Estate Board, who had charged that the proposal was
geared to "giant developers, builders of huge luxury apartments and
public housing, while ignoring the little man," said that architects
and builders fighting the proposed new resolution were "motivated by
a distinct personal interest in a chaotic development of this town."
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On December 15, 1960, the Board of Estimate adopted the Comprehen-
sive Zoning Amendment unanimously. In casting an affirmative vote,
Mayor Wagner said he felt "justly proud to play a part in this historic
legislation that will affect the wellbeing not only of this generation,
but of generations to come."
In an. editorial marking the occasion, the New York Times, in
noting that the credit list for this politically improbable consummation
was long and that Mayor Wagner's personal leadership went back to at
least 1947, when he served as CPC chairman, called attention to the
"trusted diplomacy and dogged perseverance of James Felt," Mayor Wagner's
appointed chairman of the commission, who had "won over hardened oppo-
nents in a miracle of reversal."4 6
The urgency to tackle the problem of changing the geometric rules
had been substantially affected by fluctuations in the demand for space
and also concomitantly by changes in the type of space in demand. Alter-
nate geometric rules that did not meet precisely defined specifications
of key controlling classes of real estate interest were resisted.
The various prescribed prototypes proposed over an extended period of
time were distinguished from the 1916 ziggurat prototype of the varying
degrees by which cubage was cut back from the base of that percentage
of the plot allowed to penetrate the sky exposure plane. The problem
of changing the geometric rules finally culminated when the limited
opportunities to build large 25% coverage towers at prime locations
began to be exhausted, demand for superior space continued to be
47
strong, and a need was perceived to exclude high coverage, high density
buildings on small and medium sized sites. In that, to a greater or
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lesser degree, in the various proposed prototypes cubage was cut away
from the base of the permitted tower portion of the building, there was
a distinct resemblance to Flagg's model that, prior to 1916, had been
presented as a more desirable alternative to the one that was ultimately
enacted.
The investment building community desired to exchange substandard
deep space at the base of towers for substantially increased amounts of
space on high floors with superior environmental attributes, including
outlook. Such cutting away of cubage at the base, allowing for land-
scaped plazas, concomitantly improved the environmental attributes of
the remainder of the space on lower floors. Incentive zoning repre-
sented a convenient means to convert on a selective basis - i.e. for
towers on a large site - such less useful space into more useful space.
The plaza-tower bonus system evolved in an interactive process aimed
at the resolution of a specific problem in the management of the produc-
tion of space.
Although initially primarily intended as a technical device to
facilitate redistribution of a given prescribed number of FAR points
on a postulated prototypical site, the principle of incentive zoning,
once established, was to be increasingly used as a way to achieve a
variety of objectives through use of FAR points as a kind of surrogate
currency.
This chapter has stressed how, early in the final stage of the
zoning process, emerging incentive zoning's potential was recognized
as a key means to rectify specific shortcomings of the 1916 code per-
taining to the construction of high-density office and residential
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buildings. It has described the ensuing interactive and incremental
process -- and the influential role played in it by the investment
building community -- of reformulation of the initially proposed device
and its transformation to facilitate construction of high density
residential and office towers surrounded by space and without setbacks.
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Chapter 6
The Grace Period -
A Critical Constituent Element in an Adaptive
Strategy of Managing the Production of Space
This chapter takes a closer look at the role played
by the Grace Period in the transition to the new Zoning
Resolution.
At the final hearing, the representatives of the HRH
Construction Co. and the Building Trades Employers Association,
and the Planning Consultant to the Brooklyn Borough President
had sharply contested the view of one opponent who:
predicted that after a tremendous building boom
caused by builders filing plans under the existing
laws, during a one year grace period, there would
be a devastating slump.
On March 29, 1959, approximately 18 months before final
adoption of the resolution, Felt had asked that V. W. S. & S.
modify the proposal for the benefit of the building industry
by inserting a provision for a period of grace starting with
2
formal adoption of a final rezoning plan. During such a
period, 12 - 18 months, builders would continue to construct
under the 1916 rules. In indicating that the CPC was
prepared to establish such a grace period even without a
recommendation from the consultant firm, Felt said such a
grace period was necessary because of the time required for
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builders to obtain financial backing and prepare plans and
specifications and because financiers, builders, architects
and engineers of new construction would otherwise remain in
a state of uncertainty about future plans. Felt expressed
the hope that the consultants would submit a recommendation
for a grace period before April 13, the date of the first
hearings.
In conceding that the suggested long period of grace
might result in a flood of new construction well in advance
of the effective date of changes, he said:
The extended deadline would give everyone involved
a maximum opportunity to plan ahead and to make the
transition to the new resolution as smooth as possible.
The decision was taken "to insure maximum stability in the
building and real estate industries during the important
transition period following approval of a new resolution."
Felt explained that after an examination of the legal
and administrative problems involved, it was determined "that
it would not be feasible to operate simultaneously under two
different zoning resolutions.'
In general, key real estate interests responded
enthusiastically to the delay.
- Erwin S. Wolfson, one of the city's large builders, said the
grace period was very desirable, adding that it would make
for an orderly transition from the old to the new resolution.
Wolfson headed a building group that planned to begin, in
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the coming spring of 1960, on a 0100,000,000 55 storey
Grand Central City -- later to be known as the Pan-Am
Building -- at the foot of Park Avenue above the tracks
3
of the New York Central.
- Richard Roth, Sr. of Emery Roth and Sons, architects,
said that while he too welcomed the time extension, he
would like to see even more time given and the effective
date extended to January 1, 1962, rather than to July
4
1961.
But it is definitely a step in the right direction,
particularly when one considers that the proposed
new zoning law is a new and somewhat radical
instrument for us in New York -- builders, architects
and mortgage lending institutions as well. 5
- The chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Real Estate
Associations expressed relief at the announcement of the
time extensions. In disclosing that several major con-
struction projects -- commercial and residential -- had
been shelved indefinitely after the draft of the proposed
new resolution was made public in February, he said:
Now most of the builders have decided to go ahead and
build...Generally speaking, builders and mortgage lend-
ing institutions are relieved to hear of the extension
of time. Many of us in the field of real estate had
urged that a grace period be granted, not so much
because we thought that the proposed zoning resolution
was good or bad, but mainly because of the uncertainty
that prevailed as to just when the new resolution would
become effective. 6
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One leading builder described the grace period as a
"1guillotine ready to drop after which the real estate market
will be adversely affected." In the meantime, he predicted,
land prices are going to rise sharply in anticipation of the
proposed zoning regulations becoming law:
Now everyone will begin to race to put up buildings
before the guillotine falls...Admittedly, we may need
new zoning laws, but if we are to have them, then
lets have them now without further delays which are
having an adverse effect on the cost of land. 7
On September 14, 1959, about two and one half months
later, the New York Times published an editorial lauding
the decision:
This policy would enable builders and real estate
developers to continue to advance projects without
hesitancy or uncertainty as to when the new zoning
may go into effect.
But in early 1960 immediate rezoning of Greenwich
Village was called for to protect the character of Greenwich
Village, threatened by the construction of large luxury
apartment houses, permitted to rise one and one fourth times
the width of the street they were on. With the impending
zoning revision and its grace period, the situation was
particularly grave as there was a considerable incentive for
developers to rush to beat the deadline by replacing the
predominantly smaller structures. A typical case of the way
in which the impending lowering of allowed bulks was taken
advantage of was the earlier cited example of a 20 storey
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apartment house with a FAR of 18, occupying an entire avenue
blockfront in the East Sixties. Under the initially proposed
code an apartment house in the area where the new building
was situated would have been limited to a floor area ratio
of about 4.5, or about one-quarter of the bulk of the build-
ing that was completed at the end of 1959. Subsequently,
however, the mapping was changed to allow a FAR 10 on avenues.
More typical of the effects of the grace period are
the buildings that were built in interior blocks. After
expiration of the grace period, the potentially achievable
density differential would be drastically reduced. A case
in point was a cooperative built at 8 East 83rd Street
8
between Fifth and Madison Avenues. The height of the part
of the building lying within 100 feet of Madison Avenue --
40 feet of frontage -- was controlled by the more liberal
rules pertaining to Madison Avenue. The rest of the lot was
governed by the more restrictive rules for the 60 feet wide
side street. In their desire to maximize the rental area,
the architects did not, as was the usual practice, let the
building conform to the more restrictive rules for the side
street. Instead they let the easterly portion near Madison
Avenue rise to 16 storeys in height. The westerly portion
extending 177 feet along the 60 feet wide side street
toward Fifth Avenue, was limited by the envelope configuration
to a height of 14 storeys. As a result of applying the two
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different sets of regulations, the bulk envelope was
utilized to the utmost.
Developers exercising these options were capitalizing
on the superior competitive position that their developments
would have when, after lowering of permitted bulks, compet-
ing developments of similar dimensions would be excluded,
and outlook, light and air could be ensured. Impending
lowering of permitted bulk levels encouraged developers to
take increased risks with respect to location. A certain
riskiness of location, e.g. midblocks or locations east of
Lexington Avenue, were traded-off against a perceived
security to be gained with subsequent imposition of the
new code, in other key attributes.
The more that advantage was taken of such opportunities
the greater was the interest of those that had availed
themselves of the opportunity to have the more restrictive
geometric rules imposed. Consequently, they resisted
further extensions of the deadline. The greater the certain-
ty that more restrictive rules would be imposed, the greater
the desire of other developers becomes to avail themselves
of the opportunity to build at higher densities. The incen-
tive effect of the impending deadline was to lead to a very
sizeable addition to Manhattan's housing stock in a short
period of time.
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It must be clearly recognized though that large cut-
backs in terms of allowed bulk were only imposed in the
area of residential land use in Manhattan. In the area
of office building, bulk levels subsequent to the enactment
of the resolution were to remain approximately the same as
those hitherto achieved. In consequence, whereas construct-
ion of office space continued to increase in the 60's,
there was to be an almost total cessation of privately
financed residential construction.
Under the provisions of the law, builders who filed
applications for building permits accompanied by plans
prior to December 15, 1961, one year after adoption of the
Comprehensive Zoning Amendment, were permitted to build in
accordance with the old zoning resolution, despite the fact
that neither construction nor demolition need have been
started before the new resolution went into effect. During
1961 and up to the cut-off date of December 15 of that year,
builders filed permit applications for 210 apartment build-
ings in Manhattan, containing a total of 29,240 new apart-
ments. In order to beat the deadline, during the first two
weeks of December 1961, builders in New York City filed
22,155 applications worth $2 billion, for building permits
10,
under the old ordinance.
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The time-consuming and difficult task of completing
relocation procedures prerequisite for obtaining eviction
permits contributed to the difficulties of property owners
trying to develop residential sites under the old zoning
resolution by the December 15, 1963 deadline. By this time,
foundations had to be completed and substantial expenditure
made on the superstructure. In addition, the situation was
further exacerbated because the pending World's Fair had
11
absorbed large amounts of building labor. Many builders
felt that the zoning deadline had created a building log jam
that could only be eased by an extension of the deadline.
In consequence, in October 1962, the Investing Builders
Association, composed of sixty owner-builder companies, asked
the OPC to extend the deadline for completion past the date
set for December 15, 1963. They cited the sharp increase
in the number of new apartment buildings under construction
in the city and the concomitant shortage of skilled construct-
ion workers. This made it difficult to complete buildings in
the two year grace period under the more liberal regulations
of the old ordinance.
- Lewis Rudin, principal in the Rudin Management Corporation,
described many of the new apartment buildings as "inferior
products" and their builders as "men who came from nowhere
12
and knocked the market of its feet." He called
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attention to the fact that many prospective tenants were
seeking concessions.
- Joseph P. Blitz, head of a building company bearing his
name, said the renting market was still good for apartments
13
on prime sites.
- Robert Bennet, vice president of Douglas Elliman and Co.,
a renting and management concern, said there would be over-
production for at least three years, particularly on
14
"secondary sites" along First and Second Avenues.
- William Zeckendorf, chairman of Webb and Knapp, concurred
and said that after that there would be a complete shut-
down in residential building because land would have less
15
functional value under the new zoning code.
In the Fall of 1962, Arthur K. Beman, vice president
of James Felt and Co., said that architects, builders and
real estate men were gradually changing their idea of the
value of land,owing principally to the introduction of the
16
new zoning resolution. Under its provisions, a large
plot might, in many instances, enjoy an increase in utili-
zation, much greater than would be expected by adding the
sum of its parts. Small lots, on the other hand, having a
relatively low ratio of permitted use, cannot be improved
to the extent that the large plot can. With respect to land
which was already profitably improved, Beman said such land
was not subject to the factors of change that affect un-
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improved land, because it is not affected by the new zoning
regulations, and a year before, in October 1961, James
Felt had asserted that in the last year the value of
improved real estate had attained greater stability. This
strengthening of the market he attributed to the new zoning
resolution.
In an editorial dated April 10, 1963, entitled "Sabotage
of New York's Zoning," the New York Times called for no more
extensions of the grace period. On 23 May, 1963, an irate
letter from Max Siegel, President of the Zoning Advisory
Council, was published in the New York Times taking exception
to the editorial point of view:
It is wrong to place the whole blame for the recent
unprecedented overbuilding and consequent saturation
of the rental market on "the speculative builder"
The onus properly belongs on the framers of the new
zoning resolution. It is now apparent these zoning
experts grossly underestimated the volume of new
construction that would take place by reason of the
grace periods set by them.
The recent overbuilding in our city was a direct
result of too short a grace period. Had a five year
grace period been allowed originally by the zoning
experts, we would not be faced with the chaotic
conditions existing in all phases of the real estate
and building industry, as well as in allied professions.
Now that a saturation of the rental market has occurred,
those interests who were in a position to build under
the short grace period join with the ivory tower pro-
ponents and seek to eliminate the same privilege for
others, who were unable to begin construction for co-
gent reasons beyond their control.
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On 30 July 1963, the CPC announced that on August 14
it would hold a public hearing on a proposed amendment to
the 1961 Zoning Resolution that would allow builders to
apply to the Board of Standards and Appeals for extensions
of Building Permits beyond the December 15 out-off date,
17
provided the following conditions were met:
- Failure to receive approval of plans by March 15, 1963,
due to delays in processing by the Department of Buildings
or other governmental agencies;
- Failure to gain full possession of the building by
March 15, 1963, because of unforeseeable delays in the
processing of applications to the Rent and Rehabilitation
Administration for eviction certificates or in court
proceedings.
Under the proposal, the Board of Standards and Appeals
was to be able to grant permission to allow continuation for
one year -- or two years for large scale developments -- for
buildings on which there had been substantial construction
above the foundations.
On 18 September 1963, the Planning Commission voted 4
to 2 for the measure with Lawrence Orton and Elinor C.
Guggenheimer dissenting. In a minority report, they argued
that enough grace time had already been granted, that an
unexpectedly large volume of speculative building had
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resulted and that the new code should be accepted -- and
enforced -- as the law of the city with no amnesty for
any reason.
The New York Chapter of the American Institute of
18
Architects had taken a similar standpoint.
The New York Chapter of the American Institute of
Architects was among the groups that made a thorough
study of the new zoning resolution and battled hard
and long for its adoption. It was a significant
and far reaching victory for the people of the city
and the generations to come. Now consideration is
being given to postponing its enactment until 1964
and in some cases, until the end of 1967. If this
is done, how will our city's responsible officials
justify the complete disregard of the years of work
and effort that went into the development of this
resolution, of the benefits it will bring to the
people of New York who said over and over, in every
way possible, that they wanted this resolution enacted
and put into effect?
This Chapter calls on the Mayor, the Board of Estimate
and the Planning Commission to do everything possible
to see that the will of the vast majority of our
citizens is not sacrificed to the interests of a
small group of people who would like to see this
resolution diluted and delayed for their own personal
benefits. We ask that the resolution be implemented
as soon as possible!
Nevertheless, the Board of Estimate adopted the amendment on
17 October, 1963.
60 new apattment buildings, containing a total of 8,125
apartments, were completed in 1962 in Manhattan. More than
twice as many buildings were under construction in December
1962. While no foreclosures were reported among the builders
of the many new luxury apartment buildings, Manhattan lenders
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of construction fund mortgages were coming to the aid of
those builders experiencing difficulties. Mortgage loans
were being abated. While the builder continued to pay
interest on his loan, the payment on the principal of the
loan could be delayed for a period of a month. Depending
on the size of the loan, usually several million dollars,
the amortization payments generally ranged between $40,000
and $60,000.
The decline in property sales and plans for new building
led to an abundance of mortgage money in the hands of banks
and insurance companies. The surfeit of funds tended to
lead to a lowering of interest rates.
By the fall of 1969, private new apartment construction
filings and completions in Manhattan had reached a low point.
The backlog of building permits issued under the old
ordinance finally began to be exhausted. Additional negative
factors included soaring mortgage interest rates and con-
struction costs.
In summary then the grace period enabled primarily major
investment builders with ready access to financing to exploit
the substantial achievable density differentials under the
old code in areas where, after enactment of the new code,
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density differentials would be eliminated. Investment builders
could build high density residential structures at key loca-
tions in low and medium density areas, such as in Greenwich
Village or on East Side side streets, secure in the knowledge
that their structures would benefit from superior outlook,
light and air, as, with the expiration of the grace period,
any significant achievable intensity-of-use differential would
be eliminated in the vicinity, thus reducing the likelihood
of further comparable redevelopment. As a consequence,
considerable value of scarcity could also accrue to the
developer. Within limits, the longer the grace period, the
greater was the inducement to back the new code. But the
grace period contributed to a major increase in the stock
of new housing, an increase that would otherwise not have
occurred.
PART II TOWARDS A MORE RESPONSIVE MANAGEMENT
OF THE SPATIAL ENVIRONMENT
Chapter 7
Tooling Up for a More Responsive
Management of the Urban Spatial Environment:
Structuring the Planning and Developmental Functions
In New York City
This chapter will review the extended and ongoing process
of reorganizing and restructuring the planning and development
functions in New York and its significance in furthering the
end of a more responsive management of the urban spatial
environment.
Initially, government sponsored renewal projects, based
on the Housing Act of 1949, were concentrated in and around
midtown Manhattan. These were not obscure, declining, neighbor-
hoods, but choice, commercial land. They included Columbus
Circle, Lincoln Square, Pennsylvania Station South. They
required total subsidies in the neighborhood of 1 million dollars
1
per acre.
In 1960, the disclosure of scandals had led to the dissolu-
tion of the Mayor's Slum Clearance Committee. In the Spring of
1962, Wagner established the Mayor's Housing Policy Executive
Committee, to expedite housing and urban renewal programs. The
programs had become bogged down because there was no single
- 165 -
- 166 -
coordinating authority as there had been when Robert Moses had
headed the Slum Clearance Committee. In 1955, after many years
as a key official with the New York City Housing Authority,
Samuel Ratensky became director of the Urban Renewal Board,
which had been set up as a reaction against the wholesale
clearance methods of Moses' Slum Clearance Committee to administer
the West Side Urban Renewal Area. City Planning Commission
Chairman James Felt was head of the board. Moses had planned
massive clearance and subsequent rebuilding of virtually the
entire West Side of Manhattan, from 59th to 110th Street.
The Lincoln Center Urban Renewal Area was a prime example
of Moses' approach to city rebuilding. Robert Stern has
described its two component projects as "two massive projects
in search of a neighborhood, one for culture (Lincoln Center
2
for the Performing Arts), the other for living (Lincoln Towers)."
The West Side Urban Renewal Area in New York City was
conceived in 1958 by Samuel Ratensky as an answer to Moses'
methods. Lincoln Center and the West Side Urban Renewal Area
represent polar extremes. Whereas Lincoln Towers was a super-
blocked enclave of repeated buildings with a homogeneous economic
and class tenancy, the West Side Urban Renewal area substituted
extensive rehabilitation of the rundown brownstones on the side
streets leading west from Central Park, concentrating new
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apartment construction along Columbus Avenue, where an elevated
railroad, torn down in 1960, had spawned tenements of the worst
sort; and provided a broad community mix through the use of
leased public housing in middle income cooperatives and other
legal controls. The sites ranged from 7,2000 square feet on
side streets to 40,000 square feet on avenues. Over the several
stages of the program, some entire streetfronts were to be
rebuilt, but at the respective stages -- the new structures
were mainly non-contiguous. Consequently, at the beginning,
new development was adjacent to old buildings, many of which
were in a deteriorated condition. The older buildings that
were to be retained were rehabilitated. Subsequently, both
the Slum Clearance Committee and the Urban Renewal Board were
merged into the Housing and Redevelopment Board. Mr. Ratensky
became chief of its Office of Project Development.
The Housing and Redevelopment Board, established in 1962,
was the product of a plan prepared by J. Anthony Panuch to
consolidate housing functions. It absorbed the Mayor's Slum
Clearance Committee, which had administered all Title I programs;
the Urban Renewal Board, the Neighborhood Conservation Program,
the Mitchell Lama and Redevelopment Companies under the Office
of City Comptroller; and a new program of Municipal Loans in
aid of rehabilitation. The City Housing Authority, which built
and operated low rent public housing, remained separate, as did
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the Departments of Building and Real Estate. The Rent and
Rehabilitation Administration was under the State. Milton
Mollen was appointed chairman of the Housing and Redevelopment
Board.
On April 28, 1964, a front page headline of the New York
Times announced: "Wagner to Name Mollen Deputy Mayor for
3
Housing within Two Weeks." The post had been under consideration
since the Mayor's Housing Policy Executive Committee had been
established two years before. The Deputy Mayor for Housing
was to direct programs of the Departments of Buildings, Relocation,
Real Estate and the Planning Commission.
But about a month later, on May 24, 1964, the Times carried
the following headline: "The Mayor and Mollen - Wagner firm on
Plan for New Post, but opposes Adding Title of Deputy." Not
even Robert Moses, as the City's housing czar, had enjoyed such
status and so the weaknesses revealed in the one man rule, which
led to decentralization, did not reflect directly on City Hall.
Because the City was the biggest landlord, direct identification
of City Hall with housing problems would be not only practically
unwise, but also politically foolhardy, commented Clayton Knowles
in the Times. It was feared that a Deputy Mayor directly charged
with functional responsibility would undermine the authority of
the two existing Deputy Mayors, both generalists, with across the
board concern for city affairs. Moreover, departmental heads
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were concerned about the reduction in their status should the
concept of functional Deputy Mayors be accepted.
The City Planning Commission, under William Ballard, was
partificularly vociferous in its objection to the post of Deputy
Mayor.
Half a year later, on January 16, 1965, Mayor Wagner appointed
Milton Mollen, chairman of the Housing and Redevelopment Board,
to a newly created post - Coordinator of Housing and Development.
In this position he was to be responsible for coordinating, review-
ing and setting policy for all the City's housing and related
activities. While relinquishing the position of chairman of
the Housing and Redevelopment Board, he remained on the Housing
Executive Committee and the Housing Policy Board. The new office
of the Coordinator of Housing and Development was appropriated
a budget of #145,000 with Mollen's salary set at $35,000. 80%
of the cost of the administrative machinery was to be contributed
by the Federal Government. "As our housing problems have
increased in complexity, the need has grown for ever greater
4
coordination to insure maximum efficiency," Wagner said.
Eight weeks later, on March 15, 1965, Boston's Redevelopment
Administrator Edward D. Logue, in a speech at the Bards Awards
Ceremony, urged New York:
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To throw away coordination as a system of running urban
renewal projects and create a single Boston-style agency
to do the job. What the city needed was a guy named Jones,
who would combine in his office the authority for renewal
projects now dispersed among ten or a dozen city agencies.
In Manhattan's West Side Urban Renewal project, Mr. Logue
observed, the Building Department, the Department of Public
Works, the City Planning Board, the City Housing Authority and
five other agencies were trying to work together on the plans.
Coordination hasn't worked. You run into Parkinson's 5
law that efficiency decreases as executives proliferate.
In 1960, when Logue came to Boston, there had been a
Redevelopment Authority and a Planning Board which subsequently
had been merged into the Boston Redevelopment Authority.
It's great you know, what happens is that city planners
are far more productive. The quality is improved by
having the redevelopment types mixing together in the
same office with the planners.
Mollen did not get to do too much coordinating of housing
and development, because on July 19, 1965, i.e. within six months
of his appointment, he announced his resignation to run for
Comptroller on the Republican - Liberal fusion ticket of
John V. Lindsay.
The Wagner Administration achieved many accomplishments and
I am proud to have been a participant. But it is time for
a fresh approach to vast new problems...Basically there has
been a lack of resources to do the overall job. 6
The newly created post was left vacant. Exactly one week
later, on July 26, 1965, at Gracie Mansion, Mayor Wagner applied
and administered the oath to Samuel Ratensky, Chief of the Office
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of Project Development of HRB, as a member of the board. The
board vacancy had been created in January when Mollen had left
the chairmanship of the three member board, and Herbert B. Evans,
a member, had been named to succeed Mollen as chairman.
Lindsay was elected mayor on November 8, 1965. On November
22, 1965, Mayor Lindsay stated that Milton Mollen, the unsuccessful
candidate for Comptroller "was still under consideration for a
major city post, should he still be interested in public life."
Mayor elect Lindsay asked the commissioners of the outgoing
administration to stay on until there was more certainty about
which changes were to be made.
In its December 28, 1965 editorial, the New York Times
commented caustically:
In terms of planning and urban design, the Lindsay
administration inherits a blank check for chaos and
some of the most undistinguished new construction in
the world.
One of Lindsay's first actions, as mayor, was to appoint
a housing study group to consider problems in the area of
housing and urban renewal, and to make suggestions on priorities
among the proposals offered during the election campaign.
Professor Charles Abrams of Columbia University headed the
study group. Among the task forces' members were Edward J.
Logue, head of the Boston Redevelopment Authority and David Crane,
professor of City Planning at the University of Pennsylvania.
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On January 15, 1966, Professor Abrams presented the find-
7
ings of the task force to the mayor. There were- three
primary facts detrimental to the city's housing situation:
- The multiplicity of agencies involved in housing;
- continuing deterioration of the City's housing stock, despite
vast amounts spent to replace it or correct it;
- a tendency to curtail funds for public housing from State
and Federal sources.
The group's main recommendation was that a new housing
administration be placed in charge of the functions of:
- The Housing and Redevelopment Board,
- The Housing Authority,
- The Department of Relocation;
and also of some of the functions then handled by six other
departments:
- The Rent and Rehabilitation Administration,
- The Department of Real Estate,
- The Department of Buildings,
- The Department of Health,
- The Fire Department,
- The Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity.
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In that the head of a single city housing agency would be
able to deal directly with the U.S. Secretary of Housing and
Urban Renewal, it would be easier to obtain urban renewal funds,
the group believed.
The Commissioner for Real Estate, Frank L. Lazarus, said
the Abrams report:
...sounded great. It should be done. The main thing is
getting competent people. They don't want to work for
the Government and get mixed up in politics, knowing they
may be thrown out whether they do a good job or not.
Three days later, after the release of the report, it was
announced that the Ford Foundation, through the Institute
of Public Administration, would finance a "Housing and Neighbor-
hood Improvement Survey," and Edward J. Logue was appointed to
8
head the study. A report was due on June 1, 1966. It was
speculated that this might lead to Logue's eventual appointment
as Mayor Lindsay's overall housing administrator.
On February 15, 1966, Mayor Lindsay, in observing that the
OPC concerned itself more with zoning changes than with long
range municipal planning, said he was disturbed "that the City
Planning Commission, which is responsible for our future appearance,
9
is only fussing around with zoning."
William Ballard, chairman of the OPO, felt that the Mayor,
in spite of his critical remarks, was "upgrading" the Planning
Commission. Ballard was bitter about the crippling effect that
the City's independent authorities had on the planning operation,
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in particular, those headed by Robert Moses:
Transportation has been Robert Moses own satrapy -
he has run it with no regard for anyone else. He'd
get State and Federal authorities and money, and then
present the city with a fait accompli. If there were
any objections, he'd say "You'll lose .160,000,000 in
state money." He rode roughshod over the planning
operation, but now we are finally getting it reversed
and I'm delighted. 10
The Commission should be "free to take a bolder attitude in
the governmental process."
Lindsay's aides were studying whether it would be possible
to oust Robert Moses from his post as City Coordinator of
Federal, State and City Highways, a position created in a
memorandum by Mayor Wagner, or whether bargaining with him would
be the more feasible approach. Lindsay was eyeing the huge
operating surpluses of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel
Authority, headed by Moses, with the view to using them to sub-
sidize the City's mass transit operations - an idea that was
anathema to Moses.
On his appointment, William F. R. Ballard had seen as his
task the completion of the Master Plan for the city, one of the
three Charter assignments of the City Planning Commission when
it was established in 1938.
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When I started this job two years ago, I said completion
of the master-plan was our first job, but since then
I've had to sit down with my staff and decide what the
hell that statement meant. In 1938, the master-plan was
thought of in terms of the city beautiful. Today we're
more realistic and tough. A master-plan would be a
commitment to undertake certain courses of action.
Ballard promised the completion of the plan by 1967. It was
to be comprised of a series of maps, future capital budget
projects, changes in streets and maps as well as the arrangement
of residential and non-residential building.
But the plan must not be a one shot affair. It must be
reviewed and changed regularly. If it had been drawn
up in 1938 it would be inadequate and out of date today.
An indication of how weak the Planning Commission was is
the fact that out of the City's Site Selection Board's 5 votes,
the OPC had only one.
At the end of 1965, at a time when Chairman Ballard's job
had seemed threatened by Mayor Lindsay's impending administrative
changes, the CPO had revealed the outlines of a sweeping plan
for rejuvenating lower Manhattan from its southern tip to
Canal Street.
But Lower Manhattan's development was also a matter of
prime concern to David Rockefeller, chairman of the Downtown
Business Association and his brother Nelson, Governor of the
State of New York. On May 12, 1966, at a hastily convened
press conference attended by Mayor Lindsay and OPC Chairman
Ballard, Governor Rockefeller presented plans for a "Battery
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Park City" to be built on 98 acres of landfill on the West
side of Lower Manhattan at a cost of $600 million, an amount
the State Housing Finance Agency had in unused borrowing power
12
to finance middle-income housing. The city's borrowing power
at that time was virtually exhausted.
In ex:plaining the plan that had been prepared by Harrison
and Abramowitz, the Governor said it would help to ease New
York's chronic housing shortage, draw middle-income families
back to the city, create jobs in the building trades and pioneer
a "new concept" in planning a total urban community. The project
was to have both housing and office buildings.
The Mayor and Mr. Ballard made it clear that the city would
be presenting its own plans for the area at the appropriate time.
Ballard, in calling the plan "a good illustration of the way to
use the waterfront," said although it had been informed, the
Commission had not been consulted in their preparations.
One week later, B. Sumner Gruzen, the Chairman of the Urban
Design Committee of the New York Chapter of the AIA, called the
plan "a piecemeal floating dock." In commending the City Planning
Commission's "terrific job of developing a comprehensive plan for
Lower Manhattan, integrating the pier areas into a plan for
a delightful new downtown," he suggested that any more monies
available for studying lower Manhattan's potentialities should
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be funneled through the CPC, "the only agency qualified to analyze
the problem:
When Mayor Lindsay releases the study Commissioner W.
Ballard has commissioned Wallace-McHarg, Whittlesey and
Conklin and Allen M. Voorhees Assoc. to prepare, and
which the Urban Design Committee of the AIA has reviewed,
I am sure the merit of this suggestion would be apprent. 13
Although the CPC's plan was widely acclaimed when it was
released in June 1966, some weeks later the question was asked
whether the City had the resources or the centralized authority
to implement the plan? There was a covert concern even within
the CPC, that other pressures and priorities would put the larger
aims of the plan at the unreachable bottom of the City's list.
Nevertheless, it was generally felt that the CPC plan was a bold
guideline for the downtown renaissance and had superseded the
Battery Park City blueprint.
Against this backdrop of rivalry between the City and the
State, Edward J. Logue presented his anxiously awaited report.
The report's major recommendation was to abolish the City Planning
Commission and the Department of City Planning and to merge
14
planning and developmental functions into one agency. Such
a unified redevelopment agency would embrace:
- The Housing Authority which administered the City owned low-
rent public housing programs,
- The Housing and Redevelopment Board, which oversees Federal
Urban Renewal and State Mitchell-Lama housing programs,
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- The Department of Buildings,
- The Department of Relocation,
- The Rent and Rehabilitation Administration,
- The Site Selection Board.
It should also include development functions exercised by
the Corporation Counsel, the Comptroller and the Department of
Real Estate. The seven member City Planning Commission which
had wide-ranging powers to approve capital budgets and make
administrative rule changes was to be replaced by a non-salaried
boad of review attached to a new agency.
The report urged that the Department of Public Works cede
the responsibility for selecting architects and making improve-
ments such as streets in urban renewal areas. The new agency
was to establish and enforce standards of architectural design.
All legal and practical powers to run an urban renewal
program would be under one administration. Everything from the
selection of a site to the repaving of streets was to be handled
in one agency. Unification of the agencies would enable one
man to represent the entire city program. Central office functions
would be limited to overall programs planning and budgeting on
a city wide basis. Nearly all the Agency staff with operational
responsibilities would work in area offices. To the maximum
extent feasible, operational decisions would be vested in area
housing administrators.
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The proposed reorganization provided considerable unrest
15
among the city's officials. The following kinds of statements
were to be heard:
Everytime there is a reorganization, people are going
to get scared.
The palace guard is really worried.
People very close to the Mayor feel their power threatened.
One official said:
Logue believes planning should be an arm of the action
agency, in New York, we believe planning should guide
development. The planning agency should be an arm of
the mayor not Logue.
Commenting on the likelihood of Logue's coming to New York,
the same official continued:
He won't come without it (the reorganization) and
I don't think he's going to get it.
OPO Chairman Ballard, in characterizing the OPC's function
to lay down a comprehensive plan for the development of the city
as an invaluable one, opposed any reorganization that would
destroy his agency.
Although Mayor Lindsay asked Logue to revise his proposals
so that the Planning Commission would be excluded, Logue in the
final draft of the report to the Mayor, completed and published
in September 1966, continued strongly to oppose an independent
16
planning commission.
We have not been overwhelmed with the number of occasions
when the CPC has asserted its independence and gone
against the wishes of the Mayor's Office,
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was Logue's response to civic groups that had called for keeping
the "non-partisan" body. "The Planning Commission had neither
been truly independent nor effective in getting its plans
translated into action," he felt. "Separation of a Planning
Commission from the development agency has usually guaranteed
not the- influence of planning, but its irrelevance." In
proposing that the Planning Department be part of the development
agency, Logue declared the planners should be "in the thick of
the battle." But the seven member salaried CPO, in the initial
report to be discontinued, was to be attached to the new agency.
It was to conduct public hearings on urban renewal and other
projects then held by the OPC. Preliminary hearings would be
held by advisory boards in each of 10 administrative districts.
Preliminary decisions on minor zoning changes would be made by
the Area Administrator, while final decisions would continue to
rest with the Board of Estimate. The CPC's professional planning
staff was to become one of four departments.
Two thirds of $1.5 billion to be sought from Federal authorities
was to be spent on the worst slums: Harlem- and East Harlem,
Central Brooklyn, and the South Bronx -- the City's Model City
areas. Logue insisted that if the city reorganized itself, hired
top professionals and asked Washington for more money, it would get
it.
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There is an increasing national awareness that the
municipal level of Government is being required to
deal with our most important domestic crises with
entirely inadequate fiscal resources, federal aid, and
on a large scale is required throughout the country.
But it was widely felt that the $1.5 billions in Federal
Urban Renewal Aid that was to be requested in the next six
years was unrealistic. The City would be lucky to get $50
17
million a year.
There was opposition by various groups to the absorption
of the CPC, to the taking from the Corporation Counsel of the
power to condemn property, to the suggestion that the agency
be exempt from the Civil Service regulations, and to the
suggestion that the agency draft the capital budget. The Budget
Bureau felt that it should assume greater control of the capital
18
budget than Logue had envisaged.
The Mayor, in calling the Logue report "a brilliant and
penetrating analysis," again rejected the idea of the Planning
Commission being absorbed by a development agency. "Planning
is not concerned solely with physical development and thus
should not be part of the development agency." Nevertheless,
19
he announced that he would accept most of the recommendations.
Professor Charles Abrams, who had headed Mayor Lindsay's
initial task force on housing policy, said:
City Agencies have been organized, reorganized, recon-
sistuted and merged for years. The real question is who
will be appointed and I hope that Lindsay appoints
Logue. He is a good man. 20
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Logue wanted the City Council and the Legislation in Albany
to approve the reorganization before he took the job as head
of the administration. Mayor Lindsay was skeptical about chances
of getting the reorganization plan through the legislature in
Albany and insisted on Logue's immediate decision. "We made
a hell of a commitment to get that guy," said one official.
On November 12, 1966, David Crane delivered a background
report for the Logue Study group, entitled "Planning and Design
in the City". In noting that New York depended too much on mid-
town and lower Manhattan, it argued that new centers of commerce,
culture and community services should be built in or near slums
21
that were to be scheduled for redevelopment. It shared
Logue's contention that an independent CPO would be out of the
mainstream of decision making and that it should become part of
a single agency that would make and carry out plans:
The present CPO, in addition to being isolated from decision
making, cannot initiate projects and must be a sitting duck,
virtually rubber stamping a great majority of decisions taken
by public and private forces.
In the spring of 1966, while work on the Logue Report was
still in progress, Mayor Lindsay appointed a new study group to
consider questions of urban design in both the private and public
sector. Its report, entitled "The Threatened City", delivered in
the first week of February 1967, became known as the Paley Report,
after its chairman, William S. Paley, chairman of the Columbia
22
Broadcasting System. Serving on the group were:
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- the architects Philip Johnson and I. M. Pei,
- Walter McQuade, architect and editor who, later, was to be
appointed to the CPC,
- Jaquelin Robertson, later to become one of the initial
members of the Urban Design Group and subsequently, head of
the Office of Midtown Planning and Development,
- Robert A. M. Stern, later to become one of the initial members
of the Housing and Development Administration's Office of
Planning, Design and Research.
Both Robertson and Stern had been trained at Yale, where they
had been influenced by Vincent Scully.
In urging drastic changes in the City's approach to planning,
the committee recommended that the CPO be given more professional
talent and power to control urban design. The creation of a
60- man urban design force of architects and planners within the
CPO was urged. This force was to identify areas of particular
potential allocated for specific uses in the master plan, and
either draft or commission specific plans. First priority was given
the completion of the long overdue master-plan, defining land
uses and transportation routes. "The City Planning Commission
should become the design conscience and the design brain of the
city government."
The study group proposed to increase the restrictive powers
of the zoning resolution and to transfer the powers of the Board
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of Standards and Appeals to the Planning Commission, proposals
that were endorsed by CPC Chairman Elliott.
Certain critics felt that no matter what plans the city
drew, it had only limited powers to enforce them in areas where
development was controlled by private interests. But Elliott
and the Paley group pointed out that a Planning Commission with
more professional competence would be better equipped to bargain
with private interests.
While lauding Crane's report, the New York Times felt that
the Paley report was overly preoccupied with traditional vistas
23
and views. Four of the authors of the report, Philip Johnson,
I. M. Pei, J. Robertson and R. A. M. Stern, took issue with this
24
view in a letter to the newspaper.
Action on the Paley report was quick to follow. Elliott
established Jonathan Barnett, Jacquelin Robertson, Richard Weinstein
and Myles Weintraub as the nucleus of an Urban Design Group within
the Department of City Planning. The four had worked together
with Elliott in the 1965 election campaign of John V. Lindsay on
a proposal to decentralize city government by setting up Neighbor-
hood City Halls. Elliott instructed the four to recruit their
25
own staff.
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On May 13, 1966, the Mayor said he was establishing a
design unit of "bright, youthful architects" on the Planning
Commission's staff to give it:
... a more articulate, more professional voice in shaping
the face of New York...The planning task and responsibility
must be placed in the hands of experts, who are at once
creative and disciplined, visionary and surefooted when
traversing bureaucratic terrain. 26
Next day, Walter McQuade, architect and editor, was appointed
to the CPO. It was hoped that his expertise and reputation would
give the city more bargaining power with private interests.
Mayor Lindsay and the people of New York have to be
congratulated on Walter McQuade's appointment to the
N.Y.C. Planning Commission. It is a tremendously
important step in carrying out the Mayor's firm commit-
ment to raise the level of design in the city of New
York,
27
wrote Edward Logue. He continued:
This is perhaps an appropriate time to say how very highly
I for one thought of the Paley Commission's Report. It
is certainly one of the best things of its kind that has
been done for any American city - New York is fortunate
to have people of that calibre as interested in this
important subject.
A year before, on April 12 1966, Mayor Lindsay had sworn
Samuel Ratensky to a new six year term as a member of the Housing
and Redevelopment Board and on July 6, 1966, Jason R. Nathan,
an able and experienced urban renewal administrator from
Philadelphia, became chairman of the Housing and Redevelopment
Board and also City Urban Renewal Commissioner. He had turned
down an offer to become top aide to Robert G. Weaver, Secretary
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of HUD, in order to assume this post. At the time it was
speculated that Mr. Nathan would probably eventually head the
development section of the new central agency that was to be
created. However, on November 22, 1966, one year after his
election, Lindsay swore in Nathan to head a new administration
which was to coordinate five departments until city legislation
28
was obtained to create a single development agency.
Donald Elliott became the Chairman of the City Planning Commission
29
and of the Model Cities Policy Committee.
The Lindsay Administration had decided to concentrate its
urban renewal resources on the worst slum areas which had been
30
untouched by previous programs. Whereas under the Wagner
administration relatively limited renewal areas on the outskirts
of the slums were designated, under the new approach larger
areas were designated in which planning consultants working with
a committee of residents were to prepare development plans and
select sites for housing and rehabilitation. These were:
- Bedford Stuyvesant and East New York in Brooklyn,
- Harlem and East Harlem in Manhattan,
- Mott Haven in the South Bronx.
In July 1967, the Housing and Development Administration was
created by mayoral exeeutive order. Before gaining legal status,
it had to be approved by the City Council. Although the Mayor
had wanted the CPC excluded from the fusion of agencies, he
- 187 -
had wanted the city's Housing Authority to be part of the super
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agency. In April 1967, he had said that the City Council, in
demanding the exclusion of the Building Department and the Housing
Authority, seemed to be headed toward action that would take
"the guts" out of his plan to consolidate seven city housing
agencies into HDA:
Well, that's almost the guts of it, out of 12,000 employees,
concerned with the subject of housing, almost 10,000 are
in the Building Department and the Housing Authority, so
it would be, I think, erroneous for the City Council to
leave off or leave out of the reorganization, the Housing
Authority and the Buildings Department. I fervently hope
that reorganization would be more comprehensive than that. 32
The Housing Authority remained a separate entity. There
were to be four separate departments, each headed either by a
Deputy-Administrator/Commissioner or a Commissioner:
- The Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance
- The Department of Relocation and Management Services
- The Department of Buildings
- The Department of Development
In addition, there were to be nine assistant administrators
assigned to assist the administrator. Samuel Ratensky, as Assistant
Administrator for Planning, Design and Research, was to act on
behalf of the Administrator "in all matters of physical planning,
building and environmental design."
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Jason Nathan, HDA administrator, took issue with the policy
of creating additional offices in the upgraded Department of
City Planning, which were handling matters that, in his opinion,
should be taken in hand by the agency dealing with developmental
matters, namely the Housing and Development Administration. For
instance, at the beginning of January 1967, it had been all but
agreed that Richard Buford would be named to coordinate the
numerous planning and housing agencies in the development of
33
Lower Manhattan. However, the HDA Administrator sought to
block the appointment as he felt that a position should not be
created within the Mayor's office to rival his own. But the
Administrator was overruled and Richard H. Buford was subsequently
appointed to head an Office of Lower Manhattan Development. 34
Similarly, in September 1966, Nathan had been in disagreement
with the appointment of Donald Shaughnessy, an assistant to the
Mayor to represent the city's interests in an attempt to harmonize
the diverging points of view of the State and the City in the
development of Lower Manhattan. As these were developmental
matters, Nathan was of the opinion that they should be handled by
35
his administration.
When the Housing and Developmental Administration was establish-
ed a separate design office was set up whose delegated responsi-
bilities were "to act on behalf of the Housing and Development
Administrator in all matters of physical planning, building and
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environmental design." Specifically, the tasks of the Office
of Planning, Design and Research included:
- the formulation and maintenance of design standards,
- the development of area and concept plans,
- the conduct of design review,
- the selection of architectural planning and other related
professional consultants.
It was also to undertake a program of experimental design,
endeavoring to produce through the use of advanced technology,
coupled with creative planning and design, more and better
housing in the public sector, and to set new and higher
standards of achievement in the private sector. Finally, it
was to serve as a liaison between the City Planning Commission
and other City Departments with respect to the City's overall
design goals and their fulfillment.
The Office of Planning, Design and Research also coordinated
36
design for New York's Model Cities vest pocket housing program.
Under the program, smaller housing and rehabilitation was
substituted for wholesale clearance. Sites were selected in the
City's three Model Cities areas by the community acting through
its planners. The Housing was to be built under the Federal
Programs - low rent public housing and 221 (d)(3). The City's
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principal financial contribution was the land write down.
Under PDR's guidance, Gruzen and Partners coordinated the
seventeen architects selected by the Housing Authority to
design the low rent housing. PDR worked on the establishment
of overall design criteria and prepared site plans for each
individual site. Particular emphasis was placed on architecture
that respected the existing character of the streets and the
existing scale of the neighborhood.
In 1968, for the first time since the early 1940's,
low rise public housing began to be built in New York -- not
free standing on huge superblocks, but as infill along streets
-- in accord with the neighborhood development pattern and
with the wishes of the people who lived there.
The vest-pocket housing program was the most extensive
program of its kind thus far undertaken. It was not a substitute
for long range planning, but rather a solution to a typical
urban problem: the gradual replacement of worn out parts.
It was as Robert A. M. Stern eloquently stated:
...an affirmation that once again it is possible for
architects to contribute to the agglutinative process
of urban growth and to relate wholly modern buildings
to those of the past. 38
In a major way, the 1960 zoning was to be a source of
difficulties. There was a collision between the off-street
on site parking requirements and the usable open space require-
ments. These were impossible to fulfill on the type of sites
-191 -
that had been selected, without resorting to expensive-to-build
covered below-grade parking.
In the case of the public housing components of the program,
built by the Housing Authority, the problem was not acute because
a text amendment to the Zoning Resolution had reduced the
required parking spaces by 25% on the grounds that poor people
allegedly had fewer cars. The Housing Authority had, also, in
general, secured the larger sites. In the case of the moderate-
income sites to be built under the 211 (d)(3) program, however,
there had been no similar reduction in required parking spaces.
H.D.A. pushed for and got a lowered OSR requirement, though
car ownership is, if anything, higher in Model Cities areas than
in many areas where high parking requirements still hold.
Subsequently, H.D.A. pushed for permission to provide common
off-site parking for several vest pocket projects.
In 1970, the low rent public housing component of the
program won an award in the annual design awards of Progressive
39
Architecture. The citation noted particularly that the
housing was "destined to retain neighborhood scale and character."
Planning and development had not been unified to the extent
that Logue had envisaged. What leverage then, did the Urban
Design Group have, lodged as it was within the Department of
City Planning, to shape the spatial environment? Their principal
tool was to be innovative application of incentive zoning, in a
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variety of imaginative and resourceful ways.
This Chapter has reviewed the respective roles of the
planning and development agencies in the management of the
spatial environment over an extended period of time. It has
focused on the efforts to create a unified planning and develop-
ment agency along the lines of the Boston Redevelopment Authority.
It has shed light on the various reasons why the proposal was
opposed. It described the consolidation of a number of develop-
ment-related agencies in a Housing and Development Administration
and discussed the activities of that agency's Office of Planning,
Design and Research, in the design of the spatial environment.
It has described the parallel development of the Urban
Design Group within the City Planning Commission, and has
concluded that in no small measure, the increasing use of
incentive zoning may be attributable to the very fact that
Logue's proposal to unify planning and development was not
carried out, and that, as a result, the Urban Design Group
located, as it was, in the City Planning Department, did not
have the kind of large scale environmental design projects that
the Housing and Development Administration was engaged in.
The formation of the Urban Design Group and the emphasis
of its role, is also significant in that it is indicative of a
waning reliance on the conventional urban renewal process.
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Chapter 8
Guiding Urban Growth on the City's Last Frontier -
The Staten Island Experience
This chapter reviews the development trends on Staten
Island and describes various ways in which it was sought to
influence and modify the impact of development on the
spatial environment. The cnapter focuses on the efforts of
the Urban Design Group to improve the quality of environment
through density bonuses for common open space and good site
plans.
Each Spring -- the traditional moving season -- more and
more people from the bursting neighborhoods of the other four
boroughs move to Staten Island, where they can plant tomatoes
and fly kites in their backyards. They live in thirty
communities -- with names like New Dorp and St. George --
that resemble small towns. Said one young Wall Street lawyer,
1
who was looking for a house in St. George:
Spring in Manhattan is loosening your necktie on
the subway and eating hotdogs from a cart on Fulton
Street. I don't want to live like that any more.
Maybe I'm too nostalgic, but Staten Island reminds
me of Independence, Mo., where I grew up -- there's
a real small-town atmosphere here.
By the Spring of 1969, population had grown from 220,000
(1964 figure) to 310,000 and was continuing to climb fast.
The accelerated migration to Staten Island began when the
Verrazano - Narrows Bridge, connecting Brooklyn with Staten
Island, opened in November, 1964.
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The bridge drastically reduced the time it took to get to and
from the island. Driving time from Times Square in Manhattan
to Richmond, in the center of the island, was cut to 40 minutes.
On Easter Sunday, 1969, a woman from Manhattan drove up
to a policeman on Great Kills Road and asked him to direct
her to the nearest farm. "Lady, you're about five years too
late," the policeman replied. "The farms are all housing
developments now." The policeman was not quite correct.
There were still three or four small farms left on Staten
Island. Many new housing developments now line Hylan
Boulevard, where $30,000 homes are set side-by-side on
2
40 x 100 ft. lots.
"No, it's not heaven," said Irving Schwartz, who moved
to Staten Island from Brooklyn in 1968. "But when robins
start nesting in my apple tree, I forget that the cesspool
doesn't work and that I can hear my neighbor's mother-in-law
3
yelling at him.'
Between 1960 and Spring, 1967, more than 12,000 homes
were built. During this boom, the city had no plan for
development. A master plan,mandated in 1938, was still
unfinished in 1967. Furthermore, the city, faced with budget
4
deficits, sold $53,000,000 worth of city-owned land.
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South Richmond is the southern part of Staten Island.
It has been described as "an unparalleled opportunity to
conceive, design and bring into being a better place for
people to grow, to live, to work and to play; as New York
City's last opportunity to create, on a large scale, an
environment for man and his family to match the richness and
5
tradition of the world's greatest city." But South Richmond
is plagued by problems of premature subdivision and land
speculation, which started in the 1920s. Its street patterns,
lot layout, sparse utilities and unkempt condition create a host
of physical and legal difficulties. Except for major arteries,
most streets in South Richmond are laid out in a grid system
as a result of the speculative subdivision of farms and
marginal acreage fifty years ago. These streets include
mapped but unimproved "paper streets." Many streets do not
have adequate grades or elevations and have been developed
without regard to natural terrain or drainage conditions.
Designed as a "grid" to accommodate back-to-back rows of
40 x 100 feet lots, the street system, as mapped, absorbs
30% of all land.
There are approx. 12,600 different mapped parcels. Of
these, 3,000 are owned by the city and are vacant. They were
secured because of non-payment of taxes on portions of pre-
mature subdivisions, made during the land speculation boom of
the 1920s. In terms of acreage, the City's holdings amount to
approx. 45% of the vacant land. within areas predominantly
- 196 -
owned by the City, there are widespread ownerships preventing
assembly of substantial, contiguous tracts. Of the approx.
9,600 tracts owned by private interests, there may be as many
as 6,600 different owners.
In 1966, the City, which, until then, had been selling land
in Staten Island at public auction, halted its policy and declared
a moratorium on such sales. This had the effect of slowing down
leap-frogging development. Moreover, more rigorous health
standards concerning the use of septic zones were imposed. While
these measures, to some extent, resulted in arresting the deter-
ioration of South Richmond's spatial environment, they did not
reverse the trend. City services and public facilities did not
keep pace even with slowed down development.
The most important part of South Richmond is Annadale-
Huguenot, a 1080-acre tract bounded by Arden Avenue, Amboy Road,
Wolfe's Pond Park and Raritan Bay. Vacant land is a scarce
commodity in New York City. Yet almost 70% of Annadale-Huguenot
is undeveloped. More than half of this vacant land is owned by
the city. Left to the usual forces of development, this valuable
land resource ran the risk of quickly being covered with row
upon row of identical, cookie-cutter type houses, of uninspired
design, arranged in dreary monotony along a wasteful grid-iron
street pattern. In a process that Samuel Joroff, the late Deputy
Director of the Office of Staten Island Development,has called
"terricide", trees would be indiscriminately felled, ponds filled,
6
hills leveled, and the shorefront squandered.
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Two zoning districts are mapped in Annadale-Huguenot. In
areas designated R1 - 2, the only permitted residential uses
are single family detached houses on lots with a minimum width
of 60 feet and a minimum total lot area of 5,700 square feet.
In areas designated R3 - 2, residential development of any kind
is permitted. Detached one- or two-family houses must be on
lots with a minimum width of 40 feet and a minimum total lot
area of 3,800 square feet. Approx. 26 dwelling units per acre
are permitted for apartment developments.
In 1963, the Planning Commission had designated the whole
area for urban renewal. In that way the city could have
condemned the land, changed the grid iron street pattern and
the uneconomical plot sizes, and drafted a plan for development.
It could then have sold the land to builders, who would have
been bound by the plan.
Local opposition was fierce:
To people here, urban renewal means apartment houses
-- and Negroes. They left South Brooklyn when the
Negroes moved in. They escaped here. They don't want
any more people on the island. Everybody wants to be
the last person to make it to Staten Island,
7
were the words of one prominent local builder.
While the controversy raged, a group of local residents
filed a suit to stop all building in the area. The State
Supreme Court ruled that the City could issue no more building
permits, because more construction would prevent the city from
drafting a comprehensive urban renewal plan. This ruling was
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reversed in January 1967. Although the decision was appealed,
the Buildings Department was obliged to begin issuing permits
again in Annadale and private, unplanned, construction was
resumed.
In the meantime, Mayor Lindsay had decided that all
available urban renewal money must go to slum areas. In February,
1967, however, he did allocate $200,OOO of city money to draft
a development plan for the area. Raymond and May Associates,
planning and urban design consultants, of White Plains, New York,
collaborating with Shankland, Cox and Associates, planners and
architects of London, England, were retained to draft the plan.
Raymond and May were also planning consultants for Model Cities
in Brooklyn. The plan was presented to the City in October, 1967.
Four alternative planning concepts were prepared and
evaluated. Concept 1 represented an upgraded continuation of
existing trends. Concepts 2, 3 and 4 utilized public land
assembly powers to facilitate a planned approach. While concept
2 would use single-family detached homes exclusively, concept 4
represented the maximum density permitted under zoning existing
at the time.
The emphasis was on apartment development. The preferred
alternative provided a variety of housing types, with an
emphasis on single family development of townhouses and detached
8
homes.
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In areas whose character was determined by the presence
of existing one-family homes, the plan proposed 1,000 new single-
family detached houses, generally on 60 x 100 foot lots.
Wherever possible, the new houses were to be clustered and a
portion of the individual 60 x 100 foot lots utilized to form
common open spaces.
Most of the proposed new housing (3,750 units) were to be
attached twn houses and grouped in small residential clusters of
varying design. Each family was to have private outdoor space,
as well as use of common open spaces, which it would share with
its neighbors in the same residential cluster. Each town
house cluster was to be part of a series of neighborhoods, each
containing between 600 and 1,000 homes, with convenient access
to local shopping.
Each neighborhood was to include one or two 11-story
point block apartments, in order to provide housing for young
adults, older couples whose children had grown up, and other
families preferring such housing. There were to be 400 such
apartments, with 40 to 80 apartments in each neighborhood.
It was thought these apartments could, for example, house
families who no longer needed all the space provided in a town
house, but who desired to remain in their own neighborhood to
continue established friendships and interests.
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A 65 acre shopping and residential complex,.including
25 acres of filled land jutting out into Raritan Bay, around
a 40-acres man-.made lagoon, was to serve as a focal point for
the community. Around the lagoon, the plan envisaged 1,200
dwelling units, "in terraced apartments cascading down to the
water's edge," and town houses with individual boat mooring
facilities. Two point block apartment towers were to mark the
harbor's entrance. To make this possible, it would be necessary
to place the already planned shorefront Expressway on an inland
alignment, rather than along the water's edge as initially
proposed.
A pedestrian walkway and open space system, independent of
vehicular circulation, was to knit the entire Annadale-Huguenot
community together. Each residential cluster's open space was to
be maintained by an association of homeowners. These individual
green areas were to be tied together by a continuous pedestrian
greenway, linking homes, shops, schools and large public parks.
Existing streams and ponds were to become the nuclei of a
neighborhood park system, winding through the entire community
and culminating in the waterfront center.
The walkway system was designed to provide a series of
different experiences as it passed cluster housing groups, crossed
the central park and expressway to ultimately reach the community
center and bay.
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A walk through the new community would typically begin in
one of the residential clusters. Each of these areas provided
a place for young children to play, and a sitting area for adults,
away from heavy traffic. A pedestrian path connected this open
space with the neighborhood shopping area (accessible by car
from the collector road) and passed the point block tower at
the neighborhood center. The shopping plazas were to have
decorative pavements and changes in level separating shoppers
from those relaxing and browsing. They were to be brightly lit,
with banners flying and the splash of water in fountains.
Clusters of trees would provide shade.
As the path continued, foliage alternately hid and revealed
groups of homes of varied design and layout. Each residential
cluster was carefully fitted into the existing topography;
whereever possible, existing trees were preserved. Eventually
the path joined another pedestrian route running through a park
containing a "fenway." Walk intersections were marked by changes
in pavement, special lighting and benches. Colorful information
kiosks gave directions to pedestrians and announced current
events, meetings, movies, plays and other items of community
interest. Public benches complemented by secluded sitting areas,
were provided. The "fenway" was part of a system of natural
streams and lakes which have been preserved and utilized as a
component of a new storm water drainage system.
The pedestrian path led on to the central park, which
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included an open meadow, an amphitheater set into the hill at
one end of a lake, and a lookout tower at the highest point --
a visual reference point for the entire area. The amphitheater
provided a setting for concerts and plays, the lake for row boats
and fishing, the hills as a setting for sledding. An arboretum's
plantings marked the changing seasons. There were playfields,
tennis courts and picnic areas.
The expressway and Hylan Boulevard, which bordered the park
on the south, had a pedestrian bridge at this point. The
walkway then continued on to the community center, passing a group
of houses that had been retained, and, on the left, a school, a
church, a new fire house and the police station. It passed under
the loop traffic road and emerged in the community's shopping
mall on the lagoon.
The vehicular system was to have five parts. An expressway
was to provide long distance connections of a borough-wide or
regional nature. Hylan Boulevard, an existing major artery, was
to act as a pair of one-way service roads for the expressway,
and was to be the major highway link between the community and
other nearby sections of Staten Island's south shore. Three
local intersections between Hylan Boulevard and a loop traffic
distributor were planned. The loop traffic distributor would
connect the residential neighborhoods with one another, provide
access to the major shopping area and the promenade on the lagoon.
This road would also provide access to Annadale and Huguenot,
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the areas two rapid transit railroad stations (which connect
with the Manhattan ferries). The loop road protects existing
houses from the effects of the traffic generated within the new
development. Each of the residential neighborhoods was to be
served by a collector street, connected to the loop traffic
distributor. The collector streets would serve the local stores
and each of the small residential clusters. Finally, the
individual homes would be reached by means of local streets.
In August 1966, the Mayor accepted a recommendation of
the Planning Commission to create an Office of Staten Island
Development. As director, he appointed Holt Meyer, a former
law partner and his campaign manager in the borough, to coordinate
the work of city departments, negotiate with builders, suggest
capital projects and develop procedures for controlling
expansion.
Typical of the problems of the borough is the story of a
builder, who owned 70 acres in the "heartlands" section of the
borough. Since the tract was not served by city sewers and septic
tanks were expensive and inefficient, the builder asked permission
from the City Planning Commission to build a private sewage treat-
ment plant. After lengthy negotiations, the builder agreed that
in exchange for permission, he would change the street layout
in his development, from a monotonous gridiron pattern, to a
9
network of curving and cul-de-sac streets.
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Moreover, the city wanted to build narrow public parks along
several streams, one of which ran through the builder's property.
The builder agreed to preserve the stream for one year, but said
if the city did not build the park, he would cover it up.
The Department of Public Works objected on the grounds
that uncovered streams were dangerous and only agreed to study
the proposal after six months of negotiations. The contract
with a consultant to study the park plan was then blocked by
the Controller, who said it allowed too much for the consultant's
expenses. In another instance, the city allowed a builder to
put in a sewage treatment plant and the builder donated a three-
acre school site. Mr. Meyer then wanted the builder to design
a more attractive street pattern, but he refused. Mr. Meyer said:
We have no leverage left in that case. About the only
way we'll get him to agree is if he wants something
else from us, like a zoning change. Then we can bargain
with him. 10
Bargaining with builders to change their street and site
plans can have only a small impact on the growth of Staten
Island, Holt Meyer said. More sweeping controls were needed,
especially in South Richmond, where 8,300 acres remain vacant.
In Spring, 1967, with urban renewal dead in Annadale, city
planners believed the best alternative would be a quasi-public
development corporation. Using the vast city landholdings as
collateral, the corporation could buy up land -- not only in
Annadale -- but in all of South Richmond. It could, then,
change street patterns and plot sizes, and either resell it to
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responsible builders, or bank it for future use.
"This is the year of decision for Staten Island," Holt
Meyer said in April 1967. "Every day another acre of vacant
land is lost." Building had almost halted in the previous year
because of high interest rates and the court decision, blocking
new construction in Annadale-Huguenot. In 1967, interest rates
turned downward, and the Appe.ate Division of the State Supreme
Court lifted the building ban.
In the Summer of 1966, an advisory group had told the
city: "Our image as a speculators and spoilers paradise is in
great measure due to straight-jacket zoning regulations."
One architect, of low density residences, said the present
zoning resolution represents a rigid straight-jacket for development.
Because it tries to define everything, it provides for an army
camp appearance. It allowed little imagination on the part of
the architect.
In a "rubber stamp style" both the City Planning Commission
and the Zoning resolution attempt to treat all of the boroughs
11
as if they were on the same plane, and that plane is Manhattan.
A member of the N.Y.C. Department of City Planning said that
standard R3 zoning was viewed as "pollution on the island." It
represented the city's inability to deal with builders given a
mapped street and sewer. As much of Staten Island is mapped,
as well as served, by sewers, the city had virtually no power
12
over a developer who wished to build under R3 regulations.
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Zoning is only a tool to implement a scheme. However,
Staten Island was not "planned-zoned" -- there was no scheme.
It developed itself. The city merely zoned according to
existing conditions, making official what was already there.
Staten Island's portion of the city's master plan developed to
accommodate "the city's wish to have a plan."
The most demanded residential form on the island, is a
fully detached, two-family house. It offers most of the qualities
sought in a suburban house. In 1969, a family, with as low an
annual income as $13,000, could probably finance it, due to
the $150 per month credit allowed by most banks for the second
14
rented dwelling unit. The builders contend that they erect
what the public wants. Daniel L. Master, a leading real estate
broker, said:
The responsibility for the kind of development we have
here lies with the public. We'd like to preserve trees
and make larger lots, but we have to sell houses. The
average man is a civil servant from South Brooklyn. He
can't pay for all these things, although builders would
prefer to put them in. The public dictates standards.
The builder only puts up what he can sell. 15
Conventional development on Staten Island is built on
what is called R3- 2 land. Houses are either one-or two-
family, and have front yards of 15 to 20 feet, rear yards of
30 feet, and two side yards, one 5 feet and one 8 feet. The
yard requirements in the Zoning Resolution, serve a dual purposes
To provide light, air, and open space and to provide for off-
street parking. The requirements in the 1961 Resolution
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accomplish the first, but have become progressively more
inadequate for the second. Cars have become larger, car owner-
ship and the number of two-car families have increased, and the
convenience of the front driveway, has resulted in its use as a
parking space, despite its inadequate size. The required front
yard for R3 and R4 is 15 feet. As a result, the typical 18 foot
long car encroaches on the sidewalk. The basis for the combined
13 foot side yard requirement, was to make one side yard at
least 8 feet wide. The wider yard was intended to allow a drive-
way along the side of the house, to provide either a side
parking space, or access to a rear garage. The 8 foot allowance
is no longer adequate because cars are too wide. As a result
of these lot requirements, density for conventional development
is from 10 to 20 dwelling units per acre, depending on one- or
two-family units. The housing market has been heavier on the
two-family houses, because it gives a buyer the ability to
16
buy a house and rent one of the units to help pay the mortgage.
Nevertheless, the two-unit row house is rarely built, because
a two-unit building of marketable size is legal only at R5,
where far more profitable non-complying three-unit construction
is taking place. Only a very small part of the island was
17
mapped R5.
Houses are built on 40 x 100, or 60 x 100 feet building
lots, and are generally on 200 x 600 ft., 200 x 700 ft., or
200 x 800 ft. lot blocks double loaded. On a 60 ft. lot, two
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two-family semi-detached buildings would be feasible. The
apartments usually have one large two-bedroom or three-bedroom
apartment, generally owner-occupied, and a smaller rental unit,
usually one bedroom. Based on construction costs at the end of
1969, and varying land values, the sales price ranges from
440,000 to $65,000, and the required down payment from $14,000
18
to $22,000.
On April 21, 1967, Elliott announced that the Board of
Estimate would vote on planned unit development provisions on
May 24. In August 1967, the Board of Estimate adopted a City
Planning Commission's recommendation, extending the zoning
resolution's large-scale provisions to cover low density
residential areas. Under the new law, the Planning Commission
might waive technical requirements, such as yard regulations
and height restrictions, to permit dwellings to be built close
together in clusters, leaving substantial land areas in a
natural state. In addition, the Commission, with the approval
of the Board of Estimate, was to be able to grant bonuses of extra
floor area, to developers, in return for good site plans, or the
19
provision of common open space.
Although the Planned Unit Development regulations were to
be applicable in many parts of New York City, they were primarily
intended for Staten Idand, which contained more than half of the
City's vacant land.
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The City Planning Commission was to be able to authorize
the following modifications to the zoning regulations, provided
20
that the overall plan was satisfactory to the Commission.
Bulk regulations:
- Floor area and dwelling units, rooms, or rooming units, may
be distributed without regard for zoning lot lines.
- Open space may be distributed without regard for zoning
lot lines.
- Lot sizes may be reduced.
- Yard regulations may be waived within a development.
- Height regulations may be waived within a development,
provided that regulations governing the spacing of buildings
were satisfied.
Use regulations:
- Convenience shopping, restaurants and certain other types of
consumer services, may be permitted within residential areas,
provided that the Commission was satisfied that they represented
an amenity and provided that the total area devoted to such
uses was no more than 2% of the overall floor area permitted in
the development.
- Outdoor swimming pools may be provided in the common open space,
provided that their use is restricted to residents of the develop-
ment and that the pool is located at least 100 feet from the
development's boundary, except that it can be located not less
than 50 feet from a boundary street, if it is adequately
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screened from the street.
Bonuses given by Special Permit:
The Planning Commission, subject to the approval of the Board
of Estimate, might grant bonuses of additional floor space to
the developer, for a good site plan, with or without the provision
of common open space. The bonus for a good site plan is applicable
in Rl - 2, R2, R3 and R4 districts, and can be granted within
the following limits:
- The required open space may be reduced by 10%
- The required lot area per room, or the lot area required per
dwelling unit, may be reduced by 5%
- The allowable floor area may be increased by 7.5%
The bonus for common open space is applicable in R3 and R4
districts and can be granted within the following limits:
- The required open space ratio may be reduced by 20%
- The required lot area per room, or the lot area required per
dwelling, may be reduced by 10%
- The allowable floor area ratio may be increased by 15%,
provided that 20% of the total open space (or one acre, whichever
is greater) be given over to common open space, and provided
that the site design would have qualified for the good site
plan bonus.
James G. Sweeney, a member of the City Planning Commission,
speaking for Mr. Elliott, had told the Board of Estimate that
the CPC had taken steps to allay the fears of many builders that
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cluster-zoned communities might be delayed because of bureau-
cratic snarls attendent in getting mapping and drainage changes.
"To ease problems," Mr. Sweeney announced, "the Department of
City Planning has been working to establish procedures which
would enable builders to get speedy approval from the appropriate
21
City departments." He added:
We are preparing a booklet which should be ready in two
or three weeks, to guide builders through the necessary
steps and outline standards for planned unit development
communities.
We will accompany each planned unit development permit with
a listing of the necessary reviews needed by other city
departments. We will also indicate how long these reviews
should take. Thus a developer will be able to gauge the
time by which he should be able to begin work.
We also will commit the CPC to act on a developer's pre-
liminary submission within 45 days or receipt. We hope
these steps will show a developer that we are just as
eager as he is to see his project completed.
The new planning techniques were not mandatory, but members of
the City Planning Commission expressed the hope that many builders
would take advantage of them.
Key members of the Urban Design group principally concerned
with the preparation of the guide to Planned Unit Development,
included Michael A. Dobbins, Jonathan Barnett, Frank A. Rogers;
with the assistance of the late Samuel Joroff, who was Chief of
Planning, Office of Staten Island Development; Norman Marcus,
Counsel, City Planning Commission; and Millard Humstone, Principal
Planner, Department of City Planning. It was released on May 1,
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Commision's221968, by the Commission's chairman.
The guide stressed a number of features that it expected to
be of great value to the developer and builder. These were:
- fewer and shorter streets,
- more efficient utility runs,
- better drainage, less site preparation,
- more sales flexibility in house types,
- more dwelling units and bigger houses,
- and ability to include shops and stores.
The same features would also benefit the resident of a Planned
Unit Development, the guide emphasized:
- Since P.U.D. permitted the builder to offer houses on smaller
lots, a house in a P.U.D. could cost considerably less than a
comparable house on a larger lot. Concurrently, the easing
of yard restrictions in P.U.D. permitted the builder to
construct a larger house on a conventional lot. In consequence,
the guide argued, a larger house, for less money, was a very
real possibility under P.U.D.
- P.U.D. encouraged town houses, garden apartments, detached
houses, and atrium houses, all of varying sizes, to be built
in the same development. This meant more choice of house types,
more variety of family size and income level in any given area,
and allowed families to move from one type and size of house,
to another, without leaving their old neighborhood.
- In that P.U.D. permitted as much as 30% of the land area to
remain in its natural state, while housing the same number of
families as conventional development and some times even more,
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natural features such as ponds and rock out-croppings, as
well as trees and streams, could be preserved near the places
where people live.
At the same time, the guide pointed out all houses continue
to have their own private open space, which might well be larger
than conventional backyards. The land saved for open space is
land that would ordinarily have been devoted to "unusable
side yards and unnecessary streets."
- Open space created by P.U.D. could be used for recreation areas,
like playing fields and swimming pools and there can easily
be extra open space for schools and community facilities. The
new law alows such facilities to be designed as an integral
part of the residential neighborhood, instead of being in their
own separate locations.
- The community open space of P.U.D. could be used to create
pedestrian greenways connecting houses with schools and larger
open areas. Such greenways could be designed so that they
cross few or no streets, providing safe routes for children
to walk to school, or play space.
While the intersection of two conventional "gridiron"
streets created 16 potential places, where a collision could take
place, the neighborhood loop streets possible in P.U.D. could have
as few as three potential collision points. Moreover, the clear
distinction between through traffic streets and neighborhood
streets, made possible by P.U.D., provided a generally safer
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traffic pattern, with fewer cars moving more slowly in the
areas where people live.
- In conventionally zoned areas, shops can only be placed in
sections with commercial zoning. P.U.D. permits small groups
of shops and restaurants in the middle of residential areas,
giving the kind of convenience often found in the center of
cities, but seldom in outlying residential districts.
An actual site in south Staten Island was selected to
illustrate the full range of site planning opportunities
possible under the P.U.D. amendment. Four alternatives were
investigated and compared with a conventional proposal for
development of the site.
A conventional scheme for development accommodated 1427
single-family houses on about 205 acres. Houses were placed
according to zoning lot requirements, on a street system
previously adopted by the City.
The Urban Design Group described the result as: "a
disastrously barren environment, and all of the natural
character of the site is destroyed."
The first two alternatives that were investigated, showed
developments of about the same density as the conventional
proposal. The third alternative showed a scheme of somewhat
higher density that could accommodate an increased demand for
apartment units. The fourth alternative showed how a maximum
number of units could be developed, using apartment houses.
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Scheme 1 showed the potential of clustering 1431 town
houses on collector streets. The scheme had a horseshoe loop
street system, which eliminated through traffic, used a minimum
amount of land for streets, provided a large common open space
in addition to the open spaces defined by individual clusters.
Scheme 2 showed varied house types on loop streets. Detached
houses, semi-detached houses, town houses and town house apartments,
totalled 1445 dwelling units. They were arranged around a P -
loop street system, in which each loop served only the houses
on it. Within each loop, there was a common open space. The
loops together enclosed a large parkland running along the
ridge and into the center of the site.
Scheme 3 anticipated changing market conditions during the
course of a development time span. It assumed an initial develop-
ment similar to the previous scheme, in the northern, lower
portion of the site, and then a transformation of the market
into apartment units. Three and four-story maisonettes perched
on the crest of the ridge, backed up by six-story terraced
apartment buildings. Rising out of the expanded shopping at the
south center of the site, was a square apartment tower of twenty-
stories. A total of 2800 dwelling units were thus accommodated
on the site. In addition to the surface parking, a sizeable
amount of parking was contained underneath the terraced apartments
and shopping center. More open space was provided than in
Schemes 1 and 2, in recognition of the increased density.
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Scheme 4 had an overall total of about 4500 units. The
apartment types consisted of three- and four-story town houses
and maisonette apartments; five, six and seven-story terraced
apartments; and major apartment structures stepping up from
four-stories, to as high as twenty-eight or thirty-stories.
The built mass was arranged in three wall-like megastructures.
Around the periphery of the site were extensive recreational
facilities. A very considerable amount of land was left in its
natural state.
The application procedure for a P.U.D. generally was to
have two stages. The first stage is a preliminary submission
and response. The second stage is a final submission and
formal action by the City Planning Commission.
During the preparation of the preliminary submission, the
sponsor was encouraged to keep the Commission informed of his
progress and to consult with the staff if any questions or
problems arose.
The preliminary submission was to be made up of both
drawings and written material. Graphic materials required
were extensive:
- A site plan showing existing features: Contours at five
intervals, location and diameter of all trees 6" in diameter
and larger, location of watercourses, ponds, and streams,
existing structures, and roads, and any other features,
such as large rock outcroppings, which might be distinctive
or unusual on a particular site. Scale: No less than 1"=160'.
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- Site sections sufficient to indicate the major site profiles,
presented at the same scale as the site plan.
- An architectural site plan showing proposed streets, lot
sizes and shapes, parking, curb cuts, all pedestrian ways,
placement of buildings and lots, community facilities, and
open space location and treatment. Scale: No less than 1"=160'.
- Drawings or models indicating the three dimensional character
of the proposal, in an accurate way -- either perspectives,
sections elevations, axonometrics, or isometrics in any
combination, or at any scale, that is appropriate for communi-
cating the character of the proposal.
- Required only where a new or altered street plan is included,
as part of submission, were preliminary street and drainage
plans, showing alignment of streets and direction of flow of
storm and sanitary sewer in relation to topography. Where an
official street and drainage plan exists, it should be submitted
for purposes of comparison.
- Preliminary plans of house types proposed for development.
Minimum Scale 1/=
The written part of the preliminary submission was to
contain:
- A statistical summary of proposal, including gross site area;
street area; net site area; number of each variety of dwelling
unit, and total number of dwelling units; floor area per
dwelling unit type and total floor area. Common open space
area and total open space area; and number of rooms per
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dwelling unit type and total number of rooms.
Staging plan: a general time schedule of expected completion
dates oe elements of plan.
- Financial plan: a general description of the intended means
of financing the development.
- Size and scope of shopping facilities, if any.
- Size and scope of any other community facilities.
- Preliminary ownership and maintenance plan of common open
space, if any.
- Certification of ownership of property.
Within 45 days of receipt of a complete preliminary sub-
mission, the Commission is to tell the sponsor whether a final
submission is encouraged. At this time also, the Commission is
to make known any conditions to be included in the final
submission, such as allowance for community facilities or the
need to accommodate street plans to those of adjacent areas.
Moreover, the Commission may request that certain documents be
submitted to the Commission to facilitate coordination with
other City Agencies.
In the final submission, all the drawings from the
preliminary submission had to be resubmitted in an up-to-date
form. In addition, when street and drainage plans are to be
altered, complete drawings conforming to the requirements of the
Borough President, the City Planning Commission, the Department
of Public Works and other appropriate City Agencies must be
submitted at this time.
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The written material was to be resubmitted in final form.
Within 45 days of receipt, the Commission was to either grant
administrative approval or fix a public hearing. Any substantial
changes from an approved plan -would be subject to the same
procedure as new submissions.
Howard Diamond, Architect for Waterside, one of Staten
Island's first P.U.D.s, pointed out that developers and builders
are often not the same person. The building industry is going to
move in a direction of greater specialization. Land speculators
will continue to assemble land. Developers will plan an entire
project, install the utilities and streets, and then sell chunks
23
to small builders.
In December 1969, Larry Simons, the developer of Waterside,
in noting that builders are by nature very conservative people,
said the marketability of a P.U.D. is, at this point, questionable.
The concept really hadn't been tested;
Large builders can afford to experiment with new
things much easier than the smaller ones, because
they are not really playing with their own money; its
their stockholders. But included in their operating
procedure is a safety factor which covers them for a
mistake now and then.
Large builders can more easily accept the wait involved in
24
dealing with the city, he said.
A developer working under P.U.D. must allow for 12 - 18
months in delays. One of the major contributing factors to this,
is the necessity to deal with mapped streets. If there are no
mapped streets on the site, the administrative time required is
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reduced. The need to process the demapping of old rights-of-
way and remapping of new, necessitates action by the Board of
Estimate, which represents one of the largest single chunks
of time. This is really what density incentives try to compen-
sate. The demand for town house type units will probably continue
to increase, and when the administrative procedure for processing
a P.U.D. is polished down a bit, "then the necessary wait will
be worthwhile." The time required could be economically justified.
Nationally, land costs represent 10 - 15% of the total cost
of a house. In New York (Staten Island) land represents at least
20%. Twenty acres of land on the island, bought at builders
terms, might represent a $l million mortgage. This means
$90,000 per year in carrying charges (taxes and amortization)
or $7,500 per month. This is very hard for all but the largest
25
builders to carry.
When choice is reduced to a minimum, such as under the
standard R3, the developer's job is somewhat simplified. No
time is spent deciding which direction promises the greatest
return. On the other hand, however, if demand had fallen off
for the standard R3 type before P.U.D. "developers could have
killed each other off, competing for what would have been left
26
of the market."
When choice to the builder is increased, then, as with the
addition of P.U.D., a safety valve for the developer is provided.
The land for Waterside was first acquired in 1965. Due to the
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controversy over the proposed Staten Island expressway, the pro-
ject was hung up administratively. By 1966, when changes in the
design of the road were made, money was starting to tighten up
to a point where garden apartments were no longer possible. In
1968, Waterside was forced into becoming a P.U.D. because the
physical properties of the site precluded a standard R3 development.
Had it not been for the complete lack of choice, a P.U.D. probably
would not have been built there.
It has been difficult to bring P.U.D. units in at a low
enough price to compete in the same market as the standard R3
house. Due to the costs of delay (taxes, mortgages, increasing
labor costs) and to the additional requirements under P.U.D.
(landscaping, etc.), a three bedroom Waterside unit will cost
$36,900, as opposed to the more conventional R3 unit at
approx. $29,- 30,000. Waterside will have only 53 units. Arden
Heights, however, will be much larger, with approx. 2000 d.u.s.
Due to its size, there may be a chance to bring the price per
unit down by a considerable amount.
There are two ways to approach the marketing of a
P.U.D. Costs can be held down low enough to effectively
compete with standard R3, or it can be made attractive
enough and expensive enough to appeal to a much higher
market. In between is very bad...it wouldn't appeal to
anybody. Waterside is now in the second category. It
wasn't originally intended to be, but costs were forced
up to a point where it fell between the two. Since an
inexpensive unit was no longer attainable, the price had
to be increased (by adding equipment such as air condition-
ing, etc.) to the next plateau. In order to get the
necessary financing, a family of four will have to have
at least an annual income of $17,000.
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The most demanded residential form on the island, a fully
detached, two-family house, offers most of the qualities sought
in a suburban house and, although the price approaches that of
a Waterside unit, a family with as low an annual income as
413,000, could probably finance it due to the $150 per month
credit allowed by most banks for the second rented dwelling unit.
In trying to decide between a P.U.D. and a more conventional
form, the developer must decide exactly what market he is after,
both in economic level as well as housing type. If the P.U.D.
is intended to compete with apartments, it has quite a bit to
offer. However, if it is directed at the standard R3 market,
it does have some shortcomings in the traditional sense.
Privacy, for example, is reduced in P.U.D.'s.
P.U.D. must realistically offer a much upgraded form of
living at competitive prices if it expects to draw those people
who would otherwise not move to Staten Island. One of the
additional requirements of a P.U.D. unit is that it be completely
landscaped. This represents an increased cost from $100 per unit
in standard R3 to $400 per unit in P.U.D. In order for a develop-
ment to take advantage of P.U.D. programs, it must provide for
parting other than just in front of each house. Moreover, more
open space is needed than just the accumulation of chunks thrown
in by each standard size R3 lot, which really doesn't have that
much to contribute. Higher rise structures must, therefore, be
mixed with lower rise town houses.
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On May 1, 1969, the Planning Commission set the date of
May 14 for the mapping of streets for a P.U.D. in the Arden Heights
section of Staten Island:
The street mapping lays the foundation for a new kind
of development in New York,
28
D. H. Elliott explained;
Trees, and the rest of the natural environment will be
preserved in a community that is free of traffic hazards,
with its own large recreation area.
The 168 acre area to be remapped was the same area that
the Urban Design Group had used to show various P.U.D. options
in its booklet.
But three months later, on August 21, the Board of Estimate
voted to hold off action on the development, because one of the
maps required from the CPC had not arrived. This was attributed
to administrative technicalities.
Next Spring, on March 4, 1970, Loew's Corporation Hotel and
movie theater operators, announced plans for construction of
2,025 single-family homes in Staten Island. The development was
to consist of nine clusters, each with 225 houses, surrounding
a 35 acre private park. Laurence A. Tisch, chairman of Loew's
Corporation, said at a luncheon attended by the Mayor at the
Regency Hotel announcing the start of Village Greens:29
Because we're abandoning the conventional street grid,
we can plan an environment for living close to nature.
Until now, this hasn't been thought possible in an urban
setting...
We intend to build a community of town houses (on Staten
Island) with an environment you cannot find near large
urban centers -- especially Metropolitan New York.
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Norman Jaffe, the architect, explained that the project's
origins could be traced to changes in the city's zoning resolution,
accomplished in 1967, making P.U.D. development possible. The
developers said that Village Greens owed a great debt to the New
York City Planning Commission, and particularly to its Urban
Design Group, which had fought for controlled environmental
. 30
planning on sizeable tracts, such as the one in Arden Heights.
Jaffe relates how:
... the original scheme called for small groups of dwellings
related to their own small open space. These groups, in
turn, surrounded the large major open area. The City's
criticism of this scheme was very constructive, suggesting
that the smaller spaces could be related to the larger ones
in such a way as to increase its effective size ...which
improved the scheme while still respecting the basic
concept.
There were to be 13 d.u.s. to the acre.
A green belt was to run through the center of Village Greens,
with the nine villages arranged around it, in a style that was
described as being reminiscent of small New England towns. The
architecture of the houses was to reflect this feeling with stone
and white painted clapboard to be the most prominent exterior
materials.
Jaffe said the town houses would be of contemporary design,
but that he intended them to be natural and "comfortable" in
feeling -- hence the predominance of wood and stone for the
exteriors.
- 225 -
Courtland Paul, the Californian landscape architect, said
his theory in landscaping was "to try tinkering as little as
possible with the natural attributes of the site." Jaffe and
Paul planned the site with what they described as "meticulous
care" and sought to preserve its character of rolling woodlands.
Where trees had to be removed, they were shifted elsewhere or
other trees were planted to compensate them. "We walked the
site and we listened to it," Jaffe said. "We tried to relate
its development to the surroundings, to the area's past history,
and to the experience of new life styles that are influencing
31
what people want in their communities."
The P.U.D. concept presupposes that all necessary services
will be supplied, when residents move into the houses they buy.
Mayor Lindsay noted that in some other parts of Staten Island,
homeowners had complained bitterly about the lack of connections
needed to link into the city sewerage systems. A shopping center
was to be started on an adjacent 6.5 acre site. Borough President
O'Connor said a public school would be built on land set aside
in Village Green.
The $80 million project was a joint venture of Loew's and
J. H. Snyder Co., a Los Angeles Building firm. The developers were
to finance construction themselves, without backing from a large
lending institution. The houses were to range in price from about
$29,000 for a three bedroom unit, to $39,000 for four bedrooms.
The developers expected to draw the first income by Sept. 1.
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Tisch said his company's business was "holding up very
well." Other such single-family units were under consideration
in different parts of the country. "We intend to be a major
factor in the housing business," Tiah said Staten Island offered
a rare opportunity because of the vacant land, making development
33
possible, without uprooting existing homes. "Frankly, we haven't
any answer to the relocation problem," he said, "if we did,
we might build in more crowded parts of town." The developers
hoped that Village Greens would contribute toward preventing
34
middle-income families from forsaking the city for the suburbs.
Subsequently, in 1971, Loew's Theaters and Hotels proposed
a 440 unit garden apartment planned unit development in the
35
Grasmere section of the island.
At public hearings held on a P.U.D. proposal for a cluster
of apartments on the side of Grymes Hill in north Richmond,
owners of surrounding single-family homes expressed fears that
the development would turn into a cheap speculative venture.36
John Poll, head of a "realty consultants corporation," proposed
a 135 unit condominium complex, rising as high as 6 stories on
the wooded 5.6 acre site. The apartments were estimated to cost
$60,000. A spokesman for the neighboring residents announced that
90% of them opposed the P.U.D. Poll was described as primarily
a land speculator who "rarely holds land for a year." The
question was asked how the project would be downgraded if the
$60,000 units did not sell.
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The chief protagonist for the proposals was Christopher
Chadbourne, director of the City Planning Commission's Staten
Island Office, who argued that under existing zoning, Poll could
strip the hill site of its trees and put in 54 homes on narrow
40 foot lots. With a P.U.D. a loop street could be provided
37
and most of the trees saved.
The Southgate P.U.D. promised "all the delights of suburban
country living right within New York City." In this P.U.D.
most of the homes were either detached or semi-detached.
Nevertheless, three quite substantial parks were provided within
widened rectangular blocks.
- "The Richmond" was a two-family fully detached house. It was
a so-called "mother-daughter" home. These homes were popular
because they provided a smaller apartment to the rear of the
first floor, frequently occupied by a parent or parents of the
couple that lived in the master apartment. The cost: $60,000.
- The "Savannah" was a two-family semi-detached house, with a
"master apartment" and a rental apartment, a so-called six-over-
six.
- The "New Orleans" was a two-family fully detached six-over-six
unit.
Arnold Kotlen, in charge of P.U.D.s at the Staten Island
Office, attempted to achieve a hierarchy of different sized spaces,
by increasing the percentage of attached houses, by setting some
detached houses back from the street, while placing others at
38
right angles to the street.
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Peter DePesce, President of the Rosemear Organization that
had built over 900 homes in Nassau and Queens Counties, however,
claimed that it was necessary, from the point of view of marketing,
to have the main orientation of all the homes facing onto the
street. He also resisted any increase in attached homes.
Arnold Kotlen, in noting in December 1972 that he had spent 3-
years working with P.U.D.s and that he could talk for days about
the problems and weaknesses of them, wrote: 39
For the first three years, our biggest problem with
P.U.D.s was in time delays in processing applications
through the various City agencies. The Mayor then formed
the P.U.D. Implementation Council, which is made up of the
heads of the various City agencies.
The purpose is to be involved at the beginning of a
project and help to avoid the problems which we have
found, that can happen at the lower levels of government.
This Council has helped a great deal in its short term
of existence.
One of the purposes of the P.U.D. regulations is "to protect
and preserve scenic assets and natural features." There are,
however, several shortcomings which limit what can be achieved.
- P.U.D.s are optional and have not been utilized extensively.
- Patterns of property ownership, especially those which include
many small or moderate sixed holdings, are more likely to yield
a crazy quilt pattern of common open spaces, rather than any
significant contiguous natural area.
- The amount of common open space that can be pooled from individual
lots is limited by the need for retaining a minimal standard
of open space per dwelling unit on the individual lots themselves.
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- Where building types are confined;, to detached or semi-
detached houses, considerations of privacy limit the degree
to which open space can be pooled.
The experience of Village Green indicates that the
larger planned unit developments are generally better able than
the smaller ones, to achieve a high quality of site planning
and provide sizable chunks of open space, than the smaller ones.
Under New York City's P.U.D. regulations, common open space
is privately owned and maintained for the benefit of the
residents. Many other communities take a different view and
either allow or require all common open space to be deeded to
the municipality. Some communities reserve the right to acquire
or not acquire common open spaces in each case, as deemed
appropriate.
While it may well be appropriate that open space serving
local needs should be private and that the City should not be
burdened with maintaining it, some natural areas may possess
considerable value as a recreational resource. The public
should have access to such areas.
The rolling hills of Staten Island's Greenbelt constitute
such a potential natural resource. A district plan should
designate those areas to which the public should have access
and show the natural features to be preserved.
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Development plans for areas within such districts should
be reviewed.
In order to encourage the assemblage of sites in excess
of ten or fifteen acres, some bonuses should be withheld from
developments on smaller tracts. By encouraging or mandating
large planned unit developments, chances of combining the
open space into a system in accord with a district plan, could
be enhanced.
In conclusion, some additional observations are in order.
- P.U.D.s and the utilization of the bonuses, while increasing
common open space, may lead to a reduction in the range of
housing types. The bonuses tend to work toward favoring of
the attached row house.
Attached houses in rows are not particularly suited to the
inclusion of a rental apartment, often a prerequisite pre-
condition in the decision of a family to acquire a house
because the rental will reduce the expense of house
aquisition. Thus the measures may ultimately reduce the
range of people who can afford to move to Staten Island.
A case in point is the Arden Heights P.U.D., where there
is an overwhelming preponderance of row houses without
rental apartments.
- Without wanting to derogate from the laudable concept of
open space, (comnon open space paid for in the form of reduced
private space), there is a mounting body of evidence that
sizeable amounts of utilizable private open space is an
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increasingly cherished asset in order to both "plant tomatoes
and fly kites in -their backyards."
Taking this into account, it might be also desirable to
consider policy measures to enhance the usefulness of the
open space of the typical 40 x 100 and 60 x 100 lots. In
certain situations, zero side and front lot lines might be
considered. This could enhance the usefulness of the
remaining open space. It would, of course, call for certain
specific designs. Another way to increase the flexibility
of the typical 40 x 100 and 60 x 100 foot lots would be to
provide incentives for pooled offsite, but nearby, parking.
Although the Urban Design Group worked out exemplary techniques
and aids to expedite the processing of P.U.D., good site
plan and common open space bonus applications, the fact
remains that the principal beneficiaries will still tend to be
the major developer with a large scale of operations, because
of the considerable amount of time that is still needed for
processing in spite of the efforts of the city to reduce the
time needed.
Although the Urban Design Group went to considerable lengths
to make clear what it understood by good site plans, the
concept still is overreliant on administrative discretion.
Moreover, the examples the Urban Design Group shows in its
booklet do not include a variety of examples for smaller and
intermediate sized parcels.
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Given the fact that many streets - "paper streets" .-are
already mapped and sewered, an additional avenue for the
city to explore would berather than to demap and remap
entire sections, to proceed more parsimoniously by making
incremental modifications to the existing basic system
prior to redevelopment. There is a wider range of options
in such a process than might be expected at first glance.
For instance, loops and cul de sacs could be created, to
deter through traffic, streets could be jogged, superblocks
could be created by demapping just one street and so on.
Such an approach would have the added advantage of
enhancing future adaptability in the event, for instance,
of development to higher densities with garden apartments or
elevator apartment buildings.
The approach would be helpful for the smaller builder as
well in that time would be saved and the pressure to assemble
large contiguous parcels would be alleviated.
Finally, it would reduce the cost of moving from the inner
city to the suburbs, while at the same time maintaining the
high standard of quality of the surrounding spatial
environment.
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Chapter 9
Take-Off at Times Square:
The Special Theater District - Process and Issues
This chapter examines what was at issue in the creation
of the Special Times Square District. This district was the
first of the Special Districts in which expanded use of density
incentives was applied.
In 1965, the Times Tower, a wedge shaped sliver of a
building on a site bounded by Broadway obliquely intersecting
7th Avenue and facing onto Times Square, was reconstructed. It
was rechristened the Allied Chemical Tower. Some observers
saw that this was the initial catalyst to the redevelopment
of the Times Square area. "There was a breakthrough," said
Robert W. Dowling, the financier, "that put the stamp of approval
1
of a great American company on the entire area."
Since 1904, when it was put up in the heart of the theater
district at Times Square on a site on the west side of Broadway
between 44th and 45th Streets, the Astor Hotel had lodged
stage stars, producers and other celebrities. In 1958, an
investment group, Astor Associates, bought the hotel from
William Zeckendorf, whose company, Webb and Knapp, continued to
lease and operate it. When W. & Ks. over-extended financial
obligations forced it into bankruptcy proceedings in 1965,
2
Astor Associates took over operation of the hotel. The
following year, in 1966, the property was sold for about
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$106 million to Sam Minskoff & Sons, office and apartment
developers, who planned to erect an office building on the
site. From the point of view of zoning, the site constituted
a split lot.
At the time that the property was acquired, the first 200
feet west of Broadway was mapped for FAR 15, whereas the
remaining 150 feet of the 350 deep site was located in a buffer
zone; approximately 30,000 sq. ft. or a little less than 50% of
the entire plot of 65,760 sq. ft. was in an area which would
only yield to a builder 2/3 of the rentable area in a FAR 15
district.
On May 5, 1966, Minskoff's architects Kahn and Jacobs
submitted, on behalf of their client, a written request to the
City Planning Commission that the entire plot be mapped to a
3
FAR 15 designation. Granting of the request would "result
in considerable benefit to the area and to the City -- in
improving the appearance of Times Square," the architects
asserted in noting that it was the intention of the owner to
erect "a building of notable architectural adornment."
Millard Humstone, of the Department of City Planning,
drew up a report arguing against remapping on the grounds that
the subway system was already overburdened, that sidewalk
4
pedestrian congestion was already too great. The request
was denied by CPC Chairman William Ballard, a holdover from the
Wagner Administration, who had gone out of office in the previous
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fall. Sam Minskoff had been a major contributor to the new
mayor's election campaign. Ballard was succeeded by Mayor
Lindsay's new appointee, Donald H. Elliott. Subsequently
on November 30, 1966 the CPC, in noting that the requested
extension of the FAR 15 area would provide an increase in the
permissible floor area, "in harmony with current trends of
development in the Times Square area, and that Shubert Alley
would continue to remain open as a private right of way,"
5
reversed the former denial.
This would permit addition of approximately 170,000 sq. ft.,
equivalent to the amount of space that could, in a FAR 18
district, be built on 9,444 sq. ft. of land. At a prevailing
land price of $300 per sq. ft. this amounted to a bonus of
$2,833,200. But in 1966 the mortgage market collapsed and
Minskoff could get neither financing nor a primary tenant.
Richard Weinstein, one of the first architects in the New
York Department of City Planning Urban Design Group which was
established in May 1967, relates how its first members were just
settling into their jobs when an application for a zoning change
on the site of the old Astor Hotel was brought to their attention,
6
i.e. the Minskoff property. "Someone told us," Weinstein relates,
"that Mayor John Lindsay liked the legitimate theater and was
afraid that an office-building-boom on Broadway would lead to
the destruction of the theater district. Wouldn't it be nice,
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we thought, if somehow we could build a new theater on the
Astor site?"
At the start of World War II, there were 47 legitimate
7
theaters in the Broadway area. By 1967, the number had fallen
to 34. The last Broadway theater that had been built was the
Carter, which opened on Sixth Avenue at 49th Street one block
east of Times Square in 1932. It was demolished in 1954.
Most theaters were built before 1930. The oldest theater was
the Hudson on 44th Street east of Broadway, dating back to 1903.
Closed and about to be demolished was the Playhouse Theater which
had stood on West 48th Street between the Avenue of the Americas
(Sixth Avenue) and Seventh Avenue since 1911. The Ziegfeld
Theater at 54th Street and the Avenue of the Americas had been
demolished to make way for a 50-storey skyscraper. Three other
playhouses, the Morosco on 45th Street, the Helen Hayes one block
north and the Alvin on 52nd Street, all had been acquired or
were in the process of being acquired by real estate interests.
The theater in the Paramount Building was being turned into
office space.
Initially fire regulations called for theaters to be free-
standing. Because of improvements in fire fighting methods and
construction technology, the regulations were changed so that
theaters could become part of other structures.
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Due to the concentration of free-standing theaters in the
Broadway District, densities were low. Yet most of this area
was mapped for densities of FAR 15 and with bonuses, 18, while
the portion west of a line 200 feet west of Broadway was mapped
at an FAR of 10, with bonuses, 12. Consequently, incomparable
potentially achievable density differentials lured as an incentive
to redevelopment. It was felt that a shift in the office building
boom from the East Side to the West Side could wipe out the
entire theater district. "We quickly learned," Weinstein relates,
"that the power of advising the City Planning Commission on
8
questions of zoning was of great interest to developers."
The Urban Design Group began negotiations with the Minskoffs
for a new legitimate theater as part of the office building
complex. James Felt, acting as a consultant, advised that no
bonus was necessary, but that if one were to be granted, it should
not exceed 10%. However, Minskoff, an astute business man,
argued with the Planning Commission that to put in a theater
would be economically injurious to him because of the cost rise
in construction.
At the third of a series of meetings, the developers were
told that the most they could get was:
- a FAR bonus of upto 44 percent above the base level of 15 (or
20 percent above 18, the current ceiling) with concurrent
dispensation from the requirement to provide a plaza;
9
- and waiving of height and setback regulations.
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There is conflicting testimony as to how the bonus was arrived
at. One story- has it that Minskoff had gone downtown to, the
CPC with the 20 percent figure for the bonus in expectancy of
a big battle, and that he had been surprised to have been granted
10
a 20 percent bonus outright.
The bonus program evolved early in the Summer and after a
meeting in August with Mayor Lindsay, the Minsoffs agreed to
the proposal.
Numerous alternative building configurations were tested by
11
the Urban Design Group. Through an interactive process with the
developer's architects, Kahn and Jacobs -- Der Scutt, the chief
designer for the developers' architect was an old classmate of
Weinstein's -- the final design was arrived at. But before the
agitation for the 44% bonus could be considered, it was necessary
to amend the zoning resolution.
Also in early summer of 1967, the Uris Capitol Corporation
was advancing plans for an office building on a plot 89,475 sq.
ft. in size (approximately 25,000 sq. ft. larger than that of
the Minskoff property) at a location on the west side of Broadway
from West 50th Street to West 51st Street. This lot, too, was
asplit lot. The first 200 ft. west of Broadway was mapped for
a FAR of 15, or with bonuses, 18, and the remaining 250 feet --
approximately 49,000 sq. ft. or little more than 50% of the entire
plot of 89,475 sq. ft. -- was in a C6 - 5 (FAR 10) area, an area
which would only yield to a builder 2/3 of the rentable area in
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a 06 - 7 area.
On July 27, 1967, i.e. at a time when the negotiations with
Minskoff were underway, Uris requested a remapping of the 49,000
sq. ft. of his property from a 06 - 5 (FAR 10) to a C6 - 7
(FAR 15) to give him approximately 245,000 sq. ft. of additional
12
rentable area in his proposed building. 245,000 sq. ft. of
additional floor area is the equivalent (in a FAR 15 district) of
the grant of 13,611 sq. ft. of land to Uris, which at $300 per
sq. ft. equals a sizeable bonus of $4,083,300.
The CPC suggested that a theater be included in the project.
Uris agreed and on August 29, 1967, Percy Uris wrote to the
Planning Commission that:
- remapping to a 06 - 7 District (as against relief to be granted
by the then proposed but not yet publicized Theater Amendment)
could be accomplished within sufficient time to enable Uris
to move forward with their project and that therefore remapping
of the site should be undertaken without delay;
- in return the building, when constructed, would provide without
charge against the FAR for a 1500 to 2000 seat legitimate
13
theater.
On November 9, 1967, the Commission remapped the site as a
C6 - 7 district (maximum FAR 18) "in recognition of its potential
14
for high density development."
How did these mapping changes relate to previously enunciated
mapping policy?
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- In the case of I Astor Plaza, the remapping constitutes an
indentation 200 feet wide extending 125 feet into the C6 - 5
buffer zone (FAR 10). Approximately half of the block remains
mapped at FAR 10.
- In the case of the Uris site, however, the buffer zone of
FAR 10 is completely severed.
Some remapping drew accusations of gerrymandering" from
15
the owners of abutting or adjacent properties. Opposition
came from the two Shubert owned corporations:
1) Trueuhs Realty Co. Inc., owner of real estate (the
Winter Garden Theater) located directly across Broadway
from the Uris zoning lot;
2) the Affiliated Theater Building Company, sole owner of
property adjoining the Minskoff zoning lot (Shubert and
Booth Theaters).
16
On September 21, 1967, a Planning Department staff memorandum
recommended against a theater district amendment on the grounds
that:
- zoning must be rational and text and map changes must be
able to justify the privileges granted to individual developers;
- there was no plan4
- the excessive bonus would set an undesirable precedent.
Nevertheless, next day, the general purposes of a Special Theater
17
District were announced. Under its key provision, the
Commission, by special permit after public notice and hearing,
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subject to Board of Estimate action, might authorize in any new
building in the Special Theater District containing a legitimate
theater(s), a discretionary increase in the permitted floor area
ratio not to exceed 45 percent. The precise extent was to
depend on the applicant's handling of the provision of:
- a legitimate theater or theaters, of a size and type which the
Commission deemed appropriate under the circumstances,
pertaining at the time of the application, in order to achieve.
a balance of facilities responsive to the needs of the district;
- facilities supportive of legitimate theater operations, such
as rehearsal, studio or storage space;
- open spaces, arcade, subsurface concourses or subway connections
which will ease congestion in the area by aiding in the
circulation of pedestrians or vehicles;
- restaurant facilities or other amenities useful to the
Special Theater District;
...and which will not have operated to reduce light and
air in its surrounding area or to reduce the total number
of legitimate theaters, except under circumstances where
the Commission shall find that such reduction will not be
harmful to the future of the special district.
The Special Theater District was to include the following
18
specific purposes:
- preserve, protect and promote the character of the Special
Theater district area as the location of the world's foremost
concentration of legitimate theaters -- an attraction which
helps the City of New York achieve preeminent status as a
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cultuvl showcase, an office headquarters center and a
cosmopolitan residential community;
- help insure a secure basis for the useful cluster of shops,
restaurants and related amusement activities which have been
attracted to the area based upon its past and present
character;
- retain and improve the special employment opportunities
generated in the area which compliment and enhance related
City-wide employment-generating activities and which might
otherwise become scattered and diffused outside the City to
its detriment;
- to develop and strengthen a much needed circulation network
in order to avoid congestion arising from the movements of
large numbers of people, among them, convenient transportation
to, from and within the district, and provision of arcades,
open space and subsurface concourses;
- provide an incentive for redevelopment of the area in a
manner consistent with the aforegoing objectives which are
an integral element of the Comprehensive Plan of the City of
New York;
- provide freedom of architectural design accommodating
legitimate theaters and supporting activities within multi-
use structures, which should produce more attractive and
economic development;
- promote the most desirable use of land in this area in
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accordance with a well-considered plan to promote the special
character of the district and its peculiar suitability for
uses related to the legitimate theater and thus to conserve
the value of land and buildings and thereby protect the city's
tax revenues.
The Special Theater District was to be bounded by 40th and
57th Streets, the Avenue of the Americas (Sixth Avenue) to the
east and by a line running in a north-south direction at a point
midway between 8th and 9th Avenues. Don Elliott predicted a
rebirth of the Theater District.
On October 18, 1967, the CPC held a public hearing on the
proposal. Although residents in the area were concerned about
relocation, support for the measure was strong. Bernard Jacobs,
an attorney for the Shubert organization which controlled
17 Broadway theaters and owned a half-interest in another,
expressed reservations and subsequently detailed his objections
19
in writing. Jacobs argued that the amendment had been hastily
contrived and ineptly drawn and was being presented primarily
to meet the commercial requirements of the Uris and Minskoff zoning
lots without a prior study of the prevailing needs of or economic
conditions in the theater or of the impact that subsidized
new theaters would have upon the theatrical community as a whole.
On October 30, 1967, the League of New York Theaters, an
organization of the theater owners and operators, submitted a
20
written statement in support of the Shubert's position.
The League called for provisions
- ensuring permanency of the theaters incorporated in new
office buildings;
- compelling builders receiving a bonus to share the financial
benefits with the tenant operator of the theater or with the
producer by establisging a reasonable rent for the theater;
- encouraging owners and operators of existing legitimate theaters
to continue to operate, maintain and improve their properties
by means of relief in the form of lower assessed values and
lower tax rates.
The League noted that up until then, if a theater owner or
operator made substantial improvements to a theatrical property,
the only assurance that he had was that the improvement would
result in an increase of his assessed valuation.
Lawrence Shubert Lawrence, head of the Shubert enterprises,
said that the amendment as it stood really was "a windfall for the
builder," an observation that prompted Elliott to remark on
Nov. 8, 1967, that "if he owned 17} theaters, he wouldn't be
21
happy with this change either."
Mr. Lawrence noted that his organization had resisted
opportunity after opportunity to tear down its theaters and con-
struct office buildings, because of his feeling that theater was
important. Asked whether the Shuberts might not tear down
some present theaters and install new ones in more profitable
buildings under the new program, should it be approved,
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Mr. Lawrence said: "We might just consider it, we might do it
22
anyway."
Chairman Elliott assured the League that the amendment did
contain guarantees against later conversion of a legitimate
theater in that to get a change, the builder would have to come
to hearings before both the Commission and the Board of Estimate.
"We know what the commission's intent is and we think we have
the muscle to maintain it," said Elliott.
He noted that the Commission would not fix rentals and
that he was not sure what a "reasonable rental really meant,"
but added that he thought the answer to what was reasonable should
23
come with the natural operation of the open market.
In her dissenting report entitled "Brightlights and
Bottlenecks or Will Bonus Conquer All?", Commissioner Spatt said
that before the amendment could be approved, four questions needed
24
to be answered:
1) How will the 44% bonus (FAR 21.6) affect pedestrian and
vehicular circulation?
2) How will parking problems be resolved?
3) What must be done for the present resident population?
4) Is a maximum of 44% necessary and is it a good precedent?
On November 1, 1967, after further consideration, the
Commission, in noting that the tenor of the public hearing had
generally confirmed the results of the Commission's investigation
of the conditions in the theater district and its evaluation of
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the need for the present proposal, voted in favor of the
amendment. Dissent was expressed:
Even supposing the idea of a Special Theater District
were adopted, the Citizens Union feels that such districts
should be encouraged in other parts of the city rather
than in Midtown Manhattan, where overbuilding is already
rampant, and ahy concessions beyond the bonus already
provided for plazas and arcades should be avoided." 25
26
In a motion by Bronx Borough President Herman Badillo,
the Board of Estimate hearing on the proposal that had been
scheduled for November 9 was laid over until December 7. He
said more time was needed for the Board members to familiarize
themselves with the issues.
27
Spatt argued that the Minskoffs would be getting the 20%
bonus that builders normally received for the provision of extra
open space in the Central Business District, without providing
the free and open space, along with the 20% for including a
theater. Actually, the 20% for open space is based on an FAR of
15, which brings the total FAR normally applicable upto an FAR of
18. The 20% of the theater bonus is calculated as 20% of an
FAR of 18. So, in fact, taking the base level of FAR 15, the
sum total of the bonuses adds up to 44% of the as-of-right allowable
bulk.
This was the basis of the Shubert's assertion that the
proposal would provide a windfall. The builder, having received
the extra space, would be able to make much lower rental deals
with the producers.
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With respect to public circulation, Mr. Elliott said
the bonus formula would also be used to obtain improved pedestrian
and vehicular circulation, provision for arcades, subway connections
and uses, which are supportive of the major functions of the
district. Without modifications, the as-of-right applicable plaza
bonus regulations would result in an indiscriminate proliferation
of plazas, largely accidental to the needs of the district.
On the Astor site, the Minskoffs' first proposal included the
usual plaza, which entitled the developers to the 20% bulk bonus.
The Commission was of the opinion that at that specific location
opposite the already open space of Times Square, pedestrian
arcades and a glass gallery over Shubert Alley represented an
equivalent public amenity in terms of circulation space at
ground level. Such spaces would protect ticket queues and
taxi hunters from inclement weather. (This does not take into
account that the plaza bonus was also intended to encourage wider
spacing of buildings to improve light and air. True, one side
of the building faced onto Times Square, but it also faced on
two sides 60 foot wide side streets.)
The additional 20% granted only through a special permit
is intended to encourage the otherwise uneconomical construction
of theaters. Elliott pointed out that on the Astor site, which is
a relatively small plot, the theater would eat into the office
space in such a way as to justify compensation by the complete
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bonus. On the Capitol site, which was larger, the theater
would stand clear and no bonus whatever will be granted beyond
permission to build the theater itself. (However, an FAR of
20.8 was approved. The bonus portion was in return for
circulation improvements).
On December 4, 1967, a few days before the crucial Board
29
of Estimate hearing, Mayor Lindsay, in a letter to the
Citizens Union's executive secretary, responded to that
organization's opposing views:
- In maintaining that no unprecedented high renaissance of
dramatic arts can affect land values to the point where
owners will erect legitimate theaters in place of (or inside
of) office buildings, Lindsay claimed that: "Without a
proposal of the kind that the city is now considering, the
private midtown office building boom will, in a matter of
years, wipe out the present legitimate theater district."
- Moreover, the theater district and allied entertainment
functions such as television, are dependent on proximity for
effectiveness.
- If this unique web of theater-related uses "were to be
destroyed", a unique cultural and economic resource of the
City and the Nation "would be scattered."
- In response to the Union's contention that an undesirable
precedent would be set, the Mayor, in noting that new needs
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were emerging, said that new techniques were being created
to satisfy them, and he "never felt that New York City could
be governed by a static set of rules promulgated at one time."
Chairman Elliott, in his present release of December 7,
30
1967, said:
To assist the Planning Commission in weighing applications
for special permits...there will be a group of recognized
professionals from all segments of the theater industry,
who will work with our new urban design group to formulate
specific details and requirements for each theater and
its related areas.
Chairman Elliott further stated in the release that the special
permit when issued "will spell out in detail all of the space and
related requirements of each theater -- the number of dressing
rooms, amount of rehearsal space, necessary equipment and so
forth."
Late in 1967, at about the same time that the Theater
District amendment was adopted, Robert Dowling, head of the City
31
Investing Company, sold through a subsidiary, the Astor Theater
Corporation, a 53,000 sq. ft. plot immediately to the north of
Minskoff's combined office-theater building. The plot that
included the entire west block front of Broadway between 45th
and 46th Streets and extended 343 feet deep along 45th Street
was large enough, under the revised zoning, for a building
containing 1 million sq. ft.
The plot that included the Mriorosco Theater, on 45th Street
and the Helen Hayes on 46th Street, as well as the Astor and
Victoria film houses, was acquired by Peter Jay Sharp, a leading
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developer.
At the end of February 1968, Sharp had not yet made any
plans for construction. "When we do redevelop it," he said,
"whatever we build will undoubtedly contain at least one new
theater." Mr. Sharp said he had been encouraged by talks with
members of the Planning Commission.
"I was pleased to find an attitude rather than a rule," he
said. "They give the impression...and I think they are quite
sincere, that they want to maintain the theater district where
it is and make it more interesting and exciting."
A second plot, paralleling the Astor site to the south,
was big enough for a large building without any further assemblage.
Early in January 1968, Robert W. Dowling, the financier,
32
predicted a major renaissance on Broadway. "We've only seen
the start of the renaissance so far. It's nothing like the
evolution that is coming."
The first month of 1968 saw a number of developments that
133
would pave the way for a new skyscraper:
- Toffenetti's restaurant, on the south east corner of Broadway
and 43rd Street, was sold to an investing group;
- the East block front of Broadway between 44th and 45th Streets,
containing the Criterion Theater and Bond's and Woolworth Stores,
was sold to the urst Organization, a prominent builder-owner
of office skyscrapers;
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- the southeast corner of Broadway and 47th Street was sold to
the Bowery Savings 3ank;
- a realty operator, Charles B. Benenson, contracted to buy the
northeast corner of Broadway and 43rd Street, a two-storey
building containing a Schrafft's restaurant and several
small shops.
To the south, the run-down movie houses of 42nd Street and their
companion sub-rosa book stores were under great pressure.
34
On April 10, 1968, the CPC held a public hearing on the
subject of the special permits - required under the Theater
District Amendment - for the two projects on the site of the
former Astor Hotel and on the site of the Capitol Theater.
35
The Shubert interests' attorneys continued their opposition:
- Discretion should not be exercised by the Planning Commission
to grant Uris and Minskoff additional FAR bonuses because of
the significant and extremely valuable bonuses previously
granted to them.
- The FAR bonuses were excessive and would afford Uris and
Minskoff a discriminatory and unfair advantage over existing
non-subsidized theater owners or operators.
- The additional Theater District bonus requested by Minskoff to
supplement the previous remapping bonus would yield 236,736 sq.
ft. of additional floor area, which in an FAR 18 District was
equivalent to 13,161 sq. ft. of land, amounting, at $300 per
sq. ft., to a subsidy of $3,948,300.
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- The additional Theater District bonus requested by Uris to
supplement the previous remapping bonus would yield 279,165 sq.
feet of additional floor area, which is the equivalent (in a
FAR 18 District) of 15,509 sq. ft. of land, having a market
value, at $300 per sq. ft., of $4,652,700.
- The market value of the total bonuses, including the remapping
bonus previously granted and the Theater District bonus now
applied for, requested by Minskoff, was approximately $6,781,500
and by Uris approximately $8,736,000.
- Theaters could be constructed only on unusually large plots,
because building an office building over a theatrical auditorium
would be too costly to contemplate. Except for the Uris and
Minskoff plots, there was not a single plot in the Broadway
area, they claimed, large enough for a theater to be constructed
on it in conjunction with an office building without overbuilding,
nor was there, the attorneys claimed, much likelihood that
such parcels could be assembled by any prospective builder.
According to their studies, redevelopment of the Broadway Theater
site (38,000 sq. ft.) or the Winter Garden site (22,000 sq. ft.),
two Shubert properties, could not be accomplished under the
amendment as enacted.
If no property owner other than Uris and Minskoff can
benefit from the Theater Amendment, then not only is
that resolution private and discriminatory legislation
for them alone, they argued, but the ideal of providing
over the next generation a new group of attractive theaters
for our community will never be met.
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- The applications represented the demands of two successful
commercial builders who had had little exposure to the legiti-
mate theater. "In fairness to the community as a whole, their
applications should be denied and a comprehensive study of
conditions in the legitimate theater should be authorized
immediately. Until such a study were completed, no applications
for special permits should be considered under the Theater
Amendment."
- The attorneys contested the Planning Commission's inter-
pretation of Section 74-72 of the Zoning Resolution that
states the CPC in specified districts:
May permit modifications of the height and setback
regulations for developments or enlargements located
on a zoning lot having a minimum area of 40,000 sq.
ft. or occupying an entire block.
Minskoff and Uris requested the following modifications
under Section 74-72:
- The area of the tower exceeds 40% of the area of the zoning
lot (46% for Uris and 43% for Minskoff)
- The area of the tower within 50 ft. of West 50th Street and
West 51st Street exceeds 1875 sq. ft. in the case of Uris, and
the area of the tower within 50 ft. of West 44th Street and
West 45th Street exceeded 1875 sq. ft. in the case of Minskoff.
- The height of the front walls of the theater portion of the
structure exceeds 85 ft.
- The front walls of the theater portion of the structure do
not have the required initial setback distance.
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The attorneys argued that if the relief requested by Uris
and Minskoff was essential to permit construction of an office
building and theater under the Theater Amendment, then the Theater
Amendment was, in effect, limited to plots in excess of 40,000
sq. ft., which, givn the limited number of plots in the Broadway
are exceeding 40,000 sq. ft., was another indication of the
discriminatory nature of the Theater Amendment.
- "No open space bonus should be granted except for open space
actually provided and certainly no Theater District bonus can
or should be granted predicated upon an open space bonus which
does not relate to open space actually provided."
- No group had been organized to work with the new "Urban Design
Group" to formulate specific details and requirements, neither
did the plans indicate that the space and related requirements
of each theater had, in fact, been spelled out as required.
But on April ll, 1968, the Mayor announced the appointment
of two committees to advise the Commission, one on general policy
for the Theater District, and the other for work on the development
of individual projects. This was a formalization of an already
ongoing process, in which members of the actual community had
reviewed the design policy and planning standards. The CPC
36
responded to the Shuberts as follows:
- In noting that the waiver of height, setback and tower regulations,
provided the Commission finds, an improved design resulting from
such waivers without significant effect on surrounding light
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and air, was authorized several years prior to the creation
of the Special District for lots of 40,000 sq. ft. or over,
the CPC observed that a developer was free to seek the Theater
District bonus without such assemblage.
- Recognizing the special problems and opportunities of the area,
it was the judgment of the Commission that a number of preferable
alternatives to plazas existed, such as the theaters themselves,
improved subway connections, concourses for off-street taxis
and automobile lanes, protected pedestrian ways.
Of the two buildings, only the Minskoff Building received a
37
bonus for the inclusion of a theater. Uris had already agreed
38
to the theater at the time of the remapping. Consequently, much
less was at stake for the Uris venture than for the Minskoff
building.
The Minskoff building, on the smaller site, had a complex
39
intermingling of functions. It was necessary to separate the
office building from the theater as there would be a temporal
overlap of occupancy when matinees were held. There was also
the psychological factor to consider in getting tenants. The
theater crowd was to enter from Broadway at street level and also
from an arcade between 44th and 45th Streets. To get to the
offices, one would go by escalator to a lobby on the 2nd floor.
The office portion of the development was to be on the
westerly part of the plot and was to rise 32 storeys. The portion
of the development fronting on Broadway was to house two floors
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of commercial uses and a legitimate theater, having a seating
capacity between 1,600 and 1,800 seats. There was to be a
five-storey lobby overlooking Times Square through a glass wall
ringed with balconies.
A 1,500 seat movie theater was to be located below grade
under the legitimate theater. Three restaurants are also
contemplated for the development. One restaurant was to be
located on the legitimate theater roof with a terrace overlooking
Times Square, a second restaurant fronting on a widened Shubert
Alley, the third restaurant on a pedestrian arcade lined with
shops running through the building, parallel to Shubert Alley.
Whereas in the case of the Astor Building it was the theater
itself that received the bonus bringing the FAR up to 21.6, in
the case of the Uris building it was a block-long underground
concourse extending west from the IRT station on Broadway to
the IND 50th Street station on Eighth Avenue that earned the
40
bonus, bringing the FAR for the Uris Building up to 20.8.
It was possible to enter the office tower or theaters from
either subway without getting out of doors. Lestaurants, retail
stores and other consumer services were to be provided on the
concourse and street levels of the development.
41
After thorough review of all the factors involved, the
Commission found that there was "justification to increase the
permitted FAR to 21.6 as requested by the applicant and to modify
the height, setback and tower regulation as requested" provided
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"the development went forward substantially as proposed. If
the office tower portions of the premises were completed prior
to the theater, the certificate of occupancy should be limited
to a maximum floor area ratio of 18."
Uris planned two legitimate theaters on the westerly portion
of the zoning lot. The large theater, to be located above grade,
will contain between 1,600 and l,d00 seats. A smaller experi-
mental theater with a seating capacity of between 350 and 650 seats
was to be constructed below grade under the larger theater. It
was anticipated that the experimental theater would have several
performances during the course of the day. One-act plays or
small revues might be staged during lunch hour and at about
5.30 p.m., with performances of straight plays in the evening.
The theater entrance and lobby were to open onto a 40 foot
wide arcade running north and south through the development and
linking two plazas which adjoin the office tower on West 50th
Street and West 51st Street. Stairways leading up and down to
both theaters were to be located in the lobby. The arcade was
to be bordered on its westerly perimeter by a 30 ft. lane for
automobiles and taxis. The plans also called for two sunken
plazas on the 3roadway frontage with direct connections to the
IRT subway. The station will be open to direct daylight from
the plazas.
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The two developers agreed "to periodic progress reviews
with the CPC on the design of the theater...in the course of
which, with the applicant's concurrence, the Commission might
make minor changes, modifications, amendments to the standards
and specifications, as long as they were consistent with the
purpose of the amendment."
On the Uris site the theaters stand clear of the actual
tower, reducing construction costs and providing very large
floor areas of 40,000 sq. ft.
The Uris-Capitol Building on the site of the former Capitol
movie theater was to be a 44 storey tower on a 89,476 sq. ft.
site, containing 1,861,000 sq. ft. for which an FAR of 20.8 was
set or a bonus of 5.8 above the district base of FAR 15, exclud-
ing the 107,900 sq. ft. of theater space provided. One Astor
Plaza was to be a 55 storey tower containing 1,420,508 sq. ft.
on a 65,764 sq. ft. site for which the city set an FAR of 21.6,
in exchange for 76,900 sq. ft. of theater provided.
On April 25, over the continued opposition by attorney
Bernard B. Jacobs representing the Shubert interests, the Board
of Estimate approved permits that would let Astorill Associates
43
and the Capitol Corporation go ahead with their projects.
Spokesmen for the Investing Builders' Association, Inc., and
44
others said the proposed theaters were much needed improvements.
Although Manhattan's Borough President had voted for the legislation
in the Fall, Manhattan's vote was now cast against the two
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permits. Leonard Nf. Cohen, Manhattan's Deputy Borough
President sitting in for 3orough President Percy Sutton,
said the city had done much over the years to encourage big
builders and not enough for smaller builders.
46
According to Der Scutt, who designed One Astor Plaza for
Kahn and Jacobs, the architects, the Minskoffs were in 1970
secretly very bitter about One Astor Plaza because they had
to throw out a design that they had had prepared by Kahn and
Jacobs adhering to the zoning regulations prior to introduction
of the Special Theater district legislation. The site was probably
too small, at 65,000 sq. ft. The theater had to be packed into
the office space which necessitated expensive trusses to support
the weight of the tower. Der Scutt said it was absolutely wrong
to think that the developers were in any way getting a windfall
profit. With the additional steelwork and trusses, the building
was much more expensive than anticipated, costing several million
dolllars more. Moreover, the added time involved had led to the
Minskoffs missing the rental market that was very strong when they
conceived their initial plans.
Der Scutt said the incentive zoning to stimulate theater
construction failed because it was not able to computerize
additional costs:
If the Urban Design Group can put as much specific effort
into determining the actual FAR incentive as they have in
envisioning the broad scope of the idea -- that is, into
implementing the process into uncovering the hidden com-
plexities of incentive zoning and making it fair and
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equitable, this will prove the most brilliant urban
planning idea of the decade.
47
What seems to be the problem according to the co-designer
of the American Place Theater in the new Fisher Building is that:
The formula determining what the builder must provide in
return for the bonus to be granted must somehow be made
more exact. With construction costs rising at the rate
of 3 percent per month in the city, a developer cannot
afford to spend the time to negotiate a lengthy agreement
in the way the city now requires.
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The Regional Plan Association lamented the plight of the
relatively low height area of the theater district -- threatened
in 1967 by an influx of high building. In 1967, the theater
district provided a vivid visual contrast to the office towers
to the east, by virtue of its smaller bulk and the fine-grained
detail of its activities. The area was a strong orientation
element. Low buildings permitted major focal points outside the
area, such as Rockefeller Center, Grand Central Station, Park
Avenue, to be seen and recognized from within the area.
Such low areas have an important functional as well as
visual aspect. The Times Square area harbaod a wide mix of
needed and specialized activities, ranging from printing to the
theater and including a host of eating places, large and small,
and scores of stores.
A spokesman for the Regional Plann Association expressed
doubts on bonuses for theater as they would tend to encourage
very expensive theaters, suitable primarily for musicals.
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Renting new theaters is going to be more expensive and
thus there is a danger of pushing theaters out of the
Broadway area. The developer would then apply to the
CPC for permission to convert his theaters to offices.
Even if the theaters were successful the activities
relying on low cost space that provide so much of the
diversity and uniqueness of the area, music stores,
electronic stores, inexpensive cinemas, restaurants,
book stores, will be driven out.
The Theater District legislation substantially enhanced
the potentially achievable intensity-of-use differential, and
consequently contributed to accelerated change. Concomitantly,
it was an active deterrent to keeping up the low intensity-of-
use in the area.
On one of the midtown blocks where major office structures
were going up, 22 small restaurants had been dislocated.
50
Carlisle Towery, an urban designer with RPA, found out that
some of the small firms doing business prior to the changing
of the area could even have met the high payments for rents
demanded by the major developers. However, these developers
wanted larger clients. The proliferation of small clients was
too much trouble. "Corporations look for image. The builders
keep hitting their winning combination: glass buildings and
marble banks. The banks pay high rent, take long leases, close
early - no garbage, no rats. They're ideal tenants for prestige,"
51
said Carlisle Towery.
In consequence, even with the theaters, Broadway would still
only be a repetition of the Avenue of the Americas. The zoning
bonuses offered by the city for including theaters in office
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buildings can still produce a "clutch of routine office
buildings," and the continuing spread of what the Regional Plan
Association labeled slab city.
52
RPA warned that the "gradual creep of offices threatens
to produce massive single purpose areas." Such areas are a
"vacuous visual environment." The city needs to keep focal
"low points" among its "coalescing peaks," the powerful clarity
and identity of CBD clusters such as Grand Central and Rockefeller
Center are endangered. "If the theater district is replaced by
office slabs due to short term pressures, the cost will be felt
in the long run...The preservation of low areas among the high
has both economic and amenity benefits for a headquarters environ-
ment."
53
RPA suggested an alternative future for the area, in which
it envisioned Times Square as a tree lined plaza, full of signs
with chiefly modern, low buildings and Broadway closed to vehicles
from 59th to 23rd Streets.
RPA would have liked to have seen a leapfrogging of Broadway
and 7th Avenue and encouragement of growth at 8th Avenue and West
of 8th Avenue. Instead, the march westward of offices is being
slowed down by the great incentives offered for office construction
by the theater district legislation, which discourages keeping
up the low intensity uses and accelerates rebuilding in the
Times Square area.
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In spite of the predictions of the Shubert Interests'
attorneys that no more projects would result from the Theater
District legislation, they did lead to plans for a fourth new
legitimate theater. On September 25, 1968, the City Planning
Commission scheduled a public hearing on plans to include a
54
new home for the American Place Theater in a new office building.
Fisher Brothers 47th Company filed an application for the
grant of a special permit involving modifications of the height
and setback regulations, and authorization to increase the
permitted floor area ratio for a proposed development, on a zoning
lot of 42,049 sq. ft. located on the west side of the Avenue of
55
the Americas from West 46th Street to West 47th Street.
The flexible 300 - 400 seat experimental theater was to be
below street level with access from a 50 foot wide pedestrian
plaza running through the block from 46th to 47th Street. It
was intended that the theater operate 52 weeks of the year with
performances possible at lunch hour, at 5.30, 7.00 and 9.00
o'clock. A restaurant was to be located in a structure bridging
the through block pedestrian connection and a sidewalk cafe was
to front on the pedestrian walk.
The office portion of the development was to be set back
10 ft. from the property line on the Avenue of the Americas and
15 ft. on the side streets, and to rise 42 stories above grade
plus 2 floors of mechanical penthouses.
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Because the site was less than half the size of that of
the Uris development, it was necessary for Fisher Brothers, in
order to achieve an economic floor size, to increase tower
coverage. They filed for an increase under section 74-72 of
14% from 40% to 54%.
The applicant was to construct a basement concourse from the
Sixth Avenue (Avenue of Americas) subway entrance and West 47th
Street to a line beneath the lobby of the office tower from
which it will be accessible by escalator. A corridor of space
was to be reserved extending southward through this basement
to connect with future concourse developments. The system
would therefore permit pedestrian movement northward through
the basement concourses of projects planned to the north and
connecting to the Rockefeller Center concourse system.
56
The applicant requested the Commission to authorize,
pursuant to the provisions of the Theater District Amendment,
Section 81-06 of the Zoning Resolution, an increase in the
permitted floor area ratio to 20.8. The request was granted under
the condition that the maximum FAR be reduced to 20 not later than
Dec. 31, 1974, through demolition of existing structures on the
lot.
In the Summer of 1969, on July 24, the New York Times published
57
an article entitled: "Planners Ask: Will Success Spoil Time
Square?" in which the views of key developers and public officials
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were quoted. The general tenor of the article was that precipitate
change was imminent.
- "The change has begun in the theater district," said Robert
W. Watt, president of the Broadway Association. "Let me tell
you, its going to go faster than Third Avenue, faster than
Sixth Avenue."
- "Times Square is ready for change," said Henry H. Minskoff,
who foresaw "a new office and cultural center that will make
the Square much more attractive, pleasant and comfortable."
He believed that this and other new buildings would replace
the "hodgepodge of small buildings and narrow sidewalks. A
touch of the old glitter will remain," he thought, but the
whole square will be "lifted to a new level of beauty and taste."
- "I would be very much surprised if in the next five to ten
years roughly every site facing Times Square is not rebuilt,"
said Richard Weinstein of the Urban Design Group and one of
the prime movers behind the Theater District legislation.
58
Although the Mayor's office welcomed change, it said it
did not want to see the sure-fire Times Square formula that
attracts millions ruined. "The thing about Times Square that is
so wonderful is its haphazard vitality, its virile intense
kaleidoscopic variety, its popular low brow vulgarity..the
20th Century ought to be able to have a great outdoor Fun Palace."
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A sizeable portion of the new construction within the Times
Square area was not availing itself of the special bonus
provisions. One major office building directly across from
1 Astor Plaza was started substantially later than 1 Astor Plaza
but was completed much earlier. No special permits were sought
under the Theater District Amendment by the developers, Arlen
Realty. Consequently, much time was saved. The block housing
Schrafft's and the Claridge Hotel from 43rd to 44th Street was
59
expected to be home to still another tower. Just south of
Times Square, a 42 storey office building was under construction
at 1411 Broadway, on the site of the former Metropolitan Opera
60
House. Just to the north of the square, a 42 story office
building was well advanced at Broadway and 52nd Street, and
a 41 story building had recently been opened at 1700 Broadway
61
at 54th Street.
In the case of the Bernstein Building at 42nd Street and
6th Avenue facing Bryant Park -- and within the Theater District
-- the OPC was considering granting a bonus for the inclusion
of a ballet school. When the ballet school did not materialize,
it was decided to give the bonus for a through block connection
62
instead.
An added complication led to an important zoning text change.
The developer had acquired fee ownership of the adjacent Wurlitzer
Building, but as there was a lease that had not expired, and the
tenant was not willing to relinquish it, the developer was not
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able to go ahead with the building unless a text change was
effected, allowing him to borrow FAR from the building that he
owned, but from which he could not evict one of the tenants.
A bond was given insuring that the building would be torn down.
Two of the top floors of the new building were to be kept
empty until the time the building would be torn down. (Millard
Humstone, formerly of the Department of City Planning, said that
in 1961, there was no thought that every parcel could be developed
to its full potential. This concept has been changing as is
expressed in the increased transactions involving transfer of
airrights.)
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Shortly thereafter, on 22 Jan. 1970, the Theater District
text was amended to meet a new situation. Height and setback
modifications applied only to lots 40,000 sq. ft. and over.
The Shuberts wished to develop an office-theater structure on
a lot of 38,000 sq. ft. The text was altered to allow modifications
of the height and setback regulations on lots less than 40,000
sq. ft. if "distribution of the bulk of the total development
permits adequate access of light and air to surrounding streets
and properties" and if such modification "is necessary to achieve
good design objectives."
This modification of the zoning resolution was a prerequisite
for the Shuberts to advance plans for a combined office building
on Broadway between 52nd and 53rd Street. The 1,800 seat underground
theater in the 43 story building was to be, according to the
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Commission, "the showcase of the Shubert organization in New
York City." A midblock through block walkway from 52nd to 53rd
Street was also to be provided. At the same time, steps were
taken toward creation of a walkway, a continuation of the privately
owned Shubert Alley between 44th and 45th Streets, abutting the
Shubert and Booth theaters, that it was hoped would eventually
link the new Shubert theater with the one at 44th Street.
"It may be straight, it may be crooked, it may bend around
buildings along the way but it's a real possibility," a
Commission spokesman said. At the walkway's future northern
terminal, there was to be a glass topped atrium leading to the
office entrances, "a space that's alive during the day and not
just alive with the theater," said Bernard Spitzer, the building
sponsor and developer. The FAR was set at 21.6, the maximum
achievable under the Theater District legislation.
The creation of the walkway was to be a key objective in
a proposed design overlay district. As rebuilding was proposed
along the line between the pair of one-block walks, the Commission
would bargain for the creation of a continuous pedestrian walkway.
Apparently a prime motivation for the later discarded overlay
concept was that substantial FAR grants would be continued to be
needed for further theater inclusions. To get at the same time
special desired design features, FAR increases over and above
the 21.C ceiling would be necessary.
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Midtown urban design staff tended to view the Theater
District legislation primarily as a use district, in spite of
the Uris pedestrian concourse precedent. In this manner, the
design district was viewed as an overlay over a use district.
Had there been a continuing unabated demand for theaters at the
same time as a need for costly design features, the urban design
staff might have continued to uphold the dual district concept.
However, with the decline in demand for further theaters, the
bonus envelope could be allocated to design improvements.
In late summer midtown urban design staff were still anticipating
further theaters. Consequently, it was contemplated that a number
of requirements would probably have to be mandatory.
"As with the theater bonus, the FAR is already 21.6, and we are
65
running out of bonuses."
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In January 1971, Mayor Lindsay announced that his Office
of Midtown Manhattan Planning and Development would join with
a committee representing the Broadway Association and twenty
other Times Square organizations to formulate guidelines for
future development of the Broadway - 42nd Street area. The
committee had urged the Mayor to extend the Special Theater
District zoning amendment of 1967 to cover redevelopment of the
whole Times Square District.
In summation, instead of merely being concerned with the
uses of the theater district as they then existed, the amended
Special District would address itself to design problems of the
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area.
The office felt that the 1961 ordinance was not adequate
to handle the specific nature of the problems in Midtown Manhattan.
Uses were seldom uniform in areas. There might be 10 or 12
different areas, each with specific and characteristic traits,
but as regards to mapping, bulk, PAR, and use, they were all the
same.
Therefore, in addition to the Times Square Special District,
several other special design districts were to be simultaneously
presented to the CPC. Together they would represent a virtual
67
rezoning of mid-Manhattan.
The first of the new theaters to open -- towards the end
of 1971 -- was the American Place Theater in the Fisher Brothers'
building, which was the third of the projects to be started under
the Theater District legislation. Early in January 1972, One
Astor Plaza was 80% rented up, but a month later, whole floors
68
were still available at rentals of $6 per sq. ft.
One important tenant was a major advertising agency. A
spokesman for the city's Department of Commerce and Industry noted:
"Companies going into that building are making a major commitment
to the rejuvenation of the neighborhood. It's the first chapter
69
in a promising West Side Story."
W. J. Grant Co., the retail chain, agreed to take space in
One Astor Plaza only after that building's owner took over Grant's
70
leasehold on 200,000 sq. ft. in a building more than 30 years old.
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"We wouldn't have made a move anywhere without resolving
the problem first," says Harry E. Pierson, Grant's vice
president for store expansion.
What were the prospects for the theaters themselves?
In 1969/70, Broadway theater had one of its worst seasons
ever financially and many contended, artistically too. Only
69 new shows opened in that season. The 1970/71 season saw
the opening of only 46 new shows. In September 1971, the dearth
of new productions left several theaters unbooked. Prospects
71
were bleak for Off-Broadway as well.
In 1970, while Broadway theaters were going empty, producers
were lined up two and three deep, waiting for space in Off
Broadway houses. One good reason: the average capitalization
for a Broadway show in the 1968/69 season was $230,000 and for
Off Broadway, it was $30,000. Seymour Vall, a theatrical
producer, believed that the rising costs would force Off Broadway
producers to look for large theaters -- from 300 to 500 seats --
and Broadway producers to look for smaller ones.
Vall was constructing a complex of five theaters on
13th Street. Several new theaters have been recently installed
in hotels and several others are planned. One new theater --
the Roundabout Theater -- was installed in the basement of a
supermarket serving a cooperative housing complex in Manhattan's
72
West 20's.
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"Let's stop beating around the bush," said one theater
operator, whose midtown theater fell outside the magic rectangle
of the Theater District. "This is nothing more than subsidy, a
73
very substantial government subsidy to theaters."
Personally, he favored setting aside for theaters a fixed
portion of the revenues the city collects from hotels and restaur-
ants. The theater, he urged, cannot look for relief to the craft
unions, which have to contend with erratic employment patterns,
or to the theater owners, whose houses might be dark six months
of the year.
In the third week of January 1970, only 15 theaters were in
operation with officially opened shows, and of those, 8 were taking
in over the box office only 2 or less of their potential gross
74
receipts. Percival Goodman, a planner, in taking the hard line,
75
said that the theater as an art form was moribund, doomed by the
onslaught of films and television and that no new life would be
injected via massive doses of bricks and mortar. The theater should
be subject to the usual laws of the market place.
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In January 22, 1971, the Mayor made the following remarks
at a meeting with the Broadway committee:
Broadening the zoning amendment to create a special Times
Square District would move us closer to our goal of revita-
lizing this symbolic heart of our city and restoring it as a
safe, pleasant and exciting place to work in or visit. We
anticipate intense redevelopment similar to that along the
Avenue of the Americas. The task is to integrate New York
City's entertainment center and midtown's office core, so we
can protect the whole of west midtown from becoming a sterile
forest of office towers devoid of retail shops and nighttime
activity.
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The pressure on the theater district had been largely
induced by the city itself, through its zoning policies and the
willingness to relax previously enunciated zoning principles.
Ostensibly aimed at preserving the theater district, the
remedy proposed to accomplish this objective tended in itself
to increase the pressures on the theater district, because of the
unprecedentedly high achievable intensity-of-use differentials
that it fostered.
Developers had put together assemblages straddling zoning
district boundaries. The portion of the parcel in the lower
density district could be acquired at prices reflecting the
lower intensity-of-use allowed.
The Theater District legislation provided an expedient
way to rationalize an affirmative response to a request by the
Uris interests, major financial backers of the incoming mayor,
for remapping to allow for a particularly large intensity-of-use
differential to be achieved, a request the fulfillment of which
would otherwise have drawn accusations of illegal spot zoning.
The initial Minskoff request was in a slightly different category.
In that the site was directly at Times Square, and represented
an indentation into the lower density buffer zone, rather than
a complete severing, as in the case of the Uris request, the
remapping request, although initially denied, was more easily
justifiable.
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The Theater District legislation, together with prior
remappings, contributed to the creation of appropriate pre-
conditions for "take-off" at Times Square.
In a tightly defined area, characterized by low existing
densities and excellent rapid transit accessibility, it allowed
densities substantially higher than those achievable in other
sections of the Central Business District. Moreover, FAR points
attributable to theaters were not counted, as they would have
been elsewhere in the city, against allowed FAR, but, on the
contrary, were awarded density bonuses.
In addition, relaxations of tower coverage provisions in
all three of the district buildings reduced the necessity for
assemblage of large sites or alternately enabled the provision
of particularly large standard floors on large sites, which in
turn, reduced building height, the ratio of outside building
surface, to enclosed volume and concomitantly, construction
costs and time. This unprecedented targeting of extraordinary
measures contributed to creating appropriate preconditions for
precipitate redevelopment by dramatically increasing the already
high achievable intensity-of-use differential.
The strategy, then, was quite consciously not directed at
preservation of the existing inventory of ,theaters. Rather,
it was a strategy that sought to ride on the coattails of
conventional enlightenment which either already believed, or
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alternately could be influenced to believe that preservation
of the concentrated cluster of theaters was essential. The
commonly held belief in turn made it possible to justify the
extraordinary steps taken.
The concentration of measures played a considerable role
in drawing development to Broadway and to west of Seventh
Avenue.
The District legislation had another interesting "take-off"
effect. Under the rules of the district, it continued to be
possible to build under the rules of the underlying district.
The Arlen interests did precisely this. In forfeiting the
achievable bonus density, they avoided extended design nego-
tiations with the city and were, as a result, able to save much
time in the construction of an office building directly opposite
1 Astor Plaza. Although construction was commenced much later
than the district-initiating building, the Arlen building was
ready for occupancy much earlier and could, in consequence,
draw upon potential tenants for 1 Astor Plaza.
Characteristic of the initial redevelopment process was not
so much concurrent redevelopment of contiguous areas, but rather
development at dispersed locations within the district.
In that buildings could be designed in an interactive design
process with the participation of the Urban Design Group and in
that the district legislation encouraged projects with a mix of
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uses: theaters, cinemas, shops, restaurants and offices, the
precondition was created for projects with largely self-contained
environments that could make a contribution to the enhancement
of the quality of the spatial environment of their surroundings
without concomitant contiguous development, characteristic of
the cataclysmic clearance procedures of urban renewal.
The show-case building of the district, 1 Astor Plaza,
particularly reflects the taking advantage of these new
possibilities.
The price paid, of course, was in terms of increased
densities and tower coverage.
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The latest proposal for the Times Square area envisages
a building that departs substantially from the district formula.
A 2,020 room hotel, to be built on the west blockfront of
Broadway, between 45th and 46th Streets, i.e. on the block
immediately to the north of 1 Astor Plaza, which will necessitate
the demolition of three legitimate theaters, including the Helen
Hayes on 46th Street. The Broadway blockfront now includes
movie theaters and shops. The new structure would contain a
legitimate theater and a motion-picture theater.
Initially a ladder-like structure of twin towers, connected
by five-storey high bridges, the building, as currently conceived,
is to be a single hollow tower of fifty storeys, with a large
enclosed court which is to be the trademark of the court. An
amendment to the Theater District legislation is to be sought to
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allow the developer to receive bonus density for providing
open space inside the building rather than on its outside.
The property on which it will be built is owned by the Bankers
Trust Company as a trustee for a pension fund and is under
lease to Peter Sharp, the real estate owner and developer.
The project is understood to be a joint venture between
Peter Jay Sharp and the building's architect, John Portman of
Atlanta.
This latest proposal is indicative of the changed contingencies
in the management of the production and marketing of space. To
what extent has the future been mortgaged? While the legislation
could be amended, 1 Astor Plaza, with its increased tower
coverage, was an irrevocable fact. Moreover, the concept of
providing enclosed space in lieu of open space is contingent
on close to 100 percent site coverage and building walls rising
without setback from the lotlines. Granting of such an exception
would constitute a further major erosion of the principle of
light and air. The environmental effects on the office tower
and hotel occupants alike would be egregious.
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Chapter 10
The Lincoln Square Special District:
Bonuses forD in
The Special Lincoln Square District was the second of the
special districts in which the Urban Design Group was involved.
This chapter traces the process by which it was arrived at
and discusses the principal issues.
In 1955, Lincoln Square was primarily a residential area
for families with low or moderate incomes. Some well-to-do
residents lived along Central Park West. Following the
recommendations of the Mayor's Committee on Slum Clearance in
1956, City officials initiated the Lincoln Square Urban Renewal
Project, comprising the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts
and new apartments in Lincoln Towers. For several years, it
was N.Y.C.'s largest city-building undertaking.
Private investors responded enthusiastically to the
public initiative. By 1970, over 2,200 additional new apart-
ments had been built around the urban renewal project.
Assessed value of all property in the area had, by 1970,
increased 72% since 1955. But on the negative side of the
ledger, thousands of residents with low or moderate incomes
had been forced out by the ongoing change. Particularly hard
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hit were the neighborhood's elderly, living in residential
2
hotels and rooming houses.
In this situation, typified by rapid, unguided, and
sustained change brought about by external forces, the
Lincoln Square Community Action Planning Program was initiated
by the Lincoln Square Community Council, a neighborhood
3
organization.
In 1967, the Commission held public hearings on proposals
to rezone areas on the east side of Broadway in the vicinity
of Lincoln Center. They would have permitted central business
4
district bulk and density in the area (FAR 15 + 3). Apart
from the inappropriateness of such bulk and density in the
Lincoln Square Area, the Commission found that these proposals
would not have brought about the optimal planning relationship
of these properties to one another and the general area.
According to a former employee of the Department of City
Planning, D. H. Elliott had, shortly after becoming chairman
of the CPC, suggested a new higher density residential district,
"where RIO did not have sufficient FAR for economic site
exploitation." In lieu of the introduction of a Rll or R12
district, an issue Elliott had difficulty of convincing the
Commission to agree to, an extension of the bonus device was
considered.
In 1967, the City rezoned a lot bounded by Central Park
West, 61st Street, Broadway and Columbus Circle to the south
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to allow a FAR of 18 (06-6: 15 + 3) and eclusive commercial
use. The developer of the 31,000 sq. ft. triangular site
said:
...a lot of people were saying you couldn't build an
office building there. Central Park West is solid
apartments. The General Motors Building was going up
a few blocks away, a potential glut on the market, and
there were already a few office vacancies in the area.
But we thought the future of the office market looked
good and we decided to see what we could do. 5
In return for the zoning change the city asked that the
structure's open plaza be raised above street level and be
used as a podium for the tower. They asked that trees be put
in planters on the plaza and that the builders create a round
well as a subway entrance.
"It took more time and cost more money to deal with the
city,'" said Thomas E. Stanley, head of the Dallas architectural
firm that designed the building, "but the net effect was
beneficial. Their suggestions were good, and we got a better
building." Occupying only one-third of its plot, with a large
plaza, trees and reflecting pools, the structure would provide
6
a nice transition from Central Park.
The developer had argued that the triangular plot would
be unprofitable to develop unless he got the zoning change:
The history of triangular plots in N.Y.C. is filled
with unprofitable triangular buildings. The shape is
uneconomical and they are hard to rent. 7
He decided to make the building rectangular with a small rectan-
gular section jutting into one of the corners of the
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triangular plot.
William Ballard, until 1967, CPC Chairman, had wanted to
extend the open space system of Lincoln Center by connecting
8
it to Central Park, one block to the east. This would have
entailed clearance of the block bounded by 63rd and 64th
Streets, Broadway and Central Park West. The Ethical Culture
Society located at Central Park West and 64th Street and the
Westside Branch of the YMCA -- the MacBurney Branch -- opposed
the plan as they would have had to vacate their properties.
Another impediment was the intensive real estate activity in
the area, largely induced by Lincoln Center. The remainder of
the block facing on Broadway was acquired by the New York
Academy of Arts and Sciences for $5.5 million. The Academy had
planned to erect headquarters there. Later in August 1967
the site, which was being used as a parking lot, was sold to
a group headed by Paul Milstein for $8.8 million. According to
Paul Milstein, the Director of the Department of City Planning
had encouraged him to acquire the property, and according to
a former employee of the Department, Milstein had requested
zoning changes on the grounds of hardship. Elliott, who had
just become chairman of the CPC, suggested a new residential
district because RlO did not have sufficient floor area ratio
for economic site exploitation.
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In the Spring of 1968, Lincoln Plaza Associates, headed
by Paul Milstein, announced plans for a 40 storey apartment
house on the 60,000 sq. ft. lot across from the Lincoln Center
of Performing Arts. A cruciform tower was to be surrounded by
a sunken plaza containing stores. In this manner Philip
Birnbaum, the architect, was able to obtain additional valuable
rentable area for his client that, because of a loophole in
the zoning resolution, would not be counted against the
9
allowed FAR.
The proposed building violated a number of the Urban
Design Group's emerging design principles:
- It did not adhere to the angle of Broadway. Its sunken
plaza seriously interrupted retail continuity. This was a
major criticism that had been leveled against the General
Motors Building.
- Set well back from the avenue and the side streets, it did
not define the street wall but rather aspired to the "tower
in the park" concept. Indeed, the rendering that was
concurrently released made it appear as if the building's
site was integrally landscaped as an extension of Central
Park.
The Urban Design Group entered into negotiations with
Milstein and his architect. According to testimony given by
Paul Milstein, he was told that unless he developed a building
that the Department of City Planning desired, one which they
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could design and dictate, and unless he followed the instruct-
ions of a consultant architect whom they would recommend, that
department would see to it that there would be no building
10
on the premises.
On June 12, 1968, while the Milsteins and the Department
of City Planning's Urban Design Group were holding meetings on
the projected building across from Lincoln Center, the City
Planning Commission and the Lincoln Square Community Council
announced that they would jointly sponsor a 9 month study to
11
produce a community development plan.
The project, "the first of the kind," will seek to
evaluate and coordinate burgeoning residential and commercial
construction, and fit in planned improvements with those
recently completed and others under way. Design problems and
opportunities were to be reviewed. The study was to seek
means to improve local shopping and to encourage "a lively
diversity of commercial interests." The program had two basic
steps:
- To find out all proposed or upcoming development in the area,
- To work out a coordinated action program.
Donald H. Elliott said the city and community "must
capitalize on the energies generated by the huge public
Lincoln Center investment to enrich the lives of all New
Yorkers."
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In noting that "approximately 25% of the nearly 50,000
residents are older citizens and half of these elderly resi-
dents are poor," Rabbi Edward E. Klein, president of the
Lincoln Square Community Council, said: "We are determined
that they will not become the forgotten victims of progress."
Hart, Krivatsy & Stubee, the planning consultant firm
that had been retained to undertake the study, said the study
was urgently needed to head off random displacement of elderly
and poor residents, congestion of streets, and reduction of
the number of shops and services.
On June 28, 1968, the CPC proposed a plan for a Special
Zoning District for a 13 block area to the west and north of
12
Lincoln Center. Its boundaries were to be 67th Street to
the north, 60th Street to the south. The proposal called for
improved pedestrian circulation within the area and better
pedestrian access to Lincoln Center. It would encourage the
development of a midblock walkway lined with shops, moving
picture theaters, restaurants and coffee houses. It was also
hoped that a covered arcade along the east side of Broadway,
from Columbus Circle to Lincoln Center, would materialize.
"The $175 million Lincoln Centor Complex," Elliott said,
"has sparked a boom that properly guided can fulfill the rich
promise of New York at its best." He said that one objective
would be to have new structures build along the Broadway lot
lines:
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This would preserve and accentuate the bold angle
of the wide street as it cuts through the area and
with the arcading, would make this part of Broadway
a great urban boulevard.... We have a golden opportu-
nity to create a spectacular urban showcase through
coordinated planning. 13
As incentives to carry out a coordinated district plan,
the Planning Commission was to be empowered to increase the
allowable size of buildings and also to waive height and
setback regulations.
On June 27, 1968, in a letter to GPC Chairman Elliott,
the Board of Directors of the Citizens Housing and Planning
Council opposed the proposal because the Planning Commission
14
had not established or discussed a plan for the area.
In the absence of a plan, the granting of floor area bonuses
would be "an excessively discretionary matter," and in
consequence "any prospective developer within the area might
well be able to challenge your denial of a bonus to him as a
capricious and arbitrary exercise of authority."
Hearings were held on July 17, 1968. The Real Estate
Board of New York, in expressing general sympathy with the
purpose to promote the character of the Lincoln Center Area,
said the bonuses to be granted should be based on more
15
objective criteria than proposed in the amendment because:
- the board thought it unwise that so much discretionary
power should be granted to any one agency;
- the grant of non-objective discretionary power invited
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the use of improper influence and possible corruption;
- the absence of objective criteria would discourage new
construction and new developments as an investor, in acquir-
ing land or assembling, would not know what he could build
and would be discouraged from going ahead with the venture;
- the very process of negotiation provoked by discretionary
approach would be costly to the community and the investor
in time and money.
Robert Alpern, the Planning Consultant to the Citizens
Union, in expressing the belief that the concept of the Police
Power had evolved sufficiently to allow mandatory review of
all proposed buildings in designated areas of special design
significance, voiced a preference for such a procedure with
no provision for extraordinary bonuses. He was "concerned
over the Commission's growing tendency to use increased
bulk as a "carrot" (either overtly through Special District
bonuses or covertly through ordinary mapping changes) in
situations that could be and ought to be handled with the
regulatory "stick" alone. "This troubles us particularly when
16
the bonus to be granted can go the 44% basic FAR."
Architect-planner Robert Weinberg took issue with the two
key urban design objectives of the proposal, namely the
creation of a mid-block walkway, open to the sky, lined with
shops, cinemas, restaurants and coffee houses, and the place-
17
ment of new buildings parallel to Broadway. Such a walkway
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seemed, in his opinion, not only unnecessary and uneconomical,
but wholly undesirable because such a passage, bordered by
the high walls of adjacent tall buildings, would, given New
York's climate, its air pollution and the difficulty of keep-
ing open streets clean, neither be attractive nor comfortable.
Nothing was to be gained by deliberately "preserving and
accentuating the bold angle" of Broadway, which he character-
ized "as simply a throw back to the horrors of Baron Haussman's
Parisian Boulevard of more than a century ago, where all
convenience and logic was sacrificed to artbitrary facade."
"A succession of right-angled buildings, set back on each
block or stepped back on parts of blocks, would achieve
exactly the same effect of a great urban boulevard." while
at the same time there is nothing to prevent the "creation
of a sidewalk level arcade of one storey shops, restaurants
or cafes following the actual angle of Broadway," above which
he recommended permitting a bonus-rewarded plaza to start at
the 2nd floor level.
Discussions on the building between the builder and the
City Planning Department extended over 1 year. These discuss-
ions did not produce an agreement to a structure satisfactory
to both sides. The Milsteins finally went ahead with plans for
the construction of a building without further negotiation
with City Planning. However, they adopted the last proposed
design of the Urban Design Group and filed plans with the
- 288 -
Department of Buildings.
"We were practically a glorified drafting service for
the Planning Commission," Birnbaum, the architect, was later
18
to remark.
Since the proposed structure did not comply with the
existing zoning resolution in terms of sky exposure plane,
setbacks and bulk, a variance was sought from the Board of
Standards and Appeals by an application filed on October 8,
1968. The Board of Standards and Appeals, following a
public hearing held on December 10, 1968, approved on January
14, 1969, the application for a variance.
The Milsteins had submitted an appraisal of the value of
the property showing that roughly one year after the property
had been acquired at a cost of $8.8 million, the value of
the property had risen to $12 million. Mr. Norman Marcus,
Counsel for the Dept. of City Planning, sought to persuade
19
the Board's chairman, M. Glass, that no hardship existed:
Mr. Marcus: The very statement in the applicant's
document before you, that the appraised
value of this property today is $12
million, contrasting to the price of
$8.8 million, which was the cost, should
be, I think, the most eloquent testimony
of the value under the current conditions
of the property, and the lack of hardship
in this case.
Chairman Glass: How do you draw that conclusion? If the
value of the land comes up, the hardship
reduces?
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Mr. Marcus: They submitted an appraised value from
a reputable source, which indicates that
under current conditions, the value of
the property is $12 million. That is,
roughly, one year after the property was
acquired at a cost of $8.8 million.
Chairman Glass: Are you suggesting that as the value of
the land goes up, unimproved, the econo-
mic return need be less?
Mr. Marus: I'm suggesting that this appraised value,
the figure of $12 million, indicates a
figure at which this property could be
sold at the present time.
Chairman Glass: Does that mean therefore, there is no
hardship in developing the property,
within the limits of the zoning resolution?
Mr. Marcus: It would indicate that the appraisal is
made on current conditions as it says,
and that no one makes an appraisal on
the conjectural elements of a variance.
Chairman Glass: That is what you think!
The Board, cognizant of the then pending Special Lincoln
Square District, with its maximum floor area ratio of 14.4,
found that a major contributing factor to the hardships was
the design criteria imposed by City Planning and that the plans
complied with the stated objectives of the Planning Department
as to the height of the street wall on Broadway, the arcade
along that frontage, and as to the position of the tower
portion of the building. The Board granted a variance permitt-
ing a building with 1,052,266 sq. ft., which was equal to an
FAR of 16.9, 2.5 greater than the proposed district maximum
of 14.4, but almost 7 points higher than the existing district
-290 -
base of FAR 10. According to a State law limiting the
residential FAR to 12, the additional FAR had to be used for
offices.
The Chairman of Community Planning Board Number 7 had
testified on December 10, 1968 that the proposed change would:
- "permit excessive densities in land;
- negatively affect the residential character of the neighbor-
hood,
- create a safety hazard to school children in adjacent schools,
- worsen traffic flow and public transportation,
- and was contrary to the interests of effective community
20
planning."
The President of the Lincoln Square Community Council
testified that "...great bulk on Broadway would immeasurably
complicate traffic, parking, transportation and pedestrian
21
movement."
The Planning Commission saw the variance as a threat to
the Special District Plan, in which a developer would be
allowed to build to a higher density only if he also agreed
to construct certain amenities to give the district an uniform
appearance. On the same day as the granting of the variance,
on January 14 1969, the Corporation Counsel directed that the
issuance of any permits for 1 Lincoln Plaza be withheld pend-
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ing legal reviews of the variances; the Department of Building
ordered the Milsteins to stop all work under a previously
granted escavation permit. On January 20, 1969, foundation
permits were denied.
On January 15, 1969, the CPO scheduled a public hearing
for January 29 on the proposed Lincoln Square Special District.
The matter was considered further on March 19, 1969.
In March 1969, the Department of City Planning initiated
an unusual suit against another city agency, the Board of
Standards and Appeals, in an attempt to invalidate the
zoning variance. The increased use of specially zoned
districts was advocated in the draft of the city's Master
Plan to encourage improved design. Elliott viewed the Board's
action as a threat to the entire policy.
Milton Glass however viewed the special district's con-
cept as an attempt by the Planning Department:
to dictate throughout the city what people shall
build and how people shall build it. What they're
really saying is: Come on down, Boys. If we don't
like the color of your eyes or the way you part your
hair, we won't let you build. 22
The heart of the Planning Department's legal argument
rested on the definition of a variance. Both Chairman Glass
and Counsel Marcus agreed that a variance might be granted
only if existing zoning created a hardship for the property
owner. Chairman Glass contended that there was a hardship,
while Mr. Marcus said there was not. The Milsteins had begun
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excavation but had sued the Buildings Department for refusing
to grant them a foundation permit while the Planning Depart-
ment's suit was pending. On March 11, State Supreme Court
Justice Mitchell D. Schweitzer reversed the city ruling
denying issuance of a foundation permit, leaving standing
the variance that had been issued by the Board of Standards
and Appeals. This cleared the way for construction of the
42 storey $30,000,000 structure, the first seven floors of
which were to be for commercial use with the rest for luxury
apartments.
On March 19, 1969, the OPC approved the Special Lincoln
Square District. Donald H. Elliott said again that the
variance that had recently been granted to the Milsteins
was a threat to the plan.
As the variance could not be superceded by the amendment,
there would be no advantage to the Milsteins to include
amenities, encouraged under the new plan. The New York Times
wrote in an editorial prior to CPC approval, "Professionalism
vs. Blight," that the variance "virtually kills the excellent
Lincoln Square scheme." It also gave:
what can be construed as a "windfall" award to the
builder by permitting a much larger structure with
much greater density than would be allowed under
existing zoning or even under the more generous bonus
provisions of the special zoning. 23
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The amendments creating the Lincoln Square Special
District were intended to encourage sound growth, to provide
supportive services for residents, visitors and workers, and
enhance, protect and perpetuate the special character, interest
and value of the Lincoln Square Community.
The provisions of the amendment were divided into envelope
24
and use categories.
Heading the list of envelope provisions were actions to
be taken to emphasize and protect "historic" Broadway.
Subsumed under the heading of The Broadway Street Wall, they
included:
- a mandatory arcade to integrate Broadway with the architect-
ural and cultural complex at Lincoln Center to shield
pedestrians from the elements, to provide large walking areas,
to be developed along the east side of the Broadway-Columbus
Avenue axis, beginning on Columbus Avenue at 66th Street,
continuing south on Broadway to 61st Street, where it was to
turn east and terminate at Central Park West;
- a uniform street wall requirement, under which building walls
on either side of Broadway, from 60th to 68th Street and on
Columbus Avenue from 65th to 67th Street were required to be
located at the lot line and to rise uninterrupted for a
height of 85 feet and then to set back 15 feet. On three
sides of the two trapezoid shaped blocks near the Broadway-
Columbus Avenue intersection, no set-back was required.
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- Unless a commercial use, otherwise allowed in the district,
was listed, a specially developed list of uses that provided
for the "special needs, comfort, convenience, enjoyment,
education and recreation of the many day and night visitors,
who are attracted to the civic, cultural, entertainment and
educational activities of the Special Lincoln Square District,
"the amount of street it might occupy on Broadway or
Columbus Avenue was limited to 40 feet."
Members of the Zoning Subcommittee of the Citizens Union
were to question the absence of arcades on the west side of
Broadway, the immediate approach to Lincoln Center.
According to Commissioner McQuade, the Commission had
"the orderly grandeur of the Old Park Avenue in mind" when it
proposed to establish a common cornice height. "If it works
this part of Broadway may become one of the world's pleasant-
25
est and best looking avenues," said McQuade. But Philip
Birnbaum, the architect for 1 Lincoln Plaza, in calling
attention to the recently completed Gulf and Western Building
to the south of the district, said some buildings were going
to be around for 30 years or more, making it difficult to
realize a Rue de Rivoli concept with a continuous arcade and
26
an uniform street wall height.
If we could persuade the landowners who wanted to build
here to build on this pattern by granting them certain
exceptions in zoning, there were other amenities we
could urge on them too,
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Commissioner McQuade related. Behind the bulk of their
buildings, courtyards could be carved out in the inner blocks
-- areas open to the public, with restaurants and small shops,
sort of informal ante rooms to the Lincoln Center Plaza across
Broadway.
In addition to the mandatory arcade four new amenities
eligible for bonuses were introduced, each to be governed by
a Special Permit issued by the City Planning Commission and
the Board of Estimate:
- The Pedestrian Mall was a publicly accessible outdoor space.
- The Galleria, a covered walkway with a minimum width of
20 feet and height of 30 feet, was intended to function as
a secondary pedestrian system and as a location for
supportive uses.
- The Covered Plaza, a ground floor level room, with at least
1,500 sq. ft. and 45,000 cubic feet volume, was to function
as "a congenial shelter and sitting space for visitors and
residents of the district" and to contain benches, chairs,
works of art, plantings, and adequate illumination. Part
of its area might also contain cafes, bazaars, kiosks,
bridges and other similar features, while the uses on the
special list must be located along at least 50 percent of
the walls of the room.
- Subsurface concourses or bridge connections to other build-
ings or subways to provide additional access to the subway
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system.
By providing appropriate amenities the floor area on a
zoning lot might be increased by 4.4 FAR points over the
base level of FAR 10, but a bonus or combination of bonuses
might not increase the FAR on a zoning lot above 12.0. In
determining the increase in floor area that may be given for
the inclusion of any amenity, the Commission was to consider:
- The amount of floor area by which the total floor area of
the building would be reduced because of the inclusion of
the amenity;
- the direct construction cost of the amenity;
- the amount of continuing maintenance required for the
amenity;
- the degree to which the inclusion of amenity furthered the
objectives of the Special Lincoln Square District.
The Commission was to restrict the increase in floor area for
any amenity within the ranges set forth in the following
table:27
Increase in Sq. Ft. of Floor Area
Minimum Maximum
(a) for a mandatory arcade 7 per sq. ft. of
(82-09) Mandatory Arcade
(b) for any other arcade,
except that no portion
of a building can qualify
both as an arcade and as 5 per sq. ft. 5.5 per sq. ft.
a Mandatory arcade of arcade of arcade
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(c) for a plaza, provided
that no portion of a
zoning lot can qualify
both as a plaza and as 6 per sq.ft. 7.2 per sq. ft.
a pedestrian way of plaza of plaza
(d) for a pedestrian way 6 per sq. ft. 7.2 per sq. ft.
of pedestrian of pedestrian
way way
(e) for a galleria 8 per sq. ft. 9.6-per sq. ft.
of galleria of galleria
(f) for a covered plaza 12 per sq.ft. 14.4 per sq. ft.
of covered of covered plaza
plaza
(g) for subsurface con- An amount, subject
course or bridge to the limitations
connections to other set forth in Section
buildings or to sub- 82-08, to be deter-
ways mined by the Commiss-
ion, after consider-
ation of the amenity
by criteria (1)
through (4) of this
Section.
Height and setback requirement might be modified by
Special Permit to accommodate zoning lots of any size which
are affected by the Broadway street wall requirements or which
contained any of the Public Amenities listed above.
Because the Special District was in an area in need of
parking facilities carefully located with respect to impact
on traffic flow, residential activity and safety for children
and pedestrians, parking and loading facilities were to be
governed by Special Permit issued by the OPO.
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Because the Lot Area requirements operate to reduce the
number of residential dwelling units which can be built in
a mixed building (a building containing residential and
commercial uses or residential and community facility uses)
to below the number permitted in an entirely residential
building, the CPO may, by Special Permit, reduce or waive the
Lot Area requirement for the non-residential portion of
mixed buildings, where it was demonstrable that additional
density would not adversely affect the building or the
District.
The Zoning Advisory Council, an organization whose
objective it was "to stimulate an interest in zoning, building
laws and related matter in the City of New York, so as to
promote public health, safety and the general welfare,"
opposed variable discretionary zoning controls for each
individual parcel of land in the same mapped zoning district,
because:
- such "contract zoning tended to negate the well established
zoning principle of uniformity for each class of buildings
throughout each district" and may constitute illegal spot
zoning;
- such "technique and vagaries would act as a deterrent for
new ventures, as a developer or planner would be unable to
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predetermine a reasonably accurate building projection for
28
a considered site."
The Architects' Council of New York City found it
astonishing that a city administration, dedicated to
advancing creativity, would promulgate such a proposal
to virtually freeze and dictate building design to a
preconceived model in such an extensive and important
area. 29
Robert Alpern, testifying on behalf of the Citizens
Union, endorsing the proposal in principle, made a number of
30
recommendations:
- There should be many Special Area Districts with preferred
use and public amenity lists, the latter baited with special
incentives, granted by Special Permit, supplementing or
superseding the existing "as-of-right" bonuses for plazas
and arcades; with power to force private builders to con-
struct to specifications in certain critical locations.
- Because the establishment of Special Districts requiring
"myriad" Special Permits, to a considerable extent requiring
separate hearings and approvals by both the CPC and the
Board of Estimate, which imposed a considerable burden on
builders, developers and the Department of City Planning,
Alpern suggested that the Commission investigate the legal
possibility of planning permission without Board of
Estimate review. "Precedent existed in the large scale
development sections of the New York Zoning Ordinance and
in the traditional Planning Commission Jurisdiction
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throughout the country, respecting subdivision design."
- Because the designation and administration of Special
Districts required expert attention to a multitude of
details, the establishment of Special Districts placed
increasing strain on an already overworked staff. Con-
sequently, the Commission should carefully evaluate its
administrative capacity to assure the City that the
Districts get the consideration they require and possibly
revive proposals for a special zoning administrator.
The Zoning Subcommittee of the Citizens Union questioned
whether the District was perhaps too large as a Special Use
District, and too small as a Special Design District, consid-
ering the need for design controls around Columbus Circle and
up Broadway to 73rd Street.
Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt, in her dissenting report
and in a letter to the New York Times, argued against the
31
Special District.
- In approving the special district around Lincoln Center, the
OPC had made unsupported prejudgement that the area should
be developed at higher densities than allowed at the time.
- The city should not endorse an amendment which would squander
huge floor area and density bonuses without reference to any
plan for the area's land use and circulation system and its
relationship to the greater central business district to the
south.
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- "the Lincoln Square district had a serious linear circulation
problem. Block-by-block design is meaningless. The arcades
and pedestrian malls may open up some area for pedestrian
circulation, but this is peripheral to the really serious
vehicular problem which this amendment only exacerbates."
- The objective of controlling urban design in key areas,
desirable though it be, should not be at the cost of
sacrificing planning controls. Individual building plans
should be reviewed in reference to a concept plan that
should be a matter of a public hearing and public adoption.
Edward E. Klein, President of the Lincoln Square Community
Council, in expressing the Council's strong support for the
special zoning, took issue with Spatt and called attention to
Lincoln Square's locational attributes and capacity for
additional population, its community facilities, subway and
bus service, proximity to Central Park, Riverside Park and to
the vacant river frontage which has long range potential for
open space reclamation. There were still, in March 1969,
several thousand fewer residents than before the urban
32
renewal project.
In noting that the great amount of recent and scheduled
development had been stimulated by the urban renewal project
begun in 1957, Klein characterized the special zoning as a
laudable attempt to influence this development toward "some
clear, metropolitan and community planning objectives,"
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objectives which were being spelled out by "a current and
constructive planning program with private consultants,
co-sponsored by the City Planning Department and our Council."
The special zoning would provide the means for numerous
functional amenities and public improvements would encourage
new development to provide specific neighborhood-oriented
shops and services that would probably otherwise be omitted,
and by controlling locations of garages, entrances and exits,
and improve vehicular circulation.
Two months earlier, in January of 1969, Paul Davidoff
and Neil Gold of Suburban Action had presented a memorandum
on Special District Zoning in Manhattan to the Department of
33
City Planning. Their memorandum was submitted at the
request of the Office of Manhattan Development, then headed
by Mr. Richard Weinstein, who had asked for the two planners'
views respecting the proposed Special Lincoln Center District.
In it they dealt with the question of how the city's zoning
laws might be used to develop low and moderate income housing
at no capital cost to the city or the Federal Government.
Specifically, they suggested that if it was proper to demand
that developers in the Lincoln Center District included arcades,
plazas and gallerias in return for an increase in floor area,
then it was also proper to demand that these same developers
lease a portion of their units to the City Housing Authority
in return for a similar increase in floor area. These units,
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they pointed out, could be provided either in the development
or elsewhere in the Special District.
At a meeting of the Board of Estimate held on April 24,
1969, Chairman Elliott denounced as "bold faced lies" charges
by the former Buildings Commissioner Charles G. Moerdler
that the Lincoln Square District plan was "rotten to the core".
Moerdler, in private law practice with Stroock, Stroock and
Lavan, had filed a 42.3 million claim against the city for
what he contended were unreasonable delays in approving plans
by his clients for their $30,000,000 office and residential
34
building.
At the hearing, Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton
had charged that the proposal for the area was planning only
"for the rich." After almost an hour and a half of bargaining
between Chairman Elliott and Mr. Sutton in conference,
Mr. Elliott agreed to seek to triple the zoning district's size
and award a bonus for builders who put low and middle-income
housing within the district. Mr. Sutton had insisted on an
amendment that would allow a builder to negotiate for 500 sq.
ft of commercial space in exchange for every low or middle
income apartment in the building. Elliott said the district
would have to be enlarged to accommodate the lower income
35
housing. Based on the agreement, the Board of Estimate
gave the Special District its unanimous approval.
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In another last minute action, in response to an appeal
by former City Planning Commissioner Abraham M. Lindenbaum,
the district's boundaries were amended to exclude property
between 66th and 67th Streets, Columbus Avenue and Central
Park West, where the American Broadcasting Company planned
a $50 million radio and television entertainment and arts
complex. ABC had, over a period of years, acquired the
property at a cost of "many millions of dollars" and had
retained an architect to design its new corporate headquarters
which it intended to build at an unspecified future point in
time. A rendering of the building had been exhibited in
500 theaters throughout the country and on TV as the future
home of ABC. The district's Broadway Street Wall requirement
36
would have ruled out the envisaged design concept.
In taking issue with the editorial standpoint expressed
earlier in the New York Times, Paul Milstein, one of the
37
developers of 1 Lincoln Plaza, had the following to say:
Your editorial says that the City Planning Commission
has entered into a period of sophistication and expertise
of a kind essential to the complexities of today's
planning problems. If this is so, it is coming late
in the day. Since 1965, there has been a near cessation
of private residential building in the city, largely
attributable to the failure of the City Planning
Commission to adjust the zoning ordinance to the economic
realities of current costs.
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Implicit in the statement is the view held by wide
segments of the investment building community that the
zoning ordinance should serve to ensure them, in the face of
rising costs, a constant, high return on equity. Major
investment builders, who had staunchly backed Felts 1960
comprehensive zoning resolution, because of its favorable
affects on real estate, now blamed the Planning Commission
for not seeing to it that high returns on equity were
maintained. Indeed, the ability for developers to achieve
high returns on their equity had been a guiding criterion of
Felt.
The Milsteins had been able to achieve such an unpre-
cedented density in large measure, because they and their
architect had understood how to exploit the inexperience of
the Urban Design Group, who were still relatively new to their
jobs.
The building was to be only the second mixed-use building
to be built under the 1960 code. In both cases, the architect
was Philip Birnbaum, a noted Manhattan apartment architect.
The 1960 code militated against mixed office-residential build-
ings because of greater open space requirements, than in single-
use office or residential buildings. With the need to
accommodate two separate vertical circulation systems, one for
the office portion, the lower portion, and one for the residential
portion, large lower floors were needed. In the case of mixed
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buildings, however, the plaza bonuses could only be fully
availed of if a particularly large plaza was provided. This
circumstance, in conjunction with the need for large office
floors to accommodate two separate service cores, made it
necessary to have extremely large sites for mixed office -
residential buildings. Moreover, residential buildings
commanded significantly lower rents than office space, parti-
cularly in the aftermath of the grace period.
With the propagating of the "rue corridor" by the Urban
:Design Group, a significant opportunity began to emerge, for
a mixed-use building to be erected. Substantial advantages
to the developer were to accrue from the "rue corridor" concept.
However, as the site of the intersection of slanting Broadway
and Columbus Avenue, did not face onto a parallel opposing
building line, a prerequisite for a "rue corridor", but
axially onto the Beaux-Arts style open-space system of Lincoln
Center, it was more expedient to stress the necessity of
preserving the "bold angle of Broadway" as the key objective
of the design overlay district.
Preservation of Broadway's"bold angle" of course necessitated
adherence to the avenue lot lines, which was mandated. This,
of course, ruled out the plaza bonus and substitution by an
increased arcade bonus, which, as mentioned, was, in the case of
mixed-use buildings, particularly onerous to developers. These
twin actions made it possible to achieve large office floors,
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which could easily accommodate separate cores.
With the Urban Design Group insisting on a 85 foot
cornice line, the next difficulty to resolve was how should
the two key uses be best accommodated in the building. It
would seem logical to have the residential use start at the
85 foot setback. In that case, however, the residential
portion of the building would have been too small to be
economical given a total FAR of 14.4. On the other hand,
having the use-break in the podium would have created significant
floor plan difficulties, if apartments had to be fitted above
an office floor plan. Moreover, apartments would have been
directly at the avenue lot line. Clearly, it was in the
interest of the developer to have the podium portion of the
building devoted solely to the offices.
The Board of Standards and Appeals variance made it
possible to fill the podium with offices, while,at the same
time, allowing the developer to include a large number of
apartments in the project.
Considerations of residential amenity leads to the
questioning of the validity of the "bold angle" and "rue
corridor" concepts. In the case of the recently announced
second building in the district, the podium will be occupied
by a church.
This chapter has sought to shed light on the critical
forces in the interactive process leading to the creation
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of the Lincoln Square Special District.
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Chapter 11
The Proposed Special Transportation District Legislation:
Exploiting a Priority Issue to Enhance the City's Leverage
This chapter first gives an overview of the development
strategy pursued in the transformation of Lower Park Avenue
and Grand Central Station. A proposal of the City to
establish a Special Transportation District around Grand
Central is then reviewed in the light of this redevelopment
strategy.
In 1903, the New York architectural firm of Fellheimer
and Wagner started to design the Grand Central Terminal. The
New York Central System and the New Haven Railroad, the
clients, were skeptical about some of the proposals the
architects made at the time:
- When the station was planned, the area was far north of
intensive development. No cross streets existed between
Madison Avenue and Lexington Avenue. Traffic was mainly
horsedrawn and light. In anticipation of northward expansion
of the city, the architects proposed extending all east
west streets across what was, at the time, an open cut
railroad yard, as well as continuation of Park Avenue.
East-west and north-south streets were to be grade separated,
with ramp connections. The only element of this plan to be
retained was the Park Avenue overpass at 42nd Street.
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- In anticipation of a growing number of commuters, the
architects proposed separate commuter facilities and exits
along 46th Street so that commuter traffic would not inter-
fere with long-distance passengers. Express train traffic
was to be oriented towards 42nd Street. The railroads,
however, resisted the idea.
- The architects proposed using the air space over the open
yards for high grade buildings. This was utterly innovative
and the railroads were reluctant but permitted construction
of one building. The first techniques of vibration control
were developed. Thus the groundwork for subsequent "air-
rights" development of the Lower Park Avenue - Murray Hill
district was laid. By that time, however, the opportunity
to incorporate the initially proposed traffic innovations
had been precluded.
- According to Alfred Fellheimer, one of the partnoer of the
competition-winning firm, their proposal to build a tall
office building over the station won the competition for
them. It was intended that it should offset too great
carrying charges, but the railroads believed that offices
so far uptown would never rent. Nevertheless, they reluct-
antly let foundations and columns over part of the property
be dimensioned to support a 22 storey building.
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Since 1945, Penn Central and its predecessor the New York
Central System, had converted most of its residential properties
flanking lower Park Avenue in the vicinity of the Grand
Central Terminal into profitable office buildings. After
1945, with New York City clinging onto rent control, the
commodious residential buildings facing the avenue gradually
but inexorably made way for more profitable corporate space.
Thus in maximizing its income from real estate, which it
claimed was necessary to offset losses in other areas, the
railroad displaced the entire residential component of its
famous Park Avenue Gold Coast. Even the land-mark terminal
itself was endangered.
In September 1954, the railroad announced a plan for a
5 million sq. ft. development that was to be taller than the
Empire State building, which Webb and Knapp, a New York
Developer, proposed putting up over the terminal. The archi-
2
tect was I. M. Pei.
Two weeks later, Patrick B. McGinnis, president of the
New Haven Railroad, which shared the terminal and paid over
30% of its operating costs, came out in support of an alternate
plan prepared by Fellheimer and Wagner, New York architects,
and the firm that, startng in 1903, had designed the original
3
terminal. One of the firm's original partners, Alfred
Fellheimer, wrote in 1954: "In spite of my own pride in the
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station, I must say it has become an obstacle to attainment
of important public objectives." Many of the ideas initially
formulated in 1903 were resurrected. His firm's proposals
included:
- new street extensions at different levels to minimize street
crossings;
- creation of a one-way street pattern;
- facilities for rerouting buses and trucks;
- relocation of the major part of station-induced taxicab
traffic away from 42nd Street and Vanderbilt Avenue;
- a major parking garage with multiple ramp access from
several streets;
- direct northward outlets for commuters to avoid back-track-
ing toward 42nd Street, and
-to keep the building's occupants off the congested streets,
a roof-plaza, restaurants and a shopping center at the first
4
setback level.
In its November 1954 issue Architectural Forum
published an open letter to New York Central System's
Chairman Robert B. Young, the New Haven Railroad's President
Patrick B. McGinnis and their associates. It was a plea to
save the Grand Concourse, threatened by the redevelopment plan.
It was signed by 235 architects. The Grand Concourse was
described in the following terms:
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This great room is noble in its proportions, alive in
the way the various levels and passages work in and
out of it, sturdy and reassuring in its construction,
splendid in its materials...
The big sunray pattern filtering through its windows
is part of its drama, but so is the adventure of
scurrying through labyrinthine passages to emerge
on a rainy day eight blocks north, or engulfing a
hearty steaming oyster stew in the cavelike Oyster
Bar...
To throw away a known masterpiece of architecture,
tested and loved; to remove an important link between
the city and its history; to grow careless with the
evidence of past greatness, would be an adventure
attended with great risk...
We address to you the plea: Save the Grand Central
Concourse.
But several architects dissented and did not join in the plea
to save it. Marcel Breuer, for instance, wrote:
We should not put obstacles in the way of a new
project that may create a still better architecture...
I believe in the vitality of our time. Good contempor-
ary architecture stands up against the great creations
of any past. Any "cultural" or "local patriotic"
hampering of free development of contemporary archi-
tecture is dangerous. 5
And John S. Bolles of San Francisco, California, asked:
Did you ever try to find Track 397 ...the men's room...
the taxi stand? Did you ever try to get in or out of
the place? Or drive around on Park Avenue? Honestly,
the only good thing about the place is the oyster stew,
and that is only seasonal! 6
Minoru Yamasaki of Detroit, Michigan, wrote:
Though it is a marvelously beautiful room, Grand Central
is in an archaic style, does not particularly express
the exicting materials or exciting methods of construct-
ion we have today. The new complex should culminate in
the most exciting room in the world, perhaps with its
roof an elegant perforated shell, such as Nervi has done
in Italy. A tremendous center emptying into and fed by
underground railroads emptying into a wonderful complex
of office buildings reachable in a five minute indoor
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walk and yet accessible to all New York could be
the most exciting job in the world, in the right
hands. 7
Also in the fall of 1954, Emery Roth and Sons, the
architects, as part of a study of what could be done with
the New York Central Systems properties, developed a scheme
for a 65 storey tower astride a 10 storey base above the
Terminal. With its longitudinal axis spanning in a northerly
southerly direction, the tower would not have encroached on
the terminal's famous Grand Concourse. Moreover, lined up
with the New York General Buioding, an earlier airrights
structure, it would have permitted axial views up and down
Park Avenue past it. It was not until the following spring
8
that the scheme was released.
Robert C. Weinberg, a planner-architect, in noting that
the proposed new building would encroach on light and air of
existing buil]dings, proposed that the city:
Condemn or otherwise acquire the airrights above the
roof level of the present station and then recoup the
entire cost of this over a stated period of years,
by increasing the assessed valuation of all the
properties in the area.
Such increased assessed valuation could be justified, he said,
on the same theory that was used in recouping the cost of
demolishing the old elevated railroad lines, in which case
adjacent property had increased in value through the new light
9
and air let into the street.
Subsequently, at the suggestion of Richard Roth, Walter
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Gropius and Pietro Belluschi were retained as planning and
design consultants. In May 1958, the largest commercial
10
building in the world was announced. The building was to
have a total net rentable area of about 2.5 million sq. ft.
and an overall area of about 3 million sq. ft. It was to
house three legitimate theaters, restaurants and a 2,000
car parking garage covering four levels. Construction was
expected to start by 1960 and completion was scheduled for
late 1961. At the suggestion of Gropius and Belluschi, the
longitudinal axis of the tower was turned 90 . In consequence,
views past the tower were blocked off. The 49 storey broad
octagon tower resting on a 10 storey base provided a backdrop
for the New York Central's tower. Vincent Scully, the archi-
tectural historian, was of the opinion that the "fat, wide
slab of the Pan American building dealt Park Avenue" its fatal
blow because "it visually denies the continuity of the Avenue
beyond Grand Central, deprecates the length of the Avenue's
11
axis of movement, and smothers its scale." Gropius and Belluschi
would have preferred to have a park replace the tower.
The concourse was excluded from the 3h acre parcel that
the railroad turned over to B.S. Wolfson, the developer.
Nevertheless, James 0. Boisi, N. Y. Central's vice president in
charge of real estate, said the concourse was a burden and that
he did not consider it inviolate. He said he had excluded it
because he thought that previous schemes, such as I. M. Pei's
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1954 scheme for Zeckendorf of Webb and Knapp involving
10,000,000 sq. ft. and 50,000 people, were too big. "I
12
serve no purpose making grandiose plans," he said.
Instead limited development schemes were encouraged which
would quickly start to generate a cash flow to the railroad.
A strategy was pursued in which the rate of replacement was
regulated to avoid glutting the market.
Douglas Haskell laments the missed opportunity to compre-
hensively redevelop the area, given the rare occurrence of
adequate land already assembled, and given the Railroad's
perceived need to replace rent controlled apartment buildings
13
with more profitable structures:
...instead the Central hired a real estate butcher to
cut up its magnificent Grand Central City like a carcass.
Piece by piece, individual lots were leased or sold for
individual office buildings...in the end the choice piece
of all which should have given the correlated "New City"
its urban style and its crown, was let out to Erwin S.
Wolfson, to see what he could do with it as a speculative
builder.
Wolfson, having obtained his land at an inflated rate and
being unable to treat the entire empire as a whole and
thus to average out his costs, proceeded to get a
massive rental value out of his one building by setting
rental rates low enough to attrack large numbers...
This meant putting a huge low cost building there...
This, Haskell contrasts with a vision of the:
whole of Grand Central city linked together along Park
Avenue above street levels and with new elevated bridges
across cross streets. So as to become, in effect, an
eight or ten block skyscraper laid on its side, with the
cross streets passing through it or rather under it and
with microtransport available in a jiffy like a sort of
horizontal elevator system - to pull dozens of hotels,
office buildings, clubs, theaters, and who knows what
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else into one swiftly conveniently navigable
micro-city - a grand Grand Central...
Moreover, so major a development could demand of
government - city, state or federal - a series of
public improvements to go with it.
Grand Central could have been such a "flexible, well
distributed, modestly high horizontal skyscraper had its
owner not leased out their ground piece-meal."
14
Charles Abrams took a different view:
I have heard a great deal of opposition to the Pan
American Building over Grand Central Terminal, some
planners have said that it is too high and should be
spread out. The fact, however, is that height in
office buildings around Grand Central concentrates
people within walking distance from station to work-
place whereas horizontal spread of office buildings
increases the number of cars and taxis which must
carry the people to buildings and mass transport.
Another defender of the project contended the business
community worked best "in a vertical city...a three dimensional
city...Congregation is, after all, the principal function of
15
the city."
Boisi, of the railroad, believed that many of the tenants
would be drawn from office buildings within 15 blocks of Pan-Am
16
as firms sought more space. As many arrived at Grand Central,
they would in future simply take the elevator up to their
office. Congestion on sidewalks and buses would thus be
reduced as would be the demand for taxis. He believed that the
building's population would be closer to 10,000 rather than
17,000, the figure usually cited, because
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- tenants would allot their top staff above average amounts
of space,
- computers tended to perform many tasks formerly undertaken
by lower-paid staff, thus further reducing office density,
- much labor intensive back-up work would be performed
elsewhere in the suburbs where rents were cheaper.
The incorporation of a number of circulation improvements
was planned.
- a pedestrian concourse was to connect the main concourse
directly to the ground floor level of the Pan-Am Building;
- new exits were to be provided at 45th Street to the north
and 44th Street to the west;
- a large bank of escalators (6 pairs) w&s to connect the
Pan-Am lobby with the main concourse.
Pietro Belluschi commented:
There is one point that you cannot gloss over, and
that is the congestion in the subways. Of course
...when a baby grows out of his shoes, you don't
cut his feet down, or cut off his toes, you just
buy new shoes; and we are used to growth in this
country. 17
Richard Roth, Sr., felt that eventually all surface
transportation with the exception of diplomats' cars, buses,
taxis and automobiles driven by the handicapped, must be
banned from the Grand Central area and people will "walk
as they do in the Wall Street district." He predicted that
"Pan-Am will have the most serious impact on its surroundings
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at lunchtime because the building lacks adequate restaurant
18
facilities and so does the area.
But in August 1968, Real Estate Forum wrote:
But it is generally conceded now that far from compli-
cating the pedestrian movement situation, the spacious
lobby facilities of the Pan-Am and the large bank of
escalators connecting its lobby with the main concourse
of the terminal has become an important and popular
exit point for an estimated 50,000 people per day
pouring out of Grand Central every morning as well as
an entrance from the north in the evening. Thus taking
large numbers of pedestrians off the street areas
around the terminal, easing much sidewalk congestion
on Vanderbilt, Lexington Avenues and 45th Street.
On August 2, 1967, the City's Landmarks Preservation
Commission designated the terminal a landmark, the property
at Park Avenue and 42nd Street was also pronounced a landmark
site.
In January 1968, Union General Properties Limited, a
British based property development and investment company,
obtained an option to lease the air rights over Grand Central
Station for a term of 50 years, with a 25 year renewal option,
from the 51st Street Realty Corporation, a subsidiary of Penn
Central Railroad. On June 18, 1968, the English developer
Morris Saady, head of Union General Properties Limited, presented
to members of the staff of the Department of City Planning his
plans to "float" a 55 storey 3100 million dollar building above
19
Grand Central. The proposed second Grand Central Tower, al-
though it would be four storeys shorter than the Pan-Am Building,
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was to rise about 150 feet higher because the new structure
was to have its "ground" floor 188 feet above street level -
just above the roof of the railroad terminal's waiting room.
The Grand Concourse was to remain untouched. Marcel Breuer's
answer to the difficult design problem of putting a skyscraper
behind a facade designed in 1912 was to visually separate
the two elements. The landmark facade was made up of a series
of triumphal arches filled with narrow steel framed windows,
a set of massive fluted Greek columns and a 48 foot high
group of statuary representing Mercury,. Hercules and Minerva
and a clock 13 feet in diameter. The architect proposed to
float a rectangular tower encased in concrete and granite, on
an east-west axis above the waiting room. The skyscraper
was to extend the full width of the terminal waiting room,
309 feet from Vanderbilt Avenue eastward to the roadway
between the terminal and the Commodore Hotel. The building
was to be 152 feet deep, and the distance between the new
tower and the octagonal tower of the Pan-Am building was to
be 221 feet, 21 feet more than the width of a city block.
The building was to be supported by a central core, containing
52 elevators and other service elements, anchored in bedrock
and running upward through the waiting room space. 4 large
trusses were to be cantilevered out from the core just above
the waiting room to enable elimination of ground level supports.
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The waiting room was to be transformed into a vaulted lobby,
incorporating building access with a pedestrian walkway
leading to the main concourse. The concourse itself, hailed
as a great interior space of N.Y.C., would not be impacted
by construction of the new building. The architect said he
and his associates had gone to great lengths to accommodate
the traffic needs of the terminal and the environs in the
plans for the new building.
This time, a major building in New York has been
designed with primary concern for its impact on the
public,
Mr. Saady pointed out:
In collaboration with Penn Central management and
independent traffic engineers, 175 Park Avenue will
bring pedestrian improvements not only for its own
population of 12,000 but will ease the general
traffic flow through the terminal and the 42nd Street
area. 20
The plans included a covered plaza off 42nd Street with
a taxi driveway for off-street loading. Pedestrian traffic
was to be channeled through a broad lobby at street level,
from which escalators would lead to elevator lobbies for the
new building and down to the terminal concourse. The new
floors were to replace the present waiting room. The lower
floor, an extension of the concourse level, was to give two
new direct corridor connections to the subways. In addition,
two new subway entrances were to be built and pedestrian
traffic from the three heavily travelled subway lines - the
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Lexington Avenue, 42nd Street Shuttle and the crosstown
line to Queens -- was to be rerouted. The new lobby floor
at the 42nd Street level was to handle traffic flow to the
buildings, subways and the station. Escalators were to be
generously used to move people from suburban, concourse and
street levels and to the mezzanine level where building
elevators were to be located. The 42nd Street sidewalk was
to be widened by 50 feet from 23 feet to 73 feet. Stores
on the 42nd Street side of the terminal were to be removed
and replaced by expanded space for shops and boutiques inside
the terminal. There were to be restaurants -- at all price
levels -- capable of serving several thousand lunchtime
customers.
The consulting engineering firm of Wilbur Smith and
Associates, who had carried out a Pedestrian Impact study
of the entire terminal area, concluded that the corridor
system proposed to tie in the new tower with the new station
would provide a more even distribution of people over a
greater number of passage ways and would eliminate over-
21
loading during rush hours.
Although considerable efforts had been made to retain
the terminal's facade as well as to provide pedestrian improve-
ments not only for the projected building's population of
12,000 but also to ease the general traffic flow through the
area, the chairman of the CPC, Donald H. Elliott, said next
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day:
Its the wrong building in the wrong place at
the wrong time. 22
However, as the building closely adhered to the zoning
resolution, not even requiring a variance, the Planning
Commission was not in a position to block its construction.
The Landmarks Preservation Commission indicated its
annoyance at not having been given advance notice of the
design. A representative for Mr. Saady said, though, that
the Landmark Commission members had not accepted an earlier
invitation to review the plans while the CPC had. The plans
would be submitted as soon as possible, UGP hurried to assure.
The proposal drew considerable fire. "The opportunistic
grabbing of an opening in the zoning should be blocked; this
commercial energy should be diverted to another site,"
remarked City Planning Commissioner Walter McQuade in a
23
letter to the New York Times.
- "Hiring a very great architect to design that building isn't
enough justification to build it in the first place," said
24
Philip Johnson, the architect.
- "Sophisticated architectural detailing" cannot outweigh a
building totally contrary to the spirit of the zoning
resolution, the president of the Municipal Art Society
wired the Landmarks Preservation Commission, in expressing
the organization's "determined opposition" to the project.25
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- "While many of us deplored the demolition of the Pennsyl-
vania Station, at least it was a clean death and a decent
burial. This scheme shames the excellence of the past...
Why embarass a gracious old lady by putting a modern
26
giant piggybank on her shoulders."
As Elliott had pointed out, under the rules of the zoning
resolution, there was no way to block the building. Within
two weeks of Saady's presentation, however, the Planning
Commission had a proposal ready that could, if adopted, in
effect block the proposed new building. Chairman Elliott
conceded that the Commission acted in large part because of
27
the threat of the second skyscraper atop Grand Central.
The effect on the planned 55 storey tower would be to cut by
20% its total floor area of 1.9 million sq. ft. (FAR 15) to a
little more than 1.5 million sq. ft. (FAR 12). It was intended
that the new limit could render the project unfeasible from an
28
economic point of view. Mr. Elliott said the Commission believed
it was on secure legal ground in assuming that the rules could
be applied to this end. "In many cases" construction had been
halted by zoning changes even after actual excavation work had
29
begun, he said.
The Commission's opposition to a second tower astride
Grand Central was reinforced by a critical analysis undertaken
by Professor Chester Rapkin of the Institute of Urban Environ-
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ment, School of Architecure, Columbia University. In "Some
Notes on the Transportation Impact of the Proposed 175 Park
Avenue," dated July 2 1968, Professor Rapkin acknowledged
that "the proposal provides for a number of major improvements
in the circulation pattern and in the access to and exit
from the terminal" and that the developer "has generously
offered to include these at his own cost."
- With respect to the Wilbur Smith Study, Rapkin stated that
"it is my impression the traffic burden imposed by the
new building will be larger than that estimated by the
developer and that the estimate employed a method that
understates the added peak load burden."
- He called attention "to the great congestion that now
exists on the Pan-Am escalators around 9 a.m."
- He claimed that "the traffic and transportation consequences
of the building...point up the urgenc necessity to limit
new construction in the Grand Central region."
Rapkin's findings coincided with the announcement, on
July 2, 1968, by the CPC, of the aforementioned proposal for
a new type of zoning district in which the Commission would
be empowered to reduce or increase building size in designated
areas by 20%. The amendment would:
- reduce the allowed base density by 20% from FAR 15 to FAR 12
- allow a discretionary increase by Special Permit and
subject to Board of Estimate approval, of up to 44% from
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FAR 12 to up to FAR 18,
- strip away all as-of-right bonuses, i.e. the arcade and
plaza bonus,
- make all bonus awards contingent on Commission and Board
of Estimate approval.
The amendment was to be initially operative in three
transportation centers. The Grand Central and Pennsylvania
Station areas in Manhattan; and the downtown Jamaica area in
31
Queens. The proposed Grand Central District Boundary would
run from 39th to 47th Street, between Third and Fifth Avenue,
with an extension running west to Ninth Avenue between 40th
and 43rd Street. The Pennsylvania station district boundary
was to run from Broadway and the Avenue of Americas to
Ninth Avenue with the southern boundary at 31st Street and
the northern boundary varying from 33rd to 36th Streets.
In explaining the proposed amendment, Donald H. Elliott
said:
The life of the city is tied to its transportation
network. Good transpprtation spurs development;
over development can overwhelm the system. This is
most critically evident at the transportation hubs of
the city. 32
The Commission considered the construction boom on the East
Side of Manhattan to have placed a heavy burden on transit
facilities in the vicinity of Grand Central, while opportuni-
ties for development near other transportation centers had
not been fully explored. "The City should be able to respond
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to both conditions," Mr. Elliott said. The flexible legis-
lation, the Commission stated, could spur development where
suitable and curb it where harmful. "Pedestrian connections
to mass transit lines would be encouraged. Design factors
would also be evaluated."
In Jamaica, Queens, for instance, the Commission's aim
would be to encourage more construction than was permitted
under the then applicable rules. The general goals of the
proposed Special Transportation District included the follow-
33
ing specific purposes:
- To preserve, protect and promote the character and proper
functioning of the Special Transportation District as a
focal point of mass transportation routes with major inter-
change facilities;
- to improve circulation patterns in the area in order to
avoid congestion arising from the movements of large numbers
of people;
- to encourage growth and development activities and facilities
which will enhance the districts usefulness in serving large
numbers of people throughout the day without overloading its
facilities during the peak hours.
In determining the precise extent of the decrease or
increase of the FAR, the Commission was to take the following
34
into account;
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a) To what extent the proposed use or uses will contribute
to peak or off-peak riding on the rapid transit system?
b) Whether, for uses which contribute to peak hour riding,
the proposed intensity of use conforms to a level which
is generally appropriate for new developments, reconstruct-
ion or enlargements within the Special Transportation
District in view of the capacity and utilization of the
rapid transit facilities by which the district is served?
c) Whether the applicant building makes provision for
improved pedestrian circulation to and from transportation
facilities?
d) Whether the applicant building will create a well-ordered
urban design?
e) Whether the applicant building will tend to preserve,
protect or promote the character and proper functioning
of the area as a transportation hub?
Hearings were set for July 31.
The nine member Urban Design Council, established by
Mayor Lindsay to serve as a study and advisory body on the
quality of both public and private design and planning in the
city, urged that the city use all of its power to prevent
construction of the proposed tower. Should the construction
of the proposed skyscraper be "inevitable" the Urban Design
Council said, "the landmark building should be sacrificed so
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that there would be free rin to design a building combining
unity with beauty and function and dealing with the congest-
ion problem with maximum effectiveness."
The problem raised by the second Grand Central Tower,
35
the Design Council wrote in a letter to the Mayor,
...is not the problem of a single building, but an
area problem of ciritical importance and requires
an area approach.
Even if a building is not built over Grand Central
Station, it is most probable that other large new
buildings will be built on adjacent sites and will
add to congestion in the area.
And Mayor Lindsay said in the second week of July, in making
known the Urban Design Council's recommendation, that "the
City cannot lightly accept the consequences of construction
of this building, profoundly affecting as it does the
36
quality and planning and design in this city.
A WCBS-TV Editorial broadcast on July 19, 1968 pointed
out that the Chairman of the City Planning Commission had
objected to the proposal as the wrong building in the wrong
place at the wrong time and hailed the creation of a Special
37
Purpose District as "an eminently sensible idea."
On July 19, 1968, Wilbur Smith and Associates, in a
38
letter to Morris Saady, took issue with Rapkin. In their
view:
the additional access and corridor opportunity
afforded pedestrian movements in the influence
area will greatly enhance the flexibility and
utility of the Grand Central Station area.
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- Professor Rapkin's general point of view did not seem to
be verified by factual figures available;
- Rapkin ignored the plans for additional subway lines
projected by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority;
- he did not take sufficiently into account the means for
bettering pedestrian movement that were developed "that
would help considerably in relieving congestion of subway
station platforms during peak hours of travel," including
construction of new passage ways, installation of escalators,
installation and relocation of additional turnstiles and
gates, and relocation of stairs.
Attention was called to the fact that the banks of
escalators serving exclusively the Pan-Am Building were
never crowded, and that while on the Pan-Am side of the
station there was only one point of egress, the 175 Park
Avenue project side would have five such points.
On July, 30, 1968, on the eve of the public hearings,
C. McKim Norton, President of the Regional Plan Association,
wrote Chairman Elliott that RPA was not prepared to approve
or oppose the Special Transportation District, but would like
39
to assist in improving it. In noting that the proposal
bore an important relationship to the carrying out of the
proposals in RPA's Urban Design: Manhattan and Jamaica
Center reports,
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- he said special districts represented "a radical, but
potentially very constructive departure from past zoning
practice in the City of New York;"
- and agreed that in the light of the sharp contrast between
recent Third Avenu'e, Park Avenue and Avenue of the Americas
office development on the one hand and what private enter-
prise once did in Grand Central and Rockefeller Center on
the other, there was a need for an improved regulation
process for dealing with development in central business
districts of the City.
Except where there is large-tract public land assemblage,
such as in current Lower Manhattan developments, business-
as-usual products of the zoning resolution rarely result
in well ordered urban design.
RPA was of the opinion that the proposed amendments
should not be adopted as they were then being suggested,
because they failed to establish sufficiently precise standards
to guide development and because the mapping was open to
question, especially in view of the sharp reduction in FAR.
The points Norton made were subsumed under four main headings:
- The quantity of floor area bonus should be related to
public benefit private development costs and be predictable;
- the standards for above and below ground pedestrian space
should be spelled out;
- a plan illustrating "well ordered urban design" should be
made available for each transportation district;
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- the delineation of the proposed transportation districts
was questionable.
Norton called attention to the wide discretionary
latitude in conferring bonuses and the vague standards for
their application. "For example, how can the Planning
Commission pass judgment on the proposed new building atop
Grand Central as to whether floor area ratio of 12, 15 or
22 would or would not be appropriate in view of the capacity
and utilization of the rapid transit facilities" by which
the entire Grand Central Times Square district is served?
Any such decision could be made to appear arbitrary without
specific predictable transportation findings and comfort
level standards supprting the choice made.
In order to be able to determine "whether the applicant
building makes provision for improved pedestrian circulation,"
analysis was required in each proposed transportation district
determining:
a) pedestrian trip rates generated by various building types,
b) pedestrian trip lengths,
c) major directions of pedestrian flow, and
d) comfort levels of pedestrian density.
Such studies should be concerned with above and below ground
movements. The derived standards for above and below ground
pedestrian space should be spelled out.
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To establish a special permit district, Norton contended,
without a plan, leaves the words "well ordered urban design"
without substance as a standard. Such a plan depicting the
city's intent for each special transportation district should
be available for inspection by prospective developers. Norton
pointed out that the first stage of such a plan had been
prepared by Regional Plan for Jamaica Center. It showed the
arrangement of desired building bulks, open space, and
transportation access; it linked office buildings to a subway
station with ample underground mezzanines open to light and
air, served by shops and community facilities. "Floor area
bonuses to be given should be predicated on such specifics."
Finally Norton questioned the delineation of the pro-
posed special districts. One would expect, he wrote, that
"such districts would be based...on some standard of walking
distance from the major facility. It seems rather arbitrary
that a new building at Ninth Avenue and 43rd Street should
have its floor area ratio reduced 20% but expandable by
44%, whereas a building opposite Pennsylvania Station on
West 31st Street is outside special district regulation and
advantages.
Norton sumed up by saying that the proposed special
districts contained the seeds of a new approach to development
of the central business districts of New York City, but as
drafted they were "subject to being considered unpredictable
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and arbitrary."
The Midtown Realty Owners Association representing real
estate interests around Pennsylvania Station, in calling
attention to the fact that the construction of the Pennsylvania
Station Office Building and Madison Square Garden had already
resulted in privately sponsored programs to improve the area,
objected to the amendment because "the very announcement of
a program for such change can result in tenants refusing to
execute long term leases, deferral of improvements and relo-
41
cation to other areas."
Sympathetic as anyone might be with your concern
over a single building proposed for an already
congested area, it would appear to us that the
Planning Commission's role should not convert our
system of government from the rule of law to the
rule of men.
The Bowery Savings Bank, owner of an entire block
between 7th and 8th Avenue between 33rd and 34th Streets,
i.e. immediately to the north of Pennsylvania Station, in
opposing the amendment, expressed its concern for continued
predictability in the development of real estate.
The New York Building Congress, in questioning the
amendment's effect on Midtown Manhattan's corporate headquarters
growth, said it would probably be retarded, because multi-
million dollar investment decisions would not be made, if
42
subjected to protracted individual negotiations.
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The Economic Development Council of New York City
believed the amendment would:
- place the Planning Commission under severe pressure for
decisions favoring the most intensive use of land permitted
under the amendments;
- so disrupt the real estate market in the special trans-
portation districts as to stifle future development;
- force development in areas beyond the district boundaries,
which in turn will increase pedestrian traffic and require
43
new transportation accommodations.
The representative of the influential Real Estate Board
of New York, in noting that the floor area ratio for
commercial zones was pegged so as to make it economical to
develop residential properties located in such areas into
commercial buildings, said:
The elimination in the difference between the commercial
and residential floor area ratios would make it
impossible to proceed with the orderly development
intended by the over-all zoning resolution. 44
No clearer statement could have been made of the underlying
intent of the resolution to aid eliminating residences in
mixed areas and of the interest of investment builders in it.
Any reduction in the basic floor area ratio of
fifteen times would render uneconomic any new
building in our great commercial centers and the
growth of these areas would be ended. 45
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Rexford E. Tompkins, Board Treasurer of the Real Estate
Board, in continuing his testimony, portrayed in vivid
language the potential dangers of the legislation:
Every Commissioner here, I'm certain, is aware of the
pressures that he is subjected to even now under a good,
firm, objective set of standards. It's inevitable.
People want things. But I tell you that if you adopt
this resolution, Ulysses tied to the mast will look
like a barefoot boy with shoes on. You just have no
idea of the kind of pressure you're going to subject
yourselves to. Let's say you have a building that can
be built for ten million dollars, and with a 44 percent
increase you are already talking about four and a half
million dollars. Get into twenty million dollars and
you're talking about eight million dollars.
REBNY stressed:
The absence of objective criteria would discourage new
construction and new developments as an investor in
acquiring land or assembling will not know what he can
build and will be discouraged from going ahead with the
venture.
...You know, we often laughingly talk about how you sell
the Brooklyn Bridge to a stranger. Well, boy oh boy,
here's someone who sold the air over Grand Central to
someone from England. Well, I think that that man
should be regarded as a genius. Instead, we're holding
him up here and pillorying him...
Well, that to me violates fundamental fair play. Here
is a man who had a set of rules. He worked under them,
and he is producing a building. I don't care what you
say. The way I grew up - that isn't fair and this
Commission shouldn't be partyto it.
The representative of UGP properties, the prospective
developers of 175 Park Avenue, said that Mr. Elliott's public
acknowledgement that the CPO acted when it did to avert the
threat of the Second Skyscraper atop Grand Central was spot
zoning in its clearest sense, and spot zoning was contrary to
46
He said further evidence of spot zoning was thethe l aw.
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exclusion of Radio City, where density, land values, pede-
strian and vehicular traffic were just as great, as immediate-
ly to the north of 47th and 48th Street, the northerly
boundary.
Richard Stein, a Manhattan architect, in claiming that
the boundaries were hard to understand, noted:
The Port Authority Bus Terminal is included in the
Grand Central Transportation District although it is
about a mile away. According to the designated boun-
daries, it influences density two blocks to its north,
but not at all to its south. Also, something happens
midway in the block between 47th Street and 48th Street,
whereby the southerly half is within the magnetic
field of Grand Central, but the northerly half is
not.
Penn Station seems to exert its influence largely to
the north and east but not significantly to the south
and west. From a planning analysis, the boundaries
appear arbitrary. 47
Peter Blake, editor of the Architectural Forum, compared
the Grand Central proposal with the General Motors Building,
then nearing completion on Fifth Avenue at 59th Street "to
48
illustrate the absurdity of this particular proposal."
Both buildings will have a daytime population of about
12,000; but whereas the proposed Grand Central tower
will be served by numerous subway and suburban lines
that will feed into the building directly without caus-
ing congestion up and down the sidewalks, the General
Motors Building will spill its 12,000 daytime inhabitants
onto the surrounding streets on every working day; and
these 12,000 people will then have to line up, probably
for blocks, to squeeze into the tiny subway entrances
that exist in this general area, and are already vastly
overcrowded.
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The amendment was "ill conceived and hastily drawn" and
was a "highly emotional response to one particular proposal
that displeases some members of the Commission," he said
in claiming that if one were to describe a theoretically
ideal site for a high rise office building anywhere in the
City of New York, such a description would be "an almost
exact description of the Grand Central site especially as
it is to be developed."
The hearings were concluded on August 14, 1968. The
amendment (CP-20387) was not adopted by the CPC and consequent-
ly not acted upon by the Board of Estimate. Subsequently, in
the spring of 1969, proposals were made to distribute the
air rights above Grand Central in a further attempt to stop
the second tower astride Grand Central.
I have argued that the satisficing strategy that led to
the 1916 code, created the pre-conditions for a spatial
environment with poor environmental attributes. Park Avenue
is, perhaps, the most impressive example of a rue corridor
created by the 1916 code. The transformation of Park Avenue
needs to be seen, in large measure, as a reaction to the poor
spatial environment caused by the 1916 code. Moreover, exist-
ing residential land-use and the continued existence of rent-
control, worked together with the code to create an intensity-
of-use that was, from the investors' standpoint, unsatisfactory.
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The chapter sheds light on the incremental transformation
of Park Avenue as a strategy of increasing the intensity-of-
use. The gradual transformation was characterized by the need
to test the market and bring in digestible increments of
space that could be readily absorbed by the market.
Essential to the strategy was the perceived need for
each building to be self-sufficient, i.e. each building would
have to relate to its neighbors whether these be redeveloped
or not. This circumstance militated against any comprehen-
sive area wide plan with numerous interdependencies between
individual buildings.
Rejection of Webb and Knapp's massive Grand Central
City project needs to be viewed in the light of the overall
redevelopment, from the periphery towards the hub. Instead
of a redevelopment strategy under which the key parcel, the
air rights at Grand Central, would have been developed first,
as under the Webb and Knapp proposal, the reverse strategy
was employed, a strategy in which redevelopment was phased
to progress from "the outside" towards the "inside," the hub.
In this manner, by the time the key parcel at the hub, i.e.
over Grand Central, was arrived at, area transformation
would have been largely completed. By leaving the key
parcel to the last, advantage could be taken of the rise in
property values accompanying the transformation of Lower
Park Avenue.
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Although bulk was cut away at the base, as in the case
of the Chase Manhattan Building, it became possible, due to
the size of the airrights parcel, to build a tower with large
floor plans under the 25% coverage provision of the 1916 code.
The turning in plan of the Pan-Am Building through 90 degrees
to create a terminal feature for the Avenue, was a logical
step to take to maximize the achievable intensity-of-use
differential because unblocked vistas commanded higher rents.
Consonant with the phasing strategy was the decision to
develop only one part of the terminal's airrights property
and to leave a substantial parcel for later redevelopment.
Under the new code of 1960, in preparation during the planning
of the Pan-Am building, tower coverage provisions were to be
relaxed from 25% to 40% of the site. This meant that the
second tower could have similarly large floors as the first
tower, but on a, by comparison, smaller parcel. Also a 25%
coverage tower situated next to a 40% coverage tower, would
be more advantageous in terms of spacing than two 40% coverage
towers. Thus advantage was taken of the introduction of the
new code.
The proposal for the second tower was seen by the
Planning Commission as an especially propitious occasion to
push for a proposal to increase its leverage over developers
and to enhance the effectiveness of its Urban Design Group.
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The hasty drawing up of the Special Transportation District
legislation and timing of its announcement, is indicative
of the perceived need on the part of the city to exploit
priority issues and to promote popular causes by riding on
the coattails of conventional enlightenment, in order for
the city to gain acceptance for measures that would enhance
its leverage. The alertness of the city in responding to
this opportunity to enhance its leverage is indicative of
its lack of influence in drawing up the agenda for the
management of the spatial environment.
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Chapter 12
The Proposed Special Lower Third Avenue Development District:
Combining Remappikng with Recapture
This chapter shows how, as opportunities to achieve
substantial intensity-of-use differentials become exhausted,
pressures are brought to bear for incremental remappings
along the avenues to permit private developers to develop
elevator buildings at the same densities.
On 23 October 1968, at a luncheon of the Citizen's
Housing and Planning Council in the New York Hilton,
Mayor Lindsay said there were "hundreds" of sites in every
borough where private enterprise could build thousands of
units of new housing. They are not being built, he asserted,
because zoning restrictions made them financially unattract-
ive. He suggested refinements and simplifications of the
zoning laws and bonus incentives to make such sites into
"financially feasible sites."
On October 30, 1968, Mayor Lindsay ordered a public
investigation of spiraling apartment rent increases of the
400,000 apartments not under rent control. In pledging
cooperation with the Mayor's investigation, Edmund McRichard,
president of the Real Estate Board of New York, urged,
however, that the city amend its zoning laws to encourage
2
the construction of new apartments.
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At a conference on November 7, 1968, Mayor Lindsay told
the landlords through Deputy Mayor Sweet that "it is entirely
possible that some of the rent increases we are seeing today
may be the byproduct of the building boom," but he added:
"The trouble is that you cannot expect to make up for several
3
lean years all at once without a justifiable public reaction."
Lewis Whiteman, Executive Director of the Investing
Builder's Association, demanded extensive remappings to
4
highest densities:
...the overwhelming majority of professional men in
the real estate and construction industry are convinced
that the dearth of new housing construction in New
York City is the inevitable result of the policy of
the City Planning Commission, and that unless and
until the Commission undergoes a change of attitude,
no major surge of new housing construction is likely
to develop.
If the city ever hopes to get any significant increase
in its housing inventory, we think the time has come
for a reevaluation and upzoning of specific residential
districts...
On January 29, 1969, the CPO proposed that 17 acres
of commercial land along Second and Third Avenues and the
Avenue of the Americas or Sixth Avenue be remapped from the
existing zoning designations of 06-1 (FAR 6) and R7 (FAR 2.80
- 3.40) to R1O, with a maximum floor area ratio inclusive
5
of bonuses of 12. "Rezoning New York City" (1961) describes
R10 as "a special, very confined, high-rise apartment house
district in Manhattan where greater densities are permitted
than would otherwise be desired." The areas affected were:
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- both sides of 6th Avenue between 14th Street and 23rd
Street,
Second Avenue from 33rd to 37th Street, and
Third Avenue from 8th to 15th Street.
The latter strips of land are currently lined with four storey
and five storey apartment buildings with retail stores on the
ground floors.
Remapping Sixth Avenue would affect 4,200 jobs in low
rent loft buildings containing small industries, such as
clothing, manufacturers and printers.
"I personally went into these buildings and talked to the
managers and they said there was absolutely no place for them
to go in New York at this point," City Planning Commissioner
Beverly Moss Spatt said. She called attention to the fact
6
that many of the jobs were held by Negroes and Puerto Ricans.
David Shipler, writing in the New York Times on January
30, 1969, reported that sources close to the commission had
put terrific pressure on the administration to open the
commercial areas because the land would be less expensive
than in other neighborhoods. Remapping would have the effect
of increasing land values and encouraging the owners of the
low-rent buildings there to sell to developers of maximum
7
density apartment buildings.
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On February 3, 1969, a public hearing was held on the
subject of remapping Third Avenue from St. Marks Place to
14th Street and parts of the Avenue of the Americas and
Second Avenue from R7-2 or 06-1 districts to RIO.
On February 13, 1969, however, the Planning Commission
withdrew the proposal to remap the nine commercially mapped
blocks on Sixth Avenue to RIO. The AIA Guide describes the
area as "block long ghosts lining Sixth Avenue, recalling
the latter part of the 19th Century when this was fashion
8
row." Some of the former impressive stores were Siegel
Cooper Department Store between 18th and 19th Streets,
currently used by J. 0. Penney as a warehouse, and by the
NBC as a carpentry and stage set shop; the B. Altman
Department Store, also between 18th and 19th Streets; the
Simpson Crawford Department Store between 19th and 20th
Streets, and U. O'Neill Department Store between 20th and
21st Street. There was Adams Dry Goods Store between 21st
and 22nd Streets and finally Stern's Department Store
between 22nd and 23rd Streets. Chairman Elliott gave no
reason for backing down on the proposal, except to say that
more information was needed. Arnold Yoskowitz, in a survey
for the Citizen's Housing and Planning Council, writes that
talks with union and industrial officials had indicated that
there were few suitable sites within New York City for re-
location and that the bulk of these firms would leave the
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city for suburban industrial parks.
50% of the firms in the area are in the apparel industry,
20% printing and 30% in manufacturing services. Total number
of jobs in the Sixth Avenue area -- 100 ft. set-back = 4200,
150-200 ft. set-back = 9500, 450 ft. set-back = 13,500. The
10
J. C. Penny Warehouse building alone employs 1,300 people.
The Commission's selection of these blocks had seemed to
be contradictory to its policy statement in the draft of
the master plan that:
many low skilled industrial jobs are in the Manhattan
loft area between the midtown and lower Manhattan
office districts. We aim to protect this area from
redevelopment as long as these jobs are important to
the city. 11
The other two areas on Second and Third Avenues were
retained and a hearing was scheduled for Feb. 19, 1969.
At the hearing, there was strong community opposition which
claimed that the proposed remapping would lead to the demo-
lition of needed low-rent housing. The proposal's effect on
public facilities, the nearby Cooper Square urban renewal
area and congestion, was questioned. Only one speaker
appeared in support of the proposal. Frances Golden, a
consultant to the Cooper Square Community Development Committee,
said the talk of rezoning had already boosted land values in
nearby blocks where city aided removal was about to get under-
12
way just south of the area in question.
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Several members of the OPo's professional staff accused
the Commission of disregarding planners's findings and of
yielding to powerful real estate speculators. "Real estate
speculators," their statement said, "wanted to take over
valuable inner city land where poor and working people live
and work, to construct profitable housing for rich people.
City Planning department staff determined that such a take-
over was against the best interests of everyone except the
13
real estate interests and their corporate allies."
The staff people, members of a group that called itself
"the urban underground," submitted a petition containing
113 signatures at least 25 of which were by commission
employees. The planners claimed that the Lindsay administra-
tion, under pressure to produce more housing, had overridden
the staff's recommendations. One of the members charged:
We have been asked to violate our personal integrity
by justifying decisions to the public on a technical
basis when they were made on a political level in
the Mayor's Office. We have been asked to conceal 14
information, which should be available to the public.
Chairman Elliott was upset by the attack. He did not
discuss the allegations at the hearing, but he did subsequently
15
ask critical staff members to substantiate their charges.
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I am accused of making political decisions. If
that was true in the sense of votes, for example,
why should we zone anything for high income housing?
There's no votes there.
His interlocuters shot back that while high income housing
might not produce votes to keep the Mayor in office, it did,
however, generate campaign funds and support for him. To
this the Chairman replied:
Every sophisticated person knows that the big money
contributors, the builders, the corporations, give
money to both sides in a campaign in a city like this
- not just to the man in office.
The New York Times, in calling the problem "a complex
one" that had "been made more thorny by the fall-off in all
kinds of residential building as a result of zoning and
code limitations, the spiraling cost of construction and
16
the tangled web of rent control," maintained that:
under these circumstances, it is unnecessary and
unfair to accuse Donald H. Elliott, Chairman of the
City Planning Commission, of being in league with
real estate speculators, because he favors rezoning,
as some of the speakers at a City Hearing did Wednesday.
The editorial continued:
Nevertheless, the petition signed by 113 planners,
including 25 members of the City Planning Commission's
own professional staff, should not be ignored. Their
contention that rezoning would take away valuable inner
city land where poor and working people live and work,
to construct housing for rich people, must be either
disproved or heeded.
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The day after the hearing, Mayor Lindsay said he thought
the Planning Commission's hearing on proposals to rezone
parts of Lower Second and Third Avenue for luxury housing was
entirely appropriate. The Commission and he were in entire
accord. The Commission took no action on the proposal. It
undertook a study to review the basic issues raised at the
public hearing.
Mayor Lindsay had ordered the real estate industry to
come up with a plan to regulate rents of non-rent-controlled
apartments by March 1. He also released a study by his
housing aides advocating the kind of remapping the Planning
17
Commission was considering on 2nd and 3rd Avenues. The
real estate industry took the position that the healthiest
way to stem the rent spiral in the 600,000 apartments not
under control was to increase the supply of housing by en-
couraging more private construction. In addition to remapp-
ing, the real estate industry was calling for relaxation of
the zoning regulations passed in 1961 that limited the
percentage of a site on which a building could be erected.
But Mayor Lindsay said: "Any pressure exerted by landlords
18
to change that law must be resisted."
A. L. Huxtable called the controversy about the CPC's
proposal to remap parts of Lower Second and Third Avenues
for new R10 luxury apartments "only the tip of the zoning
19
iceberg."
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"Under the muddy political waters," she continues in an
article entitled "Pressing the Panic Button on City Zoning,"
lie three very important intimately related issues:
- the present insolubility of the city's housing needs by any
currently available methods, techniques or devices,
- the political implications of the unsolved housing crisis
for the Lindsay administration seeking re-election,
- and the question of whether the proposed zoning changes
will ease the crisis.
She calls attention to the fact that for those who would be
dislocated by the new high rent construction, there would be no
replacement housing. "Adjacent areas - such as the moderate-
income Cooper Square neighborhood, which has been struggling
with its own bootstrap renewal for a decade - would be
subject to land value increases that would lead to their
speculative destruction."
She concluded that "the proposed avenue rezoning is
frankly a token gesture to the real estate community, which
is making its desire for a great deal more rezoning felt
politically."
Roger Starr, Executive Director of the Citizen's Housing
and Planning Council, in a letter to Donald H. Elliott,
recommended that all vacant housing sites on Manhattan
avenues and as many sites on side streets as possible, be
20
remapped to allow for luxury housing. This meant raising
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allowed densities from 135 two bedroom units per acre (R7) to
R1O permitting 320 units per acre.
If the city is going to attract people with money --
which means jobs for people without money -- it's got
to provide luxury housing. You've got to have luxury
apartment houses in which top executives can live.
This is a major factor in a company's decision to move
to New York. If we don't have luxury, private buildings
to take care of top executives, the expansion of industry
in the city will become impossible.
- Mr. Elliott said he strongly disagreed.
- Councilman Carter Burden, a Manhattan Democrat, in a letter
to Elliott, called Mr. Starr's rezoning plan "an unqualified
outrage," because it would virtually insure that Manhattan
will "become little more than a sterile ghetto of high rise
luxury apartments and office buildings in the future."
- Councilwoman Greitzer said rezoning "would serve up on a
silver platter an irresistible temptation to landlords to
accelerate the destruction of good middle-income housing."'
Frank S. Kristof directly attributed the dearth of
privately financed fully tax-paying new apartment construction
21
to the adoption of the new zoning resolution in 1961. The
combined effect of high interest rates, lack of mortgage
financing and increased construction costs did not prevent
the national rate of private new apartment construction from
reaching a record level in 1969. At the same time in New
York City it had fallen from 6% of the nation's apartment
construction, between 1950 and 1962 to less than 1% from
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1968 to 1970. Forces were at work that were absent in the
nation at large. The major single differentiating factor
was the adoption in December 1961 of the city's new
zoning ordinance, he asserts. Professor J. T. Howard of
M.I.T.'s Department of Urban Studies and Planning, in
questioning Kristof's comparison of United States Building
Permits with New York City completions in the period from
1950 to 1970, in which suburbs and central cities are lumped
together to get the U.S. total, suggests a more relevant
comparison to make would be between N.Y.C. and other central
22
cities.
Results of a study by Frank S. Kristof indicated that
the supply of RlO sites on Manhattan should be tripled to
accommodate demand for private new construction in the city.
If this were done, then the supply of private new apartments
in Manhattan would jump from the current level of 1000 to
1500 to a level of 5000 to 6000 annually in a short time,
23
Kristof claimed.
A. L. Huxtable, in calling attention to the many
available RlO sites on the upper East and West sides, pointed
out that the developers did not consider these ripe for luxury
housing. Yoskowitz reports that Daniel Rose of Rose
Associates, after studying a small sample of the available
RlO sites in Manhattan, concluded that most of them were not
available for sale to builders for the purpose of erecting
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new luxury housing. The reasons included long term leases
with tenants in posesession, sites designated as landmarks,
sites owned by government, sites that were too shallow for
proper development, sites in midtown that were being held
at high prices by owners for future commercial developments.
Richard Scheuer, a major developer, stated: "I do not
know of any building going on in Manhattan in anything less
25
than RIO zoning."
In a study undertaken by the Donald Zucker Co., a
leading mortgage brokerage firm, 15 major institutional
leaders active in the New York apartment market were surveyed
26
as to the availability of money for apartment construction.
All reported that adequate monies were available and they
considered a mortgage loan for a privately sponsored apart-
ment house in Manhattan as one of the most desirable mortgage
loans. While money may cost more, Mr. Zucker noted, it is
available. The problem, rather, was "to find suitable land
zoned so that development would be economically feasible."
In conjunction with his finadings, Zucker noted that only
13 apartment buildings with 3,410 units had been completed by
1969 under the new ordinance introduced in 1961.
In January, 1969, Neil Gold and Paul Davidoff of
Planners for Equal Opportunity presented a memorandum to the
Department of City Planning on Special District Zoning in
27
Manhattan. The memorandum was submitted at the request of
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the Office of Manhattan Development, then headed by Richard
Weinstein, who had asked for Neil Gold's and Paul Davidoff's
views respecting the proposed Special Lincoln Square Center
District. In the memorandum, Davidoff and Gold proposed
utilizing the City's zoning laws "to develop low and moderate
income housing at no capital cost to the City or to the
Federal Government."
They took the point of view that:
If it was proper to demand that developers in the
Lincoln Center District included arcades, plazas and
gallerias in return for an increase in floor area,
then it was also proper to demand that these same
developers lease a portion of their units to the
City Housing Authority in return for a similar
increase in floor area.
The authors pointed out that such units could be provided
either in the development or elsewhere in the Special
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District.
Subsequently, Borough President Percy Sutton prevailed
upon Chairman Elliott to accept the proposal for incentive
zoning on a non-mandatory basis in the Lincoln Square Special
District. Chairman Elliott pledged that the proposal would
be included on a mandatory basis in legislation being
prepared for the area between 59th Street and 72nd Street on
the West Side.
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Rose Associates were owners of properties on Lower
Third Avenue and at other locations in the vicinity that
they had acquired at prices reflective of R7 mapping, but in
anticipation of remapping to RIO. Planning Consultant Walter
Thabit wrote that if Third Avenue is rezoned, the value of
these luxury housing sites could skyrocket from an original
$25 per sq. ft. (now $50 as site assembly has taken place)
to $100 per sq. ft. or more, boosting land values and their
29
assessments throughout the area. Rose Associates prepared
to seek a variance from the Board of Standards and Appeals
to develop at R1O densities.
Milton Glass, chairman of the Board of Standards and
Appeals, was known to favor granting of variances if the
developer could demonstrate economic hardship. The CPC
was growing increasingly sensitive to the Board of Standards
and Appeals taking the initiative away from the CPC. Said
Michael Cortland of the Urban Design Council: "It did not
30
look good if the BSA undermined the zoning." In the case
of the Lincoln Square Special District, for instance, the
Planning Commission had been embittered at the fact that the
Milstein interests had sought and been granted a variance
from the BSA, thus undermining the Special District legis-
lation. The Planning Commission appeared to be on the horns
of a dilemma. On the one hand, it did not wish a repetition
of the debacle of the previous February. On the other hand,
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if it did not act, Rose Associates would seek a variance
from the Board for its avenue sites. In that such of Man-
hattan's avenue frontage areas was mapped at RIO, such a
request would not necessarily seem unreasonable. In their
application to the Board for variances at 39 - 45 Third
Avenue (549 - 69BZ) the appraised value of the land was
given as $1.7 million or about $70 per sq. ft. "No one in
his right mind would think of paying anywhere near that much
for land he intended to develop at R7 density," Commissioner
31
Beverly Moss Spatt quipped laconically.
On April 13, 1970, the Commission announced details of a
proposal for a Special Lower Third Avenue Development District.
It scheduled a public hearing for May 13, 1970. According to
Beverly Moss Spatt, the plan was apparently revived as the
result of private meetings held by Mr. Elliott with "those
people interested" in the zoning change. Mrs. Spatt said the
commissioners did not attend these meetings and were not
"privy" to what occurred at them. She said that she herself
32
had asked to attend, but that the "request was not honored."
With the exception of the Cooper Union Building at 9th
Street and a fine 20 storey apartment building on 10th Street,
the area mostly contained 3, 4 and 5 storey structures with
ground floor commercial occupancy. The physical condition of
most of these buildings left much to be desired. There were
also a few vacant lots used for parking.
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Significantly, remapping of Second Avenue sites had,
however, been excluded from the proposal. Alpern, in report-
ing on conversations held in March 1969 with E. Friedman and
Millard Humstone, claims that Second Avenue densities were
to be kept low as a holding action to prevent residential
development, pending eventual office construction, in anti-
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cipation of a strong continued demand for office space.
Under the proposal, Special District regulations were to
supersede or supplement certain regulations of the 06-1 and
R7 - 2 districts upon which the District was to be super-
imposed. The special zoning was to apply to a depth of
125 feet on either side of Third Avenue in the following
areas: On the west side between 10th and 14th Streets except
for two sites between 10th and 12th Streets reserved for
public housing, and on the east side between St. Marks Place
and 14th Street. Designed to promote and protect public
health, safety, general welfare and amenity, its general
34
goals included the following specific purposes:
- To promote the character of the Special Lower Third Avenue
Development District, as a prime location for new housing
developed in accordance with a comprehensive plan;
- to insure a balanced and heterogeneous population for the
area by providing dwelling units at varied household
income levels;
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- to conserve and increase the supply of moderate and low-
income housing units in the City of New York, by requiring
new development to assume its fair share of the burden of
replacing demolished and moderate and low-income structures
in the area:
- to improve circulation patterns in the area by requiring
uniform sidewalk widening and mandatory arcades and encour-
aging the provision of public open space as a related part
of new development.
Under the plan, more low-income and moderate income dwelling
units than existed within the Special District area would be
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provided for. Chairman Elliott said:
The new zoning will insure that needed new housing can
be built through private redevelopment while increasing
the total supply of low-income units in the area.
There will be more apartments here for people of all
income levels and a greatly improved environment.
To obtain RIO mapping, developers would have to reserve
part of their units for low or moderate-income tenants, or
contribute to a special fund for acquiring two designated
low-income housing sites on the west side of Third Avenue
between 10th and 12th Streets.
The Commission, in noting that the density which would
be attained upon full development of the Lower Third Avenue
area would not be greater than densities permitted along
many wide streets and avenues and that many of these existing
high density areas suffered from pedestrian congestion on the
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sidewalks, found that the high density redevelopment of the
Lower Third Avenue area would be acceptable from the stand-
point of the physical environment, if certain amenities were
provided within the Special District:
- On the west side of Third Avenue, each new development
would have to provide a sidewalk area 10 feet wider than
normal. A bonus of six square feet of floor area per sq.
foot of widened sidewalk was to be provided.
- On the east side of the Avenue, each development would have
to include an arcade at least 10 feet in depth. Since the
arcade was to be mandatory a bonus of seven square feet of
floor area per square foot of arcade was to be provided
in the Resolution for arcades constructed at the developer's
option.
The proposal promulgated the rue corridor.
Under the first option, the developer might include in
his development "low and moderate-income housing units"
occupying at least 15% of the development's residential
floor area. A "low or moderate income housing unit" was
defined as:
- any dwelling unit receiving financial assistance from the
Federal, State or City Government under any government
hoUsing program, or
- any dwelling unit in a development which is rented at a
rate no higher than 50% of the average rent or carrying
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charge of all other similarly sized units in the development
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which are not publicly or privately subsidized.
The figure 15% was selected because it was an approximation
of the ratio of the number of existing non-luxury dwelling
units within the Special District area (284) to the number of
units that could be developed on the eight private sites in
the district of R10 densities (1937).
Under the second option, the developer was to pay the
city a percentage of the estimated cost of acquiring the
two sites within the Special District on which the New York
City Housing Authority was to construct a public housing
project. The "public housing site's acquisition contribution"
was to be equal to twice the combined assessed valuation of
the two sites designated for public housing multiplied by
the ratio which the portion of the lot area of the development
within the Special District bears to the total lot area
within the Special District, but excluding the public housing
sites and all streets. If, for instance, the developer's
parcel contains 10% of the privately developable land within
the Special District, the developer must contribute 10% of
the estimated acquisition cost of the public housing sites
to be eligible for the R1O density bonus.
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In this manner, the city would be able to acquire
land at virtually no cost, that it would otherwise not have
been able to acquire because of established city policy
militating against high cost land acquisitions. The city
would be reimbursed over time as the 3pecial District was
redeveloped. In the event that all developers within the
Special District chose to include low-income and moderate-
income units in their developments, the city would have to
absorb the total land cost of the public housing project.
Fred Rose of Rose Associates has observed that the option
of inclusion of 15% public housing units is, in fact, a red
herring because it would not be possible to get a mortgage
on a fixed rent. Developers would rather seek to meet their
obligations by contributing to the public housing site
acquisition funds than mix income groups in their own
developments.
In an attempt to head-off allegations that zoning rights
were being sold, the city's lawyers likened the proposed
technique to a planning control frequently employed in
suburban subdivisions. Under it, suburban communities require,
through subdivisions regulations, that developers of large
land tracts absorb a percentage of the costs attributable
to their development burden, which would otherwise have to
37
be borne by the public treasury.
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The CPO cited the example of Jenad Inc. vs. Village of
Scarsdale, 18 N.Y. 2d 78 84 (1966). The New York Court of
Appeals had upheld a requirement by the Village of Scarsdale
that a sub-divider contribute a portion of his land for a
public park, or alternately, pay the village a sufficient
amount to enable it to meet the recreational needs of the
subdivision residents, a burden which, as the Court noted,
would otherwise have fallen on the village treasury. By
the same token, the Commission argued (OP 21197) that
developers within the proposed Special Lower Third Avenue
Development District be required to replace the low-income
and moderate-income housing units which they demolish during
redevelopment. Otherwise, the burden of replacement of the
low-income units would likewise have to be solely borne by
the City.
The Commission argued that if it were to remap the area
in question to RIO, it might be assumed that over time, every
one of the existing 338 low or moderate-income units, as well
as 144 units used for single room occupancy, would be replaced
by units renting at open market -- that is to say, luxury --
rental levels. Such a result, the Commission argued, would be
self-defeating from the standpoint of the city's overall
8
housing policy.
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The housing shortage in the one rental class of
luxury units would be alleviated only at the expense
of further aggravating the shortage of low-income
and moderate-income housing units throughout the
City, and particularly in the lower East Side area.
An unguided R10 rezoning would repeat the tragic
pattern of the early days of urban renewal; dis-
placement of poor, on site residents to make land
available for new uses benefiting the affluent.
The City's responsibility for such a result along
lower Third Avenue would not be lessened by the fact
that it "merely" stimulated private redevelopment
through zoning, rather than directly ousted the
area's residents through condemnation. Thus, if a
method could not be found to allow high-density
redevelopment without producing a significant loss
of low-income and moderate-income housing units,
the Commission would leave the existing C6-1 and
R7-2 zoning in effect rather than initiate a higher
density zoning amendment.
At a 5 hour public hearing held on May 13, 1970, the
proposal drew fire from both neighborhood groups and a
professional group known as Planners for Equal Opportunity.
A few citywide civic and housing groups supported the plan.
Roger Starr of the Citizen's Housing and Planning Council
and a representative of the Women's City Club, ignoring
boos and catcalls, said the plan would provide much needed
housing.
While representatives of the Commerce and Industry
Association, the Real Estate Board of New York and the New
York Building Congress were in favor of remapping to RlO,
they opposed the provisions requiring developers to include
low-income or moderate-income apartments in their buildings
or alternately, bear part of the cost of replacing the low
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income and moderate income housing units which would be lost
as the result of private redevelopment.
Representative of their position are the following
excerpts from the Statement of the Commerce and Industry
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Association of New York, Inc.
We favor more RIO districts. The city is in need of
more housing and the practical realities of the day
demand the establishment of these districts if the
private sector is to construct them on an economically
feasible basis. Our opposition is based rather on the
principles involved. We believe in government by laws,
not men. We believe in a Zoning Resolution based on
the use of objective standards. We are opposed to
spot zoning, to the sale of zoning, and to negotiated
zoning. It is also our firm conviction that public
housing is a responsibility of all elements of our
city and that its cost should not be levied against
any selected small group of our citizens.
The amendment before you today violates all of these
principles.
Each building developed in the area would be forced to
seek a separate special zoning permit which may or
may not result in a structure with R10 allowances.
This clearly is spot zoning. Moreover, even if the
applicant meets the sale price and other requirements
of the amendment, there is no assurance that the
permit would be issued because of the language leaving
such issuance in the discretion of the Commission.
This spells negotiated zoning. There is no hint of
what other demands the Commission might make in nego-
tiation for issuance of the permit. This is government
by man and by gamble, not by law.
That this amendment provides zoning at a price is patent
and blatant -- and the price is stated on its face. And
that price, in the form of what is termed a "public
housing sites acquisition contribution," is nothing
more than a tax upon the tenants of the individual
structure for public housing purposes. This is true
whether the price is paid in cash or by way of the
reduced rental provision for the designated percentage
of floor area. That tax obviously is by way of rental
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increases necessary to carry the increased cost.
Public housing is a responsibility of the entire
citizenry -- not of a small selected few.
If the CPC believes the area involved should be
designated an R10 District -- and that really is
the thrust of the entire Resolution -- then let
it make the zoning change necessary to that end
directly, clearly and unequivocally.
Congressman Edward Koch, Councilwoman Carol Greitzer
and Councilman Carter Burden let it be known that they
opposed the Special District on the grounds that it did not
provide enough low-income or moderate-income apartments, but
rather was a device to promote construction of luxury housing.
District 65 of the Wholesale, Retail, Office and Processing
Union, the Metropolitan Council on Housing and several
individuals, concurred with this viewpoint. Instead, they
favored either maintenance of the status quo or City action
to encourage or finance construction solely of non-luxury
buildings within the Third Avenue area. These speakers also
opposed the high density allowed within the Special District.
Testimony in favor of the proposal was frequently inter-
rupted by noisy comments and shouted insults. Epithets such
as "pig", "honky" and "vampires" were heard. The Commission
itself was accused of using "oppressive tactics".
Mrs. Jane Benedict of the Metropolitan Council on Housing
shouted: "You are provoking a squatter movement in this city
because there is no place to move". This was a time of
agony when low-income and moderate-income people were being
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harassed out of their homes to make way for developments, she
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said.
Opponents said that the proposal was a give-away of
immensely valuable zoning rights to real estate developers in
exchange for which the developers would contribute relatively
small sums for a pittance of public housing. Neil N. Gold,
a spokesman for the Planners for Equal Opportunity, claimed
the proposal would give Rose Associates and other potential
developers an annual return of more than $1 million for
40 years. In return, they would be paying only #2.8 million
altogether toward acquiring the public housing sites.
In a memorandum submitted to the Planning Commission in
May 1970, Neil Gold and Paul Davidoff claimed that the
proposal to use incentive zoning to create low cost housing
41
was "quite clearly" based on their memorandum of Jan. 1964.
We point out the paternity of the Department's latest
proposal -- not out of price, but out of profound
regret that the intent of our work has been perverted
to the point where it is likely to accomplish more harm
than good.
- Since the rent in the privately financed structures was
anticipated to average $150 per rental room, the alternative
proposal under which developers might set aside 15% of the
floor area for apartments at rentals of up to 50% of the
average rent of all similarly sized units, would lead to
rentals of an average of 475 per room. "Clearly, this is
neither low nor moderate income housing."
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- Since nearly all of the buildable sites in the proposed
Special District had been bought by private developers at
prices reflecting existing mapping, the developers would
reap windfall profits (a) on the increase in land values,
and (b) from the higher cash flow that would result from
the construction of the 1250 units permitted under the
new zoning.
Gold and Davidoff, in their analysis of the fiscal impli-
cations of the proposal, took into account the proposal's
impact on the projected land value increment and the projected
increase in developer's income.
The land value subsequent to remapping is dependent on
the number of residential units permitted in the Special
District and the value per unit or per rental room that can
be allocated to land in negotiating a mortgage. With 1930
units of luxury housing, each carrying an allocated land
value of $10,000 (assuming an average of four rental rooms
per unit), the minimum value of the 8 sites subsequent to
remapping would be $19,300,000. Taking the existing market
value of the land to be $9,300,000 -- the combined assessed
value is $5,760,000 -- the land value increment amounts to
$10,000,000. "Although it is value created wholly and in
full by public action," Gold and Davidoff indignantly note,
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"the entire sum of $10,000,000 will be pocketed by five or
six developer-speculators who purchased the land in expectation
of rezoning to R10."
In estimating the projected increase in developer's income
under the Proposed Special District, a development cost of
$40,000 per unit, consisting of four rental rooms, was
assumed. This figure includes land, construction costs, and
carrying and financing charges at the prevailing market rates.
The total development cost is the number of units
multiplied by the development cost per unit. I.e. $40,000
x 1,250 = $50,000,000. The developer's equity would be
$5,000,000 if, as can be expected, mortgages covering 90%
of total development cost are secured. Assuming the standard
return on equity in new luxury housing of 13.5%, developer's
annual return on their *5,000,000 equity was estimated to be
$675,000 (45,000,000 x 13.5). The depreciable asset is
derived by subtracting the land cost of $12,500,000 from the
development cost $50,000,000. Assuming straight line depre-
ciation over 40 years, annual depreciation will amount to
4937,500. (37,500,000)
40 years
Assuming that developers in the Special District will be in the
50% tax bracket and will have aggregate other income which
can be offset by a depreciable asset of $937,000 per year,
then, according to Davidoff and Gold, income resulting from
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depreciation will be at least one half of $937,500 or $648,750.
Total annual income accruing to developers would then be the
sum of the return on equity and income resulting from depre-
ciation, i.e. $675,000 return on equity plus $468,750 income
resulting from depreciation, equals $1,143,750 total annual
income. Over the 40 year depreciable life, this amounts to
$45,750,000. Added to the land value increment of 10,000,000,
a total of $55,750,000 exclusive of interest, is arrived at.
Gold and Davidoff contrast this sum with the $2,950,000
contribution toward the public housing site acquisition fund.
"Clearly, this is one of the best arrangements ever offered
to private developers by any public agency in the nation."
Enactment of the proposal would lead to:
The wholesale transformation of the social character
of the district from a predominantly low and moderate
income area to a predominantly upper income area.
An increase in land values along the blocks contiguous
to the District which will create irresistible incentives
for the replacement of structures presently providing
housing for low and moderate income families with
structures for household capable of paying luxury
rentals. The replacement of neighborhood stores
serving low and moderate income clientele with stores
serving upper income clientele, raising prices for the
district's present residents.
In claiming that the plan was an "outrageous gift of public
benefits for improper public purposes," Neil Gold and
Davidoff suggest that the need for low and moderate-income
housing, in the Special District, would be met more adequately
and at less cost in terms of bonuses to the developers.
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Their proposed alternate plan would consist of the
following steps:
- The city would designate the Special District as an Urban
Renewal Area.
- The city would then acquire the 10 sites in the district
at their market value,
- and remap the four sites between St. Marks Place and 12th
Street on the easterly side of Third Avenue from R7 to R10.
Rezoned to RIO, these sites could accommodate 1120 units
of luxury housing. Each of these 1120 units would carry a
land value of 310,000 or $11,200,000. Consequently, they
maintained the minimum land value increment that would be
created by remapping would be land value under R10 ($11,200,000)
minus land value under R7 ($3,800,000) which equals $7,400,000.
- The city would then resell four of the sites at their value
for luxury housing or $10,000 per unit. This would amount
to $7,400,000 -- the land value increment.
- The land value increment of $7,400,000 would be applied to
the purchase of the remaining six sites, whose combined
assessed valuation is $5,100,000 and whose estimated market
value is $8,200,000. Consequently, an additional $800,000
would be needed to complete the purchase.
- To raise this amount the developers should be required to
pay into a public housing land acquisition fund, a sum of
money equal to $8 per sq. ft. of remapped land, as
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opposed to $15.30# under the CPO plan. The combined contri-
bution of the four sites would be four times $200,000 or
$800,000.
- The city should designate the City Housing Authority, or a
turnkey developer, to construct the 1200 units of public
housing, on the remaining six sites.
Gold and Davidoff note that the developers led by Rose
Associates, in seeking remapping, argued that they needed an
increased number of apartments to make their developments
economically feasible. None of them, however, maintained that
they were entitled to the land value increment that would be
created by remapping, Gold and Davidoff stressed. In con-
sequence, they followed, "the developers cannot and will not
oppose the city's recapturing the land value increment for
public purposes. Furthermore, they cannot and will not oppose
the provision in the alternate plan under which they would
pay $8 per sq. ft. to the public housing site acquisition
fund, as opposed to the 415.30# per sq. ft. they would be
compelled to pay under the current plan."
The authors of the plan concluded that the developers
would be able to realize a greater profit on the remapping to
RIO under their alternate plan than under the city's plan.
"However, the developers would not share in any way in the
land value increment created by public action."
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On Wednesday, May 25, the hearing was reopened. About
100 businessmen, artists and residents in the lower Third
Avenue Area had formed a group -- the Third Avenue Business-
men's, Artists' and Tenants' Association -- to fight the
rezoning plan. "We do not welcome luxury apartment speculators
masquerading behind token public housing," they said in a
statement. They said they hoped to work with architects and
other professionals, as well as officials of the Housing
Authority, to draw up alternative plans that would enable
construction of more low-income and moderate-income housing
while avoiding displacing residents by building first in
42
vacant areas.
Both the Third Avenue Group and the Cooper Square group
asked for a postponement of the hearing until September or
October to give them more time to develop alternative plans.
They had with them a statement bearing the names of various
civic organizations, the Museum of Modern Art and also of
wellknown politicians (Paul O'Dwyer and Bella Abzug) in which
the hearing was denounced as a fraud. The statement said the
Commission's "hypocrisy" had forced the community to carry
its fight to the public.
Residents had declared their intent to set up various
community facilities to vacant property. One such facility
was "a squatters park" on a lot at the corner of 10th Street
and Third Avenue. But the owner destroyed the park and put
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a fence up around the property. The main goal of the effort,
explained a resident of the area, was to rally the community
and call attention to its plight.
"A second phase of renewal in Cooper Square to the
south may never be realized if the Third Avenue rezoning
proposal is approved," wrote Walter Thabit, the Oooper Square
Community group's planning consultant and President of
Planners for Equal Opportunity, in an article entitled
"Incentives to get Housing in City Court Disaster," in
July 1970.
He charged that luxury builders wanted to turn the whole
area into another high rent district, and wanted the side
streets and Second Avenue rezoned to R1O as well. Each of
the eight builders stood to make up to $1 million in unearned
profits in land, even after making the required public housing
contribution of about $350,000, he said. "If Third Avenue is
rezoned, the value of these luxury housing sites could skyrocket
from an original $25 per sq. ft. (in 1970 450 per sq. ft. as
site assembly had taken place) to $100 per sq. ft. or more,
boosting land values and tax assessments throughout the area."
He attributed the following developments in the area to
the prospect of rezoning:
- Landlords selling to speculators
- Landlords keeping their apartments off the market.
- High rent renovations ($220 for an efficiency unit) had been
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made in some buildings and were being contemplated in
others;
- higher rents and site assemblages forcing out many book
dealers on neighboring Fourth Avenue.
A spokesman for the CPO commented that the opposi-
tion of the members of the Cooper Square Group stemmed from
the fear that increased real estate values along Third Avenue
would endanger their development plan for an area around
Cooper Square and along the Bowery, which, following a 10
year controversy, had been finally approved in February 1970.
That fear was unjustified, the spokesman said, because the
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city was committed to that plan.
The parcels designated for the projects would be acquired,
regardless of any increase in their value, resulting from the
proposed Special District amendment. But the Cooper Square
Community Group's planning consultant, Walter Thabit said
a second renewal stage would also be endangered. Other
questions raised at the hearings were:
- Would high-density redevelopment of the area result in
crowding and congestion?
- Would the public facilities in the Lower Third Avenue area
be sufficient to support high-density residential develop-
ment.
Full development of the lower Third Avenue area would lead to
an increase of approximately 2,000 dwelling units, or about
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6,000 persons.
- On the basis of guidelines established by the Board of
Education, the Commission reached an affirmative conclusion
with respect to the ability of available schools to absorb
an increased school population.
- As for public transportation, the Commission found that the
Special District was centrally located and well served by
buses and subways. This service would be improved with the
completion of the Second Avenue Subway. Existing service,
however, was considered sufficient to support high-density
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redevelopment.
- With respect to recreation, the Commission noted that the
proposed Special District was within easy walking distance
of neighborhood parks at Washington Square, Tompkins
Square and Stuyvesant Square and was near the East River
Park. The District regulations made provision for addition-
45
al public open space on the public housing sites.
- Police and fire protection, sanitation, sewage, water
supply, postal service, hospitals, clinics, were considered
46
to be adequate.
- While many retail stores existed close by along 10th and
8th Streets, the Commission anticipated inclusion of addition-
al facilities as redevelopment in the District progressed.
The only supermarket existing in the area would not have
been adequate alone to serve the increased population within
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the Special District.
The Commission, in finding that the achievable density
upon full development of the Lower Third Avenue area would
not be greater than permitted or existing in Manhattan along
many wide streets and avenues, noted that many of the exist-
ing high density areas suffered from pedestrian congestion
on the sidewalks.
The Commission noted that the mandated provision of
- a sidewalk 10 feet wider than normal on the west side of
Third Avenue, and
- an arcade at least 10 feet in depth for each development
on the east side of the Avenue, would provide a significant-
ly larger circulation area than would be the case if
redevelopment took place on a parcel-by-parcel, uncoordinated
basis.
- The arcade would afford protection from the elements during
inclement weather and make the ground level retail facilities
48
more attractive.
Commissioner Spatt charged, however, that with the
exception of design studies, the Commission had made no study
of the impact of extensive rezoning to RIO. "What will be
the effect on people, on services, on systems," she asked in
49
her dissenting report entitled "A Mess of Pottage":
One wonders how the majority report can state that
public facilities such as fire, public sanitation,
sewage and transit are adequate to service the
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increased population. The Office of Midtown Planning
publicly admits that the infrastructure of Manhattan
has already passed the margin of safety...The basic
question is what kind of a city do we want. What
shall be the quality of urban life?
On August 12th, over protests against "selling zoning"
and "deforming the city physically and socially," the
CPC, in an unusually close 4 to 3 vote, approved the Special
Lower Third Avenue Development District.
Commissioner Walter McQuade, one of the dissenters,
in pointing out that "as we all know, there is quite a lot
of acreage zoned R1O on Manhattan," said that the problems
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to building on it were threefold:
- The present high interest rates charged for mortgage money;
- the high asking price by the owners of the land zoned R1O;
- the very high costs of construction.
The bankers will not budge on their interest rates
to builders. The landowners will not come down in
their asking prices. The contractors, suppliers,
and construction trades certainly will continue to
get everything they can... Zoning should not be bent
to solve what is really a cost problem; there is the
danger of deforming the city physically and/or
socially.
I do not believe the big dumbly designed new apartment
houses now conventional to R10 improve most New York
neighborhoods physically, or in spirit. I share the
reaction of other middle class people to these high
undistinguished cliffs filled with apartments renting
for nearly a thousand dollars a month. These buildings
are excessive with their rooftop swimming pools and
saunas, their pretentious little curved driveways,
interfering with pedestrians and street traffic.
We are told eloquently these buildings are essential
to house the executives of the businesses, which make
Manhattan prosper. I don't believe that. Most of the
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executives I know avoid them. Instead you find
squadrons of airline hostesses,.which is fine,
and less good, hardpressed families, who cannot
really afford these rents.
Walter Thabit had voiced a similar view earlier in the
columns of the New York Times. In charging that the idea
that more housing at such high rent levels would result in
more housing for the less affluent via the trickle-down
theory was pure nonsence, he said, and that, in effect, a
51
"trickle-up theory" was at work.
Less affluent people desperate for housing are forced
into luxury buildings and pay far more rent than they
can afford. Among others, medical personnel, airline
hostesses, young executives and even couples have
been doubling, tripling and quadrupling up in luxury
apartments in order to pay their rent.
McQuade also questioned the arithmetics of the proposal:
If this land is rezoned RIO, I think you will see
the asking price jump a multiple of that $15
per square foot.
He said he was in favor "of having the city share the
increment of value added when land is rezoned, by insisting
that the owner compensate by making investments in amenities
which will benefit the city as a whole. These would include
such things as subway access, or open space." Nonetheless,
he was against "the game of rezoning for cash considerations,
however well that cash is to be used."
the
Finally, he said/amer~cment would work to create a very
high density housing district, housing only the very rich
and the very poor, because developers would choose the option
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of paying cash to the public housing site fund, rather than
subject their apartment house to formal rent surveillance
by including 15% non-luxury rental apartments for moderate
and middle-incomes. "It is said that Manhattan has been
moving in that direction for some time, but I would rather
not push it." Not only was this unrealistic but it was
also "historically dangerous."
In taking issue with the Planning Commission's majority
report, Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt detailed her object-
ions in an 11 page statement.
The Indians sold Manhattan Island for $24. The
New York City Planning Commission is selling Manhattan
Island for only #15.30# per sq. ft. Anyway it's put,
it is selling zoning -- unconstitutionally, unethically,
improperly. The selling of zoning opens a Pandora's box.
It sets a serious precedent and bodes ill for the future.
At another time, another administration, it might very
well lead to corruption. Each building in the area will
have to seek a separate permit which may or may not
result in the granting of R10. This is spot zoning.
The sale of zoning restrictions on densities has many
attractions for those whose job it is to save the City
money. If the restrictions can be sold to get sites
for low income housing, why not for any number of other
purposes for which the City finds itself short of funds,
such as the building of public schools, health centers,
hospitals, libraries, factories, etc. If this kind of
thinking were to prevail, New York City might well become
so overcrowded and congested as to become completely
unliveable,
she warned.
The City Planning Commission, in approving this zoning
change, is doing the very thing warned against by the
National Commission on Urban Problems.
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She cited the Commission's report:
Zoning often is used for opportunistic reasons. The
city officials are persuaded to change not because
the new zoning appears to produce the best land-use
pattern for the future, but because they are anxious
to improve the tax base.
An aspect of land-use administration by lay bodies is
that decisions which should be made on the basis of
technical enalysis are made instead through the
political process.
The warping of land-use regulations to help solve some
public financial problems has been called Fiscal Zoning.
In all such cases, the objective of land-use regulation
to foster the best pattern of urban growth is subordinated
to the cure of a fiscal ailment, and as a result, urban
pattern suffers. And it can often be demonstrated that
what seems to give an immediate financial advantage
actually creates a financial disadvantage in the future.
("Problems of Zoning and Land-Use Regulations"
Research Report No. 2 Washington D.C. 1968)
"Of all the agencies in the City government, it is surely
the CPO that has the responsibility for taking a long range
viewpoint," Commissioner Spatt remarked. In calling attention
to the fact that the amendment would be offering a bonus of
300% for the inclusion of low and moderate-income housing
in 15% of the units, she posed the question whether the under-
lying zoning designation was justified. "If the underlying
or residential zone is suspect, the entire structure is
52
built on shifting sand," she said, citing Daniel Mandelker:
- If RIO controls are adequate for the provision of open space
and protection against congestion when 15% or more of the
units are for low and moderate-income families, why must a
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developer who does not want to take advantage of the
incentive, be restricted to a building just one-third the
size and be required to provide open space at the ratio of
22 sq. ft. per 100 sq. ft. of floor area, or about 220 sq.
ft. per family.
Spatt believed that the provisions of Section 86-071 and
86-072 which were to provide for an increase in the permitted
residential floor area ratio, contingent in the case of 86-071,
upon the inclusion in the development of at least 15% of the
total residential floor area for low or moderate-income
housing units and in the case of 86-072, upon payment of monies
for public housing site acquisition, to be invalid because
there would be a total lack of uniformity within the same
district if some buildings were permitted an FAR of a R10
district, while others would be restricted to the residential
floor area ratio permitted in a 06-1 district. This would
violate the stipulation of the General City Law, Section 20
Subdivision 24, that regulations "shall be uniform for each
class of buildings throughout any district." The difference
in bulk and density, Spatt pointed out, was not justified by
any zoning concept or purpose, but was rather based on the
aim to provide more housing for a "limited and specified
class," which "praiseworthy as this aim may be" was not a
"purpose of zoning under our present laws."
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Moreover, although the proper provision of housing for
low and middle-income groups is a matter of public concern
and "properly a matter of municipal action and interest,1
it has "nothing to do with zoning or with the purposes of
zoning" and it is impermissible to use the zoning power so
as to "accomplish the result which properly should be
achieved by use of the general police power."
The Proposed Special Lower Third Avenue Development
District constituted a significant departure from past
zoning practice in two key ways:
- it restricted two blocks within the Special District to
public housing. Commercial uses were accessary to public
housing and public open space.
- It introduced the concept of recapture for value added
by zoning action.
Robert Alpern, a zoning expert, in a discussion of the
CPO's majority report (Cp 21179) asked the following questions
53
with respect to the use restriction to Public Housing:
- Can zoning properly be used for site selection for public
improvements, when other site selection procedures are
prescribed by law?
- Can zoning properly exclude all but a limited set of public
programs from a site? What is the status of the site if
public action to acquire it is not forthcoming within a
reasonable time?
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- In the present instance, is the Housing Authority, a
state-created authority, independent of the City, in fact,
committed to development of the site for public housing?
He pointed out that zoning action was not the authorized
procedure for site selection for either housing projects or
parks. One involved procedures prescribed by the Public
Housing Law, the other City Map procedures prescribed by
the City Charter:
The restriction to a limited set of public programs --
unique in N.Y.C. zoning and quite possibly ultra vires
the enabling legislation -- seems especially questionable
where there is no hard assurance that action to initiate
such programs will be taken.
In discussing the concept of recapturing value added by
zoning actions as it applied to the Special District, Alpern
asked whether the recapture options -- government assisted
units, units at half rate, or contribution to the Public
Housing site fund -- were comparable (i.e. equivalegt in
burden.)? What assumptions were made with respect to subsi-
dized rents and apartment types under each option?
With regard to the Public Housing site acquisition
contribution, the following questions were raised by him:
- What legal basis does the Planning Commission have for
using a tax equalization rate different from the State rate
to determine site value?
- What legal basis does the Planning Commission have for
accepting a tender of money from a developer?
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- What assurance is there that the earmarked sites will, in
fact, be developed for public housing, and if they are not
so developed, how will the Planning Commission enforce its
recapture requirements?
Alpern concludes that the theory of the section seems to
be that the service infrastructure and circulation facilities
of the area in fact would support an FAR of 10 (or even 12)
rather than & "as existing and notes that instead of simply
remapping to RlO as in past practice, the Commission insists
on recapture for the value added by the new floor area; in
this case, recapture in the form of housing subsidy."
This prompts Alpern to ask a set of questions as to what
city-wide implications pursuant of the recapture policy might
have:
City-wide, will recapture be City policy wherever
simple remapping would have been used in the past?
What other areas qualify for similar treatment?
City-wide, will the added density permitted by recapture
provisions (or, for that matter, by remapping) in fact
be based on service, infrastructure and circulation
adequacy, or will it be based on developers' profit
requirements as determined by site construction and
maintenance costs?
What techniques will the Planning Commission use to
determine adequate density support levels? What
assumptions does the Commission make respecting
developers' costs?
What form will recapture take in other circumstances,
e.g. where new housing is not appropriate?
What economic assumptions will the Planning Commission
use in determining a fair recapture burden?
-385 -
But, on October 8, 1970, over the oppostion of
Mayor Lindsay, the Board of Estimate voted 18 to 4 against
the Third Avenue plan. The four votes in favor were
Mayor Lindsay's; the Mayor's stand-in Edward A. Morrison
voted for the plan "as the only way to get low income
housing built in this area."
Manhattan Borough President Percy E. Sutton, in
voicing a suspicion held by the opponents that "the low
income housing would never be built," cast his two votes
against the plan.
City Council President Sanford D. Garelik voted against
it "with a heavy heart." He said he doubted that the board's
desire to spur low and middle-income housing would produce
the quick results hoped for by others.
Controller Abraham D. Beame, who it was understood had
agitated against the plan in executive session, objected to
the provisions on which the rezoning was to be made contingent.
Mr. Beame also called attention to the fact that no one except
the City Planning Commission chairman, Donald H. Elliott, had
54
appeared before the Board of Estimate in favor of the plan.
Mr. Elliott, in expressing his disappointment at the
Board's decision, described the plans as "an unprecedented
opportunity to create new housing at a range of income levels
55
in an area where land costs are high."
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This chapter views the remapping proposals for Lower
Third Avenue, Second Avenue and the Avenue of the Americas
as part of a deliberate strategy of regulating development,
plotted at the inception of the 1960 code.
A bsic underlying tenet of residential investing
building in Manhattan was a prerequisite precondition of
potentially achievable high intensity-of-use differentials.
A second precondition was the ability to secure superior
environmental attributes.
The 1960 code was based on these tenets. The 1960
code may be viewed as the second part of a three-part strategy
of managing the production and marketing of space to the
advantage of an oligopoly of investment builders.
In the first part, the grace period, developers were
encouraged to build high density buildings at locations where
this would no longer be possible after expiration of the
grace period because of elimination of achievable intensity-
of-use differentials. Construction was stimulated where and/
or when it otherwise was not likely to have occurred. The
precondition of securing superior environmental attributes,
light, air and outlook, plus averaged-out area densities that
would not place an intolerable burden on services and the
area wide infrastructure, was likewise to be expected after
expiration of the grace period..The first part of the strategy
had a most prodigious effect on the production of housing.
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The mapping and bulk controls of the 1960 code constituted
the second part of the ongoing strategy of housing production,
by investment builders. It envisaged that both high inten-
sity-of-use differentials and superior environmental attributes
would be secured through the twin actions of mapping and bulk
controls. The number of opportunities were limited, however,
to protect and improve the space marketing position of the
relatively small oligopoly of investment builders of high-
rise elevator apartment buildings.
As the initial limited allocation of sites allowing high
achievable intensity-of-use differentials allotted under the
1960 code -- limited, to a considerable extent, by space
marketing considerations -- gradually became exhausted, the
investment builders' strategy called for incremental remapp-
ings to higher densities. Such incremental remappings
constituted the third part of the strategy of privately
financed residential space production and marketing management.
The Third Avenue controversy needs to be evaluated in the
contect of this three stage strategy. The Third Avenue
experience demonstrates the vulnerability of the strategy.
Although the Third Avenue remapping proposals were consonant
with the model of the spatial environment promulgated by
the 1960 code, namely of high-bulk spines flanking the
avenues, there was considerable community opposition to such
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remapping, based on concern over the impact on community
and environmental values. Moreover, there was increasing
public sentiment against the "windfall" values thought to
be created through the public action of remapping to higher
densities. The visibility of this issue tended to make it
a priority issue.
A combination of factors, then, contributed to jeopardize
the continued successful prosecution of the tripartite strategy
of managing the marketing and production of residential
space. Failure to gain remappings represents a breakdown of
the strategy.
The proposed Third Avenue Special District was an
attempt to overcome the impasse. With it, the line of
demarcation between the concept of recapture of values
created by public action, and the accepted externality
concept, became increasingly ambiguous.
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Chapter 13
The Lower Manhattan Experience and the
Special Greenwich Street Development District
This chapter starts by reviewing the impact of the plaza
bonus on the spatial environment of densely built up Lower
Manhattan. The major portion of the chapter is devoted to an
analysis of the process leading to Lower Manhattan's first
Special District.
When Skidmore, Owings and Merrill designed the Chase
Manhattan Building in the 1950s, they had no idea that they
would be doing the adjoining building, the Marine Midland
Building, at 140 Broadway, next to the Equitable Building, as
well as the United States Steel Corporation's Building next
to the Marine Midland, across Broadway:
- The Marine Midland Building squeezed out all possible bonuses.
Cedar Street that in the case of Chase, had been closed, was
left open. However, its width of 45 feet was reduced froi
the point of view of the zoning lot to 35 feet. The additional
ten feet were-acquired by providing additional plaza space on
the Broadway frontage. For every extra six feet of plaza
depth provided on the Broadway frontage, 140 Broadway received
one foot of encroachment upto a maximum of 10 feet (45 to 35).
This provided an 80 foot deep plaza on the Broadway site.
(Harry Helmsley was on both the boards of 120 Broadway and
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140 Broadway.) In this manner, the 52 storey trapezoidal
tower of 140 Broadway let a substantial part of 120 Broadway's
Cedar Street frontage face onto a ground level plaza, thus
enhancing that building's environmental attributes. In the
summer of 1967, demolition began on the Singer Building and
several others -- including the old 32 storey City Investing
Building immediately to the south -- to make way for a 54
storey tower that United States Steel proposed to erect on
the block bounded by Broadway and Church, Liberty and
Cortland Streets.
On March 20, 1968, the Planning Commission approved a
request by United States Steel that this block and the block
to the south bounded by Liberty Street and Cedar Street,
2
Church Street and Broadway be treated by the developers as one.
This arrangement resulted in plans to put up one large build-
ing with 1.8 million square feet of rentable floor space instead
of two smaller buildings, one on each of the two blocks.
A landscaped park planned by U.S. Steel for the block
south of the new building was to extend open space created by
the plazas of the Marine Midland and Chase Manhattan towers
to the east. To the west slightly off this axis were the
giant Trade Center twin towers and plaza.
Under the zoning resolution, a building of about
1.3 million square feet could have been built on the northern
site of 1 Liberty Plaza, with a second building of 500,000
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sq. ft. on the park site to the south. A number of street
widenings and closings were negotiated. Cedar Street and
Liberty Street were widened. Temple Street, a narrow one-
block alley connecting Cedar and Liberty Street that cut
through the site of the projected park, was bought and
closed.
For this consolidation of blocks, a special permit was
needed. In addition, certain amendments to the zoning
resolution were needed. In connection with the special
permit an underground passage was called for. The CPC wanted
a connection along Broadway because they felt that the Fulton
Street Station complex should be tied together with the
Wall Street Station complex. In this manner, it would have
been possible to have gone underground from the Trade Center
to those two stations. U.S. Steel, however, only agreed to
a limited concourse which followed the path of least
resistance around a truck dock and an L shaped space containing
the vaults and the computers of the prime tenant, the stock
brokerage firm of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith.
There were no shops at the below grade level. In an earlier
scheme, the passage was lined with shops on both sides. But
3
U.S. Steel took the attitude:
You show us how it will make money, then we are
interested. If it does not, we are not interested.
SOM staff members said that this was the first such
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example of negotiations between a client and the OPC and
that it was felt the city was still inexperienced in that
they were asking for too much. But the cooperation between
the city and U.S. Steel, which made the visual and traffic
links possible, was lauded by Richard H. Buford, the
Planning Commission's executive director, as a "great
4
planning achievement."
In 1969, the Downtown Lower Manhattan Association had
said:
Never has the case been more compelling for increasing
the capacity of the overstrained subway facilities
serving lower Manhattan than when Lower Manhattan faces
a big increase in working population.
Downtown Manhattan is flanked by the congested Brooklyn
and Midtown portions of the subway system, through which all
subways to and from downtown must pass. Other factors
critically affecting subway access to Lower Manhattan were
critically overloaded subway stations with insufficient
entrances, too little platform space, too short or too narrow
platforms, too few turnstiles or inadequate staircases.
The Office of Lower Manhattan Planning and Development
held that only the Bowling Green Station's capacity was
limited by inadequate platform size and that the capacity of
the six stations in the district was limited, not by platform
5
size, but by inadequate access to the stations.
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What is going to be done to get the additional
thousands of workers to and from the New York
Trade Center?
6
was the question asked in a letter to the Wall Street Journal.
.. I wonder if there would have been a trade center
if planners had ever tried to get to the Wall Street
area via the IRT Lexington Avenue line at 8.30 in
the morning, or.had tried to take a walk at lunch
time around Nassau Street, or had tried to grab a
"quick" bite at any of the overcrowded overpriced
luncheonettes in the area?
The letter's writer viewed the Trade Center:
...as a gargantuan monument to the single minded
devotion of landowners and builders to their "return
on investment" at the expense of such human "amenities"
as adequate transportation, adequate walking space,
adequate lunching space, adequate breathing space...
Why is people planning always after the fact?
- At 55 Water Street, closings enabled the consolidation of
a four block site to make possible the construction of the
world's largest privately owned office building. The Uris
building provides 3.2 million square feet of rentable space,
in a 56 storey tower and 15 storey wing that borders on a
one-acre plaza, raised 30 feet above street level and
accessible to the public by means of an escalator.
By raising the plaza and through the street closings, in
this manner it became possible to provide a considerable
percentage of the development's rentable office space on
very large contiguous floors. In Lower Manhattan, ther ewas
a premium on such extremely large contiguous floor areas. How
desirable to developers the concept of the raised plaza with
valuable rentable area beneath it was, had already been
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demonstrated in the case of the Chase Manhattan Building.
The design for the Uris Building also necessitated relocating
Jeannette Park, a delightful vest pocket park.
Pulitzer Prize winning critic A. L. Huxtable comments
7
on the scene as follows:
Community waterfront uses? Parks and plazas united
in open space planning? Human amenities? Urban
esthetics? Municipal sense? Public good? None
of it balances against private profit. And so the
city closed the streets and handed them over to
the developers, moved Jeannette Park and widened
Water Street, all in the most pragmatic way possible.
(Singing the Downtown Blues)
- Rising along the Hudson is the 16 acre complex of the
Port of New York Authority's World Trade Center. Bounded
on the north and south by Vesey and Liberty Streets and
on the east and west by Church and West Streets, it will
be the largest commercial superblock in Manhattan, made
possible by the closing of all internal streets of fifteen
small blocks.
In 1960, it had been felt that the subways were too8
congested and that it was necessary to "put a lid on."
Therefore, if a FAR 15 existed then that area was
made a FAR 15. Boundaries were very tightly drawn.
A FAR of 10 was thought to be the top reasonable FAR
designation to be allowed,
said Millard Humstone who, as a key planner with the Depart-
ment of City Planning, had been involved in the studies
leading to the Comprehensive Zoning Amendment.
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However, this was arrived at without a scientific
basis. Now any FAR 10 area is looked upon as a
golden opportunity for negotiation.
In early 1970, the Office of Lower Manhattan Planning
and Development was approached by the Fisher Brothers. They
wanted to build an office building immediately to the south
9
of the World Trade Center with an FAR of 18. Their site,
one block to the west of the succession of spaces and
major new office buildings that, by virtue of the fact
that they had all been designed by the office of Skidmore,
Owings and Merrill, had come to be known as Skid Row, was
located in a FAR 10 district.
The scale of the Fisher Brothers requests was unprece-
dented. Having assembled two complete blocks, Fisher Brothers
needed their consolidation as a prerequisite for development.
They were, then, petitioning the city not only to increase
the allowed density but also to close and sell a portion of
Cedar Street to provide a zoning lot of 65,882 sq. ft. Not
only were they asking for 400,000 additional square feet of
floor space, but also for dispensation from the tower coverage
regulations to allow greater tower coverage.
The city had already fashioned a modus operandi for deal-
ing with such situations, namely the Special District device.
In the case of Lower Manhattan West, as the proposed Special
District was initially referred to, the City sought to avert
some of the criticisms that had been encountered in previous
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Special Districts. In effect the Office of Lower Manhattan
Planning and Development -- now under Richard Weinstein
(Buford had left to take a post with Uris) -- sought to
devise a Special District framework which would enhance
predictability, eliminate extended negotiations, make it
unnecessary for the Board of Estimate to pass on each
individual project, introduce a degree of responsiveness
toward changing market conditions, help achieve implementation
of a detailed comprehensive plan for the area.
Plans were developed for a second level walkway linking
10 buildings with a shopping mall, stretching southwards from
the World Trade Center along Greenwich Street. The Fisher
Brothers Banker's Trust Development to be connected by a
bridge to the Trade Center was to be the northern anchor of
the walkway.
In July 1970, OLMPD was considering downzoning that
part of the Special District, the major part, in which the
base level was 15 to one of 10; and stripping away the as-of-
10
right bonuses for plazas and arcades.
A subsequent increase in the FAR from 10 to 18 was to be
paid for (1) in the form of cash to a fund earmarked for
circulation and/or subway improvements in the area, and
(2) by specified built features. The money raised in this
manner was to be deposited in a transit authority fund for
Units of Transit Improvement. If the money deposited in the
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transit authority fund had not been spent within a 10 year
period, it was to go back to the developer.
The Transit Authority is like a principality and so
an urgent question to be solved is how do you work
out a modus operandi with the TA? We plan to map the
improvements that are to be made first, in order that
we mzy know that the money is spent in the district.
Otherwise, the TA might spend it elsewhere. We only
have indirect control but nobody is going to turn
down free money. 11
At the suggestion of developers, in order to (1) avoid
discretionary negotiations, (2) eliminate the uncertainty
created by incentive bonuses and (3) allow a more equitable
evaluation, a formula was arrived at that took the following
factors into account:
- Assessed land values from the tip of Manhattan Island to
Canal Street;
- sales prices of respective properties.
It worked in the following manner. The average assessed
valuations were multiplied by an adjustment factor gauged
to the area in which the development was situated. The adjust-
ment factor was geared to give a projection of the market
value of the site following its redevelopment. The product
was then to be divided by
18 (in an area with a base FAR of 15 + 3 for bonus) or
12 (in an area with a base FAR of 10 + 2)
The resulting quotient was the contribution rate per sq. ft.
of bonus floor area. In this manner, then, the Fisher Brothers
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would have been abke to acquire for the sum of $100,000, or
l unit of Transit Improvement, 12,500 sq. ft. of additional
space. At one stage of the process, it was intended that the
Fisher Brothers acquire 5 such UTIs, i.e. for the sum of
$500,000, they would have acquired 62,500 sq. ft. of addition-
al space.
As it was very difficult to assume the rents being
charged -- for instance, in the Theater District negotiations
between developers and the city had tended to become "a
guessing game" -- mapping of various districts with specific
factors that took assessed values into account was considered
superior because it was "at least grounded in something you
12
could objectify." But by the first week of August 1970,
13
the Unit of Transit Improvement was "out of the window."
Norman Marcus, the legal counsel to the Planning
Commission, had been skeptical about tying subway improvement
funds to the Transit Authority. It was felt that court
challenges might result if it was sought to arrive at the
market value by multiplication of assessed valuations by such
an adjustment factor. And it was felt that establishing an
uniform dollar contribution per unit of floor area applicable
to all sites within the proposed special purpose district,
was the more appropriate course to take. The scheme would not
have required a plan and developers would not have been bound
to specific requirements in the design of their buildings.
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Also, because of the concept of externalities, cash contri-
butions would need to be clearly connected to specific built
features, which would warrant increased FAR and concomitantly
increased building populations by improving circulation
facilities used by their occupants. Lowering the base would
have raised legal questions as to whether a drastically
lowered base was arbitrary or not. Assisting the Office of
Lower Manhattan Development in its study of Lower Manhattan
West was the office of Haines, Lundberg and Waehler, formerly
Voorhees, Walker, Smith and Smith, the firm that, in the late
'50s, had been retained by the CPO to prepare a proposal for
the Comprehensive Zoning Amendment. The firm had a consultant
contract with the CPO to study special districts in N.Y.C.
By December 1970, the Office of Lower Manhattan Develop-
ment had formulated its district plan for the Special Greenwich
Street Development District. After approval by the OPC
and the Board of Estimate in January 1971, the Fisher Brothers
were able to go ahead with their 40 storey $36 million office
building.
The Special District was "designed to promote and protect
public health, safety, general welfare and amenit o" Specific-
ally these goals included the following purposes:
- To foster and promote the orderly expansion of commercial
office development;
- to encourage the development of a desirable working environ-
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ment;
- to improve the rapid transit facilities in the area and
pedestrian access thereto, including the provision of sub-
surface pedestrian access thereto, including the provision
of subsurface pedestrian connections from centers of major
commercial development to the transit facilities;
- to develop and implement a plan for improved pedestrian and
vehicular circulation, including the grade separation of
pedestrian and vehicular circulation systems;
- to retain and promote the establishment of a variety of
retail consumer and service businesses;
- to provide an incentive for development in a manner con-
sistent with the foregoing objectives, which were integral
elements of the Comprehensive Plan of the City of New York;
- to encourage a desirable urban design relationship between
each building in the district, between the buildings and
the district's circulation systems and between the develop-
ment in the district and in the adjacent areas of Battery
Park City and the World Trade Center;
- to provide the most desirable use of land.
The two underlying base densities within the district
were retained at 10 and 15, but throughout the district,
achievable maximum densities were set at FAR 18. This, of
course, provided those sites, e.g. the Fisher Brothers site,
that had an underlying zoning classification of 10 with the
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possibility of achieving a particularly high intensity-of-
use differential. It was found that in addition to FAR
increases, raising rental incomes, developers placed increas-
15
ing value on relaxation of the tower coverage requirements.
For instance, a developer could save 5 million dollars if,
instead of adhering to the zoning resolution's text calling
for 40% site coverage, he could provide 50% site coverage,
thus reducing the amount of floors to be built, in consequence,
reducing windbracing, shortening construction time. With
the building completed 6 weeks sooner, rental income would
16
be greater and insurance would be less.
Concomitantly, less exterior expensive-to-bui.d -
building surface would be required to enclose an equivalent
amount of space, thus construction costs would be further
reduced and maintenance costs would be cut.
The prevailing view in the Office of Lower Manhattan
Development was that larger coverage towers could be accepted
if the development was coordinated with adjacent lots:
We are exploring the possibility of granting that
privilege. There is only one major disadvantage,
and that is that they cast more shadow. The streets
of Florence are more oppressive than in New York because
they are narrower in proportion to their height. The
old City Beautiful concept is anchored in the zoning
resolution and we are glad that it is there, because
it gives us more leverage. We are getting a year
round protected environment, open to the public. As
half the year, you would prefer to be inside anyway,
we are glad to trade off 3/4 mile of covered environ-
ment for light and air. It is worth it. However, if
you had random development and on top of it, increased
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coverage, you would be crazy. If all you are
losing is some bulk, it is a small price to pay. 17
But Millard Humstone had a less optimistic view. In
calling attention to the fact that Fisher Brothers had first
called for a coverage increase from the allowed 40% to 44%,
then to 49%, then to 52% and finally to 55%, he claimed that,
in this manner, the principle of light and air was being
18
chipped away. He said:
Just think of the neighboring parcel, if an 18 FAR
tower building is built with a coverage of 55%, with
no modifications of height and set-back! The detri-
mental environmental aspects will be compounded, if
the developer of the adjacent site, in the name of
equity, also demands the privilege to develop at 18
FAR and instead of the 40% coverage, also desires
55% lot coverage.
Despite such reservations, a formula was included in the
Special District Text which allowed conversion of excess
bonus floor area into tower coverage. Under the formula,
the maximum percent of lot area which may be occupied by a
tower shall be the sum of 40% plus one-half of one percent
for every .1 by which the floor area for such development would
exceed floor area ratio 18. I. e. for each 0.2 points of
allowable FAR which remained unbuilt, the tower coverage
might be increased by one percentage point. The maximum allowed
tower coverage on a zoning lot was not to exceed 55%. This
represented a 15% increase over previously allowed tower
coverage. By availing himself of the conversion formula,
the developer might provide additional amenities worth 3.6
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points of FAR. Without such a conversion formula, the
achievable maximum FAi would have been 216, i.e. more than
double the base level.
In addition to allowing for increased density and
increased coverage, the city could exert leverage in a third
area, namely in the closing, demapping and sale of streets.
This device was resorted to particularly in Lower Manhattan.
Louise Huxtable commented in Singing the Downtown Blues:
In Lower Manhattan, historic streets have been
damapped and eliminated by the City Planning
Commission to make profitable superblock parcels
for private builders. 19
In the Critical Issues Volume of New York City's
Master Plan (page 23), street closings are listed, along with
remapping height and setback variations, the power of condem-
nation for unassisted urban renewal, as tools "whose potential
for shaping development the City had only recently begun to
exploit...Each of these tools can have a strong effect on the
profitability of a piece of land."
Almost without exception, street closings were a pre-
requisite to Lower Manhattan's major new office structures.
- The consolidation of blocks 54 north and 54 south involved
closing and selling of yet another portion of Cedar Street.
The resulting block 54 has a lot area of 65,882 sq. ft.
In return for the closing and as a condition of sale,
Fisher Brothers agreed to provide a through block arcade
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approximately along the alignment of the closed portion of
Cedar Street between Greenwich and Washington Streets.
- Inclusion of the street portion in the zoning lot,
- joining of the two separated blocks,
- and waiving of the until then applicable 40% coverage
limitation for tower coverage,
made it possible to provide floor sizes of approximately
36,250 sq. ft. Had the 40% coverage rule still been applicable,
then floor sizes would have been at 26,350 sq. ft., approxi-
mately 10,000 sq. ft. smaller.
Large floors were more in line with perceived space
marketing needs. Moreover, three such large floors could
contain as much space as four smaller ones.
As already stated, the Special District contains land
zoned previously either at FAR 10 or 15. The zoning overlay
does not alter these basic densities. Rather, it provides
a schedule of FAR bonuses which developers may earn to bring
their maximum FAR in any part of the district to FAR 18.
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The schedule worked in the following manner:
- For any development in that portion of the District super-
imposed upon a 06-4 District, e.g. the Fisher Building, the
basic maximum floor area ratio might be raised from 10.0 to
-405 
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15.00 by means of additional floor area allowances for
provision of pedestrian circulation improvements or for
money contributions in lieu thereof.
- A basic maximum floor area ratio increased in this manner
was to be referred to as the adjusted basic maximum floor
area ratio.
In order for the Fisher Building to achieve the adjusted basic
maximum floor area ratio of iL), the Fishers had to refer to
the block descriptions in Appendix B of the zoning text.
Heading the list of Mandatory Pedestrian Circulation Improve-
ments for Block 54 N was PCI:B
An open pedestrian bridge spanning Liberty Street
between the north lot line, near its middle of
block 54 N and the World Trade Center plaza and the
elevated public pedestrian circulation system required
it block 54 N.
With a bonus rate of 100 sq. ft. per linear foot, the
160 foot long bridge contributed a floor area allowance of
16,500 ft. There were three other Mandatory Pedestrian
Circulation Improvements listed:
- An open pedestrian bridge spanning Greenwich Street to
provide pedestrian access between the elevated public
pedestrian circulation system of Block 52 N and 54 N.
However, the bridge was not required if block 52 N had not
been redeveloped to provide the pedestrian connection.
- An open pedestrian bridge spanning Washington Street,
to connect the elevated public pedestrian circulation
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systems required in Block 56 N and 54 N. However, this
bridge too, was not required if Block 56 N had not been
redeveloped to provide the pedestrian connection.
- With the closing of Cedar Street, an elevated shopping
bridge spanning Cedar Street and connecting blocks 54 N
and 54 S was obviated.
Fisher Brothers, after having selected the only applicable
Mandatory Pedestrian Circulation Improvement, the bridge earn-
ing 65,000 sq. ft., were still 312,910 sq. ft. short of the
total of 377,910 sq. ft. needed to reach the adjusted basic
maximum FAR of 15. Therefore, it became necessary to get
further density for Fisher Brothers to select elective
pedestrian circulation improvements in the order in which
they were listed in Appendix 0 of the district's regulations.
As opposed to Mandatory Circulation Improvements which
must be built on the designated lot, Elective Pedestrian
Circulation Improvements are, in the rule, separated from the
lot. The list of Elective Pedestrian Circulation Improvements
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contained nine PCIs. The first four of these were pedestrian
tunnels, improving access patterns to the Lexington IRT Fulton
Street and Wall Street Stations. PCI 5 through 7 provided for
modernization of the entrance and control areas of the Lex
IRT Wall Street Station, escalators and stairs, while PCI 8
was concerned with improving the Broadway BMT Rector Street
Station.
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Heading the list was a Pedestrian Tunnel under Church
Street between Block 62 and the World Trade Center. Block
62 was the site of the United States Steel Corporation's
building at 1 Liberty Plaza. The tunnel was located at the
north westerly corner of the block and was thus a considerable
distance to the north east of the Fisher building. With PCI
1 earning the Fishers a space increment of 303,500 sq. ft.,
they were still short of 9,410 sq. ft. to achieve an FAR of
15, the adjusted base level.
At this point, a second important and innovative element
of the Special District, namely the Greenwich Street Develop-
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ment District Fund, comes into play. By making a cash
contribution to the fund at a rate of $6.75 per sq. ft., the
developers were able to make up the difference needed to
achieve the adjusted basic maximum. The cash contribution
was the number of sq. ft. (9,410) multiplied by the monetary
rate ($6.75) which equaled $63,517.50. The District Fund was
to be established by the OPC, the Transit Authority and the
Comptroller. Monies levied by it were to be devoted solely
toward the improvement of public transit facilities within the
District in accordance with a Transit Improvement Program
prepared by the New York City Transit Authority and approved
by the CPC. Such Transit Improvement program, the preparation
of which may be financed by the fund, was to set forth
"a coordinated series of improvements and a renovation
- 408 -
design." Specifically identified were the following kinds
of improvements:
- lighting
- painting or resurfacing of the walls, floors and ceilings,
- the modernization of turnstiles, mechanical exits and
change booths,
- graphic design and replacement of signs.
By comparison with earlier plans, the District Fund appeared
to have been greatly watered down. It had been assigned a
relatively humble role.
It is interesting to note that no pretense was made to
establish any kind of connection between the impact of
increased densities of individual projects and amelioration of
those impacts through deployment of the district funds to that
end. The kind of improvements listed fall, with the arguable
exception of the modernization of turnstiles, mechanical
exits and change booths, all within the province of maintenance,
normally and rightfully an obligation of the Transit Authority.
It will be recalled that Norman Marcus, legal counsel to the
CPC, had been skeptical of the proposition of tying subway
fund contributions to the TA. Nonetheless, tne &ina or
improvements envisaged were not abandoned. The problem had
largely been successfully circumnavigated by introduction of
the Elective Pedestrian Circulation Improvements, off-site
subway related improvements for which individual participating
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developers themselves were directly responsible. However,
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as Millard Humstone has pointed out:
Improving pedestrian circulation is not necessarily
going to reduce congestion, which is also a factor
of the number of trains the station can serve in a
given period of time. Any amount of escalators and
additional entrances and underground concourses will
not necessarily solve the problem.
It was determined' that 1 sq. ft. of additional rentable
space was worth $6.{. In determining this value, the
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following factors were taken into account:
- With an 80% efficiency factor (net to gross sq. ft.) and a
10% vacancy factor, tne net rentable area amounts to 72%
- With New York City construction costs ranging between
$40 - 45 per gross sq. ft., or an average of 442.50,
dividing by the net rentable to gross area figure of (21
cost per net rentable sq. ft. is $59.25.
- The yearly net rental of 1 sq. ft. of space is net rental
less operating expense: (410 per sq. ft. less 34% or
$3.40) $o.bO. Capitalized value at 10% capitalization
rate is $66.00 per sq. ft.
- To arrive at the value of a net rentable sq. ft., a net
net sq. ft. is capitalized and the construction cost per
net rentable sq. ft. deducted.
The capitalized value of a net net rentable sq. ft. $66.00
Less Building Cost of a net rentable sq. ft. - 59.25
Value of an incremental net rentable sq. ft. of
space = $ 6.75
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We have then, in fact, a surrogate currency substituting
for legal tender. The cost of desired features is trans-
lated into bonus increments in floor area by dividing the
cost of each individual feature by the values of an incremental
net rentable square footage of space.
We may then deduce the cost that the Office of Lower
Manhattan Development anticipated for each feature entitled
to a floor area allowance by multiplying the specified award
rate by $6.75:
Floor Area Allowance for Mandatory Pedestrian
Circulation Improvements
per Lin. cost per
sq. ft. lin. foot
a) for an elevated shopping
bridge 700 4,725
b) for an enclosed pedestrian
bridge 270 4 1,791.50
c) for an open pedestrian
bridge
(1) single span 90 $ 607.50
(2) multiple span 100 0 675
(3) with stair or ramp 120 $ 810
Conversely, if for instance the cost of one pair of
32 inch escalators straight run is in the vicinity of 140OO00,
the floor area allowance will be set at 20,000 sq. it. which
is $140,000 divided by $6.75.
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It is of significance that, whereas the floor area allow-
ances for Mandatory Pedestrian Circulation Improvements,
Elective Pedestrian Circulation Improvements and Lot Improve-
ments were immutably codified, provisions were made for annual
adjustments to the fund contribution rate. On July 1, 19(1,
and on each subsequent July 1, the CPC was to publish the
monetary rate at which additional floor area was to be
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credited for the forthcoming year. Such rate was to be
arrived at by multiplying the monetary rate for the previous
year by a fraction, the numerator of which was to be the land
assessed value for the fiscal year, beginning on July 1, and
the denominater of which was to be the land value for the
fiscal year having just ended. The term "land assessed
value" was defined as the sum of the:
values of real estate unimproved by those zoning
lots upon which are constructed the thirty most
recently completed privately owned ofrice building,
having at least 100,000 sq. ft. of floor area and
located south of Chambers Street in the Borough of
Manhattan. The contribution, if tendered prior to
July 1, 1971, shall be at the rate of $6.75 per
sq. ft.
At this point, two observations are in order:
- Although two different ways were used to arrive at the
value of an incremental square foot, the rates were, in
both cases, the same.
- Applying the recomputation formula one finds that the
contribution rate would increase to $6.95 if the "land
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assessed value" increased by 35 in one year. In this
manner then, if the cost of providing amenities were to
remain constant, there would be at one and the same time,
two different values for the incremental rentable square
foot.
Fisher Brothers were compelled to make a cash contribut-
ion to the fund because it was necessary to exactly achieve
the adjusted basic maximum FAR of 15, before proceeding to
get further bonuses under C5-5 regulations where the base
already was at 15. Although there were additional mandatory
improvements listed for Block 54, all of these would nave
exceeded FAR 15 if added to the already achieved density.
With the Fisher Brothers having achieved mae adjusted
basic maximum floor area ratio of 15, they became eligible
for the bonus rates established in the regulations of the
C5-5 district. However, this option was qualified in that
first any mandatory Pedestrian Circulation Improvements and
mandatory Lot Improvements designated for the site by the
District Plan had to be constructed. Once the adjusted
basic maximum FAR had been achieved in this manner, they
had to again proceed in accordance with the specifications
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of Appendix B - Description of Improvements by Block.
Next on the list were the lot improvements. There are
three types of lot improvements:
- 413 -
- mandatory
- preferred
- discretionary
First, Fisher provided the required mandatory lot improvements:
- A shopping arcade approximately 100 ft. in length producing
a floor area bonus of 10,000 sq. ft. bonusable at a rate
of 100 sq. ft. per linear foot of arcade.
- A shopping way producing a floor area bonus of 74,000 sq.
ft. bonusable at a rate of 400 sq. ft. per linear foot.
- Escalators to a second floor lobby bonusable at a rate of
30,000 sq. ft.
This added up to 114,000 sq. ft.
Then they turned to the preferred lot Improvements:
- By building an elevated plaza designated as a preferred lot
improvement, they were also able to fulfill the requirements
for a mandatory pedestrian connection. At 10 sq. ft. of
space for each sq. ft. of plaza, they earned 200,000 sq.ft.
- 16 trees at 300 sq. ft. per tree produced 4,800 sq. ft.
The cumulative total of earned space was now 318,000 sq. ft.
Of this, 171,293 sq. ft. FAR (2.6) was converted into
increased tower coverage of 53% leaving a FAR of 17.4. With
0.6 points short of a total FAR of 18, two discretionary
improvements were availed of:
- An arcade along Liberty Street,
- And a plaza on Washington Street.
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As conditions to the issuance by the Department of
Buildings of an excavation permit for development of a zoning
lot in a block containing any mandatory or preferred lot
improvement, mandatory pedestrian circulation improvement:
- the developer was to submit to the Chairman of the CPC
(a) written notice of its intention to develop a zoning lot,
or portion thereof, in the District, the floor area of such
intended development, and the lot and pedestrian circulat-
ion improvement, if any, which the developer was to construct,
or, alternately have a private party or a public agency
construct on its behalf;
(b) plans and outline specifications for such improvements;
(c) an agreement regarding those pedestrian circulation
improvements to be constructed by a private party or a
public agency, obligating a private party or a public
agency to construct such pedestrian circulation improvements
reasonably coincident with the construction of the develop-
ment.
- Upon receipt of the necessary documents, the Chairman of
the CPC was to certify to the Department of Buildings, the
developer's compliance with the District Plan.
Where a developer is required to have a private party or
a public agency construct an elective pedestrian circulation
improvement on its behalf (the "third party improvement") and
the developer is unable to enter into an agreement with such
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private party or public agency which is satisfactory to the
Chairman of the CPC, the Chairman may allow the developer to
select the next highest ranked unconstructed improvement in
lieu of the third party improvement.
On application, the CPO may grant special authorization
for minor modifications upon a developer's showing of compell-
ing necessity.
Fisher Brothers applied for a number of such special
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authorizations. They requested that the pedestrian bridge
between the World Trade Center and their building be allowed
an average width of 12J feet, rather than a continuous width
of 15 feet, so as to allow for a ten foot wide link at the
World Trade Center's end of the bridge, a stipulation demanded
by the World Trade Center's architects; the shopping way to
be set back somewhat less than four feet from the front line
along Greenwich Street to allow a projection of the building's
columns; reductions in the width of the shopping arcade;
shortening of the shopping way; counting of an outdoor cafe
on the elevated plaza towards the 2.5% retail requirement, and
doors at the foot of the escalators at the southeast corner
of the building for reasons of security, maintenance, pro-
tection against inclement weather, and efficient climate
control. The latter request was rejected on the grounds that
a sense of unrestricted public access was essential, and that
doors, even if of glass, would create a psychological barrier.
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Inclusion of the outdoor cafe was made subject to provision
of two serving kiosks, at least twelve tables with four chairs
each and overhead protection. In the course of the process,
the possibility of granting bonuses to encourage specific
uses was contemplated. This device was to be a feature of
the Fifth Avenue Special District. Such provisions were,
however, omitted. It was felt by the staff and rental agents
that the working population and the anticipated pedestrian
population would be sufficient to economically support a
minimum of 22 % of the total floor area of any development
in the District allocated to retail or service uses without
28
additional stimuli.
The frontage on a shopping arcade or an elevated shopping
way was regulated to prevent:
- an aggregate linear dimension of all frontage occupied by
airline offices, banks, loan offices or security brokerage
offices, exceeding 25% of the front lot line of the zoning
lot;
- any such individual establishment occupying more than 40 ft.
of frontage;
- any grouping of such establishments occupying more than
80 feet of frontage;
- depths of store space less than 15 feet.
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These stipulations were considered necessary to:
- protect needed and district-enhacing retail uses and
services from competition from such uses as the afore-
mentioned, which
(a) generally could afford higher rentals,
(b) afforded a building greater prestige,
(c) in the view of many developers, created less problems;
- to prevent dead spots in the pattern of retail usage
- and maintain retail continuity.
They were a response to the experience met with in the redevel-
opment of Third Avenue, Fifth Avenue, the Avenue of the
Americas (6th Avenue) and other areas of the OBD in which uses
and services vital to an area's effective functioning had been
displaced or excluded or in which retail continuity had been
interrupted.
Projects that can be reasonably expected in the next 10
years could result in about 132,000 persons working in the
area, Richard Weinstein estimated in 1970. About 70,000 work
there now, he said, and about 116,000 could work there if the
present zoning was used to full development. Mr. Weinstein said
that $l0 million to $15 million worth of circulation improve-
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ments could be added along with the increase in the population.
I'd say we'd begin to feel the impact within 5 years,
and there would be quite a few developments within
15 years.
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If builders were to exercise all options, what would
emerge would be a separation of pedestrian and vehicular
traffic, control of parking and loading and a two level
retail "spine" down Greenwich Street from Liberty Street to
the Battery.
A number of obstacles stood in the way of achievement
of the Special District's avowed long range design objectives.
Realization of the area plan was dependent on completion of a
majority of its constituent elements. The plan did not lend
itself to piecemeal incremental fulfillment. Even if most
of its developments were completed, just one missing link
could prevent the second level walkway system, the key
element of the scheme, from being used. Thus, great additional
densities would have been built up and the district's work-
ing population substantially increased, without the circulation
improvement needed to handle the additional population, upon
which those densities were to be contingent, being available.
It was unlikely, as Richard Weinstein himself indicated, when
he said he expected "quite a few developments within 15 years,"
that the scheme would be completed within a short time horizon
or, alternately, that a reasonable number of its onstituent
elements could be completed to make it operational. Indeed,
both Marvin Markus of the Citizens Housing and Planning Council
of New York and John Pettit West III, one of the key staff
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planners of the Office of Lower Manhattan, anticipate major
redevelopment occurring over a period of 10 to 30 years,
although they expected New York's recent glut of office
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space to slow the process. In addition, many buildings
within the district were commodious and even in spite of the
readjusted densities, the achievable intensity-of-use
differential was not a sufficient inducement to redevelop.
Although detailed specifications had been worked out on a
block by block basis, presupposing development in increments
of city blocks, ownership patterns still reflected considerable
parcelization within individual blocks.
In face of its being less than likely that precipitate
area redevelopment would occur, the question needs to be
asked to what extent did the scheme lend itself to disaggreega-
tion into useful subunits?
Here the following factors need to be considered:
- Can a development occurring at a random location within the
district under the provisions of the district, relate to
and interface with both (1) existing, abutting buildings
that may continue to exist for a long period, as well as
(2) to other new structures, under the provisions of the
district, replacing existing development?
- Can the district legislation adequately cope with the
various levels of specificity involved, i.e. both at the
area-wide scale and at the building scale? Can all
- 420 -
contingencies of the intricate and complex process of
designing a major building be anticipated?
Were it possible to stage development sequentially --
to anticipate which sites would be developed and in what
order -- it might indeed be possible to legislate certain
features on a building by building basis that, upon completion
of a sub-group of buildings, would result in a useful amenity
benefiting all of the buildings of the subgroup. That amenity
in turn could then be related to an amenity of another stage
of the district's development, which, too, has an independently
functioning amenity, spread over a number of developments.
In this manner then, the cohesive system of amenities would
gradually fall into place. However, in most cases given the
kinds of constraints and indeterminants outlined, this will
not be a viable approach. Therefore, each increment of
development, as it occurs, randomly and disjointedly over time,
should be of value, in its own right, to both its immediate
surroundings, whether these are also undergoing change or
not, as well as to the area at large.
Must we then conclude that the Special Greenwich Street
Development District has either been a failure or is alternately
doomed to fail? If we are to measure success in terms of
successful implementation of long-range plans for a compli-
cated design and complex physical framework, the avowed
objective of the legislation, then the answer would probably
-421 -
have to be in the affirmative.
I suggest, however, that the key participants in the
process tended to measure success in different terms. The
underlying and unavowed objectives of the undertaking were
surely inspired by the following kinds of factors:
- Fisher Brothers desire to substantially and unprecedentedly
enhance the potentially achievable intensity-of-use differ-
ential of a prime piece of property just to the south of
the World Trade Center.
- The climate toward zoning and mapping changes was growing
increasingly unfavorable. (The Manhattan member of the
Board of Estimate had voted against several Special Permits
to be granted under the Special Theater District's desig-
nation, one even pertaining to a Fisher Brothers project,
on the grounds that too much had already been done for the
big builders.)
- Simplistic tailoring of the zoning text to fit individual
sites was becoming too transparent.
- It was necessary to do something to ward of allegations of
favoritism, resulting from granting of Special Permits on a
discretionary basis and based on vague criteria of the Special
Districts.
- It was felt necessary to avoid bringing in the Board of
Estimate to pass on individual projects of Special Districts
which might have voted against the project.
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From the point of view of the Fisher Brothers, the
legislation as enacted had several advantages:
- It substantially enhanced the achievable intensity-of-use
differential of the site without their having to go before
the Board of Estimate, which was necessary in the case of
the other Special Districts or otherwise having to negotiate
for a Special Permit.
- With theirs, the ilstrict-initiating development, they were
nevertheless able to participate in an interactive design
process with respect to what was required of their develop-
ment. The potential dangers faced by subsequent projects
inherent in legislating complex architectural designs could
in consequence, to a considerable extent, be averted.
Many of the built features, in exchange for which Fisher
Brothers received additional rentable square feet, were
themselves of considerable value to the Fishers.
Given immutable colification of award rates and
escalation of building costs, costs of built features to be
provided could be more accurately gauged to prevailing build-
ing costs than in subsequent developments. Fisher Brothers
were able to concentrate the bulk of their building in the
southerly portion of the site. The building, with its
increased coverage, rose vertically without setback from its
lotlines. In this manner, a prestige-enhancing plaza facing
the World Trade Center was made possible.
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Draping the Special District cloak around the Fisher
Building made it possible for the city to legitimize and
achieve certain objectives that otherwise it could not have
achieved unless it had expended capital funds. I am referring
specifically to the provision of Elective Pedestrian Circulation
Improvement #1, namely the pedestrian tunnel under Church
Street between the World Trade Center and 1 Liberty Plaza,
the United States Steel Corporation Building. This link was
considered by the city to be vital. Its provision made possible
the linking up of the network of concourses beneath the World
Trade Center and tying into the Port Authority Trans Hudson
tubes, with the underground pedestrian passage beneath
1 Liberty Plaza. In this manner, it became possible to
connect the World Trade Center with the IRT station at Fulton
Street and beneath Broadway to the east and the United States
Steel Corporation's building with the PATH tubes to the west.
However, and this deserves to be stressed, the link
constructed by the Fisher Brothers did not serve to shorten
or enhance the walk of the occupants of the Bankers Trust
Development to and from their nearest IRT subway station,
which was the Wall Street station, 3 short blocks to the
south of the Fulton Street IRT and one block due east of the
Bankers Trust Development with an entrance at Cedar and
Broadway.
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In the case of the Fisher building, it would not have
been possible to directly establish a clear connection between
the increased densities and increased occupancy and the
elective pedestrian circulation improvement because, as stated,
- the tunnel was a considerable distance to the north,
- it afforded no direct connection to block 54,
- the building's occupants would tend to use the nearest of
the two IRT stations, and in so doing, would avoid the tunnel.
Draping the protective Special District cloak around the
Fisher building and emphasizing the comprehensive district-wide
plan aspects of the special legislation, provided the means
with which to justify building the missing link in the East-
West circulation system. I am arguing then that the main area
of concern on the part of the city was not the implementation
of a comprehensive area-wide plan, which admittedly the
framework of the legislation tends to suggest, but rather a
more limited one. Achievement of these limited objectives was
considered in and of itself a satisfactory objective to pursue.
The process was geared to achieve these more limited ends.
The draping of the Special District cloak was a means to an
end, rather than an end in itself.
Why was Liberty Street not adhered to as the northern
boundary to the district between Church Street and Broadway?
Why was a single block to the north bounded by Church Street
to the west, Cortlandt Street to the north, Broadway to the
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east and Liberty Street to the south, on which the United
States Steel Building had already been erected, included as
an appendage to the otherwise more or less rectangular
district?
The experience suggests that this was primarily done
so as to be able to legalize construction of the tunnel
connecting the World Trade Center and the U.S. Steel Corpor-
ation building at the northern most corner of the block on
which the U.S. Steel building was situated. There definitely
was a need for such a below grade connection to serve pede-
strians moving west from the Trade Center or west from
Broadway and the U.S. Steel Building. However, at that
location, no clear connection can be established between
either the added densities of the Fisher Building, or the
cumulative additional densities projected by the district to
the south as a whole.
Why were award rates for to-be-built features immutably
codified although it was expected that projects would be
built over a long period of time? Of course, continued
escalation of construction costs was a factor that had to
be reckoned with, and at one and the same time, varying bids
could be expected. There are a number of possible answers
to this question. Of course, this could have been an over-
sight or an inadvertent omission. But I think this is not
likely. Rather I submit the experience suggests this is
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indicative of the nature of the process in which the focus
of interest was on one particular problem at hand, a problem
that, it was thought, could realistically be dealt with.
Therefore a price was established for that feature that was
actually to be built.
Other prices indicated an approximation of the prevailing
construction costs in 1970. The principal purpose, I
suggest, of inserting prices for other to-be-built features
in the form of incremental square footage was to give the
wnole district construct an aura of comprehersiveness and
credibility and to convey in a superficial way that everybody
was being judged by similar standards. But how would one
reconcile this preceding answer with the apparently so
carefully worked out requirements for each specific block?
A recent case study of various developmental alternatives
possible under the district's provisions for two key sites
revealed numerous glaring inconsistencies and shortcomings
inherent in the text of the district as it applied to the
two sites.
While great care was taken -in an interactive and
ongoing process with much give and take -- in arriving at
the appropriate developmental package for the Fisher
Building. it was inherent in a process in which future
clients had not even been identified and in which future
contingencies could not be anticipated, that exact and
- 427 -
complex architectural specifications could not be forecast
over varying periods of time, and mandated. At the same time,
the district's text with its often contrived or unreasonable
requirements or arbitrary features, including inconsistencies
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and ambiguities, creates an environment in which the
prospective developer's hands were bound to be tied in
advance. The framers of the legislation rode on the coat-
tails of the concept of the comprehensive plan that, in view
of its generally recognized ineffectiveness, still commanded
a surprisingly high degree of esteem among laymen, politi-
cians and certain professionals, among whom it seemed as
never before, to be regarded as good currency. It created,
perhaps unwittingly, conditions that, rather than facilitat-
ing and speeding up the process of development -- their
avowed purpose -- would, on the contrary, by virtue of the
straight jacket they imposed, compel potential developers to
again enter into negotiations with the city to seek changes,
dispensations, relaxations, etc. from the district's stringent
and narrowly defined specifications.
Richard Weinstein gives recognition to the problem in
32
the following words:
There is, however, a built-in difficulty of reducing
the amount of ambiguity and doing it by the book,
which is based on the very nature of entrepreneurial
endeavors. With too many design predilections and the
creation of a straight jacket, there is a danger of
losing in the process of granting permits, a certain
amount of flexibility...
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There is tension between what you want to negotiate for
and the zoning resolution...
Next day, someone is going to come along with a different
way of doing it, so there is always justification for
a certain amount of latitude -- no negotiation, whatso-
ever, is possible either... We have not been so inven-
tive in making it automatic as we have been in deter-
mining what should be done, therefore we have been
going to the real estate community who can help us
on this.
These statements were made in an interview with the
writer in Summer, 1970.
Having argued that the Greenwich Street Special District
was primarily conceived in order to meet the needs of the
city and the Fisher Brothers with respect to block 54 N,
rather than to secure implementation of long range complex
design goals, it is in order to ask how well those needs were
met? How did the city fare in the bargaining process? Did
the resulting structure justify the alterations to the rules
made to make the Fisher Brothers structure possible?
First, light and air. Required open space is reduced
from 60% to 45% of the site on the grounds that this is
acceptable if a coordinated plan is adhered to. By virtue of
the fact that the remaining 45% of open space is concentrated
on the northern portion of the site facing the low rise
structures of the World Trade Center (the building rises
vertically without any setback from three of its side lot lines,
namely from Washington, Albany, Greenwich Streets, all of which
are narrow streets), a number of consequences are generated
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that, it would seem, are more advantageous to the developer
than they are to the city. As Markus and West have correctly
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pointed out:
The streets of Lower Manhattan were designed to
accommodate carriages and wagons and three or
four storey buildings, rather than 40 to 60 storey
buildings.
It would seem that given:
- the narrowness of the streets,
- the fact that there is an air-park over the low-rise
portion and plaza of the trade center,
- the reduced amount of on site open space,
- and relaxation of setback requirements,
it would have made more sense, from the point of view of:
- minimizing adverse effects of increased coverage,
- supplying the densely built-up area to the south with
sunlight, light, air and open space,
- providing possible future development to the south wt.
UIght and air and open space,
- providing shelter from the winds of the Hudson and the up-
winds of the Trade Center,
to have located the building's open space to the south of the
site where it could have provided:
- a wind-sheltered and sunlit plaza, particularly valuable in
the winter, rather than to the north, where it would be
almost perpetually in shadow.
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But Fisher Brothers insisted that the plaza be to
the north of the building facing the Trade Center for reasons
of prestige.
A questionable precedent is set in the relaxation of
open space and setback requirements. By allowing buildings
to rise vertically from lot lines of narrow streets, similar
environmental conditions are created to those created by
120 Broadway, the Equitable Building, just two short blocks
to the east, the reaction against which triggered the 1916
zoning resolution. Even if a coordinated plan can be
achieved, I strongly doubt whether such trading-off of light
and air against a climate controlled environment is justi-
fiable, a belief which is reinforced by the experience of
the Fisher Building. In view of the fact that such a plan
is not likely to be implementable in short order, if at
all, existing structures will be faced with seriously
deteriorated environmental conditions when those new
neighbors that are built rise perpendicularly from the lot
line of narrow streets for 40 to 60 storeys, as does the
Fisher Building.
Another area of concern is the fate of Cedar Street.
It is the southernmost east-west street, i.e. the first
street to span Broadway connecting the eastern and western
parts of Lower Manhattan. All other cross streets below it
terminate at Broadway. As such a cross street, it enjoys
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special significance:
- it provides good east-west access;
- in conjunction with Liberty Street to the north, it could
have served as the southern leg of a one-way pair of
streets;
- with its closing, between Washington and Greenwich Street,
and the erection of a 60 storey building in its bed, yet
another terminal feature was created.
The World Trade Center had blocked off four more such
streets between Broadway and the waterfront. These numerous
terminal features blocked off the view of the patch of sky
reaching to the horizon, just above the Hudson, a feature
that tended to:
- alleviate the oppressiveness of the narrow streets in a
high density environment,
- provide a sense of orientation and visual delight.
Moreover, Cedar Street's funnel of space, reaching across
Lower Manhattan from the Hudson in the west to the east,
had fulfilled an important micro-climatic function in that
it facilitated circulation of air within the district.
Fisher provided bonusable features that allowed its
building to be tied into the World Trade Center and partici-
pate in its amenities. It was, in effect, an extension of
the beachhead created by the World Trade Center.
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True, the city gained an important connection between
two separate below grade pedestrian systems, but this did
not, as has been demonstrated, ameliorate, to any significant
extent, impacts of doubling densities on block 54. It was
a feature for which provision should have been made,
regardless of whether block 54 N or any of the other blocks
in the Special District were redeveloped or not.
On January 18, 1971, a week after the Special Greenwich
Street Development District was approved by the Board of
Estimate, the Fisher Brothers' plan to erect a $36 million,
40 storey structure, to be connected by a footbridge to
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the World Trade Center, was announced at City Hall.
The Times stressed the building's relationship to the
World Trade Center in the article's heading, "Addition to
Trade Center Planned." The new building was to be leased by
the Bankers Trust Company as its main operations headquarters.
The bank was to occupy only about 800,000 sq. ft. of the
structure's 1,185,000 sq. ft. total and sublet the rest.
Fisher Brothers were to contribute $2 million toward a
$3,000,000 subway pedestrian tunnel connecting the U.S. Steel
Building at Church and Liberty Streets, with the PATH subway
system under the World Trade Center. The Port of New York
authority, which was building the Trade Center, was to pay
the $1 million balance of the tunnel's cost. The architects
were the firms of Shreve, Lamb and Harmon Associates and
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Peterson and Brickbauer. Competition was scheduled for 1973.
Also, within the confines of the district, developer
Sylvan Lawrence is considering redevelopment of block 20 N
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between Broadway and Trinity Place south of Exchange Place.
To the south, the site abuts a windowless firewall of a pre-
1916 office building. The site is presently developed at an
average density of FAR 7. The Bank of Tokyo has been
committed as the primary tenant. Law firms are expected to
take the remaining space. Skidmore, Owings and Merrill were
retained to prepare a scheme for the site. In charge are
Gordon Bunshaft and Roger Radford. The scheme prepared by
SOM, envisages a relatively slender and tall 34 storey
building on the southerly portion of the site. Developer
Sylvan Lawrence had identified, mainly among the many law
firms in the area, a market for relatively small floors.
The building's core element was to abut the windowless
firewall which was to serve as an element separating the two
building bulks. On the northern portion of the site it was
proposed to provide a plaza, thus eliminating notoriously
narrow Exchange Place. This would also create open space
facing onto Lower Broadway. This would have been beneficial,
from the standpoint of light and view, to occupants of
buildings on the east side of Broadway. Lower Broadway,
much narrower than the typical north-south avenue and, to a
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considerable extent, built up before enactment of the 1916
resolution, was lined with buildings as much as three to
four times higher than the width of the street. The
proposed development package, it seems, would thus have
made a substantial contribution to the rehabilitation of the
quality of the environment in its vicinity.
In calling attention to the "significant urban wall"
created by the "facades of a series of buildings, each rising
to a height of twenty or thirty floors, without setback from
the edge of the street," the framers of the legislation had
mandated that certain developments, e.g. on Broadway,
"conform to the established streetwall."
The Office of Lower Manhattan Development raised several
objections to the proposal:
- The requirement to build to the Broadway lot line along
its entire length in order to create a continuous street
wall was not fulfilled;
- in consequence the required arcade along Broadway could
not be built;
- the elevated shoping way along Trinity Place had been
omitted; and
- it was argued that the plaza to the north would not
receive sunlight.
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Ranked fifth among the Mandatory Lot Improvements for
block 20 N was an elevated plaza spanning Trinity Place. It
was an important purpose of the plaza to receive from the
north the elevated walkway along Greenwich Street. It was,
therefore, a key component of the area plan. The district's
text stipulates that the elevated plaza is not required if
a small traffic-island-like triangular piece of property
between Greenwich Street and Trinity Place were not
available for development. In order to secure the construct-
ion of the elevated plaza, the city made the city-owned
property available to the developer. This would have enabled
the developer to count the deck in coverage computation and
thus to provide a 55% tower with 35,000 sq. ft. floors as
opposed to floors 23,000 sq. ft. in size, as in the developers'
initial scheme. The city, however, also insisted that the
requirement of building to the lot line up to the height of
85 feet be adhered to.
At the time of writing, it is too early to predict what
the outcome of the process with respect to Block 20 N will
be. Nevertheless, some observations are in order. It is
extremely difficult to predict all eventualities and con-
tingencies in advance. In the case of 55 Broadway, convert-
ing Floor Area Ratio into increased coverage was not an
incentive. Neither was the requirement of building to the
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lot line desirable, from the point of view of the developer.
This would have brought about deep large floors with a
considerable amount of secondary space which, the developer
calculated, would command less rent than peripheral primary
space on high floors. Moreover, in the high-coverage,
high-density environment of Lower Broadway, the developer
placed a premium on a plaza. Not only did it improve light
and air, and thus the working environment and concomitantly
rentals on the lower floors, but the plaza was also
prestige-enhancing, considerably more so than an anonymous
component of a contiguous street wall was, a circumstance
to which developers and their clients, both corporate and
non-corporate, attached considerable value.
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Chapter 14
The Fifth Avenue Special District
The Fifth Avenue Special District continues the pattern that had
begun to emerge in the preparation of the previous special districts,
a pattern of designing a district around a specific building proposal.
This chapter covers the first Special District to be adopted in Midtown
after Mayor Lindsay's reelection.
On May 8, 1969, Mayor Lindsay established a special office to
draft a master plan for the redevelopment of midtown Manhattan! How-
ever, both the Mayor and the chairman of the Planning Commission,
D. H. Elliott, denied that the new office would weaken the Planning
Commission. "This office," Mr. Elliott said, 'will be very closely
related to us and will supply very substantial staff services."
J. T. Robertson, a key member of the City Planning Commission's
Urban Design Group, was to head the new office. He said one of the
principal reasons for creating a unit that will report directly to the
Mayor was to enable it to oversee action by various city agencies,
whose overlapping jurisdictions and competing goals often slow things
down.
"At first, Don and I were hoping we would do this out of planning,"
Mr. Robertson said. "But agency jealousies make it very tough for one
agency to be supervised by the other."
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The move brought immediate criticism from Percy E. Sutton,
Manhattan Borough President, who complained that "planning for midtown
Manhattan would become the special preserve of the Mayor," and
Mrs. Beverly Moss Spatt, a member of the Planning Commission, charged
that the new office "further emasculates the commission," which she
said "may very well be called in only at the llth hour for statutory
approval, after plans and programs have reached a point from which
there is no return."2
The new agency was to coordinate such super agencies as the
Housing and Development Administration, the Economic Development
Administration and the Transportation Administration:3
The city expects to use incentive zoning, urban renewal
and other tools to replace certain rundown and underused
sections of the midtown area between 30th and 59th Streets,
with more efficient street and sidewalk patterns, larger,
more functionally designed buildings and other structures
providing access to the bank of the Hudson River.
With new subway lines going in and a superliner terminal planned,
the pressure for private development was expected to increase quickly.
Mr. Robertson said:4
This is potentially one of the greatest real estate gold
mines in the world. We're at a point where a lot of
major decisions can be made. This kind of point comes
about once every thirty years. Without coordinated
planning, its going to be moved on randomly and in a
piecemeal fashion.
Edward J. Logue, president of the N. Y. State Urban Development
Corporation, speaking at a Regional Plan Association Conference at the
New York Hilton Hotel, in November 1969, strongly dissented from the
City's Master Plan on its "maximization of development in Midtown." 5
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He held that the midtown area had already been "overdeveloped." Instead,
Mr. Logue said he favored enhancing Nassau County and White Plains as
developing centers. Within the city, he said there is a desperate need
to restore life and vitality in downtown Brooklyn requiring major
policy decisions which have not yet been made, and to carry out develop-
ment plans for Jamaica, Queens which he said "have not been implemented
in a serious way."
A similar center of development was needed, he said, for the
Fordham Road area in the Bronx. Harlem should have "more than one
isolated state office being discussed." He said Union Square had once
been a major center that had been allowed to slide. Such centers, he
contended, would be inevitably sacrificed by overemphasis on midtown
development. In taking exception to the Master Plan's stress on mid-
town development, Logue added, "I suspect I'm on the minority side and
I'll lose."
Initially, Fifth Avenue had had a residential character. Before
the Civil War it had been the residence of some of the nation's richest
families, centering around Madison Square. Residences gradually moved
northward followed by the retail trade. In 1895, DePinna's Department
Store was opened on the south west corner of W 52nd and Fifth Avenue.
In 1902, Franklin and Simon opened, followed by Tiffany's in 1903, and
Altmans in 1906. Numerous small shops clustered around these large and
prestigious stores. Between 1901 and 1907, with the construction of the
Plaza, the Saint Regis and the Gotham, luxury hotels became a key Avenue
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land use. The avenue began to perform an important ceremonial function
and was the scene of many parades to celebrate ethnic holidays, civic
and national events.6
On January 30, 1969, Percy Uris, chairman of the board of the
Uris Buildings Corporation, speaking at the company's annual stockholders'
meeting, announced plans for two midtown office buildings. Both were
to be located on side streets flanking Fifth Avenue:
- a 20 story annex for the 45 story J. C. Penny Building
at 1301 Avenue of the Americas between 52nd and 53rd
Streets, with 250,000 square feet of floor space.
Penny, operator of a national chain of variety stores,
leased 30 of the 45 floors in 1301 Avenue of the
Americas, which was completed in 1964. The company
was to occupy all of the annex, except for about
10,000 sq. ft. of ground floor space.
- a 350,000 sq. ft. office building to be erected on
53rd Streets, just east of Fifth Avenue, on a
17,000 sq. ft. plot that extends to 52nd Street.
Immediately to the north is Paley Park. Mr. Uris
said his company owned the plot, which included a
variety of commercial buildings at 4 to 10 East
53rd Street and at 7 to 9 East 52nd Street. No
Fifth Avenue frontage was involved.
At the time of the announcement there were 15,000 sq. ft. of stores.
No chance was seen by Uris of creating that kind of store space in the
new building. "It's a pity to see something like that disappear."
Uris's spokesman regretted.
Under the C5 - 3 zoning regulations of the district, a builder
might build a structure equal in floor space to 15 times the size of
his plot and 18 times if he availed himself of the plaza bonus. In
order to be able to utilize the plaza bonus and build an office building
of conventionally profitable size and layout, it was necessary, in an
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interior block location, to assemble 100 foot deep properties that were
back to back. In this manner it became possible to achieve a parcel
depth of 200 feet rather than one of 100 feet, if assemblage had taken
place solely along one street.
The general pattern of office development was to develop the
avenue sites first, then pressure was exerted on the side streets. In
the case of Fifth Avenue, however, incursion of high rise office towers
had been resisted. Office development emanating from Park Avenue to
the east had leapfrogged Fifth Avenue, and Sixth Avenue had become the
scene of intensive redevelopment. The Avenue had been protected against
intensive office development, partly because of difficulties in land
assemblage and high property values. With gradual exhaustion of suitable
office building sites in midtown and their concomitant rise in cost,
the character of Fifth Avenue began to be endangered. Moreover, banks,
travel and airline agencies and corporate showrooms had been increasing
their percentage of Fifth Avenue frontage. Several international stores,
such as Gucci, Jourdan, and Mark Cross, as well as such banks as the
Banco De Brazil, had appeared. These banks and stores sought the
prestige of Fifth Avenue.8 Their high rents for floor space at street
level were at times subsidized through advertising budgets. Banks and
airline ticket offices were particularly desirous of the advertising
value provided by Fifth Avenue frontage. This trend left retailers,
who could not afford the high rents, with only slightly more than 50
percent of the frontage from 34th Street to 59th Street. Georg Jensen's,
- 443 -
a landmark store on the southeast corner of 53rd Street and Fifth
Avenue, was forced off the avenue. When their rent was doubled, they
decided to move.
In the Summer of 1970, Steve Quick of the Office of Midtown
Planning and Development described the situation with respect to Fifth
Avenue as he perceived it from the point of view of his office.
Buildings were being considered strictly on their own
merits and considerations of buildings on adjacent
parcels were disregarded. At no time were there
visual projections of a physical and functional poten-
tial made over an area of three to four blocks. This
led to Sixth Avenue which frightened the "hell out of
everybody"
and showed that any character an area has was destined to disappear.9
Now (Summer 1970) 5th Avenue begins to feel pressures of redevelopment.
Its zoning designation is C5-3 which is a national center use zone with
offices, showrooms, and wholesaling. "Zoning is only in respect to uses
and does not concern itself with the physical sense." With the increas-
ing land values, pressures for redevelopment have increased and 5th
Avenue merchants are lobbying for something to be undertaken to preserve
5th Avenue's image as that of a "promenade and elegant avenue."
Legislative aid is needed and this goes hand in hand with
the special district which is an overlay on the existing
C5 - 3 designated area. An example of how existing
character can be thoroughly wiped out is the loss of 25
restaurants on one block alone on 6th Avenue.
The initial impetus to the Fifth Avenue Special District study
had been an application in February 1970 by Sam Minskoff and Sons for
a height and setback waiver on a small lot, the site of the De Pinna
Department Store at the southwest corner of W. 52nd Street and 5th Avenue.
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The lot was 99 feet x 118 feet (18,000 sq. ft.) The CPC could not
give a variance and so the only recourse for Minskoff would have been
to seek a variance on the basis of hardship from the Board of Standards
and Appeals.
On Monday evening, October 7, 1970, the McCrory Corporation
relinquished its lease, which still had 34 years to run, on the 12
story building at the northeast corner of Fifth Avenue and 51st Street,
the home of Best & Co., a major department store. Next day, Best & Co.
began a liquidation sale. Also on Tuesday, Arthur G. Cohen, chairman
of the board of the Arlen Realty and Development Corporation, said that
an Arlen Onassis partnership planned to erect a skyscraper, probably
45 stories tall, on the Best site. The block front running up to 52nd
Street on the east side of the avenue was now completely controlled by
a 50 - 50 partnership between Victory Carriers, Inc., a family trust
set up by Aristotle Onassis, and Arlen Properties, Inc., one of New
York's most active office-building firms, and one of the country's
largest builders of shopping centers.
Best and Co. gave as a reason for relinquishing their lease
rising land values spurred by the boom in midtown office building, which
presented them with the possibility of making a greater profit by
selling their land to a builder than they could by carrying on their
business on the avenue.10
In announcing the building plans, Arthur G. Cohen called attention
to two innovative features: an arcade at the rear of the plot and a
park like setting for the Cartier, Inc. building located at the southeast
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corner of Fifth Avenue and 52nd Street. The 4 story Cartier Building
Co. was a designated city landmark. It was built as a residence in
1905 from plans by Robert W. Gibson, and was remodeled for store use
in 1917. Under the Landmarks Preservation Law, the exterior cannot be
altered without city permission. Mr. Cohen said:
We think that building is a jewel and we want to give it
a proper setting. We plan to tear down the Olympic build-
ing next door along with Best's and we'll surround Cartier's
with an open plaza so that it can really be appreciated.
According to the plans as they stood in Fall 1970, the planned
arcade was to vary in width from 35 to 50 feet and was to be lined with
boutique style stores, with the probable inclusion of an extension of
Cartier's at the rear of the store.
The arcade at its north end was to face one beneath the 37 story
office building under construction by the Uris Buildings Corporation,
running through to 53rd Street. The arcade would terminate opposite
Paley Park, the "vest pocket" park with a waterfall at its north end,
a gift to the city from William S. Paley, chairman of the Columbia
Broadcasting System.
In an interview with Glenn Fowler of the New York Times, 1 2
Mr. Cohen said he had talked with Federated Department Stores, owner
of Bloomingdale's and Abraham and Straus, with the view to getting a
high-fashion specialty store to take space in the new skyscraper.
Federated controls I. Magnin, the West Coast Fashion Store. William G.
Bardel, deputy director of the Office of Midtown Planning and Develop-
ment, attached to the Mayor's Office, commented:1 3
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"We think it's absolutely essential to attract more
retail trade to Fifth Avenue and we're optimistic
about the developer's plans. We see it as something
that could well be followed elsewhere on the avenue."
On February 1, 1972 Andrew Goodman, president of Bergdorf Goodman,
New York's fashionable one-store retail establishment, indicated before
the Federal Trade Commission that it might have to close its store at
the northwest corner of 57th Street and Fifth Avenue and convert it to
a high rise office building to obtain maximum "economic use" if the
FTC disapproved Bergdorf's proposed purchase by Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc. In testimony before the commission Edward W. Carter, Broadway-
Hale's president, said that Andrew Goodman, president of Bergdorf, had
approached him through an investment banker to buy the single store
company and avoid the need to convert the property. Mr. Carter, in
denying that the Bergdorf acquisition by the Los Angeles based Broadway-
Hale - and the largest retailer in the west - would curb competition in
New York, said it would instead be "pro-competitive." The many merchants
of 57th Street in Manhattan "who live off" Bergdorf would be imperilled
if that store closed. As the "anchor store" on that intersection, he
said, "Bergdorf Goodman's leaving would have a devastating effect on
the small merchants in the area." The closing on Fifth Avenue of Best &
Co., Milgrim's and De Pinna's had caused a decline of consumer drawing
power, which had hurt the nearby small stores, he said.
Allan R. Johnson, chairman of Saks Fifth Avenue and president of
the Fifth Avenue Association, testified the following day that his
company had "fully expected" to derive business benefits when Best & Co.
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closed its Fifth Avenue store.15 This, however, did not develop. "Not
only didn't this happen," said Mr. Johnson, "but our own business has
fallen off since then in certain areas." He said this experience proved
that when stores go out of business, "their customers usually do not
go to their competitors." The Fifth Avenue shopping area has "steadily
deteriorated" over the last 15 years, Mr. Johnson said, with more banks
and airline office's coming up, while the number of stores has been
reduced. "I'm just not concerned about Bergdorf Goodman but about any
store that goes out of the area." He added.
"I'm very concerned about the deterioration of the Fifth
Avenue shopping section anchored on the south by us and
by Bergdorf on the north."
At the beginning of January 1973, 2 1/2 years later, Steve Quick
related how Best and Co. had announced their closing on Friday and that
Arlen had come in with a proposal on the following Monday.16 The only
handle that the office had on Arlen was Arlen's request for a special
permit for covered pedestrian open space, he said. It was decided to
simultaneously investigate both the possibility of granting a residen-
tial bonus through a special permit and the possibility of creating a
Special District. As the office market had become "soft," Arlen liked
the idea of a residential bonus. A basic agreement was arrived at
between Cohen, the CPC and OMPD. Arlen was concerned about the time
problem of getting the building into the ground and therefore requested
that if a Special District were to be enacted, that a June 1, 1971
deadline be met. In January 1971, it was decided to drop the Special
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Permit for a residential bonus and in February, the proposal for a
Special Fifth Avenue District was made public.
On Tuesday, February 9, 1971, Mayor Lindsay proposed a special
zoning district "aimed at sustaining and advancing the position of
Fifth Avenue as the world's greatest shopping street and urban
promenade."1 7 Seated at the Mayor's side was Arthur G. Cohen, chair-
man of the board of the Arlen Realty and Development Corporation.
The Mayor said:
Fifth Avenue is a street of exciting stores and important
events, of dazzling window displays and colorful parades.
It's a place to see and be seen, rich in ceremony and
tradition, but it is also vulnerable to change; action is
urgently required for it to remain the world's leading
shopping street.
The Mayor noted that in recent years, banks and airline ticket offices
had been replacing boutiques and specialty stores. "Now office develop-
ment is planned on the former sites of Best's and De Pinna and is
likely at the former Georg Jensen site. A recent survey indicates
that there are 25 other sites which will be developed, several of which
are currently being assembled."
Without some form of public intervention, Fifth Avenue
could be transformed from an international boulevard
into a street lined with anonymous office buildings.
The study that led to the proposal was prompted by a plea for
help from members of the Fifth Avenue Association, a group representing
the principal merchants, owners and tenants on the avenue. They pointed
out that the high fashion and the luxury shops on the avenue, along
with the city's theaters and cultural institutions, were the prime
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attractions that drew millions of dollars of tourist business to New
York each year.
Alluding to the Special Theater Zoning District that was created
in the Times Square area to encourage the building of legitimate theaters,
association members had appealed for a similar device to encourage
retailing on Fifth Avenue.
J. T. Robertson, director of the OMPD, noted that the prospective
developer of the Best's site, Arlen Realty and Development, had co-
operated with the city to achieve a proposal to conform with the goals
of the zoning proposal.18 The Special Zoning District was proposed to
preserve and reinforce Fifth Avenue's distinctive qualities. It is
bounded on the north by 58th Street and on the south by 38th Street.
It extends 200 ft. east and west back from the Avenue street line,
except between 38th and 40th Streets on the westerly side, where it
extends 100 ft. The entire area is located within the underlying C5-3
District, which allows for a basic FAR of 15.0. With respect to uses
permitted C5-3 is the most restrictive high density zone in the CBD.
The traditional maximum FAR of 18 was still achievable through the use
of an Elective Lot Improvement Bonus which includes numerous new bonus
features, replacing the basic as-of-right plaza and arcade bonuses.
To assure the continuation of Fifth Avenue as Midtown's major
retail street, a minimum amount of selected retail space (1.0 FAR) was
made mandatory.19 This amount is equal to about two stories of retail
space. In addition to mandating a minimum retail requirement, the
Special District encourages the provision of additional retail space on
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Fifth Avenue through an innovative bonus schedule. For the first time,
residential bulk is awarded as the bonus. The bonus for residential
space rather than office space was chosen, Mr. Robertson said, because
the city wanted to encourage people to live in the heart of the city
and to provide around the clock activity on streets that ordinarily are
dead at night. Another reason was the shortage of apartments, even
for those who can afford luxury rents:20
Hotels and residential units are desirable because they
add to the housing stock and keep the streets alive in
the evening; introduce a market for existing retailing;
and help provide a necessary service for corporate head-
quarters located in Midtown. And because they provide
walk to work accommodations, they reduce pressure on
the transportation system.
There are two kinds of bonus systems:21
- On lots less than 30,000 sq. ft. in size, increased tower coverage
in return for additional retail space.
- On lots over 30,000 sq. ft. in size additional residential bulk in
return for additional retail space, followed by increased tower
coverage for even more retail space.
In this manner for lots greater than 30,000 sq. ft. the potential bonus
could amount to 21.6 FAR plus an increase in tower coverage from 40% to
50%. For every square feet of retail space above the mandatory minimum,
the developer is awarded 4 sq. ft. of residential space. The developer
may increase the FAR from FAR 18 by 20% to a total of 21.6. At an award
rate of 1 to 4, this will result in an additional 0.9 FAR, or a total
of 1.9 retail space. This is approximately equivalent to four stories
of retail space. Moreover, the developer is offered an increase in
- 451 -
tower coverage from 40% to 50% if additional retail space is added.
- For each additional floor area ratio equivalent to .06 devoted to
retail uses set forth in a special list (Use Group F) a developer
shall be entitled to a 1.00 percentage point increase in permitted
lot coverage; OR
- For each additional floor area equivalent to .18 devoted to residen-
tial or hotel use, a developer shall be entitled to a 1.00 per-
centage point increase in permitted lot coverage.
If the developer has exhausted the bulk bonus and has already achieved
a 1.9 FAR for retail space, he may as an alternative provide additional
residential space in the office tower in lieu of office space and
receive the 10 percent increase in tower coverage bonus. In this
manner the developer may achieve more residential space in lieu of
office space. This option may be especially desirable in the event of
22
a weak office market.
The 20% increase in FAR (3.6 FAR) must be devoted to residential
and/or hotel use, unless a hotel is the primary use on a site rather
than office use, in which case the additional FAR must be used for
residential purposes.
- On lots less than 30,000 sq. ft. in size, granting of the residential
bulk bonus was considered not possible, due to the various site
problems of accommodating ground floor service requirements,
retailing requirements, the bonus amenity and public access. How-
ever, tower coverage may be increased 10 percentage points, from
40% to 50%, by increasing retail uses from FAR 1 to FAR 1.9.
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- On lots below 20,000 sq. ft. in size, basic allowed coverage has been
raised from 40% to 45%. Thus the increased retail means a coverage
of up to 55%.
- Many retail establishments on Fifth Avenue have more than 1.9 FAR
devoted to retail uses, e.g., department stores. In fact Georg
Jensen, the department store that closed, was a 12 story building,
most of which was devoted to retailing. Because of the possibility
that there would be a need for more retail space than that bonused
under the district's procedures, provisions are included under which
the CPC may grant by special permit after public notice and hearing,
and subject to Board of Estimate approval, an increase in the
permitted lot coverage and modification of height and setback regu-
lations for any development which includes at least a floor area
ratio equivalent to 3.00 or greater devoted to selected retail uses.
The District's legislation contains a number of non-bonusable
mandatory requirements related to the goal of assuring the continued
stability of Fifth Avenue as a retailing street. Mandatory require-
ments pertaining to uses are as follows:
- A developer is required to devote the ground floor of his develop-
ment, with the exception of lobby and servicing space, to selected
retail uses.
- A development shall contain a minimum of 1.00 FAR of retail uses
which is roughly equivalent to about two stories of retail space.
- Banks and airline ticket offices were to be permitted only above the
ground floor but were to be counted in computing the retail requirements.
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- Along the west street line of Fifth Avenue, above a height of six
stories or 85 ft., whichever is less, the front wall of the build-
ing was to be located not less than 40 ft. from the street line on
a zoning lot of less than 20,000 sq. ft. and not less than 50 ft.
from the street line on a zoning lot of 20,000 sq. ft. or more.
The requirement was not to apply to any zoning lot which was 100 ft.
or less in depth from the Fifth Avenue street line.
The street bulk was treated asymmetrically to give recognition
to the Fifth Avenue "wall" on the eastern side of the Avenue, an almost
unbroken line of buildings extending from. the frontage along Central
Park south, past 42nd Street, at a height close to 15 stories;23
- to the western street line, with its massing similar to Rockefeller
Center characterized by a six story high podium upon which rests a
tower set back some distance from the street, as in the case of
Tishman Building at 666 Fifth Avenue and Canada House. In this
manner, at the height of 85 ft., the avenue will be 150 ft wide.
The terrace thus created was to be eligible for a floor area bonus if
the following requirements were met:
- At least 25% of the terrace is planted, preferably with trees;
- the remaining terrace area is provided with benches for sitting and
is suitable for walking. This portion of the terrace may include
outdoor cafes; and
- the terrace is readily accessible to the public at least during
normal business hours.
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This requirement was included because non-retail uses such as
banks and airline ticket outlets have moved into key locations, inter-
rupting the flow of pedestrian shopping traffic from one store along
the avenue to the next.
"The numbers alone tell the story," Mr. Robertson said.
"There were ten airline ticket outlets in the district in 1950;
there are seventy now." (Feb. 1971). Ground floor space occupied by
banks, which close at three o'clock, had also increased rapidly. "We
firmly believe they belong in the district," Mr. Robertson said, "they
just don't belong on the street level occupying the best retail frontage
in the city."
With respect to the lot improvements, the following requirements
were specified:
- No through-block arcades, plazas or plaza-connected open areas were
to be permitted within 50 feet of the Fifth Avenue street line.
- Entrances to the office, residential or hotel part of the building
had to be at least 50 feet back from the Fifth Avenue street line.
This was required in order to maintain retail continuity on the avenue.
A number of bulk envelope requirements pertaining to setbacks
and "building walls" were mandatory:
- The front wall of all developments within the Special District were
to extend along the entire length of the street line for a minimum
height of three stories.
- Along the east street line of Fifth Avenue above the third story the
front wall of the building or portion thereof, may be built up to the
avenue street line.
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Having fulfilled the mandatory requirements a developer may
increase his development's bulk to the maximum allowed in the under-
lying district (18.0 FAR) by providing elective lot improvements.
Several new options are introduced which, when applied, reinforce the
design aims of the district and increase the amount of public space
within a building. No Special Permit is required.
With the exception of the landscaped terrace, previously described,
they may all be subsumed under the genaric heading of through-block
connections. The through-block connections, similar to London's
Burlington Arcade, are to eventually provide a supplementary walkway
system parallel to Fifth Avenue. Such through block connections are:
- to be at least 30 ft in height;
- to provide selected retail uses along at least 50% of their aggregate
frontage;
- to have the same elevation at the sidewalk for a distance of at least
25 ft. into the zoning lot;
- to have adequate illumination, utilizing sunlight wherever possible;
- be accessible to the public and be suitably maintained.
Access to the through-block connection may be permitted either through
a retail use or a public passageway no more than 15 ft. wide. Three
types of through-block connections are identified:
- The Open Through Block Connection is similar in concept to the
through-block plaza. It has an area of at least 8,000 sq. ft. and
a minimum width at any point of 40 ft. and is to be open to the
public at all times.
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- A "Covered Through Block Connection" is a covered space complying
to the following requirements:24
Has an area of at least 6,000 sq. ft. and a minimum
width at any point of 30 ft.
Has openings at the face of the building for entrances
at least 30 ft.in width and 30 ft. in height, and is
unobstructed for a depth of 25 ft. opposite the entrances;
and
is required to be open to the public from 7 a.m. until
12 midnight.
The covered space may be either
- fully air-conditioned in summer and properly heated in winter, in
which case the bonus award rate is 14 sq. ft. of additional square
feet of residential space for 1 sq. ft. of covered space, or
- without air-conditioning and heating and is kept open for its full
height at the entrances, in which case the award rate is 11 sq. ft.
of additional square feet per sq. ft. of amenity.
- The Porte Cochere allows both pedestrian passage and vehicular access.
It is permitted only in those developments containing residential or
hotel units, and provides an interior drop-off. The area is divided
into a pedestrian passageway of at least 15 ft. width and separated
from the vehicular access area, by bollards, columns or other similar
elements capable of withstanding automobile impact. It is subdivided
into an automobile movement lane and a waiting area which may accom-
modate no more than three vehicles at one time.
Also included in the Elective Lot Improvements are modified
versions of the covered pedestrian space and the Plaza which supercede,
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for purposes of the Special District, their respective regular provi-
sions. Both the plaza and covered pedestrian space were to be located
in their entirety at least 50 ft. from the Fifth Avenue Street line,
except for a covered pedestrian space provided for an interior lot on
Fifth Avenue. A through lot was to be eligible for a plaza bonus only
if a through connection is also provided within the development.
At the Feb. 9, 1971 press conference, it was announced that the
zoning proposal was to be heard at the CPC's public meeting on March 3,
1971. Initial reaction to the proposal was generally favorable:25
- Michael B. Grosso, executive director of the Fifth Avenue
Association, in joining the Mayor at the news conference at which
the proposal was announced, said he thought it would be "very good"
for Fifth Avenue and would help merchants maintain and increase
their space on the thoroughfare. 26
- Donald H. Elliott, Chairman of the City Planning Commission, described
the incentive zoning for Fifth Avenue as "far-reaching but achieveable.
The Special District is economically sound architecturally and
functionally innovative, and a positive and persuasive planning
device. 27
- Samuel Lindenbaum, special counsel to the Real Estate Board, while
endorsing the proposal, said the Board would seek some amendments
to make the provisions more flexible. 2 8
- Arthur G. Cohen, seated at the Mayor's side and chairman of the Board
of the Arlen Realty and Development Corporation, which jointly with
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Victory Carriers, an Onassis family trust, owned the site of the
former Best & Co., store, warmly endorsed the proposal and said he
would take advantage of the bonus elective to erect a 45 story
building with as much as 150,000 sq. ft. of retail space on the
lower floors, offices in the middle floors and apartments on the
topmost floors. Running behind the tower from 51st to 52nd Street
would be a two-story arcade for shops, cafes and services.29
- Commenting on bonuses in the form of residential space instead of
the usual office space, A. L. Huxtable, the architectural critic,
said it was much better to put up luxury apartments on Fifth Avenue,
than it was to "up-zone" uptown side streets, as had recently been
proposed, which would have worsened transportation and destroyed
neighborhood quality and scale. 30
- Peter Blake commenting in the same vein wrote that the "lure of a
Fifth Avenue address will attract a great many developers whose
expensive co-op apartment schemes are currently threatening some
very nice and stable middle-income brownstone neighborhoods.3 1
- In commenting on the additional densities brought about by the
bonuses, A. L. Huxtable wrote that the point at which increased
density tips the scales against planned improvements is a matter
for the Delphic Oracle. 32
Adverse reaction to the proposal came from Percy E. Sutton,
Borough President of Manhattan and member of the Board of Estimate.
Through a spokesman he said that he was angered by the failure of the
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Midtown Planning Office to consult him as it drafted the proposal.3 3
Mrs. Carol Greitzer, the Councilman whose district includes the Fifth
Avenue shopping, similarly complained that she had not been consulted. 3 4
On March 3, 1971, the City Planning Commission adopted the Special
Fifth Avenue District. In his concurring statement, CP Commissioner
Walter McQuade voiced two criticisms both concerned with the through
block connections.35
- He regretted that the through-block pedestrian connection would be
used as a porte-coche're for automobile traffic.
There goes the pedestrian - dethroned. Once let cars
into these crosswalks and the cars will dominate them.
Cars will be impossible to police. They will also knot
up traffic making the turns in from the east-west side
streets.....I cannot for the life of me see why we are
inviting them into this pedestrian domain in the middle
of the block.
- Secondly, McQuade criticized permitting doors on the pedestrian
inner-block crosswalks. He maintained that this would convert
them into lobbies.
"A door says 'stay out'--even the door to the Ford Founda-
tion Building's garden. A door also says: "artificial
environment inside." People will stay out. The shops of
these little crosswalks will get much less trade than if
the openings were really open, not confused by revolving
doors."
The district proposal was endorsed at the March 3 hearing by
representatives of the Real Estate Board of New York, the Fifth Avenue
Association, the Citizens' Housing and Planning Council of New York, and
the Municipal Art Society.
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On March 12, at the subsequent hearing before the Board of
Estimate, however, Beverly Moss Spatt, a former city planning
commissioner, criticized the Fifth Avenue proposal on the grounds that
retailing in Manhattan did not need a subsidy and that the special
zoning would not keep businesses from leaving Fifth Avenue:3 6
"Retailing in Manhattan is not in difficulty and needs
no subsidy. Only a few intermediate sized stores on
Fifth Avenue have experienced trouble. The city is
using its zoning authority in behalf of specific
private interests. In fact, the city would be sub-
sidizing Fifth Avenue stores while stores in other
areas receive no similar public support. This
special district plan, apparently, is nothing more
than a disguised cash payment to Fifth Avenue
merchants, realtors and developers."
J. T. Robertson said of Mrs. Spatt's views: "I think she has a
misunderstanding of retailing in New York City."
Nevertheless, some of the borough presidents on the Board of
Estimate then began asking questions: What about help to Fordham Road
or downtown Brooklyn? Opposition was also expressed on the grounds
that the District would provide housing and shops for the rich, but
would neglect the poor. As a result, the Board of Estimate put off
voting on the proposal until March 25, when it was adopted. 3 7
The dispute, however, did not deter Henry H. Minskoff, president
of Sam Minskoff and Sons, from acquiring on March 18 a 12 story building,
formerly the home of Georg Jensen's, from Isidor Konein. The Minskoff's
planned to strip the building to its steel frame and renovate it for
office tenancy. There was no intention, however, of including apart-
ments. 3 8
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The new zoning directly affected a lease that American Airlines
had signed for space on the ground floor and in the basement of the
building situated at 655 Fifth Avenue. The space amounted to about
half the ground floor - a total of 3,000 sq. ft. - and far exceeded
the permissible 10 percent ground floor space that a bank, travel
agency, or airline could use in any one building.3 9
On August 31, 1971, Mayor Lindsay and Arthur Cohen, chairman of
the Board of Arlen Realty and Development Corporation, announced plans
for the first project under the provisions of the Fifth Avenue Special
Zoning District. It was to be a 50 story mixed occupancy building on
the site of the former Best & Co. store. Donald H. Elliott, Chairman
of the City Planning Commission, said: 4 0
"The speed with which this project has progressed rein-
forces our confidence in the Special Zoning District con-
cept. It also confirms my belief that this type of zoning
is sufficiently flexible to allow the city to respond
effectively to the special requirements and needs of
different areas of the city."
J. T. Robertson, Director of the Office of Midtown Planning and
Development, whose office prepared the District legislation and had
worked closely with Arlen Realty in developing plans for the project,
said: 4 1
"This building, an exiciting new prototype, represents a
major contribution to the future development of Midtown
Manhattan. Mixed-use buildings of this type enjoy the
advantages of a balanced urban environment and make more
efficient use of the city's core area. I would say this
building heralds a new trend in Midtown.
Many of the urban design objectives that the city has been
trying to achieve for such a long time will be incorporated
in this one building."
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The building was to contain:
- Two floors comprising in excess of 100,000 sq. ft. of retail space
fronting on Fifth Avenue
- 19 floors (3 through 21) providing 400,000 sq. ft. of office space.
Access to the office part of the tower was to be from the arcade,
a two-level through block connection lined with shops and a
restaurant and containing the building's main entrance.
- 27 floors (23 through 49) of cooperatively owned apartments above
the office floors (providing 400,000 sq. ft. of residential space
and 260
An underground connection below the streets to Rockefeller Center
and the 53rd Street IND subway station was negotiated. The proposed
below grade concourse was to run from Rockefeller Center below Fifth
Avenue and the shopping arcade of Olympic Tower to 52nd Street, where
it was to meet another underground concourse continuing to the 53rd
Street subway station. In this manner, the underground system begun by
Rockefeller Center in the 1930's would be increased by approximately
700 ft.
The office part of the building was to be constructed of steel,
while the residential part was to be concrete. By constructing the
co-ops of concrete, heavy steel beams intruding in the apartments will
be avoided.
Melvin Dawley, chairman of the Fifth Avenue Association, said:
"This exciting building project marks another interesting
chapter in the history of a great avenue - we look forward
to its completion."
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The cost of the project was to exceed $30 million. The owners
expected the building to be open for occupancy in the summer of 1973.
Mayor Lindsay congratulated the development community for their
contribution to Fifth Avenue and the city: 4 2
"I view this project as a tremendous vote of confidence in
Fifth Avenue from the business and development community
and as a clear demonstration of the city's ability to
adapt to change and to create a new urban environment."
The plaza bonus system of 1960, served in a major way to deflect
development of office towers away from Fifth Avenue and thus to protect
the existing character of Fifth Avenue. In that it could only be used
satisfactorily on large sites, because of the necessity to create large
floor plans in towers. Where the intensity-of-use was low as it was on
Sixth Avenue, the plaza bonus exercised a powerful incentive for
assemblage to occur so that the maximum FAR of 18 could be availed of
by taking advantage of the 20% plaza bonus, while at the same time, pro-
viding satisfactory floor sizes.
With an already existing intensity-of-use on moderately sized and
small sites considerably higher the potentially achievable intensity-
of-use differential would be even lower on Fifth Avenue then on Sixth
Avenue, if development could only occur at or just above the base level
of FAR 15. The case if the plaza bonus could not be taken advantage
of.
The plaza bonus system of 1960 was effective in warding off
incursions on Fifth Avenue, until the Arlen-Onassis interests and the
Office of Midtown Planning and Development collaborated on the design
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of a new structure for the Best Department store site. On the basis
of this collaboration, it became possible, in spite of a decline in
office demand, for the Arlen-Onassis interests to be assured of an
achievable intensity-of-use differential of such magnitude as to
warrant their buying up the lease on the Best Building site.
In this manner the new zoning policies of the city contributed
in a major way to encroachment of Fifth Avenue, an encroachment that,
thus far, had successfully been warded off in spite of great demands
for office space. An indication of the degree to which the hitherto
existing incentive zoning system had served to protect Fifth Avenue,
is the fact that when pressures for office development reached a peak,
limited office development occurred on Fifth Avenue side streets,
rather than on the Avenue itself. This was a reversal of the usual
pattern in which, only after available avenue sites had been availed
off, development started to shift to the adjacent side streets.
The fact that the Best site already had a high intensity-of-use
resulted in extraordinary measures to achieve a postulated high
intensity-of-use differential. They included:
- Stripping away of the plaza bonus, thus reducing the necessity
for a block front wide site to achieve satisfactory floor sizes.
- Substitution of the plaza bonus schedule which would have allowed
for a maximum FAR of 18, on a large site, for a bonus award and
amenity schedule that allowed for a maximum FAR of 21.6 on sites
considerably smaller than the conventional site, where the plaza
bonus was applied.
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- Increasing tower coverage to 50% so as to make it possible to pro-
vide large floors on the smaller sites.
- The substituting of office space for residential space, to allow
for luxury condominiums.
The achievable intensity of use differential for the Arlen
building, was also affected by a number of other factors. The negative
effects of the high densities and high coverages, however, were
mitigated, in the case of the Arlen building, by virtue of the fact
that it was immediately adjacent to St. Patrick's Cathedral to the
south, which, dwarfed in scale by the towering skyscraper, served as
an air park and secured outlook. To the north and on the same block,
the low-rise landmark building of Cartiers contributed to keeping
averaged out densities for the block front lower than had the whole
200 ft. block front been redeveloped from side-street lot line to
side-street lot line. Moreover, the Onassis building benefited from
the asymmetrical Fifth Avenue cross section, that was mandated, in
that, situated on the east side of the avenue, it could rise vertically
for its full height without any setback from the avenue lot line,
whereas buildings on the west side would have to have a substantial
setback at a 85 ft. cornice line. An added advantage for the Arlen-
Onassis building, was that it could key into a back-from-the-avenue
through-block walkway system, reaching from St. Patricks Cathedral to
Paley Park, the vest pocket park. The elaborate back-from-the-avenue
through-block pedestrian passages were a major selling point of the
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Special District legislation. However, the Minskoff proposal for a
smaller corner site demonstrated the difficulty, on Fifth Avenue, of
block front sized increments being developed at one time. In con-
sequence, a through-block through connection may take many years to
be completed or may even never be completed. In the meantime, the
question arises of whether the first part of the connection can be put
to some interim use.
The district's bonus award and amenity schedule, does not
exercise a strong incentive towards assemblage as did the plaza bonus
system on Sixth Avenue.
In that it encouraged the redevelopment of small and moderately
dimensioned sites, where the existing intensity-of-use is low, it may
be counterproductive to the district objective of securing through-
block connections.
Where development under the district's legislation has occurred
on part of a blockfront; cramped conditions and an existing high
intensity-of-use on the remainder of the blockfront, in conjunction
with the elimination of the possibility of pooling blockfront sites,
given high density redevelopment of one part of it, will reduce the
chances for completing blockfront redevelopment and concomitantly,
reduce the chances for completion of through block connections.
While the Arlen-Onassis interests were able to derive substantial
commercial advantages, in the design of the building, from the close
collaboration with the Mayor's Office, the question arises whether the
strictures of the Fifth Avenue Special District legislation will be
detrimental to further development.
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Chapter 15
Mixed-Use Districts: A Response to Office Overbuilding
As the demand for office space further declines a hitherto
neglected building type, the mixed office-residential building, assumes
new significance.
On January 19, 1972, the City Planning Commission scheduled a
public hearing on a proposed amendment to the Zoning Resolution to
establish districts in which office and residential uses could be mixed
on the same site. The hearing was held on February 2, 1972 (Cal. #41)
and continued on March 1, 1972 (Cal. #42).
By mapping mixed-use districts in existing office zones, it was
hoped to establish a new housing market. The 1961 zoning provisions
did permit mixed use residential and office buildings. Yet such
developments were considered impractical from an economic standpoint
because additional density and floor area regulations were placed on
such structures. The 1961 Zoning Resolution's regulations pertaining
to mixed-use building were based on the supposition that mixed-use
buildings add to the intensity of use of any given area. Therefore the
number of residential zoning rooms was restricted. In consequence,
total achievable development bulk was lowered. Moreover, more at-grade
"plaza" amenities were required than for any other building type. Under
1961 rules, there were three options open to the developer:
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- an all residential building of no more than FAR 12 (10 + 2)
- an all office building of up to 18 FAR (15 + 3)
- or a mixed building whose FAR lies somewhere in between.
Under 1961 rules zoning density calculations are based upon lot area
requirements (30 sq. ft. per residential zoning room and 6.5 sq. ft.
for each 100 sq. ft. of commercial floor area). In consequence as the
mixture of office and residential use is varied, the lot area require-
ment for each use changes accordingly. The lot area requirement works
toward lowering the amount of office space that may be built, when
residential rooms are maximized. If a developer were not to maximize
the residential part of the building and instead sought to achieve the
maximum 18 FAR bulk, keeping within the bounds of the allowable 12 FAR
residential bulk, room sizes would become too large. This is because
the number of zoning rooms is reduced even though the floor area of
12 FAR remains the same.
An additional deterrent to the development of mixed-use buildings
were the requirements of Section 35-35 (Floor Area Bonus - for Plaza,
Plaza-Connected Open Area, or Arcade in Connection with Mixed Buildings).
This section stipulated that each use have its own "plaza" bonus. I.e.,
in the case of a mixed building with a total FAR of 18, a plaza bonus
of 5 FAR had to provide (3 FAR for the commercial portion and 2 FAR for
the residential portion as compared to the usual 3 FAR). With the amount
of plaza area much greater than that required if the uses are separated,
a larger site is required to develop a viable mixed use building with
an FAR of 18 than is required to develop an office building. Built on
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the typically sized office building site, the bulk of the mixed-type
building would be constructed and construction would become too costly.
Moreover, by virtue of the low coverage, the location of desired retail
activities at ground level would be curtailed.
As a result, since 1961, only one mixed-use building, a structure
at 53rd Street and Second Avenue, was built according to the zoning
regulations. A second structure, the Excelsior, located at 57th Street
and Second Avenue, received numerous variances. The most recent high
density mixed use development is the One Lincoln Plaza Building, the
district-initiating building of the Lincoln Square Special District.
It, too, however, received variances in the form of additional bulk
concessions from the Board of Standards and Appeals.
The only other high-density mixed use building of recent years
is a grace period building built under the provisions of the 1916
zoning resolution, and was not subject to the bulk limitations of the
FAR formula - the United Nations Plaza Buildings. It combines two
residential towers atop an office base and has become one of the East
Side's most prestigious addresses. All these buildings had proved
rentably successful.3
A number of causes contributed to the dearth of mixed-use build-
ings:
- Land and development costs militated against developments that did
not maximize their FAR potential.
- Office space commanded much higher rentals than residential space,
particularly in the period ensuing the grace period when a glut of
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residential space depressed the residential market.
- The rules were written so as to impose economic penalties on the
developer of a mixed office residential building.
With the dramatic deterioration of the office rental market,
the extreme shortage of housing, even of luxury apartments, and
concomitantly a strengthening market for condominiums, strong pressures
were brought to bear to amend the Mixed Building zoning. The follow-
ing measures were proposed:4
- To delete Section 35-41 (Lot Area Requirements for Non-Residential
Portions of Mixed Buildings). Thus, in specified districts ("CR"
Districts)
- it became unnecessary to count residential zoning rooms on the
basis of reduced lot area,
- the number of zoning rooms might be as high as the maximum number
permitted by the district zoning.
I.e., the room count was to be calculated as if the residential use
were the only use on the site.
In this manner, the penalizing effect of the previously applicable
provisions was removed. As a result, an FAR of 12 of residential floor
space was permitted in an 18 FAR structure, while, at the same time,
room sizes were normal. In order to control the residential zoning
room count a floor area per room control is introduced to replace the
lot area requirement, which allows the same number of rooms as allowed
in a R 10 building, while at the same time an FAR of no more than 12 is
assured for residential floor space.
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- Only lots of more than 20,000 sq. ft. were to be eligible. This
was to assure sufficient ground level space for the residential
service core, the office core and retail use.
Several requirements were stipulated for developments using
this mixed-use option. They are as follows:
Tenant Recreation Space
A minimum of 5,000 sq. ft. of tenant recreation space accessible only
to tenants and their guests. Portions of the space may be covered
and enclosed. They may be located in one or several locations through-
out the development. Enclosed areas count toward floor area calcula-
tions. The purpose was to provide indoor spaces for winter and
exterior, landscaped, open and shaded spaces for the Summer.
Service Area
Bonused Pedestrian Amenity
All mixed buildings utilizing these amendments regardless of develop-
ment floor area are required to provide pedestrian amenities which
generate a floor area ratio bonus equivalent to 2.5. These might be
- a through-block arcade
- a plaza
- an arcade
- a plaza connected open area or any additional amenity or combina-
tion of amenities.
As a result the bonused pedestrian amenity working in conjunction
with the tenant recreation space required, this building type when
measured on a per residential zoning room basis will contain more open
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space amenity than an all residential or an all office structure.
Concurrently, the requirements of section 35 - 35, that required that
each use have its own "plaza" bonus, were removed.
- Mechanical Equipment Screening was to be provided to assure that
adequate noise and environmental screening is provided persons
using the tenant recreation space.
- All setbacks occurring in the commercial portion of the building
greater than the required minimum of 20 ft. must be landscaped.
5
"The term landscaping has been kept specifically general
in this instance in order to permit experimentation and
design flexibility. Trees and shrubbery are desired -
but not required. Public and private access is desired
but not required. The reason for this requirement is
twofold: should the tenant recreation space be located
on the roof of the tower this will guarantee that the
tower base will be treated (note: tenant recreation
space when located on the roof of the commercial por-
tion may substitute for this requirement to the extent
that the recreation space develop the roof area re-
quiring landscaping, and that the landscaping will add
to the residential character of the building as well as
provide an air-park for the surrounding building. Land-
scaped setbacks and roof areas can become actual amenities
and provide the city with some additional visual pleasure."
(CP 21848)
A major easing of parking requirements was proposed. Under then
existing rules, 40 percent residential parking spaces were required.
An additional 225 space garage was optional. The mandatory 40 percent
required residential parking regulation was waived making such require-
ment optional. No more than 225 spaces were to be permitted, the same
number as in office structures.
Modifications of the height and setback and yard regulations for
a mixed building development were to be permitted, provided that it was
found:
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- That such modification will enhance the relationship of the
building to nearby buildings; and
- That such modification will aid in the concentration and
enhancement of the area or areas required for recreational
space, other than provided pedestrian amenities.
It was expected that the mixed-use concept would generate a number
of benefits:
- To counteract the decentralization of the office industry encouraged
by the availability of desirable housing, it was felt that, in order
to compete effectively, NYC must provide opportunities for living
and working in the centre city.
- Because of the fact that floor area devoted to each person is, less
in apartments, than in offices, mixed-use building may lead to
an on-site population one third less than that in all office
building.
- Increased street activity was expected to result from the additional
residential component, particularly in the evenings and on weekends.
Retail stores, restaurants and other activities were expected to
benefit. A safer environment would result.
- The concept was expected to relieve pressure on middle-income
brownstone neighborhoods and residential side streets, which were
threatened by high rise co-op apartment schemes.
"CR" Mapping is within existing 15 FAR office districts, except for a
small portion of the Special Greenwich Street Development District
mapped 10 FAR but with a 15 FAR option.
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In determining the mapping of appropriate areas, it was con-
sidered whether
- there already was a mix of these two uses which could be reinforced,
- some supportive services and residential amenities already existed
- an additional servicing load could be kept to peripheral office
areas.
The area north of 53rd Street, in central Midtown and the
Lexington Third Avenue spine in east Midtown currently contain grocery
stores, doctors and residential structures, as well as offices. They
represent the northern and eastern transition zones in Midtown where
most development is currently occurring. The mapping excludes the
previously enacted Special Fifth Avenue District.6
In Lower Manhattan, the "CR" zone formed a ring around the
regular office core. In as much it created a transition zone between
the core and the proposed developments off-shore.7
"Building in the transition zone will serve three Lower
Manhattan functions: it will improve existing rela-
tionships to mass transit, it will create new pedestrian
linkages from the core to the off-shore developments,
and it will provide residential services to support new
off-shore housing."
Included in the remapping is a site for a mixed building on a
zoning lot running through from East 57th Street to East 58th Street
between Park Avenue and Lexington Avenue. The major portion of the
site is zoned C5 - 3 (FAR 15) and the remainder is zoned C6 - 4 (FAR 10).
The remapping placed the entire site under a unified C5 - 3CR (FAR 15)
mapping designation. The applicant agreed to restrict the area formerly
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mapped at C6 - 4 to C6 - 4 bulk regulations. In this manner, a bulk
increment will be conveyed to the former C5 - 3 portion of the site.
Plans for the building were announced by Mayor Lindsay at a press con-
ference on February 2, 1972. Joining in the announcement, was Edward
Glickman, a partner of Madison Equities, the developers of the proposed
mixed occupancy structures.8 Madison Equities, a real estate develop-
ment and investment partnership, had been active in Midtown Manhattan.
They had been developers for the Excelsior on East 57th Street, one
of the very few mixed occupancy buildings built in recent years. The
proposed building by Madison Equities is to be located on the north
side of East 57th Street between Park and Lexington Avenues. Located
next to the Ritz Tower Hotel, the site includes the New York
Genealogical and Biographical Society building, which will be preserved.
Plans for the building, consisting of a residential and office
tower atop a 64 ft. high commercial and retail base, included: 9
- A public covered pedestrian plaza linking 57th and 58th Streets,
This split level galleria will contain a 90 ft. high skylit
"atrium" at its center point. The plaza is to be lined with shops,
including a sidewalk cafe.
- 7 floors of office space, of which two levels in the tower contain
medical suites, served by a separate lobby. The main lobby for
the office space is entered through the covered pedestrian plaza.
- Over 310,000 sq. ft. of cooperative apartments in the top floors of
the tower, with views of Central Park and midtown. A typical floor
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contains eight apartments and the entire building contains over
260 units.
- Located atop the commercial and retail portions of the building will
be a swimming pool and sun deck connected to a health club beneath
the tower. The roof of the tower contains over 6,000 sq.ft. of
landscaped tenant recreation space.
Consulting architects for the residential portion of the building
was the Office of Philip Birnbaum. His office had prepared the plans
for 1 Lincoln Plaza, the district initiating building of the Lincoln
Square District.
The public hearing on the proposed amendments was held on the
same day that Madison Equities plans were made known. The hearing was
continued on March 1, 1972. On March 14, 1972, the City Planning
Commission adopted the amendments.
At the same press conference that the Madison Equities plans were
announced, plans were unveiled for the second skyscraper to be built
under the provisions of the Fifth Avenue Special District.
It will be recalled that in February 1970, i.e., two years prior
to the announcement, Sam Minskoff and Sons had applied for a height and
setback variance on a small lot (18,000 sq. ft.) (99 x 118 sq. ft.), the
site of the former De Pinna Department Store. This application had
subsequently led to the studies for the Fifth Avenue Special District.
Because the site was less than 20,000 sq. ft. in size the building was
ineligible for the residential bonus.
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The building was to house more than 30,000 sq. ft. of retail
space, about twice that required by law.
The shopping area on four levels was to be accessible directly
from Fifth Avenue and also from a 4,000 sq. ft. public promenade with
30 ft. high ceilings. Its 85 ft. wide entrance on West 52nd Street is
on axis with the existing through block arcade linking 52nd Street to
53rd Street and the Independent Subway Station. Escalators to upper
and lower levels will provide access to several floors of shops. The
space will not be enclosed, thereby providing easy pedestrian access
to the retail shops and in the future, to an underground concourse
connecting it to Rockefeller Center.
Above the retail floors and public promenade was to rise a tower
containing 300,000 sq. ft. of office and professional space on 29
floors. 650 Fifth Avenue was to be 37 floors high, including two levels
below grade and two floors of mechanical equipment. Architects were
John Carl Warnecke.
Jaquelin T. Robertson, director of the Office of Midtown Planning
and Development, whose office authored both zoning proposals and who
had worked closely with the developers in planning for each of their
projects, commented as follows on the mixed-use concept:10
"The mixed use building, first formally put forward last
year in the Special Fifth Avenue District, is a major
break through in our search to continue the viable
development of our high density center cities. By com-
bining retail facilities or housing with offices in a
single building, not only does a given piece of land
and its supporting services begin to work more efficiently
over a 24 hour period, but the vital, life-giving and
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mutually supportive activities of shopping, recreation,
working and living are brought back into our downtown."
Although the Mayor did not mention it, the projects were initiated
at a time when vacant office space in post war office buildings totalled
10 million sq. ft. just short of half a square mile. Mayor Lindsay, in
hailing the new mixed-use building trend, said: 1 1
"If we are to preserve New York's position as the
corporate capital of the nation, we must continue to
test new and promising approaches in planning for office
areas. Experimentation requires a large measure of
courage and I commend the development community for
their commitment, foresight and cooperation in working
with us on these projects.
The vitality of the city's office industry depends upon
a healthy mix of retail, housing, recreational and other
uses. I view both of these buildings as outstanding
examples of a new trend in office planning. They are
the result of the innovative approaches we have taken
in incentive zoning."
The mixed-use districts is a further example of a special district
designed around a single building. Again, as earlier in the theater
district, the district initiating building straddles zoning district
boundaries.
Mixed-use buildings in Central Business District locations are
attributable, primarily, to the weak market for office space.
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Chapter 16
The Emerging Role of Development Rights Transfers
in the Management of the Spatial Environment
This chapter describes how density transfers gradually
began to emerge as an important tool in the management of
the spatial environment and how the 1960 zoning resolution
is gradually being adapted to accommodate such changes.
Even before the introduction of the 1916 code, Ernest
Flagg had suggested that property owners be allowed to sell
their rights to develop 25% of their lot to any height to
adjacent property owners. And in the 1920s, he modified
his proposal to allow trading of tower development rights
2
between non-contiguous plots but within a city block.
In 1965, in the case of the Chase Manhattan Building, it
became possible, through street closing, to transfer develop-
ment rights to the northern portion of a consolidated site,
thus enabling the provision of a large plaza. Later, after
introduction of FAR as a density measure, development rights
were transferred across another stretch of the same street,
to protide a sufficiently large achievable density differential
for a projected skyscraper for the United States Steel
Corporation to warrant demolition of the Singer Building,
once the world's tallest.
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When the Tishmans built a major office building on
Third Avenue, they acquired for the sum of #1,0O0,OO0 the
unused development rights of P. J. Clarks, an Edwardian
3
style pub. The pub had achieved fame in a film and the
owner was consequently reluctant to sell. Moreover, the
Tishmans could derive significant advertising value from the
distinctive pub.
The first projected transfer of development rights in
New York City involved Amster Yard, a group of picturesque
mid-19th century buildings located around an attractive
courtyard. After World War II, James Amster rehabilitated
the buildings and created a small park in the middle of
Manhattan. To the west of Amster Yard, on Third Avenue
between 49th and 50th Streets, Laird Properties was planning
in 1969 to build an office building containing 580,000 sq.
ft. of space. Laird was planning to buy 30,000 sq. ft. of
that total from Amster Yard, which had been designated a
4
Landmark in 1966. Amster Yard, Inc., was to receive nearly
#500,000 from Laird Properties for this transfer of its
unused development rights. This one transfer would use up
all the potential of the Landmark site. One hundred thousand
dollars of the Laird payment was to go into a trust to be
used for the maintenance and preservation of Amster Yard.
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After the defeat of the Transportation District Legis-
lation aimed at stopping a second tower above Grand Central,
the Department of City Planning investigated alternative ways
of stopping the structure. On September 20, 1968, the Land-
marks Preservation Commission determined that the Penn-Central
Company's application for a certificate of No Exterior Effect
relating to the proposed 55 storey tower over Grand Central
terminal did not meet the requirements for a certificate.
On April 10, 1969, a public hearing was held before the
Landmarks Preservation Commission to consider the Penn-Central's
subsequent application for a Certificate of Appropriateness
for permission to build one of two proposed office tower
schemes over the station. The CPC found both the Breuer
designs "although commendable in many important ways, incom-
patible with good planning principles and the orderly long-
range growth and development of the Grand Central area,"
because:
- the building's 12,000 workers would throw insupportable
stress at this time on the already grossly inadequate
Lexington Avenue subway and platform system;
- construction of either building would commit the city to an
irrevocable error -- "destruction of the only existing
5
reservoir of sunlight and air in this district."
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In the period from September to April, 1969, the
Department had investigated other alternatives available to
Penn-Central "to deal more rationally and more humanely
with these two problems."
In noting that Penn-Central owned large parcels of
property adjacent to the terminal from 42nd to 50th Streets,
representing "a ring of high density development with verti-
cal circulation rising on the periphery of an essentially
open horizontal central circulation system, ... i.e. the
existing concourse and the two levels of track to the north,"
J. T. Robertson, Director of Midtown Planning, criticized
the Breuer proposal to put 2.1 million sq. ft. of office
space directly atop the station because it would defeat
"this intrinsically sound ring idea by intruding still another
monolith into the center of the ring -- a superimposition of
vertical over horizontal circulation at the very point of
6
maximum congestion." If 12,000 more people must be accommo-
dated, placing the building on the periphery of a central
concourse area seemed the superior planning notion:
to the Department of City Planning because the Breuer
proposal would not only increase congestion on the
platforms, but would also strip away the brakes and
filters of the inefficient street and pedestrian
system, disgorging concentrations of people directly
onto the system before any diffusion took place.
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As alternatives, then, to the Saady-Breuer proposal,
the Department investigated the possibilities of transferring
the development rights from above the terminal to adjacent
sites on the ring. It was proposed that the 2.1 million sq.
ft. of the proposed Breuer building be distributed among two
or more of Penn-Central's holdings as additions to the
7
allowable floor area. The sites included:
- the block from 42nd to 43rd Streets, between Vanderbilt
and Madison Avenues,
- the Roosevelt Hotel site between 45th and 46th Streets,
- 466 Lexington Avenue from 45th to 46th Streets,
- the Post Office site on Lexington Avenue between 44th and
45th Streets, which although owned by the Federal Govern-
ment, might well become part of a development project.
For example, if the Breuer space were to be distributed
between the two sites to the west, allowable floor area on
each site would be increased from 630,000 sq. ft. to
1,700,000 sq. ft. Similar distribution on a 25% basis to
each of four sites could be effected if the Post Office and
466 Lexington Avenue sites were added to the other two.
The Planning Commission already had the power by special
permit to allow a transfer of development rights from a zon-
ing lot upon which a building designated as a landmark is
situated to an adjacent zoning lot. As the law then read,
however, no adjacent zoning lot could be increased by more
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than 20%. The Planning Commission now suggested that the
Zoning Resolution be amended to allow greater flexibility in
bulk transfers to enable most, if not all, of the allowable
floor area to be transferred to any combination of adjacent
blocks.
Subsequently, negotiations between the Office of Mid-
town Planning and Development, representatives of Penn-
Central Railroad, their developer Maurice Saady and their
architects, Marcel Breuer and Associates, were carried out
regarding the transfer of air rights from the Grand Central
Station Landmark site to an adjacent zoning lot under their
ownership, the block between Madison Avenue, Vanderbilt
Avenue, 44th and 43rd Streets. Long term leases at many of
the sites in the ownership of Penn-Central to which surplus
air rights could conceivably be transferred posed complications.
On the 11 September, 1969, Marcel Breuer presented to
the Office of Midtown Planning and Development a proposal for
the Biltmore site, providing a 30 foot wide landscaped arcade
on Madison Avenue, and a 30 foot wide arcade on Vanderbilt
Avenue:
...infilled at ground level with shops which created
the possibility of using the shop roof level for
some amenable and possibly bonusable use. 8
This scheme was superseded by a proposal which provided
a landscaped plaza 35 feet wide and a 10 foot wide arcade on
Madison Avenue; and 16 foot wide arcades on both 43rd and
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44th Streets. In addition to this, the building was setback
2 feet on the streets and 4 feet on Vanderbilt Avenue. Access
to the Grand Central Concourse was provided from both street
arcades.
This second proposal met with some criticism from the
Office of Midtown Planning and Development as it did not
provide enough plaza or arcade space to generate a maximum
9
FAR of 18. The FAR as-of-right for the building minus the
transferred FAR was 17.2. The area's base FAR level was 15.
By providing bonusable amenities, the FAR level could be
raised to 18. While the Office did want the transfer of air
space from the landmark site, it did not, however, want this
to be at the cost of losing bonusable amenities. If
additional building bulk could be won through the transfer
device the developer might not want to provide plazas and
arcades, the usual way by which to increase the FAR from 15
to 18.
Both proposals have demonstrated serious concern on the
part of Mr. Breuer and his clients for public circula-
tion and amenities, however, some problems still exist.
One is the fact that not enough plaza or arcade space
has been provided to generate a maximum FAR of 18. 10
The Office suggested a number of alternatives, which
would provide bonus square footage in amounts that would allow
11
a maximum as-of-right FAR of approximately 17.7. The
Breuer proposal would allow a FAR of 17.2. To this FAR of
17.7 would then be added the FAR points resulting from the
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transfer.
From the following zoning computations, the order of
magnitude of the transfer will become apparent. The transfer
of development rights would enable the erection of a building
three times the size of a building otherwise allowed under the
zoning resolution. The net transferable FAR from the existing
Landmark lot amounts to 2,151,000 sq. ft. For a building under
as-of-right allowables with bonuses, with a square footage of
741,372, the FAR would be 17.1, i.e. .9 points below the
maximum possible FAR of 18. 1,375,128 sq. ft. would be needed
to be transferred from the landmark site to build a 62 storey
tower, of which the upper 59 storeys would each have a floor
area of 34,500 sq. ft. with a total of 2,116,500 sq. ft.
(2,151,00 - 1,375,128 = 775,72)
There would still be 775,872 sq. ft. left to be transferred
from the landmark site.
Instead of a 55 storey 1.9 million sq. ft. building float-
ing above an existing terminal building on a site
3 4 0 '4" x 394'4" = 134,202'33"
it was proposed to erect a building considerably larger on a
site (43,311 sq. ft.) that was less than a third of the size of
the originally intended site. Originally, the Breuer building
was to have 1.9 million sq. ft. Later, this figure was
increased to 2.1 million, i.e. the building on the smaller
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Biltmore site was to have approximately the same amount of
space. To the north, south and east, the site was bounded
by relatively narrow streets and to the west by Madison
Avenue, the narrowest of north-south avenues.
On December 4, 1969, the Zoning Resolution was amended
to meet the needs of the Grand Central situation. Section
74-79 enabled distribution of surplus development rights
from above a privately owned landmark provided that
- the lots were adjacent to one another,
- they were in the same ownership.
The definition of adjacency was expanded to mean in the case
12
of lots located in highest bulk commercial districts:
A lot contiguous or one which is across a street
and opposite to another lot or lots which, except
for the intervention of streets or street inter-
sections, form a series extending to the lot occupied
by the landmark building. All such lots were to be
in the same ownership.
As a condition of permitting such transfer of development
13
rights, the Commission was to make the following findings:
- That the permitted transfer of floor area or variations
in the front, height and setback regulations would not
unduly increase the bulk of any new development, density
of population, or intensity of use in any block to the
detriment of the occupants of buildings on the block or
nearby blocks, and
- that a program for continuing maintenance would result in
the preservation of the landmark.
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The legislative amendments were framed to meet the
specific requirements of the Grand Central situation.
The concept, however, had significant potential for
application in other situations. It will be recalled that
a maximum FAR of 18 was achievable only where sufficiently
large sites could be assembled to provide plazas that would
earn 3 FAR points without, at the same time, reducing the
standard tower floor size to uneconomic dimensions. These
conditions could be more easily met in the Midtown area than
in Lower Manhattan. In the past in Lower Manhattan, many
high density and high coverage office buildings had been built
on small sites. Consequently, potentially achievable density
differentials were in general much lower than in Midtown.
Indeed, in many cases, replacement of a building on a site
would have resulted in:
- a structure with less floor space than in the structure
that was being replaced. The Equitable Building at 120
Broadway is a case in point. Chase Manhattan had been
able to achieve a satisfactory density differential prior
to the introduction of FAR ceilings;
- through utilization of the 25% coverage provision that
allowed towers to rise to any height. In the case of the
U.S. Steel Building, built after the introduction of FAR
ceilings, a satisfactory density differential could only
be achieved through pooling of adjacent sites, one contain-
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ing the Singer Tower and the others, whose development
potential had been "sterilized" not only by the Singer
Tower to the north, but also by the towering Equitable
Building to the east, thus producing low rise structures.
Pooling made the averaging out of FARs possible. While
the FAR for the total area was still quite high, a
satisfactory intensity-of-use differential could be
achieved because of the functional obsolescence of the
Singer Building and the high rents that a modern structure
could command at such a key location.
At another prime location, at 1 Broadway at the foot
of Broadway, the existing 15 storey structure's FAR was
already close to the maximum achievable. Prospects to assemble
a larger site were dim and even so, the maximum FAR could
only have been 18. Based on the concept that had evolved
earlier at Grand Central, the CPO advanced an amendment that
would enable the United States Lines, Inc. to put up a 50
storey building with an FAR of approximately 30, thus achiev-
14
ing a significant density differential.
The purpose of the amendment was to allow the transfer
of development rights from lots occupied by publicly owned
landmark buildings as had recently been permitted for privately
owned landmarks. As in the case of the transfer of develop-
ment rights from privately owned landmarks, the transfer
was to be subject to the grant of a Special Permit by the
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CPO and the Board of Estimate. Before granting a permit,
the CPO would have to find that the permitted transfer of
floor area or variations on the front, height and setback
regulations would not unduly increase the bulk of any new
development, the density of population or intensity of use
in any block, to the detriment of the occupants of buildings
on the block or nearby blocks, and that a program for
continuing maintenance would result in the preservation of
the landmark. In addition, in the case of publicly owned
buildings, the transfer would be contingent on the provision
by the applicant of a major improvement of the public
pedestrian circulation or transportation system in the area.
A OPO spokesman admitted that the only specific plan
under consideration involving the amendment was that for
1 Broadway. Under it, excess air rights atop the nearby
United States Custom House were to be transferred across
Bowling Green to the site of the proposed skyscraper. In
return, the builder was to make "a major improvement" to
pedestrian circulation and to the underground access and
corridors to the adjacent Bowling Green Subway Station.
Moreover, the company would be required to contribute to a
fund or otherwise take a direct part in preserving the
massive old Custom House, a designated landmark to be
vacated when the Federal Government moved its offices to the
World Trade Center.
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Planning Commissioner Spatt, in dissenting, asked
whether the city was gaining anything by giving away over
#10,000,000 (780,000 square feet) of space in return for
improved underground access and corridors to the Bowling
Green Subway Station and a contribution to a fund to maintain
the landmark. Spatt said the selling of air rights should
15
be treated the same way as city owned land.
The usual procedure is for public auction with
competitive bidding. Yet informal city negotiations
have been going on concerning the transfer of the
air rights to the United States Lines. Will the
discretionary power enable the Planning Commission to
choose one developer over another because of some
vague better public improvement? ...Today's approval
opens up a a Pandora's Box. Not only will government
be heating up an already speculative real estate
market ... but also it will be setting a poor precedent.
She continued:
Selling and transfer of air rights from a public land-
mark to solve the city's fiscal problems is a warping
of the zoning resolution. It is the very thing warned
against by the National Commission on Urban Ploblems.
If we sell the air rights over the Custom House, the
first time, what will be next? The Public Library on
42nd Street? And the museums?,..The United States
Lines is just across the park;. but we already have a
responsible request to transfer other air rights 500
to 600 ft. away. What about historic districts?
Shall we permit owners of buildings to transfer their
air rights out of the district and to where?
The achievable magnitude of density is enormous in the
case of certain landmarks. For example, the excess development
rights above the Custom House (789,800 sq. ft.) equal the
floor area of the 60 storey Woolworth Building, while the
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Public Library had 2J million sq. ft. of surplus development
rights. A Commission spokesman said that the air rights
over the Public Library might indeed be transferred in some
16 17
future project. Donald H. Elliott held the zoning plan:
...a practical and imaginative way to get good
development, preserve a landmark, and improve
the subway and pedestrian movement in this key
part of the city.
The relaxation of zoning by the Planning Commission gave
the impetus to the leasing of air rights over all types of
public buildings. Under another program, the city's
Real Estate Commissioner, Ira Duchan was beginning to lease
air rights atop city owned structures to developers planning
construction on adjacent sites. Under the provisions of
Article 1, Ch. 2, paragraph 12 - 10 (1971) of the Zoning
Resolution, a developer might increase the authorized floor
area on the project site by obtaining a long term lease on
an underimproved or vacant adjacent site, designating both
that site and the project site as a single "zoning lot,"
and shifting the unused floor area from the former to the
latter. These leasings were not subject to any special
permit.
The first such leasing was arranged with the developer
Samuel Rudin and Company. It involved a construction project
18
at Madison Avenue and 26th Street. 100,000 sq. ft. of
unused air rights over the ornate three-storey Appellate
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Division Court House, a stone-faced structure with corinthian
columns and rooftop statuary on the west side of Madison
Avenue at 25th Street, were to be transferred to a site
on the south east corner of 26th Street and Madison Avenue.
With the air rights leased from the city, the developer
was able to increase the size of the proposed structure by
nearly one quarter -- from 420,000 to 520,000 square feet.
The Madison Avenue development rights transfer took advantage
of a statue that allowed the city to lease municipally owned
structures for up to 99 years to the highest bidder. There
were several legal complications. First the city turned over
the court house premise including building and air rights,
to the developer for 75 years. In a second lease, the deve-
loper subleased the building back to the city, with full
control of it, while retaining 100,000 square feet of air
rights. Over the 75 year period, the developer was to pay
a total of $3.45 million for the rights, first paying $35,000
a year and eventually $50,000 a year, averaging 46 cents
a square foot. Office space in the area rents for $7 per
square foot and up.
Commenting on the two-fold benefits to the city's
19
real estate, Commissioner Duchan said:
.- 494-
We get rental income for our air rights and
we add real estate tax revenue because of the
additional size of the developer's building,
which is fully taxable.
Again, one must however ask to what extent was the
possibility of such development rights transfers taken into
account at the time of the Comprehensive Redistricting in
1960. In determining the district's overall densities,
the planners surely did not anticipate that such air space
transfers by sale or lease from public buildings could become
a generally applied strategy. Mr. Duchan foresees many more
air rights transactions throughout the city, through leas-
ing of the unused air rights over police stations, fire-
houses and schools, where adjacent sites are ripe for develop-
ment. To what extent will the carefully conceived density
and intensity of activity allocations underlying the
original mapping be thrown out of kilter? True, the ornate
three storey Appellate Division Court House had only a
relatively low FAR, but nevertheless, its intensity of use
is probably at least equivalent to that of a structure with
the district's prevailing high FAR. Court Houses often
generate large amounts of traffic. There is a constant
coming and going of attorneys, lawyers, defendants, plaintiffs.
Typical, also, are the clusters of excitedly gesticulating
persons crowding the sidewalks. Often there will be an
endless stream of taxis and private cars discharging and
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picking up passengers at the curbside. Then, of course,
from time to time, special security precautions will have to
be taken, which will further burden the area's infrastructure.
Similar considerations should be taken into account when
transfer of development rights from police stations, fire-
houses and schools is contemplated.
Firehouses, with their large ground level areas for
parking firefighting equipment, usually have quite low FARs,
but if the unused FAR is translated into high-intensity use
right next door or just across the street, over and above
the as-of-right zoning lot allowables, then the efficient
operations of the firehouse may be seriously impaired.
Legally as well as often illegally parked police department
vehicles often block entire streets. This is a very real
indication of the great difficulties encountered in running
an efficient police operation in the inner city. Transferr-
ing "unused" development rights might well compound these
difficulties.
How is one supposed to reconcile the fact that (i) trans-
fers of development rights between holdings in the same
ownership and (ii) transfers of development rights from
publicly owned landmarks to privately owned sites by sale
should be subject to a Special Permit from the Planning
Commission, while transfers by means of leases should not
be reviewed and approved by the Planning Commission? The
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circumstances in terms of impact on the city are surely
similar.
And if the transfer of development rights from a
smaller and relatively inactive office building, i.e. the
Custom House, warrants a major circulation improvement, then
why would not, by the same token, such an improvement be
warranted in the case of a development rights transfer
away from the Court House, a building of similar size, yet
in contra-distinction to the Custom House an intensively
utilized building?
While the amount of square feet transferred from the
Court House was only 100,000 square feet, the precedent
was set for transfer of much greater amounts without Special
Permit through the leasing device. For instance, what was
to prevent throwing the 21 million square feet of air
rights available over the New York Public Library at
Fifth Avenue and 42nd Street, onto the market? According
to one member of the CPC, this leasing is accomplished with-
out referring the matter to the Planning Commission.
This indicates that approval of such leasehold transfers
is subject to administrative discretion. This makes it all
the more imperative to establish a hard and fast set of
criteria with which to administer such leasehold transferrals.
What effect will such transferrals have on the real
estate market? Consider a situation in which a developer is
497-
assembling a site for an office building. Instead of
rounding off his parcel by acquiring an adjacent lot at
the going market rate, he decides to take advantage of a
city offer to lease transferable development rights at
more advantageous terms. In this manner, the city can
influence to a really considerable degree the workings of
the real estate market. This power may be put to use to
break the controlling grip of hold-outs that drive prices
up and make assemblages impossible or extremely expensive.
In this manner, the city could positively influence develop-
ment.
However, any temptation to bargain away environmental
standards must be overcome. Operating criteria should be
established to guide administrative discretion, or,
alternately, an as-of-right applicable set of rules may be
established.
In June 1971, a group of investors headed by Henry B.
Helmsley, president of Helmsley Spear Inc., bought the Tudor
20
City development for $36 million. Located between First
and Second Avenues from 40th Street to 43rd Street, it was
built between 1928 and 1931 and housed 2,800 families in
ten buildings, some of which were 32 storeys high. One of
Tudor City's more delightful features were two small private
parks each about 100 feet by 230 feet on either side of
42nd Street west of First Avenue.
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Harry Helmsley said he couldn't afford to keep a park:
"I cannot afford to buy a park and pay taxes on it." In
October 1971, Helmsley said there would be a decision 'in
a few months" on the future development of Tudor City. It
might include using the parks as apartment house sites, he
said, or the parks might be left untouched and new buildings
constructed spanning but not blocking 42nd Street. "We are
21
certainly exploring all possibilities," Helmsley said.
Peter Hellman writing in New York Magazine, placed
Harry Helmsley at the top of a list of the 10 most powerful
22
people in real estate in New York City in 1972. What
Helmsley could not do in 1972, Peter Hellman wrote, was to
build residential towers in the two private parks. Helmsley
was "checkmated" by Jaquelin Robertson, director of the
Mayor's Office of Midtown Planning, until December 1, 1972,
second on Hellman's list, who, he said, dreamed up some
exotic alternatives to building on the parks.
On December 7, 1972, the Board of Estimate approved a
zoning amendment creating a special park district over the
two small parks, allowing the developer to transfer or
sell to another builder the unused zoning rights over the
parks within the area bounded by Eighth Avenue and Third
Avenue and 40th and 59th Streets. At the same time, the
23
parks would become public.
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The 1960 Zoning Code created a problem in that the
lowering of densities that could be achieved, made it
difficult to replace obsolete high coverage high density
buildings. In many instances, this was an intended effect
of concern by real estate interests. Such buildings were
ensured a prolonged life. The density ceiling made it
impossible or difficult for such structures to be replaced
by structures generating more rents. In some instances,
however, no amount of modernization could make some of the
older structures a viable economic proposition. At the
same time, redevelopment of a site containing such a
structure was not sufficiently profitable at lower densities
than those existing, even if much higher rents were charged
for the more modern space. Development rights transfers
provided a way to replace very large obsolete buildings
in that reattached development rights from an adjacent or
nearby site created the needed increase in density to warrant
demolition. It was used in this context to replace the
Singer Building and thus make the United States Steel
Building possible. In this instance, development rights
were transferred across a street. The availability of the
tool considerably broadens redevelopment options where old
but large buildings are- involved.
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Although used first in this context, the device was
primarily promoted as a way with which to protect low
density landmark structures situated within districts
mapped at high densities by the reattaching of surplus
development rights to adjacent or nearby sites.
Although the concept of development rights transfers
is an intriguing one, a caveat is in order. When the
district density levels were established, the impact of
density transfers on district densities was not anticipated
and consequently had not been taken into account. It was
commonly understood that allowed district densities would
not be attained because, in many cases, the difference in
attainable densities would not be high enough to provide
a stimulus to redevelop. It was also generally expected
that many lower density public and private landmark build-
ings would be retained and that this would contribute to
lowering the district's average density. As a consequence
of the development and application of the technique, area
densities may be raised beyond anticipated and desirable
thresholds.. Moreover, distribution of surplus density to
neighboring or nearby sites could usually only be achieved
if there was some concomitant relaxation of envelope controls,
such as increased coverage and exceptions to setback rules,
to accommodate the increased density.
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Transfers of development rights also posed a potential
threat to incentive bonus systems in that they became an
alternative way for the developer to achieve desirable
density differentials. In this manner, for instance, the
developer would be relieved of the necessity to assemble
a large site to become eligible for the plaza bonus needed
to get the necessary density to warrant redevelopment;
or alternately, to provide other amenities that might be
considered onerous by the developer.
Development rights transfers, in competition with
incentive bonus systems, might then lead to increases in
densities without any concurrent compensating amenities,
such as increased open space as in the case of the plaza
bonus. Whenever, for instance, it is a purpose of the
incentive bonus system to discourage the redevelopment of
small sites, this effect could be cancelled out by density
transfers.
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Chapter 17
The Special South Street Seaport District:
Orchestrating Urban Renewal, Incentive Zoning,
Development Rights Transfers and Sales
To Achieve a Seaport Museum
The chapter will shed light on the potential of syn-
thesizing a variety of techniques including urban renewal,
incentive zoning and density transfers.
On March 27, 1968, New York City's City Planning
Commission disclosed plans to apply for the first time
full scale urban renewal that was to be keyed to the pre-
servation, restoration and rehabilitation of landmarks.
The plans called for transforming an 11 block, 38 acre tract
of the Fulton Fish Market and surrounding property immediately
to the south of Brooklyn Bridge, into an "Old New York"
neighborhood, of museums, restored historical buildings and
apartment houses. The boundaries of the urban renewal area
were to be Water Street north from John Street to Fulton
Street, Pearl Street northwest to Dover Street, Dover Street
east to the pierhead line of the East River, the pierhead
line south to John Street, and John Street west to Water
Street. A seaport museum is planned for the area. Ships
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that visited New York in the early 19th Century and which
are still afloat, are to be brought to South Street from all
over the world. These are to include the only known sur-
viving wooden square rigged American merchant ship -- the
Charles Cooper -- which would have to be towed from the
Falkland Islands; the Wavertree, an iron sailing ship's hulk;
a paddle-wheel steamer, the Gloucester fishing schooner
Caviar, and the first Ambrose light-ship. These vessels
are to be moored permanently for inspection by the public
at the foot of Fulton Street.
The CPO, seeking to move quickly on the project, set
April 17, 1968, for a public hearing on designating the
proposed site for urban renewal. Donald H. Elliott, chairman
of the Planning Commission, emphasized that the city's move
for urban renewal should quickly put the restoration into
action. The Planning Commission's executive director,
Richard H. Buford, foresaw the possibility that the actual
rehabilitation of historic buildings might begin within a
2
year.
In addition to the fish market, the area includes a
variety of old houses and commercial structures, and several
blocks of dilapidated warehouse and commercial buildings.
At the time of the proposal, the Fulton Fish Market occupied
a key waterfront parcel, the block between Fulton Street and
Beekman Street. It was scheduled to be relocated to the
Hunts Point Section of the Bronx.
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The prospective sponsor for the area, the South Street
Seaport, Inc., of which Peter Stanford is president, Jakob
Isbrandtsen, chairman, and Robert J. Tarr, secretary, had been
working on proposals for a maritime museum.
Through the Summer of 1968, the Housing and Development
Administration's Office of Planning, Design and Research was
engaged in developing a concept plan for the urban renewal
area. It envisaged a reconstructed historical building on
the present site of the Fish market, a multiblock pedestrian
precinct, a major air rights office structure over Pearl
Street in conjunction with an elevated plaza and tourist center.
Rehabilitated buildings principally along the water front would
have maritime displays, shops and restaurants. Characteristic
for the area were the wedge shaped slips, widening towards
the water front, e.g. Peck Slip, where in former times vessels
had been repaired. Although run down, the area did contain
some noted eating places, Sweets Restaurant in Schermerhorn
Row and Sloppy Louie's just around the corner on South Street,
frequented each noon by throngs of executives and white collar
workers employed in the financial district and in the nearby
civic center area. Schermerhorn Row on the south side of
Fulton, a rare survival of early nineteenth century Federal
style architecture, is the core of the South Street Seaport,
the non-profit, privately financed state and city-sponsored
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project to keep and restore one of the historic sites of
the city's sailing age. It was predicted by Mr. Elliott
and Mr. Buford that the Seaport Museum and the restored
area would attract as many as three million visitors a year.
Chairman Elliott pointed out that there would be no
grants of public funds to the renewal area. Rather, he
said, the city would use its own power of eminent domain
and its money to condemn the needed land. The money outlayed
by the city was to be refunded in full by private sponsors.
Although the city was moving at full speed to have the
area designated as an urban renewal area, commercial builders
were also attracted to the area.
The non-profit sponsors, the South Street Seaport, Inc.,
contended that two skyscraper builders, the realty developers
John P. McGrath and Sol G. Atlas, were imperilling their project
by buying up propaties in the block containing historic
Schermerhorn Row.
Peter Stanford said that Atlas McGrath was completing
negotiations for most of the remainder of the block:
We had been negotiating with the owners for months at
a level of $70 per sq. ft. We seemed near a conclusion
so we thought.
Atlas McGrath were proceeding with their acquisitions even
though the Landmarks Preservation Commission had recently
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designated Schermerhorn Row as a landmark. They were
offering $100 per sq. ft. According to Mr. Stanford, they
4
were operating under a cloak of secrecy:
...with the hope that the large Atlas McGrath
investment would influence the city to scrap or
sharply alter the restoration plan.
Asked about their activities in the area, Mr. McGrath,
a former City Corporation Counsel, said that they "haven't
done anything illegal, anything I don't have a perfect right
to do." He continued:
I am under no obligation to make any statement at this
time. I don't owe anything to the seaport museum.
I am a citizen in a free country, free to conduct
myself in any way that is legal.
The seaport group, he said, should be "less emotional
and more practical."
Richard H. Buford, executive director of the CPC, said
that he had told Mr. McGrath that the Lindsay Administration
was "committed to the South Street seaport plan" but that it
was not inconceivable that Mr. McGrath could play a role in
the urban renewal project. 5
The Urban Renewal Plan had been adopted on October 28,
1968 by the Board of Estimate. On November 13, the CPC
approved a recent action of the Landmarks Preservation
Commission in designating historic structures within the
renewal area -- Schermerhorn, Row -- as landmarks. Final
approval of the designation is required by the Board of
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Estimate. On December 19, 1968, the Board of Estimate
unanimously upheld the previous designation which had been
ratified by the CPC and conferred landmark status on the
6
18 houses of Schermerhorn Row. In doing so, it rejected
an argument of John P. McGrath that:
...this prime property, close to Wall Street,
should be used for high rise commercial buildings
to serve the city's financial community.
Mr. McGrath also gave his views in a letter in which he
stated that he and Sol G. Atlas, as developers, had acquired
most of the Schermerhorn Row property and intended to erect
their own office building on the plot. The erection of
commercial office buildings on the site would produce real
estate taxes of $5 million a year in addition to "a large
volume of sales taxes, annual use and occupancy taxes, sewer
and water taxes and other revenue."
The Board's action assured the preservation of
Schermerhorn Row, at least for the time being. Just prior
to the Board of Estimate's meeting, the New York Times
published an editorial calling on the Board not to withhold
the landmark ratification from which the following quote is
7
taken:
Mr. McGrath, a former corporation counsel for the
City of New York, has excellent political connections.
He says that he is not used to losing. A great many
New Yorkers want him to lose this one.
The real issue involved here is whether the Board of
Estimate, by withholdinq landmark ratification, is
going to scrap the city s own exemplary plans to
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please two men who seem bent on personal gain
irrespective of civic cost. To permit this would
be an unconscionable act of cynicism by responsible
public officials.
It was up to the sponsors of the South Street Seaport
Museum to demonstrate that it was economically feasible to
preserve Schermerhorn Row as part of the overall plan.
Approximately l1 years later, on May 25, 1970, the Housing
and Development Administration announced that the city had
negotiated a complex land transaction in order to accomplish
the funding and maintenance of the South Street Seaport
Museum. In the interim period, Sol Atlas and J. P. McGrath
had aligned themselves with Jakob Isbrandtsen who, as we
recall, was the Chairman of the South Street Seaport, Inc.
Under the agreement, an Atlas-McGrath-Isbrandtsen joint
venture would be permitted to construct a two million
square foot office building on block 74W, i.e. on the site
next to Schermerhorn Row. As the block's 04-9 zoning would
not permit a building of such excessive size, it would be
necessary to transfer development rights from abutting sites
to build the structure.
In consideration for the transfer of sufficient develop-
ment rights to build the structure, the joint venture was to
8
fund the Seaport Museum.
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Its funding will take the form of an initial cash
payment, to be used by the Museum to reduce its current
indebtedness and a personal guarantee by Jakob Isbrandtsen
that the Museum will be placed in sufficient funds to
acquire, free and clear, all of blocks 96 and 97 and
to undertake initial restoration. The guarantee will
be secured by Mr. Isbrandtsen's half interest in the
office building.
On the basis of the guarantee, the Museum will effect-
ively receive all income from Mr. Isbrandtsen's half
interest during the five years succeeding the City's
approval of the project. At the end of the five year
period, Mr. Isbrandtsen will VersonaLy make up the
difference between the Museum s acquisition resources
and all costs, including indebtedness, of acquiring
blocks 96 and 97. A surplus of $4 million cash will
be left with the Museum.
In order to permit Mr. Isbrandtsen to recoup as much
of his contribution as possible, the City will permit
his sale of the streets, or their development rights,
to be closed in the Seaport area to the sponsors of
abutting projects. The city will seek to maximize
Mr. Isbrandtsen's return by allowing him as much street
as possible. As of now, his second phase street sale
will include Front and Beekman Streets. It may be
necessary to add a portion or all of Peck Slip at a
later date.
The question that had to be subsequently resolved was:
How was Mr. Isbrandtsen to be enabled to profitably dispose
of the development rights that he had acquired through the
street closings, i.e. where could the surplus development
rights be reattached? To the north-west were the recently
completed Southbridge Towers, an urban renewal area, formerly
known as Brooklyn Bridge Southwest. A few irregularly shaped
and small sites that seemed hardly conducive to redevelopment
were all that was left.
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Key components of the concept plan prepared by the
Office of Planning, Design and Research for the renewal
area were bridging Water and Pearl Streets with an air rights
plaza and office structure. The plaza was to be in the
path of Fulton Street and was to connect the two urban
renewal areas. It was also to be connected with the proposed
Second Avenue subway:
2(e) Following the development of the proposed Second
Avenue subway, connections to the concourse level
should be considered in the Water Street area.
To facilitate a modern and efficient circulation
system in which pedestrian and vehicular traffic
are separated vertically, connection is to be
studied to the pedestrian system in Brooklyn
Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Area.
On July 14, 1970, a meeting was held to discuss the
zoning lot configuration for an office building on a number
of medium sized and smaller parcels bisected by Pearl Street.
In attendance were Norman Marcus, legal counsel of the
City Planning Department, representatives of the Office of
Lower Manhattan Development, Arthur Wrubel, Michael Pittas
and three representatives of the Housing and Development
Administration's Office of Planning, Design and Research
9
led by John Boogaerts, Jr.
Section 74-741 of the Zoning Resolution states that as
a condition for consideration by the Commission of any
application under the provisions of Section 74-74 (Commercial
Developments Extending into more than one block), the
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following minimum requirements shall be satisfied:
The total lot area of the zoning lots comprising
such site shall be not less than 60,000 sq. ft.
and each zoning lot shall either occupy an entire
block or contain a lot area of at least 20,000 sq. ft.
2 B was the largest parcel with 42,198 sq. ft.
Parcel 2 Bb had 6,051 sq. ft. The total lot area lacked
several thousand square feet to make it eligible as a
recipient for transferred development rights. 60,000 sq. ft.
was the minimum. It was decided to demap a pedestrian street,
Cliff Street. By adding it to Parcel 2 B the two zoning
lots would become eligible for zoning lot computation under
Section 74-741(b).
Section 74-742 permits 40% tower coverage of the site.
Section 74-742(c) permits "that where a tower is permitted
to occupy more than 40% of the lot area of the zoning lot
on which it is located, at least 50% of the entire site will
be developed either as:
(1) Plaza or as open area designed for public use and
enjoyment contiguous to a plaza and at no greater
elevation than the plaza to which it is contiguous.
(2) In the case of an Urban Renewal Project, as landmark
and historic buildings plus public spaces, public
amenities and public uses that are related to them.
According to Scheme II percentage coverage of total site,
56% of this site will be developed as plaza and adjoining
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open space if the definition of zoning lot were to be
expanded to include planes that are contiguous vertically
if not horizontally. This would facilitate pedestrian
circulation on continuous planes of different levels.
Mr. Marcus questioned "site versus zoning lot" definitions
in the Zoning Resolution and proposed that a change in the
zoning lot definition be drafted.
It was decided to propose that the area of the zoning
lot located in the demapped portion of the street should
be used for bonuses but should not have attributable floor
area, i.e. no floor area was to be permitted from Parcels
2 Ba and 2 Bc, the demapped portions of Pearl Street.
The meeting had prepared the legal basis by which
development rights of the closed streets could be transferred
out of the urban renewal area. Expanding the definition of
zoning lot and demapping had created a zoning lot in excess
of 60,000 sq. ft. In addition the demapped portions above
Pearl Street were to be eligible for bonuses.
Based on the agreement between the City and Isbrandtsen
a consortium of five banks had agreed to lend him about
$12 million against the future sale of other air rights
over the three storey and four storey buildings and closed
streets. When the bottom fell out of the commercial real
estate market, the development rights lost value and
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Mr. Isbrandtsen's property was in danger of reverting to the
mortgagors.
The Office of Lower Manhattan Planning and Development
then began to investigate the possibility of creating a
10
Special South Street Seaport District. The general goals
of the proposed special district included the goal of
implementing the provisions of the Brooklyn Bridge Southwest
Urban Renewal. A key purpose was to preserve and encourage
the restoration of the Schermenhorn Row Landmark Buildings.
Other purposes included:
- To encourage the preservation, restoration and, in certain
cases, redevelopment of real property and buildings thereon
into a South Street Seaport environmental museum which was
to have associated cultural, recreational and retail
activities;
- to assure the use of the area as an area of small
historic and restored buildings, open to the waterfront,
having a high proportion of public spaces and amenities
which would serve as an urban retreat from the neighbor-
ing commercial office buildings and activity of Lower
Manhattan.
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As a means of accomplishing these purposes, the Special
District was to permit the transfer and disposition of air
rights from designated zoning lots to other lots in the area
designated for intensive commercial development.
A number of important new definitions were introduced
to the Zoning Resolution. The amendment distinguished
between granting lots and receiving lots. Granting lots
were defined as zoning lots and closed streets identified on
a Transfer District Map from whi-ch development rights might
be transferred, either directly to receiving lots likewise
identified or alternately, to a person for subsequent
disposition to a receiving lot.
A "person" could be either an individual, a corporation
or a partnership, trust, firm, organization, other association
or any combination thereof.
Only development rights in excess of
- an amount equal to 5 times the lot area of each of such
zoning lots OR
- the total floor area of all existing buildings on any such
zoning lot, whichever was greater, might be so conveyed,
except where streets were designated as granting lots, in
which case no limitations were imposed other than that of
the district's ceiling.
The two largest receiving lots lay in the East River
between the bulkhead and Pierhead lines at the foot of
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Wall Street. In fact, over 50% of the Special District was
located in areas yet to be reclaimed from the East River.
But only that portion closest to Wall Street had been
designated as a receiving lot.
Another area within the district with neither a granting
nor a receiving designation was three blocks controlled by
the City under its Renewal Powers, immediately adjacent to
the contiguous cluster of granting lots centered around
Schermerhorn Row.
All or any portion of the development rights transferred
from a granting lot might be added to the floor area of all
or any one of the receiving lots over 30,000 sq. ft. in
size, in an amount not to exceed the ratio of 10 sq. ft.
of development rights in each sq. ft. of lot area of such
receiving lot.
In the case of receiving lots with less than 30,000 sq.
ft., however, the aggregate increase in floor area from such
transfers was not to exceed a floor area ratio of 21.6.
Nevertheless, development rights in excess of an aggregate
FAR of 21.6 transferred to such lots might be converted into
increased tower coverage so that the maximum percent of lot
area which may be occupied by a tower shall be the sum of
40 percent plus one-half of one percent for every .1 by
which the increased floor area attributed to the transfer
of development rights for such development would exceed
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a floor area ratio of 21.6, provided that in no event
tower coverage may exceed 55 percent on a receiving lot. In
one event was the floor area ratio of a residential building
or portion thereof to exceed 12.00.
Under the proposal a kind of a commodity exchange in air
rights would be created. Development rights could be acquired
and held for future sale and reattachment. The success of
the idea would be in part dependent on whether the financial
community could be persuaded to buy "futures". The proposal
was heard by the CPC at a meeting held on April 26, 1972.
Action on the proposal by the Board of Estimate is still
pending, but the idea was picked up in midtown as a way to
save the two small parks of Tudor City. The arrangement would
have enabled Isbrandtsen to get funds by selling his develop-
ment rights above Schermerhorn Row. Participating banks
hoped that an improved real estate market would subsequently
push the value of the air rights over the seaport up to
11
$6 million, or $8 million.
This chapter has described a clash between the conflicting
goals of the management of the spatial environment to
greater public advantage and the management of the marketing
and production of office space, and has shown how it was
proposed to resolve the conflict through a combination of
techniques.
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Chapter 18
Incremental Adaptations to the 1960 Code Since Its
Inception: Incentive Zoning's Role
This chapter will show how, over a period of a decade,
as the demand for both office and residential space continued
to be strong, pressures were brought to bear for changes
to be made to the Zoning Resolution, which would allow for
a higher intensity-of-use to be achieved on a widened array
of sites. It will show how manipulation of density incentive
award rates and amenity schedules were soon seen by the real
estate community as a principal means to achieve desired
intensities-of-use. By the same token, it will be seen how,
through withholding of bonuses, development may be deterred.
The chapter commences with some early reactions to the code
as it is put to use.
In 1962, a spokesman for the CPO remarked:
We felt from the beginning that a monumental
undertaking like the new code would require
many revisions, and that many of them would
not be foreseen and acted upon until architects
began putting the Code into use.
Richard Roth Sr., the architect, objected to the
2
esthetic limitations imposed by the new code:
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We will have a series of towers all looking
like the Washington Monument. Under the new
code, a builder is penalized if he attempts to
attach an unusual facade to a building's curtain
wall. If the facade projects even as much as
a foot over the building line, he is forced to
give up interior footage.
George D. Brown, partner in the architectural firm of
Brown and Guenther, asked James Felt, the CPC chairman, to
back a change in the code to permit the use of ground floor
space in apartment houses for laundry rooms, baby carriage
storerooms, meeting rooms and other non-dwelling facilities.
He said the zoning code would force a builder who installed
non-residential areas on the ground floor in an apartment
building, to give up an entire residential floor, while if
he installed such facilities in cellars or sub-cellars, he
would not be compelled to give up rentable space. A cellar
is defined as a space having more than half its height below
the legal curb. Calling for the abolition of cellars for
such uses on the grounds that they were difficult for house-
wives to enter and leave, and that they had inadequate
natural light and air, he suggested that:
...encouraging the provision of more bright and
cheerful community spaces without sacrificing
rentable area in an apartment house seems a sound
principle.
This would also enable the builder to avail himself of
the arcade bonus, an option not readily available with
ground floor apartments.
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At a meeting held in April 1965, in the offices of the
CPC between the new chairman of the Commission, William
Ballard, and Richard Roth, Roth criticized further aspects
4
of the new code. He said the combination of open space
requirements and other regulations under the new law tended
to produce a new stereotype in place of the old wedding cake
stereotype, namely sheer towers rising from regular setbacks
on the building lots. The law should give the architect
greater freedom, he said. Within reason, he argued, the
architect should be allowed to place building towers on any
part of the lot that he saw fit. And with reasonable controls
he should be freed from the sky exposure plane and be governed
only by the allowed floor area ratio. "I might agree with
that," Mr. Ballard said, "but we might disagree on what is
within reason and what are reasonable controls."
Mr. Roth also said that although the zoning law sought
to encourage construction of arcades, few were being built.
The bonus in floor area of three feet for every foot of arcade
area is not great enough to be a stimulus, he said. In
addition, he held unreasonable for the builder to be penalized
in floor space for terraces that are partly enclosed, while
the area of exposed terraces is not counted in computing
allowed floor area ratios.
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Perry Coke Smith, managing partner of Smith, Smith,
Haines, Lundberg and Waehler, formerly Voorhees, Walker,
Smith and Smith that as consultants to the Planning Commission
had made the study leading to the new zoning law, supported
Mr. Roth's contentions. He said that the fewer geometric
5
restrictions placed on an architect, the better.
These architects who are going to design good build-
ings are going to design them anyway and those who
are going to design bad ones are going to do it with
or without restrictions.
The institution of the floor area ratio as the primary
controlling factor was the most progressive part of the new
law, so far as the architect is concerned, Smith said. The
greatest good to the public, he said, will come from the
open space requirement and the bonus rule that declares:
Give us a plaza we can walk on, Mr. Builder,
and we'll give you more space to rent.
On April 14, 1965, the CPC approved an amendment to
6
permit greater diversity in the design of office towers.
The Commission's action would allow buildings to occupy a
limited area within 50 feet of the street line on a street
less than 70 feet wide or within 40 feet of the street line
on a wide street, regardless of the buildings or their
positions with respect to the curb line. The first project
to benefit from the change that was approved by the Board of
Estimate was an office building for the New York Telephone
Company in the Murray Hill area at 233 East 37th Street in
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the middle of the block between Second and Third Avenues.
As the building site extended through to 38th Street, there
were to be landscaped plazas 50 feet deep and 150 feet wide
on both streets. The tower was to be raised on columns and
under it was to be a street to street arcade. The New York
Telephone Company was one of the city's largest owners of
real estate. With the new skyscraper the telephone
company owned 21 buildings containing a total of approximately
seven million square feet of space in Manhattan alone (62
in the five boroughs).
The change in the law that had first been proposed by
R. A. Jacobs, partner of the architectural firm of Kahn and
Jacobs to the Department of Buildings in November 1964,
enabled the building to have, instead of 18,000 square feet
7
of floor area, 20,000 sq. ft. of floor area. When a build-
ing was to be erected on a narrow street (less than 75 feet
wide, as East 37th Street was), the zoning law required the
tower's facade to be set back from the property line by a
distance equal to one-third of the tower's width. The
zoning law gave the architect the option of putting 1,875 sq.
ft. of-the tower's total floor area in front of an imaginary
line 50 feet back from the property line. This projection
under the revised zoning law could take any shape the
architect desired, provided that no portion of the tower was
closer than 15 feet to the property line. More generous
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allowances were made for towers erected on wider streets.
By 1969, bonuses were introduced for Through Block
Arcades. They were to be regulated by Special Permit issued
by the CPC. For each square foot of through block arcade in
commercial districts (FAR 10) 3 sq. ft. of floor area was
permitted. In FAR 15 areas, 6 sq. ft. was permitted. Each
application for a through block arcade was to meet the
following criteria:
- Result in substantial improvement of pedestrian circulation;
- provide appropriate secondary commercial frontage along
the through block arcade such as small shops and restaurants.
The effect of these additional bonusable covered open spaces
was to make it easier to develop smaller sites at higher
densities. While the 1 to 3 as-of-right arcade bonus still
applied, some types of covered pedestrian space could achieve
as much as 16 sq. ft. additional floor space for each sq. ft.
of such space provided. Under Section 74-87 (Revised 4-16-70)
the following increases were permitted:
Permitted Additional Floor Area Per Square Foot of
Covered Pedestrian Space
Area with Air Conditioning and Area without Air Condit-
Heating Facility ioning and Heating
Facility
14 11 05-3, 05-6, 06-7,
06-9, FAR 15
11 8 05-2, 05-4, 06-4,
06-5, 06-8,
FAR 10
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But where a major necessary direct access from the
covered pedestrian space to a subway station mezzanine or
concourse is provided in the development and such connection
is kept open to the general public for the same hours as the
covered pedestrian space, an additional bonus of 2 square
feet of floor area per square foot of covered pedestrian
space might be permitted. In effect this meant that much of
the space formerly eligible by right for the 1 to 3 arcade
bonus, now became eligible by Special Permit for bonuses of
I to 8 or 1 to 11, for the same type of space, and if pro-
vided with air conditioning and heating facility, of 1 to
11 and 1 to 14. (To this 2 sq. ft. could be added, if access
was provided to a subway station.) Only that portion of the
covered pedestrian space which was within 10 feet of a
street line continued still to qualify only for the 1 to
3 arcade bonus.
Until the 1961 comprehensive zoning revision, wedding-
cake skyscrapers were the general rule with a few significant
exceptions, e.g. the Chase Manhattan Plaza, the Seagram
Building and Lever House. These were designed to "fill the
zoning envAlope" by enclosing the maximum amount of space at
each floor level, with setbacks, storey by storey at the
higher levels, only to comply with the old zoning code's
light angle requirements. The new code, with its incentives
for including open space at street level, had from the build-
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ing owner's standpoint the practical effect of making most
profitable a sheer tower set well back from the curb to
create a plaza. As a result, as Edward Sulzberger, president
of the real estate firm Sulzberger Rolfe, Inc., pointed out,
the zoning change did little more than substitute one design
8
cliche for another. "Aside from the different facade
materials used in the towers, the buildings are practically
interchangeable in design." He gave credit, however, to the
architects of the towers that had come up with a number of
imaginative approaches to the design of the plazas.
Sunken plazas, landscaped plazas, shopping plazas,
plazas with fountains and plazas that are illuminated
at night, have all become part of the scene in our
business districts. These spaces have created welcome
vistas in a crowded city. And certainly the towers,
rising from them, are a big improvement architecturally
on the buildings that went up in the fifties.
Plaza associated problems, Mr. Sulzberger called
attention to, were the difficulty of assembling a site for
a new skyscraper. In assembling a building site, a developer
must buy up almost an entire blockfront on an avenue in
order to make his project feasible. This is because only
a small percentage of the total site can be covered by the
building proper. Midblock apartment buildings on side streets
-- normally the most desirable of locations -- are generally
impractical under the new zoning ordinances because they
must be set too far back on the plot. The site coverage
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limitation had resulted in even taller buildings. The typical
Manhattan office skyscraper built in the fifties was between
30 and 40 storeys high. In the sixties, the average had
become between 40 and 50 storeys. This resulted in increased
rentals because of the greater unit cost that resulted when
towers were stretched higher into the sky. This had been
only partly offset by the development of new lightweight
building materials that out foundation and structural costs.
In conclusion, in commenting on the overall effect of plazas
on the local scene, Mr. Sulzberger thought it was time for a
change. Perhaps new incentives might be written into the
zoning code to encourage more variety of design in skyscrapers,
he suggested and added:
This could get away from the single note theme
song of the sixties in Manhattan architecture.
In June 1970, James Felt, former chairman of the CPC
and principal architect of the 1960 Zoning Resolution,
9
called for a review of the Zoning Resolution. He noted that
the plaza and arcade regulations of the 1960 resolution had
had "a most dramatic effect in the areas of the city's
continuing and prodigious office building boom." In response
to criticism that the recent development of Third Avenue and
the Avenue of the Americas was "monotonous and sterile," he
said that this was a matter of taste. With respect to the
criticism that a planning opportunity had been missed, he
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responded that this criticism was more valid, although a
matter of hindsight. Felt urged that the plaza and arcade
regulations should be improved. Moreover, he recommended
the development of additional incentives, such as in the
Special Theater district or direct subway access.
With the expanded use of incentive zoning, developers
were complaining of being held up.
In 1970, a lawyer with many builder clients estimated
that a routine application took six months to a year
compared with four months to six months before the reorgani-
zation and expansion of planning functions under the Lindsay
Administration after 1967. Previously, the lawyer said,
it was also possible to get within three or four weeks
a preliminary staff indication of what the Planning Commission's
final disposition would be, information that was most useful
to a client to whom time,. means money. In 1970 it took a
10
good deal longer to get that preliminary indication.
You are now dealing with a whole group of staffs and
substaffs. Sometimes, I don't know who gets into
these things.
In 1970 a builder's proposal presented to the Commission
for review might be reviewed by the technical controls staff,
the urban design group, the transportation staff, the district
planning office and the local community planning board.
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Felt expressed considerable concern over the admini-
11
stration of incentive zoning:
The Planning Commission has taken some bold steps
in incentive zoning. This is generally to the good,
but there is one caution I would give. The approach
appears to be very much on a negotiated rather than
on a general basis. This gives a skillful negotiator
an unfair advantage over a less sophisticated developer
and should be avoided where possible.
It would probably be better, for example, if the
Commission could detach itself from the administration
of incentive zoning. It would then have more freedom
to prescribe incentives without evoking the suspicion
and hostility it now does among builders.
He criticized the administration of zoning divided as
it was between the Department of Buildings, the City Planning
Commission and the Board of Standards and Appeals and called
for a zoning administrator with a trained staff and adequate
budget. He recollected that in an early stage of preparation
of the 1960 zoning resolution, the appointment of a zoning
administrator was proposed, but that the proposal had to be
dropped as it became a roadblock to passage of the resolution.
It was James Felt's firm conviction that changes in
mapping to a higher density classification were warranted and
that, consequently, areas where changes were requested should
be systematically reviewed by the CPC. In fact periodic
12
reviews were essential, he contended in July 1970.
Rexford E. Tompkins, chairman of the Real Estate Board
of New York, argued that remappings to high density classifi-
cations were necessary because:
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the only major variable in new development is zoning
...construction costs, financing costs, operating
expenses and taxes were not variable.
Further, there was a maximum price at which apartments
could be marketed.
Under one zoning reform developers were seeking in 1970
an additional 20% bonus to be granted in R10 districts,
bringing about a floor area ratio of 14.4. This was the
maximum achievable density in the Lincoln Square District.
In order to eliminate the possibility that this would merely
increase land speculation and drive up the cost of land rather
than encourage the construction of housing, it was proposed
that the added bonus would only be provided where there
were no change of ownership and that construction began within
13
a specified time period, such as two years.
Another proposal that was advanced by builders from
time to time was to raise R6 zones to R8 -- a 100% increase
in rooms per acre. Much of Brooklyn, Queens and the Bronx
14
are mapped at such densities.
Some builders are particularly anxious to get zoning
changes so as to be able to go ahead with construction on
sites they already hold. As many as a dozen-vacant apartment
sites in Manhattan are "ready to go." One informed source, it
was reported in the New York Times, said that many sites had
been purchased at a time when the Board of Standards and
Appeals was more liberal in granting hardship variances for
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higher density construction than the zoning allowed. A case
in point was the Milstein building at Lincoln Square. Now
the purchasers are "stuck with the land," he said. "They
15
took a gamble and it didn't pay off." On May 28, 1970,
Milton Glass, chairman of the Board of Standards and Appeals,
announced his resignation. Mr. Glass's term expired January 1,
and sources in the Administration said he had wanted to see
if he would be reappointed by the Mayor. Mr. Elliott and
others were said to have urged Mr. Lindsay to refrain from
making the reappointment.
Yet another plan calls for a raise of all residential
districts by one density category across the board. Accord-
ing to Mr. Elliott, this particular proposal had been
virtually ruled out. "That would have the effect of destroy-
ing a substantial amount of good housing," he said in an
interview with Alan S. Oser, on what was roughly the 10th
16
Anniversary of the Comprehensive Zoning Amendment. He
also made known that the CPC was planning to extend the use
of special zoning districts, a device it had used to guide
commercial development in specific districts. Mr. Elliott
said that special zoning districts eventually would be
proposed for other boroughs than Manhattan, in downtown
Brooklyn, in the Jamaica area of Queens and on Fordham Road
in the Bronx.
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While developers contended that zoning changes would
make the crucial difference between developing and not develop-
ing plots, the prevailing view among high Lindsay Administra-
tion officials was that zoning was not the critical factor.
Rather they held that high construction and financing costs
had pushed non-subsidized housing to price levels beyond the
reach of most citizens and beyond the marketability of most
areas. In January 1972, this belief was reiterated in a
report released by the Department of City Planning, entitled
17
"Infill Zoning":
Many developers have claimed recently that zoning
was responsible for the slowdown in private residential
construction in New York City. This is not the case.
In a typical new one-bedroom apartment in a Manhattan
high rise building, the report cited, only $26 of the
$185 increase could be attributed to increases in land cost.
Costs resulting from construction and interest account for
$101 of the increase.
On 20 August 1970, the Board of Estimate accepted a CPC
recommendation to remap the midblocks between Park and
Fifth Avenues from 86th to 96th Streets, to a R8 designation.
This area was one of the two areas in Manhattan -- Murray Hill
being the other one -- where 60 foot side streets were mapped
at RIO. Except for these two areas, R10 zoning was limited
to avenues, creating north south "spines" of tall and bulky
buildings, a pattern of high density "mountain ranges" along
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the avenues and low density "valleys" on the side streets,
S18
a principle established in 1961. The objective of the
measure was to prevent high rise projects in the midblock
areas of the cross streets between Fifth Avenue and Park
Avenue. The Carnegie Hill Neighborhood Association,
supported by Community Board No. 8, had urged the CPC to
remap the midblocks from RlO to R8.
William J. Diamond, chairman of Community Board No. 8,
19
said:
Unless the proposed rezoning application is granted,
we can anticipate construction of additional gigantic
structures and the demolition of phypically sound
five storey to seven storey buildings.
Peter Sharp, a developer, had planned to build, a 42
storey structure between 88th and 89th Streets, midblock
between Park and Madison Avenues. He subsequently scaled
the size of the building down to 30 storeys, with a plaza
and some town houses. Under the R8 zoning, the building
could not be built half as high. Abraham Lindenbaum,
attorney for Peter Sharp, succeeded in convincing the
Planning Commission to exempt the block in question from the
zoning change on the grounds that work on the project was
already too far advanced.
But David Perlmutter of the Carnegie Hill Neighborhood
20
Association told the Board that the one block exemption:
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...defeats the entire purpose of the rezoning.
The entire neighborhood will be degraded by his
monster building.
The Association went to court in an unsuccessful attempt
to upset the exemption.
On September 17, 1970, the Board of Estimate,without
comment for or against, adopted a series of changes in the
city's zoning resolution, relating to the ways in which towers
might be placed on their sites in the city's highest density
residential districts. One of the city's top architect-planners
said: "It isn't brutish architects or rapacious builders but
the zoning ordinance that designs buildings."
"Any building is as much influenced by zoning as by
architecture," said Raquel Ramati, whose studies led to the
amendments, "zoning is the grammar in the language of
21
architecture."
In the view of Ellen Perry Berkeley writing in the
November 1970 issue of Architectural Forum, what made the
amendments significant was that they were not just the first
attempt to make useable the open space surrounding towers,
but that they were also the first attempt to consider a
building's relationship to nearby buildings and streets.
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The changes regarding 40% coverage towers
- established anuniform setback zone of 10 feet from a wide
street and 15 feet from a narrow street, previously applied
only to a tower with a base;
- abolished limits on the amount of floor area permitted
within various distances of the street;
- allowed, by special permit, for a tower to be built up to
the line provided the lot ran the entire width of the
block along the avenue, an arcade was built, and a public
open apace of at least 4,500 sq. ft. (minimum dimension of
40 feet) was furnished on the site, and provided the
change would "enhance the architectural relationship" of
the building to its surroundings, and would "improve the
relationship" of the open space to its surroundings and
would not obstruct anyone's access to light and air.
"The builders had been pressing us, saying that the
zoning was inflexible and it was," said Raquel Ramati. In
the course of the study, the few architects who did most of
the city's high density luxury housing were conferred with.
Richard Roth Jr. in agreeing that the new regulations
were "excellent" on the right track, said no one suggests
22
that the changes will make for more housing. Samuel H.
Lindenbaum, Jr. who represented the development community,
in noting that developers would continue to build as they
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did previously, said the only real incentive to development
was to increase the floor area, thus spreading the cost of
23
the land and the foundations.
Ramati also studied the question of greater site
coverage. "Some buildings have a floor area ratio of 20,
but you don't feel it," she observed. Since the FAR would
remain constant, greater coverage would mean larger floors,
fewer storeys, an improved ratio of exterior surface to
enclosed space, reduced construction time and reduced costs
of operating. On sites less than 20,000 sq. ft., greater
coverage from 50% to 70% which according to Raquel Ramati,
results in an uneconomical floor size, would affect half.
of the vacant or "soft" sites. "But we're not pushing these
changes now," Berkeley quotes Ramati as saying, "if it isn't
economical to building 250 units, it isn't economical for
24
100."
In the third week of January 1972, the CPC proposed
special regulations for zoning lots in both R8 and RlO
25
districts, so called "split lots." Under the provisions,
whenever a zoning lot was located partly within a R10 district
and partly in a R8 district, a part of the R8 portion equal
to up to one half the lot area in the R10 portion was to be
governed by the provisions of R10 districts, which allow a
maximum FAR inclusive of bonuses of 12.
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The following conditions were attached:
- The entire zoning lot would have had to have been in
single ownership since September 1, 1971.
- Not less than 75% of the total floor area permitted on the
zoning lot was to be located on the RIO portion of the
zoning lot.
- Not less than 20% of the lot area of the zoning lot
was to be developed as a public open space in one location
within a minimum width of 40 ft. at street level, and with
planting, pedestrian walkways, sitting and/or play areas.
Driveways were not to be permitted within such open space.
Such public open space was to be eligible for a plaza
bonus.
The number of families to be relocated was to be no more
than one fifth of the total number of dwelling units to
be developed on the zoning lot.
Unique was that in order to build under the provisions
of the proposed change, plans would have to be filed no
later than 6 months after its effective date. Moreover,
the benefits of the provisions were to lapse unless the
foundations of the development were completed within 18
months of the effective date of the change. There were at
the time 15 eligible sites on the East Side. Eleven of the
sites were on Third and Second Avenues between 26th and
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93rd Streets, A Commission spokesman, in making public a
list of the affected Manhattan sites, said there was no
26
definite information on the identity of the owners.
"For one thing," he said, "we don't care who the owners are."
Elliott in characterizing the proposed change as
"significant but reasonably modest," estimated that the
sites, which would provide 4,200 apartments if built under
present rules, would provide 4,900 under the proposed changes.
In noting that the East Side aspect might provide a windfall
for current owners, he said then prevailing financing con-
ditions made it impossible to build on the sites at then
authorized densities, that some of them were totally vacant,
and that it was desirable to build housing there.
The chairman of the Community Planning Board No. 8,
William Diamond said he was "shocked to see the Planning
Commission advocate piecemeal zoning that will richly reward
a few selected property owners." The proposal was not
adopted.
Further to the west on Park Avenue and on Fifth Avenue,
the persistent though gradual pressure for redevelopment
posed slightly different problems to those that had resulted
in the split-lot zoning proposal for specific sites on or
east of Third Avenue. An analysis of recent development
activity indicates that because of the prime location, new
construction is possible on smaller than average sites (less
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than 10,000 square feet) and that assemblage activity
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reflects this pattern. Excluding new construction, co-ops,
landmarks, and buildings over 10 soreys, the Department of
City Planning identified 17 sites capable of redevelopment
within the next ten years.
At the corner of Park Avenue and 71st Street, a slender
30 storey co-operative apartment tower has recently been
completed. The developers, in catering to an anticipated
demand for the most luxurious of apartments, decided that
each apartment should occupy an entire floor. Each apartment
had nine rooms with 3,420 square feet of floor space --
the equivalent of two town house floors. With only one
apartment per floor, the- building's standard floor size
could be accommodated on a site substantially less than
10,000 square feet in size, while at the same time taking
advantage of the plaza bonus.
As of March 16, 1973, four of the five top apartments
had been sold, while in the rest of the building only two
28
had been sold. The apartment on the 27th floor was still
available for 4288,000. They were $90,000 to $100,000 more
expensive than those on lower floors. It is evident that a
significant premium is placed on height.
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At the beginning of January, 1973, Raquel Ramati was
putting the finishing touches to a proposal to establish
Park Avenue and Fifth Avenue Districts. The desire of
developers to obtain the 20% plaza bonus caused developers to
set back their buildings from the lot line and thereby to
destroy the "unique uniform building line which characterizes
extensive portions of Park Avenue and Fifth," she said.
While conceding that the objective of the zoning resolution
to obtain greater open space through the plaza bonus in high
density areas was a desirable one, the Department of City
Planning was of the opinion that "the ample width of Park
Avenue and the proximity to Central Park made it unnecessary
and inappropriate" on Fifth Avenue between 59th and 110th
Streets, where it faced on Central Park, and Park Avenue
29
between 59th and 96th Streets.
The Department of City Planning was of the opinion that
only if some other means were found to enable the developer
to obtain the 20% bonus could a developer be required to
build new construction to the lot line. Therefore, it was
recommended that in order to maintain the strong building
line along Fifth Avenue between 59th and 110th Streets and
along Park Avenue between 59th and 96th Streets, the Zoning
Ordinance be amended to rpquire all new construction to be
built to the lot line and to permit the developer to contri
bute to a fund for the improvement and maintenance of off-site
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but proximate amenities along Park and Fifth Avenues in
lieu of providing on site plazas. Assuming that 17 sites were
to be developed within the next ten years, it was estimated
that approximately 2.3 million dollars could be available
to the fund. This includes 20% reduction from the estimated
30
real value.
Discussions between the Department of City Planning and
the Parks Council elicited a preliminary list of needed
improvements to the Park Avenue Malls, to the West Side of
Park Avenue, and to the portion of Central Park adjacent to
Fifth Avenue. These improvements could be funded in lieu of
plaza contributions:
- Replanting of Park Avenue Malls,
- improved maintenance of the Malls,
- replanting of the eastern edge of Central Park,
- renovations and maintenance of existing Central Park
playgrounds,
- additional street trees, bus shelters along Fifth Avenue.
It was proposed that a separate fund be created to
receive the in-lieu-of-plaza contributions and to finance the
off-site improvements. The fund could be administered by
either an existing or newly created non-profit organization
which had as its central purpose a concern for the improvement
and expansion of public open space and pedestrian amenities.
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Care was to be taken to ensure that all monies contri-
buted to the fund could be expended only on an established
list of approved project categories and that the overseers
of the fund would include the appropriate public officials,
such as the Administrator of Parks, Recreation, Cultural
Affairs Administration.
The amount of the contributions was to be established
initially as a percentage of present estimated building cost,
and was to be updated at five year intervals.
The proposal was to be an as-of-right proposal. Under
the proposal, a building wall on Fifth and Park Avenue,
of at least 125 feet in height, would be required before
setback was allowed. Buildings would be limited in height
to about 22 - 24 storeys.
The mandatory front building wall requirements also
applied to all development along the street lines of a
narrow street within 50 feet of its intersection with the
street line of Fifth Avenue or Park Avenue. For the next
20 feet along the street line of a narrow street or for
the next 75 feet along the street line of a wide street,
the mandatory front building wall requirements were to be
optional.
541 -
In a late breaking development, the Board of
Estimate gave final approval to the proposal. The vote was
12 to 10. With the Borough President of Queens, Brooklyn
and Staten Island voting against the bill, the measure
carried when Council President Sanford D. Garelik, who had
previously opposed the proposal, cast his four votes for
the bill. He changed his position because the bill, at
his request, had been changed to put the money into the
city's general fund earmarked for the park district where
the buildings were to be constructed, rather than into a
special trust.
The measure was supported by community planning boards
that cover the areas all around Central Park, not just along
Fifth Avenue. The assumption was that later this principle
would be applied to all sectors around Central Park as well
as to parks in other parts of the city. The widespread
backing by the community planning boards was cited by
Manhattan Borough President Percy E. Sutton as a maaor
reason for his support. He noted, however, in voting for it,
that he reserved the right to vote differently on such
measures in the future.
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Deputy Mayor Edward A. Morrison voted for the measure
on behalf of Mayor Lindsay. He said:
This is a zoning plan that makes sense. We know
that ordinarily, when money is appropriated for
p&rks, it is spent all over the city. This money
would go to the special park areas in which the
buildings are put up.
Ooatroller Abraham D. Beame opposed the measure and
32
called it:
...essentially a zoning-for-sale system. If it
is proper planning to permit construction up to
the building line with an increase in bulk, then
that should be incorporated in the zoning regula-
tions without requiring the payment of a penalty.
If this is not proper planning, then the payment
of a cash donation will not make it proper and it
should not be permitted.
The principle represents a major departure from the
externalities concept and represents a further move toward
the principle of recapture of values created by public
action. The measure does not even make a pretext of
combatting the externality of increased coverage or density.
The funds do not go toward the creation of new and nearly
open space but to maintenance of existing open space, often
far removed from the site. Park Avenue, for instance, is
two blocks away from Central Park; or of little recreational
utility such as the traffic islands in Park Avenue.
Adequate maintenance of such public open spaces falls within
the province of the city rather than that of individual
builders.
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On the other hand the measure will make possible high
coverage, high density buildings on small sites by sub-
stantially increasing the potentially achievable density
differential. This would warrant demolition of sound
housing that hitherto had been protected because of a
potentially achievable density differential tolow to warrant
redevelopment. Thus, the indirect density control exerted
by the plaza bonus system was rendered inoperative. Again
the rue corridor argument is used to justify the measure.
Park Avenue's street walls were to be protected from erosion.
The uniform cornice line so typical of Park Avenue and
usually given much emphasis in Special Districts, was,
however, not recognized. Buildings may rise 25 storeys
without setback from their lot lines. The quality of the
spatial environment of existing abutting buildings will be
prejudiced. Environmental attributes of buildings built
under the regulations will be poor. The measure enables
the developer to not only increase densities but also to
achieve substantial construction cost savings.
Clearly, a case can be made for contributions to a
fund in order to more effectively combat the effects of
increased density or coverage in accord with a neighborhood
plan. But the special park district legislation does not
do this. Characteristic of early bonus formulas was that
they ostensibly sought to internalize the impacts of
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increased density and coverage with compensating amenities
on site.
Legal support for incentive zoning rests on the
extension of two traditional concepts: the concept of
externalities and the concept of general welfare. Under
the externalities concept land-use that creates external
harm is prevented. The concept has been used to justify
subdivision requirements such as park and school site
dedication requirements on the grounds that the development
will create new demands for such facilities and that
therefore the developer must help pay for -- or ameliorate
-- the external impact of his development. Similarly, the
concept of compensating for external influences can be
applied to bonus incentives. But the externalities argument
is only applicable if there is a clear relationship between
the density and coverage bonuses granted and the amelioration
of the externality provided by the required amenity.
When the rationale between the bonus and the amenity
is not clear, i.e. when it cannot be supported by the
externalities concept, an extension of the general welfare
concept is used to justify bonus formulas. Under this
extension measures that enhance the environment may be
required, rather than measures that simply protect it.
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The lack of court cases involving incentive zoning is
in large part attributable to the advantages the developer
receives and who consequently has little interest in attack-
ing the legality of that advantage. Attacks on bonus
fomulas may be expected from the following quarters.
Firstfrom the abutting property owner who believes the
impacts of the bonus will be detrimental to his property.
Secondly, from the developer who believes that he did not
receive a bonus comparable to the amenity he provided. The
Lincoln Square case falls into this category. Thirdly,
from developers who believe that they are being unjustly
denied bonuses through arbitrary drawing of district
boundaries. Fourthly, from developers who question the
basic density limitation on the grounds that it has been
set low arbitrarily to encourage developers to take advan-
tage of the bonus formulas or on the grounds that the base
level is too low to take advantage of without the bonus.
In spite of the Robin Hood traits of the Park District
transfer device, developers are likely to be willing
participants because they have a lot to gain in terms of
developmental advantages at least over the short term, and
by comparison little to lose through the cash contributions.
The significance of the experience is that it sets an
important precedent.
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The question arises as to whether the Parks' District
Legislation constitutes a prelude to general acceptance by
society of the concept of recapture of values created by
public action eventually leading to establishment of the
concept as a principle for revenue raising. This question,
it seems, need not be posed directly as long as it continues
to be possible to operate covertly under cover of the
loosely draped twin cloaks of the extended externalities
and general welfare concepts.
Increasingly, it appears that spatial standards are
being sacrificed as the city either accommodates to builders'
demands or pursues planning objectives that are often quite
questionable. Such attempts to sacrifice and erode spatial
standards,hogver expedient they might appear on a short-term
basis and from the point of view of construction, should be
resisted because giving in to them will be detrimental to
the objective of rehabilitating the quality of the spatial
environment. However, because bonused amenities -- both on
site and off site -- often do not adequately counteract and
ameliorate the added bulk and/or coverage attributable to
the bonus, the concept of contributions to a fund to better
combat externalities and enhance the environment is a valid
one. It needs to be protected from abuse. Its working
needs to be improved.
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The 1960 code, by and large, represented an expression
of the interests of a dominant segment of the investment
building community as these were perceived at that point
in time. This chapter has shown the various strictures and
constraints of the 1960 code as conditions changed, and
has sought to shed light on the process of adapting the
code in an incremental fashion to meet changing contingencies
in the management of the production and marketing of space.
It has given an indication of the close relationships
and interdependencies between the management of the urban
spatial environment to greater public advantage and the
management of the production and marketing of both office
and residential space.
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Chapter 19
Findings and Recommendations
Early attempts to regulate building bulk were
resisted as potential developers of tall buildings sought
to prevent owners of existing tall buildings from exerting
a monopoly hold over space with superior environmental
attributes. As tall buildings started to crowd one
another,impairing environmental attributes, it was sought
to overcome the environmental deficiencies attributable
to lack of regulation through improved construction techno-
logy. Improved elevators, better foundation methods allowed
even taller buildings which secured once again superior
environmental attributes at key locations.
Regulation of building bulk did not become a priority
issue as long as the demand for space continued to be strong.
Impending regulation of building heights and bulk tended to
provide an incentive for developers to capitalize on the
creation of new values at the cost of destroying existing
ones, because once restrictive legislation was enacted
they would be able to exert a monopoly hold on space with
superior environmental attributes and consequently derive
substantial benefits from the ensuing value of scarcity.
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This led to a further serious deterioration in the
quality of the spatial environment in the financial district.
The measures, then, did not contribute to arrest such
deterioration but on the contrary accelerated it. They
did not protect and enhance the values of those interests
that had initially sought protection through restrictive
legislation. Rather the measures provided protection of
those values that had been created subsequently in the
face of impending restrictive legislation.
Initially the problem had been seen as one of protect-
ing a quite range of interests. In the course of the
process the problem was transformed into one of protecting
the interests of a narrower range. To a considerable
extent the task was seen as one of eliminating achievable
intensity-of-use differentials subsequent to completion
of the last generation of towers.
It is characteristic of the problem solving process
that only the most pressing problem is addressed while
associated problems are neglected. From a more inclusive
point of view the problem should have been defined as one
of also securing superior environmental attributes to
future development. This however, was of reduced concern
to the framers of the resolution.
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Neither of the groups of interests concerned with
protecting and stabilizing existing values had a vested
interest in optimizing environmental attributes of subse-
quent development elsewhere. As a result, reformer-
planners who advocated an alternative model of the spatial
environment that addressed itself to the problem of
securing suitable environmental attributes for subsequent
development were overridden.
The ruLes had a crippling effect on the building
type, the tower, that, had it been adequately spaced,
would have provided satisfactory environmental attributes,
comparable to those of buildings completed immediately
preceding enactment of the 1916 resolution.
The solution of the limited problem of stabilizing
real estate values was at the cost of creating a legacy
of new problems resulting from the spatial environment
promulgated by the 1916 Zoning Resolution. The rules
eliminated achievable intensity-of-use differentials in
only two developed areas, while in areas scheduled to
undergo redevelopment, no significant limitations were
imposed.
The varied impacts of application of identical
geometric rules to dissimilar building types were met in
different ways. Development since 1916 has been to a
considerable extent dictated by the need to overcome the
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limitations that the rules imposed.
Initially, however, the prevailing pattern of develop-
the
ment was dictated by the behavior of/conventional developer,
which, in turn, was dictated by his and his lender's
appraisal of the riskiness of a project. Erecting projects
in rapid succession with little equity, they rely on their
managerial and financial skills for a high velocity of
turnover. Their risk-minimizing behavior resulted in
clustering of developments at existing hubs of development,
projects with short gestation periods and maximum densities
and filling out the allowed envelope. As long as building
was profitable they were content to build increments
of rue corridors.
The problem of overcoming the deficiencies of the
spatial environment promulgated by the 1916 code began to
be addressed as competition for tenants increased. In the
case of office structures, efforts were made to secure
superior environmental attributes through increased utili-
zation of the 25% tower coverage provision that allowed
towers to penetrate the bulk envelope. In order to achieve
practical tower floor sizes, it was necessary to develop
large sites. Large tower plans on the other hand led to
excessive amounts of deep space at the base of buildings.
In consequence, deep space at the base of towers began to
be cut back.
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This led, as in the case of the Empire State Building
and Rockefeller Center, to development at less desirable
locations away from the hubs of development, where large
sites were available. Locational attributes were traded
off against environmental attributes.
Such developments were high risks and in addition
demanded enormous resources. The projects had very long
gestation periods. In consequence, such pioneering projects
could only be undertaken by the very largest builders.
Two significant technological innovations aided
conventional developers resist competition from such
developments: namely air conditioning and fluorescent
lighting. In that these innovations created new possibili-
ties to utilize left over interstitial sites that had been
bypassed as superior environmental attributes began to
be more in demand, they created a renewed incentive to
complete rue corridors.
In that deficient environmental attributes could be
now upgraded, the need to replace obsolete structures was
reduced, thus the innovations tended to contribute to a
reinforcement of the rue corridor.
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As a result of the innovations there was no longer a
perceived need to develop superior open plan site plans.
Moreover there was no longer a need to trade location off
against improved environmental attributes. They eliminated
the necessity to cut away allowed bulk from the base of
towers.
While one major response to overcome the inferior
environmental attributes resulting from the 1916 resolution
exercised a spreading effect, the second response counter-
acted that effect and contributed to increasing concentra-
tion and densification at existing hubs.
The urgency to tackle the problem of changing the
geometric rules of the 1916 resolution was substantially
affected by changes in the type of space in demand. More-
over, there was also little incentive for those classes of
real estate interests to undermine their market position
by promoting legislation calling for space superior to
theirs.
In addition, the rules, once set, conferred
predictability and thus tended to survive despite their
recognized deficiencies. The technological innovations
also contributed to a prolonged life of the rules. But
it became increasingly apparent that in spite of the
innovations, anonymous components of rue corridors could
not much longer serve the needs of corporate tenants.
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Changing space marketing and production demands called
for a prototypical high density office building with large
repetitive floor plans with both peripheral executive space
and secondary secretarial space; a prestige enhancing
setting; economical construction and ease of maintenance.
But the recession plane requirements and the 25% tower
coverage limitation made the postulated building type
possible only on the very largest sites.
The investment building community desired to exchange
substandard deep space at the base of towers for substantially
increased amounts of space on high floors with superior
environmental attributes. Such cutting away of cubage at
the baseallowing for landscaped plazas,concomitantly
improved the envi-ronmental attributes of the remainder of
the space on lower floors. Consequently, the investing
building community opposed the Harrison, Ballard and Allen
proposal of 1950 that would have contributed to reinforcing
and perpetuating the rue corridor and a high density,
high coverage environment.
Subsequently in the 1950's, a number of pioneering
office towers were built utilizing the envelope piercing
privileges of the 25% coverage provision. Substantial
advertising value accrued to these buildings.
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The need to change the geometric rules to overcome the
rue corridor finally culminated towards the end of the
1950's when the limited opportunities to build large 25%
coverage towers at prime locations began to be exhausted;
the high density tower became firmly established as the
prototype for commercial rental office buildings; demand
for superior space continued to be strong and need was
perceived to exclude high coverage, high density buildings
on small and medium sized sites.
The plaza bonus system off 1960 made it possible to
achieve this desired building prototype, because it
encouraged assemblage of large sites; provided a greater
achievable density differential on such sites rather than
on smaller sites; reduced the necessity for the exception-
ally large site; provided the possibility to exchange less
desirable substandard space at the base of towers for
substantially increased amounts of space on high floors
with superior environmental attributes, including outlook;
and concomitantly improved the environmental attributes
of space on lower floors.
The plaza tower bonus system evolved in an interactive
process aimed at the resolution of a specific problem in
the management of marketing and production of office space.
It overcame the negative effects of the rue corridor.
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To a considerable extent office builders had been able
to overcome environmental deficiencies of the 1916 resolu-
tion's rue corridor through incremental adaptive responses
within the framework of the geometric rules. The predicament
of housing was much more dire. Many of the city's worst
slums were built under the 1916 rules. The 1916 rules
contributed to rendering high-density, high-coverage
luxury housing on Park Avenue prematurely obsolete.
Considerable sections were promptly displaced in the 1950's
when air-conditioning and fluorescent lighting contributed
to making offices much more profitable.
Technological innovation was not able to assist hous-
ing overcome the inherent defects of the rue corridor as
it had in the case of office buildings. The rue corridor,
which promulgated the "hollow square" site plan on long
narrow blocks, had been dealt a decisive blow by a series
of experiments that showed how far superior the open plan
layout was. In order to improve spatial standards, the
open plan layout was necessary. But housing did not
have the same resources at its disposal that Rockefeller
Center had. Here outside help in the form of land write-
down was needed to facilitate large scale assemblage
necessary to achieve open plan layouts and overcome the
debilitating effects of the rue corridor. It is no coinci-
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dence then that the sponsor of the United States Housing
Act of 1937 was Senator Robert Wagner, Sen., Mayor Wagner's
father. It provided the means for land-write-down.
In the 1940's, major insurance companies assumed the
role of sponsoring large scale city redevelopMent based on
open plan layouts. Such investors have staying power since
they have large financial resources and are interested in
a long-term moderate rate of return. The long-term investor
saw theclose-in location, the built-in protection of the
controls in the urban renewal plan (which run for 20 to
40 years) and the increasing demand for space in convenient
locations as sound justifications for his long-term invest-
ment. There were also tax advantages, related primarily to
depreciation allowances, which constituted an additional
important incentive. But the renewal process was too slow
and the seasoning process too long for the typical conven-
tional developer. The conventional developer also had less
concern for the competitive position of the building in
future years. Working with little equity, he depended
upon creating value quickly. Typically the conventional
developer makes his profit on the sale of the property
once it is built and rented.
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Well intentioned though the efforts were to create open
plan layouts and thus overcome the effects of the rue
corridor, they created new and serious problems associated
with massive clearance.
In an important way the 1960 code provided an alterna-
tive to massive clearance in that it increased the opportuni-
ties for conventional developers to participate in the
process of city rebuilding. In that it ensured protection
of environmental attributes through bonus formulas, open
space requirements and importantly through the way in which
high density districts were juxtaposed with low rise and
low density districtsitobviated large scale assemblage and
clearance and deterred development of sites beneath a certain
threshold size, it created suitable preconditions for the
intermediate developer to participate in the production of
residential space.
The plaza bonus formula worked to allow 20% larger
buildings on sites spanning the width of the block and
reaching back 150 feet to the district boundary,
simplified construction by obviating tiered construction,
facilitated standard repetitive floor plans and allowed
for a higher percentage of apartments higher up for which
higher rents could be charged.
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The bulk envelope described by the 1916 code eliminated
achievable density differentials in only two critical areas,
namely in Lower Manhattan and on Fifth Avenue. As a conse-
quence of not imposing significant limitations in areas
undergoing redevelopment, the 1916 rules added a considerable
element of uncertainty for developers.
With incremental remappings along the avenues --
linear extensions to the high rise spines -- it was intended
to phase development in accord with the needs of space
marketing to avoid glutting of the market.
Finally then the formula had been devised that helped
rehabilitate the quality of residential environment in
significant sections of Manhattan without resorting to area-
wide clearance. New and old were juxtaposed successfully.
Interior blocks were protected and could be reclaimed. A
better mix of units within the neighborhood was provided.
Interior block town houses and brownstones could be
unslummed as single-room occupancies began to be eliminated
and low rise town houses began to be converted into
family units by enterprising middle-class families.
Neighborhood disruption and dislocation was much less
than in the case of urban renewal. Along avenues incentives
were created to develop housing where low density
commercial strip development or obsolete old and new law
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tenements existed. Years of exposure to clattering elevated
trains -- now removed -- had contributed to blight along
avenues.
Once it became certain, around 1960, that the days of
the 1916 resolution and of the rue corridor were numbered,
a strong stimulus was exerted for redevelopment to occur
under the more lenient rules of 1916. Developers could build
high density residential structures at key locations in low
and medium density areas, such as in Greenwich Village or
on East Side side streets, secure in the knowledge that
their structures would benefit from superior outlook, light
and air, as, with the expiration of the grace period, any
significant achievable intensity-of-use differential would
be eliminated in the vicinity, thus reducing the likelihood
of further comparable redevelopment in the vicinity. As a
consequence, considerable value of scarcity could also
accrue to the developer.
This aspect of the rezoning process had a most prodigious
effect on housing production. Up to a certain point, the
longer the grace period, the greater was the inducement to
back the new code.
- 561 -
To a considerable degree the rezoning process may be
viewed as a process of allocation of achievable density and
intensity-of-use differentials in an interactive, disjointed
and incremental process in which various competing classes
of interests sought to assert their respective interests
over an extended period of time. A density differential
is defined as the difference between existing density and
potentially achievable density. An intensity-of-use
differential takes into account both use change from a
less profitable to a more profitable use and the achievable
density differential. Through manipulation of achievable
intensity-of-use differentials real estate values may be
critically affected.
It was the FAR and district system of the 1960 code
that was to provide the basis for selectively designating
achievable intensity-of-use differentials. By the way in
which it was applied, achievable intensity-of-use differ-
entials could be alternately
- reduced or eliminated in areas where high density develop-
ment has occurred;
- reduced or eliminated around areas of high density or
undergoing high density redevelopment to prevent
adjacent or nearby competing high density redevelopment;
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- reduced or eliminated in lower density areas to prevent
high density redevelopment from occurring;
- pegged high in selected lower density areas, often within
a larger contiguous, lower density area to favor high
density redevelopment;
- ttemporarily set low to create holding zones.
In a series of incremental adaptations and under
Felt's stewardship, V.W.S.& S.'s initial rezoning proposal
was reformulated largely.to provide a closer fit with the
perceived needs of the investment building community for
continued and expanded office and luxury apartment con-
struction.
Outstanding examples are the blanketing of midtown
with the highest density commercial bulk designations;
the emergence of the high density residdntial spine
strategy along the avenues; Felt's insistence on the early
introduction of the grace period device; and the reformula-
tion of the incentive formulas.
The fixed geometric relationships of the rules of the
1916 resolution were rigid and had not lent themselves to
incremental adaptation and could in consequence not be
easily adjusted to meet specificly perceived needs. They
had not been responsive to the needs of developers for a
system that could be incrementally adapted to meet changing
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and emerging needs in the management of the production of
space. "Where the resolution's rigid rules created tensions
and pressures, these had to be met, mainly by ways other
than rule changes, e.g. through technological innovation.
Whereas the 1916 code had been intended to and, as has been
shown, to a considerable degree did promulgate New York's
final form, it was understood, then, that the 1960 resolution
would be subjected to periodic review and adaptive changes.
Changing conditions as well as the comprehensive
amendments extreme detail and complexities created
numerous tensions that invited dialogue between developers
and the city. There was an incentive for various classes
of real estate interests to seek to exert continuous
influence on the rule framework.
Initially, as most of midtown was mapped for a maximum
FAR of 18, there was little need on the part of developers
to seek changes. The city had to look on while the enhanced
achievable intensity-of-use differentials in midtown resulted
in:
- the accelerated demolition of sound housing stockof shops,
restaurants, supporting services, and of department
stores that tended to occupy large sites and were thus
suitable sites for skyscrapers and particularly desirable
because they did not involve assemblage;
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- in excessively large buildings on side streets;
- in overburdening of sidewalks and subways;
- in threats to landmarks and the theater district.
Only when suitable sites began to be exhausted and
demand for space continued to be strong did developers start
requesting remappings in peripheral lower density areas
that were contiguously adjacent to the highest bulk
district and adjustments to bonus formulas to allow
maximum densities and increased densities on smaller or
on midblock sites.
Such pressures gave the city an important tool to
negotiate for improvements to the spatial environment. By
denying bonus formula adjustments, the city could achieve
a deterrent to development or deflect development. Many
of the code's rules lacked an objective basis and were often
arbitrary. Where they created tensions, they enhanced the
city's bargaining power. There was then a considerable
utility to be derived by the city from the existence of
such rules and concomitantly little incentive on the part
of the city to edit such rules out of the code. The city
could exert most leverage in connection with requests for
mapping changes from lower density designation to higher
density designations. These tended to be on the periphery
of highest bulk commercial districts and often involved
lots divided by a zoning boundary. To a considerable extent
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special district incentive zoning was a response to the
threats brought about by blanketing of large areas with
the maximum density designation of the new code.
An effort to enhance the city's leverage in midtown
by reducing the base level by 20% while maintaining the
maximum FAR at 18 met with the determined opposition of
real estate and was defeated. The city's principal
opportunity to secure influence in areas where densities
were already pegged high, was to offer even higher
densities and increased coverage. But this was a critical
trade-off to make. In exerting such leverage there was
the danger of bargaining away valid standards.
Of all bonus formulas the plaza bonus had the greatest
impact on the spatial environment. In that it could best
be taken advantage of on large sites, it encouraged
assemblage. It encouraged towers at locations where large
sites were available or alternately where assemblage could
be accomplished relatively inexpensively and where the great-
est intensity-of-use differentials could be achieved. In
that the bonus formula militated against achieving similarly
high densities on smaller and intermediate sized sites,
it served to dissuade redevelopment of smaller sites. On
the other hand where smaller sites were relatively intensively
used as on Fifth Avenue, assemblage of sites large enough
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to take full advantage of the plaza bonus to achieve
maximum densities, would be disproportionately expensive.
Consequently the bonus formula tended to exert a protective
effect on such areas as Fifth Avenue with its intensively
used small and intermediate sized sites. The formula tended
to draw development to where entire avenue blockfronts could
be advantageously assembled, such as west of the Avenue of
the Americas. Thus Fifth Avenue was leapfrogged.
This gives an indication of the critical role that can
be played by bonus formulas. Had the controls instead
allowed for the same maximum densities on smaller sites as
on larger sites, the effect would probably have been
accelerated transformation of Fifth Avenue, excessive
concentration of density in tightly defined existing hubs of
development, rather than dispersal of development within a
larger area.
Thus although the highest density bulk designation
blanketed the entire midtown area, the bonus formula worked
to a certain degree toward dispersal of development.
The arcade bonus was hardly used. A higher award ratio
would conceivably have made it possible to fill the 20% of
total building bulk allotted to bonuses. This would have had
a significant impact on city form in that it would have
reduced the incentive for assemblage because achievable density-
differentials would have been the same om damaller site a-as on
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larger sites. It would have stimulated redevelopment of
smaller sites and could have caused rapid redevelopment, for
instance, on Fifth Avenue. In that arcades are, in the
rule, contingent on contiguous development for continuity
and consequently favor high coverage reaching from side lot-
line to side lot-line, they are basically irreconcileable
with the concept of the plaza that discourages high coverage
and contiguous buildings conducive to connecting arcades.
The preference given the plaza bonus formula reflects
the exigencies of space marketing and production as these
were perceived by the investment building community at the
beginning of the sixties.characterized by an anticipated
continued strong demand for space and a need for large
sites with buildings for high densities. The plaza bonus
formula facilitated larger buildings than were typical
prior to 1960. These larger buildings, nevertheless, had
similarly high densities as their predecessors under the
old code.
Later in the decade space demands became more differen-
tiated. The plaza bonus had, as intended, played an import-
ant role in the assemblage of large sites. Now these
opportunities began to be exhausted. However, the demand
for space in the Central Business District continued
unabated. If they were to be met within the confines of the
CBD, other measures were needed to enhance the development
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potential of smaller sites. The twin measures selected
were increased coverage and density. Increased density
alone would not have sufficed because if significant
open space demands were to be met typical floorswould have
been uneconomically small. The key to higher densities
was to increase coverage and thus to remove the deterrent to
achieving maximum district densities. Both these objectives
could be quite simply accomplished by simply adjusting the
arcade bonus and broadening its scope. Of essence then
itasato provide the ability for developers to achieve the
district density ceiling without forfeiting building
coverage.
Timing the bonus formula adjustment played an important
role in both the management of the spatial environment
and the management of the production and marketing of
space. It is appropriate to speak of a two phase strategy.
In its first phase it created suitable preconditions for
large assemblages and provided the basis for an entirely
new spatial element in the inner city, namely contiguous
open space systems consisting of the connected spaces of
plazas, streets and avenues. It enriched the spatial
vocabulary of the city which until that time had been
largely dominated by the rue corridor theme.
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Spatially defined plazas could also occur where
redevelopment did not take place on adjacent sites or
alternately where subsequent developments used a site plan
configuration that provided for spatial definition of the
plaza on the neighboring site. A case in point is the
recognition and preservation of the spatial definition of
the plaza of the Seagram's Building in the Roth Office's
sensitive site plan design for Seagram's southern neighbor
at 345 Park Avenue. Moreover, as already indicated its
first phase tended to encourage dispersal of development
and the establishment of beachheads rather than continued
concentration at existing nodes. Buildings were tall.
The second phase of the strategy impinged on the
spatial environment in a complimentary fashion. The
first phase established the major theme and overall
pattern -- reaction to the rue corridor through towers,
spaces,dispersal, beachheads -- whereas the second phase
allowed for a pattern of interstitial filling-in.
Increased coverage allowed for lower buildings. Thus
the effect of an even levelling upward of building heights
was mitigated. Increased coverage could contribute to the
definition of the larger contiguous open space systems
created by the plaza bonus. The bonus adjustment made it
possible to shoehorn buildings into interstitial sites.
The kinds of amenities elicited by the adjusted bonus
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formulas -- arcades, covered passages, through block
connections -- complimented the open spaces.
The next phase of the development of midtowntoward
the end of the 1960's, is characterized by a beginning
decline in demand for space. The Times Square area
offered special development potential in that existing
densities and economic inansities-of-use were low,
thereby facilitating assemblage. The Theater District
Legislation should be viewed as an attempt through a
variety of measures to establish a new growth pole on the
western periphery of midtown and at a point in time where
a decline in demand of office space starts to become
discernible.
The measures included allowing of unprecedented high
densities in a narrowly defined area, permission to
include theaters that were not counted against the floor
area ratio, relaxations of coverage and setback restrictions,
coverage increasing alternatives to the plaza bonus,
special design assistance through the city's urban design
group.
Whereas the as-of-right bonuses, applied on an areawide
basis, met the relatively undifferentiated needs of a strong
market demand for space, Special District Incentive Zoning
is an attendant phenomenon of a declining overall demand
for space in which a need is perceived amd for differentiated
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developmental opportunities to exploit the remaining
market.
Special Districts were designed around specific
individual building projects. District-initiating
buildings emerged from an interactive process between the
developer, his architect and the city, in which, to a
considerable extent, design and program reflected the
marketing needs of the developer. Although there was a
degree of interaction between the design of the district
rules and the package for the district-initiating building,
it seems the demands of the developer took priority.
In that subsequent development within the Special
District was at a substantial comparative disadvantage
to development that had been able to avail itself of the
interactive design process from which the district's
rules had emerged, because the high degree of specificity
of the district's rules tended to work as a straight-
jacket for such future development, the competitive position
of the district-initiating building tended to be
reinforced.
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In the Theater District (1967) the first of the Special
Districts, conceived at a point in time at which the market
for space was still strong and at which it was hoped to
draw a significant amount of the remaining development
potential to the Times Square area, no such straightjacketing
effect was exerted. Subsequentlyat a new low point in the
demand for office space, special district zoning was the
tool with which new space marketpossibilities were pioneered.
The Fifth Avenue Special District and the Mixed Building
Districts introduced Residential land-use to the Central
Business District.
Although incentive zoning was initially primarily
intended as a technical device to facilitateby means of
the plaza bonus formula, redistribution of a given number
of FAR points on a prescribed, prototypical sitecas a way
to overcome the stultifying straightjacket of the rue
corridor envelope on the commercial office building:, the
principle of incentive zoning, once established, was
increasingly to be used as a way to achieve a variety of
objectives through use of FAR points as a kind of surrogate
currency.
The experience has shown that bonuses are often
awarded for features that could and should be required by
police power as a prerequisite for permission to develop.
Often amenities encouraged by bonus systems tend to serve
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the developer more than they do the public. Bonus systems
are subject to promulgating covert aims in the interests of
major developers.
The process of arriving at the appropriate bonus
level is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty. In the
case of the Greenwich Street Special District development
costs were weighed against revenues per square foot based on
annual rentals less annual operating costs. The net rental
income per net square foot was capitalized to establish the
value of a net square foot of additional bonus space. Then
the construction costs of developing a square foot of such
area -- based on typical construction costs -- were sub-
tracted from the capitalized values to obtain the incremental
value of the net rentable area. Once the value of the
surrogate currency had been established, the cost of providing
the amenity -- based on average building costs -- was related
to the amount of additional net rentable square footage
needed to provide an appropriate incentive factor.
The following difficulties are inherent in this process.
The value of the bonus to the developer will be contingent
on the location and the rents that can be charged for the
awarded bonus space. Consequently, with fixed award rates,
incentive factors for one and the same amenity, but at
different locations, may fluctuate quite widely at the same
point in time, causing inequities, i.e. immutable codification
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of bonus formulas on an area wide basis may not take
respective locational values sufficlently into account.
At the same point in time, incentive factors for differ-
ent amenities may range from positive to negative. Incentive
factors are likely to change over time as costs of providing
specific amenities change. oreover, escalating construction
costs are an impediment to establishing equitable incentive
factors. There is a potential of windfall profits when
monetary gains from the bonus are out of proportion to
the costs of the amenity provided. Incentive zoning lends
itself to falsifying or obscuring the true costs of providing
amenities. It may foster corruption. Moreover, it is quite
difficult to gauge incentive factors. Ideally, from the
public point of view, the incentive factor should be slightly
above compensation level. The compensation level indicates
the transition point from a disincentive or a negative
incentive factor to a positive incentive factor. An
incentive factor just above the compensation level is the
optimal level, because it is at this level that the city is
relatively assured of getting the amenity, while at the
same time, the cost is held to a minimum. Bonus systems
may be a deterrent to redevelopment if incentive factors are
too low.
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Bonus systems may lead, through varying incentive
factors, to a preponderance of one or a few amenities, e.g.
plazaaand a dearth of otherse.g. arcades. To a considerable
degree improvements to the spatial environment through bonus
systems are largely or wholly dependent on the vagaries
of construction activity. Many bonused amenities are
inappropriate or undesirable. Bonus systems are in general
insensitive to changing conditions over time. They are
often quite inflexible and unresponsive to perceived newly
emerging needs. Incentive zoning often involves extended
negotiations, thus reducing predictability. Bonus systems
are not an adequate area-wide control. Particularly as-of-
right bonus systems may encourage excessively large
buidings at inappropriate locations, which may cause-
undesirable or unpredictable side effects such as shadows,
shutting out of light, air and sunlight, blocking of outlook,
and negative micro-climatical impacts. In that such large
buildings may preempt the market for space, they may deter
area wide redevelopment. Bonus formulas may often reduce
in an undesirable way the comparative redevelopment
potential of small sites through the way in which they
impinge on the achievable intensity-of-use differential.
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Bonus systems have often tended to create sterile and
vacuous environments in that they have eliminated diversity.
They have hastened the exodus of small businesses and support-
ing services. This may have a critical impact on the
Central Business District's attractiveness. Plaza bonus
formulas often tend to lead to undesirable interruptions of
retail continuity. The plaza of the General Motors Building
on Fifth Avenue is an example of this effect. Moreover,
widening of the sidewalk by one developer may be ineffectual
if other developers do not follow suit. Many of these side
effects are attributable to the as-of-right nature of the
bonuses and to the fact thA the provisions are only applicable
on a building-to-building basis. The success of bonus
provisions is also dependent on demand for development within
an area.
High FAR base levels are a general characteristic of
central city bonus systems. Grafted onto such existing high
base levels, bonus systems may lead to the building up
of excessive area-wide densities. Moreover, at the time
that the base levels were initially set, it was often not
intended or anticipated that additional densities be
introduced by means of bonus systems. Similarly, facilitating
of development rights transfers subsequent to establishing
of base levels, may increase densities in an unintended
and unanticipated manner.
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In addition succumbing to persistent pressures to
increase coverage will also contribute to increasing district
density levels.
In addition to permitting more profitable development
of small and moderately dimensioned sites, increased coverage
was also increasingly sought for developers of buildings on
large sites. Increased coverage meant reduction of a
building's height and in consequence, fewer floors which
reduced construction time and cost and improved the building's
ratio of volume to surface. Increased standard tower floor
sizes improved the ratio of core to rentable floor area.
Moreover, as more and more buildings had plazas, the value
of plazas to developers diminished. They no longer had the
need for the advertising effect. The impacts of increased
coverage are more easily ascertainable than are those of
increased densities. Increased coverage measurably impacts
light, access and outlook of adjacent sites. The quality of
the ground level environment suffers. The impacts are
exacerbated where buildings face onto narrow streets as in
the case of the Fisher Building in Lower Manhattan. Where
substantia~lyincreased coverage is granted for the first-
comer building, this can impair the chances for similar
high density development of adjacent sites and may sterilize
such sites.
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Where the precedent created by the first-comer building
leads to a similar relaxation for new neighboring buildings,
(such a relaxation is being currently sought for the site to
the north of One Astor Plaza), the quality of both the public
environment and the building's rental space may be seriously
impaired. Real estate values may be impaired.
One might speculate as to whether obtaining increased
coverage may have also been seen as a disingenuous strategy
to secure a monopoly on superior light and outlook by
sterilizing development potential on abutting sites. The
cavalier attitude towards coverage conflicts with zoning
orthodoxy. Increased coverage has been a critical constitu-
ent element of the bonus package not only in the pioneering
theater district but also in the most recent Special
Districts, i.e. both in the Fifth Avenue and the Upper Fifth
Avenue, and in the Greenwich Street Special District.
The willingness to use increased coverage to bargain
for amenities is probably in large part attributable to
the interactive bargaining process by which the district-
initiating building is typically arrived at and from which
then the district rules are derived. Moreover the impact of
increased coverage is not as dramatic in the district
initiating building as it is subsequently when further
development occurs. However, cumulative increased coverage
might jeopardize the carrying out of further elements of the
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plan, if the quality of the resulting spatial environment
threatens to be seriously impaired. In the case of the
Greenwich Street and Fifth Avenue Districts the impacts of
cumulative increased coverage might not have been so
apparent because of the fact that both district-initiating
buildings were adjacent to open space or air parks, ie.
the plaza of the World Trade Center in the case of the
Fisher Building and St. Patricks Cathedral in the case of
the Arlen Building.
Whereas there was a perfunctorily demonstrable relation-
ship between increased density in return for more open space,
no such demonstrable relationship existed in the case of
increased coverage.
Whereas prior to 1916 developments subsequent to and
abutting existing high coverage buildings ldegeek to
overcome detrimental impacts on light, air and outlook by
building higher, a limit to density preempted any such
option under the new code.
Even the 1916 code had ensured that towers above a certain
height would not have more than 25% coverage.
Whereas 40% towers located on wide avenues backed up by
low rise air parks recognized to a certain degree the under-
lying philosophy of the open plan layout, this could not be
said of the large high density high coverage tower -- the
Fisher Building -- pushed up closely against narrow streets.
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While the residential environment of the Arlen
Building might be adequate in spite of the increased
coverageby virtue of the twin air parks above Cartiers
and St. Patricks, high coverage residential towers elsewhere
in the district, without such assets, would have a consider-
ably less desirable environment.
The experience has shown how, to a considerable degree,
city design was subordinated to the exigencies of managing
space production. Nevertheless, pursuing the objective
of enhancing the publicspatial environment was invariably
used as a pretext to obfuscate the pursuit of partisan
aims of particular classes of real estate interests.
Typical -of the pro c esswat thpt 'inve tmezit .builders sought
to ride on the coattails of conventional enlightenment
in pursuing their limited self-interested objectives.
Popular urban design concepts are used to emphasize the
public benefit aspects of bonus formulas and to deemphasize
the advantages accruing to developers. Noteworthy is the
generally close fit between developer's perceived needs
of space production and respective favored specific urban
design values at separate points in time.
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Favored and influential city design values in the
late 1950's were those of the "ville radieuse", the
"tower in the park" and concomitantly a general revulsion
against "unbroken blocks of masonry." This was at the
same time that key investment builders were promoting
code revisions to facilitate large site assemblages to
allow for tall office and residential towers surrounded by
a cordon of space.
Late in the 1960!s when large sites were increasingly
difficult to acquire and demand for space continued to
be strong a corollary switch In preferred urban design
values away from the "tower in the park" to the rue
corridor g,.which was considered to be more "urbanistic"
is apparent.
When key investment builders started talking of the
need to get away from the "single-note theme-song" of the
sixties, namely the tower surrounded by a plaza, they were
in fact signaling that assemblage had become difficult and
that there was a perceived need to raise site coverage and
the potentially achievable density differential, on sites
other than the large sites, to levels comparable to those
of such larger sites.
The "rue corridor" is conducive to high coverage of
sites, as it implies building from side lot-line to side
lot-line. In consequence, in that it reduced the pressure
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to assemble large sites and make redevelopment of smaller
sites more viable, it was in accord with investment builders'
emerging desire to develop smaller sites at high densities.
Leaders in promoting the street wall were former
students of Vincent Scully at Yale, who formed the nucleus
of the Urban Design Group. Recognition or creation of
unformly high "street walls" was advanced as a key concern
in most of the Special Districts.
Creation of such a wall is, of course, contingent on
the redevelopment of sequences of contiguous sites.
Prerequisite precipitate area wide redevelopment is,
howdver, not likely to occur.
There is a noticeable tendency to rely on district-wide
design objectives in justifying design measures applied to
individual buildings. A proposed building's adherence
to a district plan, particularly if it is the initiating
building or a key constituent element of such a district
plan, may serve as a powerful argument to justify special
measures, such as increased FARs or coverage, beneficial
to such projects.
In that district initiating buildings emerged from an
interactive process between the client, his architect and
the urban design group, they usually reflected the developer's
specific needs for his site. For instance, while the
Bankers Trust Building, the district initiating building
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of the Greenwich.Street Special District had a 20,000 sq.
ft. second level plaza which conveniently tied in, by means
of a footbridge, to the Trade Center, it concurrently
benefited from the very large ground level floor that was
thus made possible.
Although aimed at achieving evanescent district goals,
the special district process did have significant
utility in achieving substantial piecemeal change on key
sites, change that in and of itself could enhance the
quality of the spatial environment, even without further
elements of the district being implemented. The district
plan tended to create tensions between prospective future
developers' buildings and the district's legislation.
Consequently, future developers would have to enter into
negotiations with the urban design group. In this manner
then, the Special District device afforded an opportunity
to the city to influence the design of individual
buildings.
Several distinctive, individual buildings have emerged
from the various special districts, although usually not
more than one per district. However, in none of the districts
that espoused district design goals, such as the second
level walkway along Greenwich Street, has any significant
headway been made toward achievement of those goals.
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Amenities provided through incentive zoning tend only
to address the very tip of the impact iceberg of large build-
ings. Mayor John V. Lindsay has pointed out that "density
is responsible for inevitably higher costs for almost every
conceivable service." All high-rise office construction,
where bonus systems have been operativehas been concentrated
in the tiny areas of lower and midtown Manhattan. While the
clustering of economic activities in midtown and downtown
Manhattan skyscrapers does provide very sizeable benefits
to firms within the cluster, public services such as trans-
portation, parking, police, sewer systems, power producing
capability, water delivery all must be expanded substantially
as densities are increased.
Increased expenditures will be needed for road repairs,
street cleaning, garbage removal, etc. Moreover, many costs
of density and congestion do not show up in budgets. They
include, for example, buses operating inefficiently because
of traffic tie ups, illegally parked cars preventing sani-
tation trucks from sweeping the streets, and slowing down
the process of garbage collection; ambulances caught in
traffic; workers late for work.
A major impact is created in that office buildings
have not been designed to conserve energy. In spite of
the plaza bonus new tall office buildings still crowd
closely together. consequently even on higher floors
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there may be no view of the sky and, as a consequence,
increased dependency on artificial lighting results. In
the past the Illuminating Engineering Society has regularly
raised its recommended lighting level which currently is
100 foot candles for offices. Even with the use of relative-
ly cool fluorescent lighting the summer air-conditioning
load is increased by as much as a quarter.
One lighting specialist maintains that if all the office
buildings in New York used heat absorbing glass and double
glazing there would be no problems with electricity.
Different kinds of exterior walls for different exposures
should be considered. In calling for more control of daylight
through the glass walls, one interior architect said: "You
don't need blazing illumination everywhere in an office
anymore than you do in a home."
Developers' low first-cost mentality militates against
such measures because it would add to the initial cost of
the building. Moreover, building owners buy electricity
wholesale and earn a profit by retailing it to their tenants
and consequently have little incentive to conserve energy.
Energy waste occurs in cooling, heating, lighting, ventilation.
In one recent year the addition of 17 million square feet of
office space in Manhattan raised the peak demand on
Consolidated Edison by about 120,000 kilowatts, enough to
supply Albany, New York.
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Shape and orientation of the building itself can play
an important role. Heat reflected from the hard surfaces
of the plazas themselves exacerbates the cooling problem.
Planting would reduce heat loads on such plazas.
This thesis has shed light on the effects of zoning
controls on the management of the urban spatial environment.
It has revealed how difficult it is, once rules are imposed,
for these to be changed. Even though rules may be redundant
at their inception or may become redundant, this will not
deter development where development pressures exist. It
may shape development in a crippling manner but it will not
stop it. It may also deflect development as has been shown,
and stimulate extraordinary measures and exertions for the
deficiencies to be overcome. Thus the 1916 controls had
very significant side effects.
The situation is different where development pressures
are weak. Here it appears that rules may deter development
or be a serious impediment to development. The experience
suggests that modifications to rules may be a significant
stimulus to development.
This thesis has indicated that considerable attention
needs to be paid to design and application of zoning
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measures and suggests that a closer relationship between the
goals of managing the spatial environment to greater public
advantage and those of developers should and can be achieved.
The final section will give an indication of how the
dichotomy between the goals of managing the spatial environ-
ment and developmental goals can be overcome.
This thesis has also shown how rates of change can be
significantly affected through timing of introduction of
controls and how development stimuli may be released, which
may lead to patterns of development that are different from
preceding patterns or the prevailing pattern subsequent to
the code change. It has shown how subsequent to 1960 a more
adaptive management of the spatial environment was pursued.
Incentive zoning was a major tool of the strategy.
Its formulas could either work as a temporary deterrent to
development, create holding zones, accelerate development
or shape development in different ways at different points
in time within the same area; it could impact and shape
area-wide patterns of development, but it could also shape
individual buildings, create beachheads for development;
focus development demand in specific areas; provide the
essential preconditions for take-off to be triggered as at
Times Square; it could spearhead entirely new markets for
space and create appropriate preconditions for existing and
new buildings to be juxtaposed, and provide average area-
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wide densities that were comparable or lower than in urban
renewal areas. Finally, it provided in a major way an
alternative to urban renewal. Incentive zoning's record
of accomplishment, then, isby and largequite significant.
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Chapter 20
Development of Alternatives
This concluding part offers some suggestions and sketches
out some plausible options that are intended to stimulate
planners and to help them respond to the challenges facing
them. It is intended to be neither an exhaustive catalog
of solutions nor a manual of design standards. The purpose
is to suggest some of the issues which planners should consider
in the management of the urban spatial environment and to
provide some suggestions on how they might address these
issues using incentive zoning techniques.
The first and most important step in developing a bonus
system is for the city to develop a clear idea of what is
to be accomplished by the bonus system. The general intent
-- to encourage a better environment -- needs to be translated
into specific objectives. These purposes set the groundwork
for every thing that follows and are in consequence critical
to the success of the bonus system.
We need to distinguish between bonus systems that apply
within larger contiguous zoning districts such as in midtown,
and such systems that are operative within small districts,
i.e. districts surrounded by lower density districts such as
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the narrow R10 districts flanking the avenues.
From the point of view of equity the RIO district
system and its bonus formula was not optimal because it
depended on a reduction of comparative development potential
on adjacent interior blocks to achieve its superior environ-
mental attributes. This, of course, was to no small degree
the precondition for the success of the high spine redevelop-
ment strategy in Manhattan. These or similar mapping patterns
did not occur elsewhere in the city. Indeed, as will be
recalled, they had not initially been intended for Manhattan
either. Only at the insistence of the investment builders
were incentive formulas and district boundaries revised in
an envelope deterministic manner to better meet the needs
of the investment builders.
It would seem desirable to attempt to design bonus
systems that allow for similarly strong stimuli for develop-
ment as under the RIO - R8 and RIO - R7 mapping patterns and
their bonus formula, but which do not depend on similar
density gradients for their effect.
A careful survey of existing development potential needs
to be undertaken. Development might be deterred for any one
of a number of reasons or for a combination of reasons.
Often the achievable density or intensity-of-use is un-
attractive to developers. Assemblage might be too difficult.
On-site parking requirements may make it necessary to provide
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below grade parking which could be too costly. Coverage
requirements might make it necessary to build a taller
building than economically practical.
But in large areas of the city the critical factor
deterring redevelopment will probably be neighborhood and
area attributes, rather than specific limitations of zoning
on individual sites.
The study would seek to identify those areas where
zoning restrictions play a role in deterring development.
It would examine to what degree zoning changes could make
development more easy. It would at the same time examine
the trade-off involved in making changes and would identify
the nature of the changes that would be appropriate.
Bonus formulas could be devised that are aimed at achiev-
ing more facilities, for the benefit of the residents,
including recreational space, more useful open space, a wider
choice of housing unit types; and for the benefit of the
wider neighborhood, more involvement in the site planning and
control of developments by the community, better assimilation
of projects with existing development including retention
of existing useable and/or historic buildings and incentives
for the development of small sites; for the benefit of both
the project residents and the wider community, a wider choice
of housing accommodation, more varied forms of projects, more
opportunity for improved site planning and broad neighborhood
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design.
Criteria for prototypical situations will be established
by the city, the community and representatives of the real
estate industry. In this process, a key interface role
may be played by the Urban Design Group.
Care needs to be taken that the incentive factor is not
excessive. Visual and activity surveys will play an
important role in formulating the criteria.
I propose a bonus system that would recognize specific
localized conditions and objectives while also allowing
for specific area objectives identified in district or
community plans. It would not represent an immutable codi-
fication but would be reviewed and adjusted to meet newly
perceived needs. This would be done either on a regular
basis or when specific and predetermined conditions occur.
It would encourage and stimulate development while at the
same time address a variety of problems of concern in the
management of the spatial environment.
Coverage in relationship to density may be varied in
a variety of density ranges. We may use open space between
tall buildings in a variety of ways; we may create or
preserve park like spaces; we may use part of the space
for low-rise housing either attached, patio type housing or
three-storey family units, or town houses attached in rows;
the space in between may also be used for community facilities
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such as theaters; or it may be used for retention of historical
structures or valuable existing housing stock such as town
houses or brownstones.
We may use wide open spaces between such towers to
preserve vistas and views.
The preceding is based on the assumption that the level
of density allowed of right is the same over larger areas.
New possibilities emerge as building types are perfected
that provide a much higher volume to coverage ratio than
was previously economically plausible. This allows medium
to high densities with still significant amounts of open
space.
We can, for example, first create environments that are
low density, low coverage but high-rise. The city might then,
at some later date, double the allowed densities. Using
a similar building type, there still would be ample space
between buildings. Or, alternately, the city might call for
low-rise high coverage development in the second stage
providing a moderate overall density for both stages.
Under the proposed system the application and the phasing
of introduction of special district overlays will be of
essence. These may be applied temporarily, over a longer
period of time or permanently. They may be incrementally
expanded and may be overlaid over one another. Within
district overlays bonus formula adjustments may be made
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to meet changed needs.
Special district overlays may also be applied for a
short period only to provide an incentive for development
to occur under more lenient conditions than normally apply.
In addition to increased density or coverage, the developer
will have the incentive of profiting from a relative
quality of uniqueness and concomitant value of scarcity once
the temporary provisions expire.
This proposal is an application of a principle encountered
in the grace period which, as will be recalled, had a strong
effect on the spatial environment.
District overlays in which specific rules apply may be
incrementally expanded according to an announced schedule or
alternately when certain preconditions have been met, such as
the reaching of a given development threshold in the initial
district increment. This proposal is akin to a formalization
of the intended informal strategy of incremental remappings
to higher densities along Manhattan's avenues.
Within given district overlays adjustments to bonus
formulas may be undertaken in accord with specific planning
aims, when specified preconditions are met. This proposal
has its roots in the midtown experience in which bonus
formulas first favored buildings on large sites and subse-
quently were adjusted to give similar status to the small
site.
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Where uncertainty exists as to whether specific incen-
tives will be a sufficient inducement for development to
occur, the specific district overlay may be applied success-
ively in various areas with similar characteristics.
District overlays may overlap one another. Some special
districts will fall entirely within a larger special district
that embraces a major part of the borough or even straddles
borough boundaries. In other areas where stability is of
essence and preservation of the existing quality of the
spatial environment is desired, rules will be less flexible
and will be of a more permanent nature.
Under the bonus system, bonuses would be awarded under
specified circumstances for assemblages that include parcels
on both sides of a street or avenue, or assemblages extending
over more than one block. This will greatly enhance flexi-
bility in achieving neighborhood design goals, as will be
shown in the following prototypical examples which give an
indication of the variety of objectives that may be pursued:
- Seventh Avenue, north of Central Park, resembles a wide
stately boulevard with trees lining both sidewalks and
the mall in the median. The usual redevelopment strategy
would be to map R10 for towers along the avenues. To
preserve the spatial quality of the avenue, while at the
same time allowing development to occur, a district over-
lay is applied-- Sidestreets and avenues are currently
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mapped at the same densities -_ with bonus formulas that
encourage assemblage, low coverage, provision of common
open space, as well as retention of town houses on the
interior block. In that assemblage is encouraged on both
sides of the street, a midblock through block vestpocket
park may be created, with a point block facing onto it
from across the street. The bonus formulas may be designed
to keep neighborhood density levels at the same level as
if the usual RIO - R7 juxtaposition had been mapped.
- In yet another avenue situation, bonus formulas would
encourage -- through use of the expanded zoning lot
definition -- concentration of allowed bulk on one side
of the avenue or side street and creation of a blockfront
wide park on the other side. This principle can be
applied to achieve a staggering of towers on a skip block
basis. This would in and of itself constitute an added
incentive to developers because it would enhance the
buildings' environmental attributes.
- In another situation, rather than creating the stereotype
symmetrical avenue cross section of axially arranged
towers, bonus formulas could be designed to encourage low
coverage point blocks and open space and to discourage
retail uses on one side of the avenue, while on the other
side they would encourage a widened tree-lined sidewalk,
a continuous arcade and concentration of shops and
neighborhood services.
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Under the proposed system, incentive zoning techniques
could be used in a number of ways to overcome limitations to
the development of specific site categories. This option
may be particularly germane in areas outside Manhattan.
If, for instance, the useable open space requirements clash
with on-site parking requirements necessitating below grade
parking, then a bonus might be considered for below grade
parking, as has been proposed for Toronto, Canada. Or,
alternately, a cash contribution to a fund to be used for
the construction of a neighborhood parking structure in
the vicinity.
The same general principle of cash contributions to
a fund in exchange for increased coverage and/or density
could be applied to get small vest-pocket neighborhood parks
in the proximity of the development. This option might be
considered where difficulties in assemblage prevent large
sites from being assembled.
Recent advances in structural systems, such as tube-
within-tube and framed tube structural systems, have made
it possible, by reducing the comparative unit cost of
enclosed space, to package a given large amount of space
more economically in particularly large, high rise buildings
than in several smaller buildings.
Current zoning controls militate against such buildings
in Manhattan as of course elsewhere in the city, in that
unusually large sites would be required which are not
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typically available except possibly on the extreme periphery
of the CBD, on landfill or in marginal areas and far from
commuter rail or transit access.
However, RPA's projected demands for office space in
Manhattan suggest that pressures will be brought to bear for
zoning changes to allow such structures to be built. Such
pressures should be resisted. Such buildings would be most
appropriate atop commuter rail terminals and at points where
subway lines intersect, such as the Long Island Railroads'
Atlantic Terminal in Brooklyn and Jamaica Center in Queens.
Thus incentive zoning provides us with an opportunity to
attempt to deflect such developmental pressures away from
Manhattan.
RPA has identified as the most critical part of the
journey to work the part between place of work and commuter
rail or transit access. Appropriate bonus formulas could
work toward assemblage at such transit hubs to provide the
preconditions for such highrise structures rising from low
or medium rise surroundings, while at the same time
maintaining overall densities on an area-wide basis at such
a level to preserve the rest of the area's low rise profile.
A circularly shaped special district with the transportation
hub at its center would be superimposed on the zonin-map.
Within it, an array of bonuses would be awarded that would
have the cumulative effect of encouraging high intensity
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development close to the hub, while at the same time dis-
couraging less intensive development away from the hub.
Appropriate bonuses would include graduated bonuses for
proximity to the transportation hub rising steeply with
increasing proximity; bonuses for large assemblages;
bonuses for low coverage and possibly also for retention
of existing buildings on site. In addition to benefiting
from the bonuses, the developer would also benefit from
excellent tansit and rail access, and superior environmental
attributes to both lower and upper floors, attributes that
he would probably not enjoy in Manhattan.
The strategy of decentralization should be augmented by
appropriate policy measures to limit further concentration
in midtown and lower Manhattan. Whereas in Brooklyn, Queens
and the Bronx, special efforts will be needed to attract
development, in Manhattan measures should be applied that re-
duce the incentives for continued high density office
development in the small areas of midtown and lower
Manhattan. These might include curtailment of further
remappings to the maximum bulk designation, and curtailment
of bonus formula adjustments that allow shoe-horning of high
density high coverage buildings onto interstitial sites.
With reapeet to- d-en-sity transfers, I have ambivalent
feelings. On the one hand, they do have a certain potential
for preserving air parks, open spaces and landmarks, but on
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the other hand, the experience since 1961 indicates that
the principle can seriously exacerbate the density problem
in congested areas. It endangers low rise development on
interstitial sites, thus posing a potential threat to the
continued existence of valuable air parks. Moreover, it
almost inevitably means that setback rules will have to
be waivered, that sky exposure planes will have to be
penetrated and that coverage will have to be overstepped,
impairing environmental attributes to neighbors -- and also
to the occupants of the building in question -- possibly
to the extent of sterilizing abutting sites. In addition,
density transfers tend to provide the potential of windfall
profits, if they are transferred from secondary locations
to prime locations.
Closely linked with the question of development rights
transfers is the question of development rights sales by
the city. While there is much to be said for cash contri-
butions to earmarked funds to achieve amenities in accord
with a neighborhood plan, in lieu of actual construction of
amenities, sale and transfer by the city of surplus develop-
ment rights above such large buildings as the public library,
or above closed streets in urban renewal areas, as is being
onsidered in the case of the South Street Seaport Museum,
raises serious questions. Such sales and transfers will
necessitate reattachment to other sites which will create
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problems of the nature indicated earlier. The strongest
bidders for such development rights will be at prime
locations, locations that are already experiencing excessive
congestion. These are precisely the areas where further
densification should be resisted. M±oreover, the sale by
the city of surplus development rights will tend to undermine
the workings of the real estate market and add an element
of unpredictability. The sale of development rights
between willing neighbors should be seen in a different
light. Consequently, I recommend that serious consideration
be given not to extend selling of development rights by the
city, at least not in the context of midtown and lower
Manhattan. I also suggest that serious consideration be
given to rescinding the increased densities and coverages
granted in the special districts in midtown and lower
Manhattan.
What is the likelihood of such policy measures gaining
acceptance? Real estate interests will probably divide
into two factions. The measures may expect to find strong
support among those developers who are currently suffering
from the effects of the high vacancy rate, while developers
advancing plans for new projects in anticipation of a
resurgenc-e of demand wil tend to oppose the measures.
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The first half of the Seventies, then, might be an
appropriate point in time to consider "putting the lid on"
in Manhattan in terms of further densification -- but this
time in earnest -- and to actively pursue public policies
that promote decentralization, some of which have been
indicated in this thesis.
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Appendix A
Roots and Precedents of Incentive Zoning
In 1930, at the third meeting of Les Congres Internation-
aux d'Architecture Moderne, in Brussels, Walter Gropius
attempted to demonstrate the relationships existing between
1
building height, open space, sunlighting and orientation.
Using parallel buildings, Gropius found that for a given
total floor space on a site, it was better, from the point
of view of lighting, to build higher buildings farther apart.
This point is demonstrated by comparing three alternatives
on a given site that all have the same density, but in which
the density is accommodated in parallel rows of buildings of
either 5, 10 or 15 storeys in height. Whereas the angle
subtended at the ground floor in the 5 storey arrangement is
about 51 degrees, it is reduced to about 39 degrees in the
10 storey arrangement and 36 degrees for 15 storeys. Gropius
noted that there was a limit to the light improvement
obtainable in this manner.
In establishing this quantifiable relationship, Gropius
provided the theoretical basis for incentive zoning. The
inference of his finding was that densities could be increased,
while maintaining the same standard of daylighting if the
proportion of open space was increased.
Grapiu-s onlgy examined parallel buildings. Moreover,
he apparently took no account of the gap occurring between
the ends of buildings.
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It occurred to researchers of the Building Research
Station in Great Britain that such gaps might be utilized
to obtain a view of some portion of the sky at a sufficiently
low angle for the light to penetrate better into the room.
To test the hypothesis, every second building was turned
through 90 degrees on plan. This led to a 70% increase in
penetration. In the parallel arrangement of buildings, the
sky is more or less of constant height as one goes back into
the room. With the alternative arrangement, a substantial
area of sky is visible much lower and consequently, its
2
effect on the penetration of light is much greater.
The amount of direct daylight to be found at any parti-
cular point in a room depends almost entirely on the size of
the patch of sky visible from the point. This, in turn, is
limited by the top and sizes of the windows and also by the
skyline of any obstructing building.
At a lecture read at the R.I.B.A. on 23 January, 1943,
3
William Allen stressed that this was:
A significant point to establish, because from it, we
can postulate that a serrated skyline has advantages in
respect of lighting not possessed by the constant sky-
line, which it has been the custom to encourage through
many centuries of town planning.
Next the researchers compared other plan types: the
hollow square, the cruciform, including the "L" and "T", the
"Y" and the rectangle. The floor area ratio was held constant
as was the spacing. Heights varied as each plan type had a
different area on a single floor. The hollow square was
lowest, the cruciform next. Sites were 200 feet square with
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the buildings reaching across the entire site. With streets
60 feet wide, spacing was 260 feet.
It was found that the hollow square plan configuration
led to the least successful daylighting. This was unfortu-
nate, because where independent piecemeal development occurs,
the hollow square is virtually the only possible form
because there was nowhere else to put the individual buildings
than along the street frontage.
Allen noted that before World War II, the FAR in the
City of London was of the order of 2. However, where rede-
velopment had occurred, the tendency was for the FAR to be
3, 4 or more. Consequently, the continued use of the hollow
square in redevelopment would lead to a deterioration in
4
daylighting.
Allen concluded that unless it became possible by some
means to undertake comprehensive development in urban
districts:
...no material improvement in daylighting can be
obtained except by the unlikely and, in many respects,
unattractive course of reducing the density of
development.
A Daylight Code was developed, based on the findings of
this research, which took account of the light coming past
the sides of buildings as an alternative to the light coming
over the tops of buildings, as was the invariable rule with
previous forms of control. The Code consisted of alternative
solid angles, representing patches of sky. The geometry
of these alternative patches was described in A Form of
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Control for Building Development in Terms of Daylighting
(1947). The alternative angles, drawn on paper as "Permiss-
ible Height Indicators," are used for testing the effect of
any building on adjacent buildings.
One consequence of the Daylight Code was that since
account was taken of the light coming from past the sides of
obstructing buildings, towers could be constructed on
appropriate sites of virtually unlimited height, while
complying with the Code. It was thought that use of the
floor area ratio device, which the British called the floor
space index, would be a suitable method of regulating density
in central areas. According to D. H. Crompton, H. E. Beckett
of the Building Research Station had been the first to use
the device. In residential areas, it was officially
suggested by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government,
in 1952, that density be regulated by limiting the number of
5
rooms per acre.
In 1947, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning made
recommendations in the Town and Country Planning Act, for a
form of control of building heights and space about buildings,
in both central and in residential areas, that were largely
based on the findings of the Building Research Station.
They were incorporated with alterations and additions, in
the Holden - Holford Plan for the City of London and used by
the London County Council. In addition to ensuring a reason-
able standard of daylight for offices and for dwellings, this
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control was intended to bring about improvements in standards
of ventilation and noise insulation and in conjunction with
the new floor space index device.(floor area ratio) to permit
a greater flexilbility in site planning arrangement.
In January, 1954, Gordon Stephenson, who holds a Master's
Degree in City Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, found the "persistence of the rue corridor ...
amazing. Haussmann is dead but Haussmanization...which was
6
not envisaged when the 1947 Act was prepared...lingers on."
A few months later, in June, 1954, I. M. Richards, writ-
ing in the Architectural Review, found "the even levelling
upwards over larger areas at a time which takes place when
every site is developed to the maximum extent, permitted by
the plot ratio (FAR) of 5J at present enforced...was destruct-
ive of the whole character of the City, as well as its
agreeableness as a place to work in."
Richards called attention to the existing tradition of
vertical punctuation represented by the Wren steeples.
A series -of slim skyscrapers carefully placed, might be
"a quite inspiring contemporary equivalent related to the
new scale which increased land values and modern building
techniques have inevitably brought into being... Permitting
a few thin skyscrapers, between which the City panorama could
be seen, would be less obstructive than large acreages of
7
building of perhaps half their height."
He goes on to say that the principle of the plot ratio:
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.. should not be applied as an invariable rule to every
site however small. A far higher ratio on an isolated
site can be counterbalanced by lower ratios on surround-
ing sites, so to provide a greater variety of skyline
and allow light and air to penetrate into the streets
between occasional high building, as well as to allow
the planning of maximum occupancy of whatever points in
the City circumstances may require.
... A policy of mere infilling is quite unworthy of the
City's reputation.
... Developers of building sites may be commercial rivals,
but when it comes to choosing between a City of well
coordinated buildings and a mere conglomeration of un-
related structures, each destroying instead of enhanc-
ing the effect of its neighbor, their interests are
wholly identical.
Richards found that the weaknesses had been encouraged
by a spirit of "What-I-Have-I-Hold" commercialism and by
"Government niggardliness about capital investment." He
called for "heroic" measures, involving both thought and
action of the boldest possible kind, something quite differ-
ent from the cautious nibbling at problems, the carelessness
about visual values, and the tendency to shelve difficulties
in the hope that they will solve themselves, which have
characterized the rebuilding of the City since the war.
Stephenson found that the new planning technique gained
8
ground but slowly:
Too frequently, the 1947 Act is being used to dragoon
developers and their architects to line streets with
buildings of uniform height and midiocre facades and
all in the name of good planning. Use, economic demand,
daylighting and layout techniques, which are modern,
yet proved by time, are ignored.
In October, 1955, in an article in the Town Planning
Review, that was to prove to be extremely influential,
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D. H. Crompton suggests the failure in the City of London,
on the part of private developers, to make use of the
demonstrated advantages of the open plan was in large measure
attributable to the ability of developers to attain maximum
floor areas, while complying with the Daylight Code by
providing relatively low rise, high coverage buildings, which
9
were less expensive than tall buildings. Orompton writes:
There appears then, to have been little incentive to
develop large sites, possibly because with a fixed
F.S.I., the advantages of the open plan are offset
by the necessity, in such development, to provide
coorespondingly tall buildings. In practise, this
lack of incentive has resultea, in spite of the new
controls, in low standards of layout arrangement.
Crompton then examines the possibility of creating an
incentive to assemble large sites through application of slid-
ing scale bonus system, based on the Building Density Index.
The Building Density Index differs from the Floor Space
Index only in that the area of the site covered by buildings
is not counted. The effect of a control by this ratio, would
be to enable higher F.S.I.s with tall buildings and low
coverage. This would tend to encourage open plan forms.
The possible additional cost of such development should be
"more than met by the additional floor areas allowed, as
well as by other advantages, such as carparks, made possible
with the open plan."
Given a B.D.I. of 6, the resulting F.S.I. would be 2.0
when the average number of storeys is 3; 3.0 when it is
six; 3.6 when it is nine.
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Density zoning by B,D.I. would make it impossible to
determine precisely the amount of floor space eventually to
be built in an area. Crompton discounts the necessity to
control density this closely, "either from the point of view
of overall floor space needs, traffic generation or the
effect on the spread of values." He writes:
If a B.D.I. of 6 were imposed on a whole zone, the
F.S.I. resulting would probably be between 2.0 and 3.0,
the exact figure depending on site sizes and the extent
of grouping of sites for redevelopment.
D. H. Orompton's article was read with interest by a
group of architect-planners, who had been called in to
study Philadelphia's bulk controls and to propose a new
system of bulk control. They were Robert Geddes, Melvin
Brecher, and George Qualls. The group was intrigued by the
bonus idea and sought to apply it in Philadelphia. In 1955,
Philadelphia's Mayor Joseph S. Clark, had appointed a Zoning
Advisory Commission, headed by Architect, Planner and
University of Pennsylvania's Dean, G. Holmes Perkins, to
begin a comprehensive revision of Philadelphia's zoning
10
ordinance.
The Geddes group chose Realtor Reynold Greenberg Jr.
and University of Pennsylvania Law School Associate
Professor Paul Mishkin, as their consultants. G. Holmes
Perkins had great hopes for "a new architecture in which
buildings will be seen as three dimensional sculptures,
11
surrounded by open space."
We've got to get the open spaces back. One thing we
have la in the past several years is the creation
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of great park systems like those our grandfathers
used to build.
He believed that bulk zoning, with bonuses, would be the
only way to provide such open spaces once again and thus to
make city life decent living for the person on foot.
The basic FAR was set at 5 to 1. Premiums were
allowed on streets 60 feet or more in width in the city's
highest density commercial district, for plazas, building
setbacks, but also for arcades. The base level was set low
to recognize the low city profile. A floor space bonus of
10 square feet for every square foot of open space on the
ground was granted. Smaller floor space bonuses were granted
12
for arcades and building setbacks on upper floors.
On a 10,000 sq. ft. site, a developer would be entitled
to 50,000 square feet basic floor area. However, on the
same site by providing a plaza approximately half the size
of the site, he could earn another 48,000 square feet of
rental area, i.e. he could almost double the size of his
building. If he also utilized the arcade premium, he could
earn another 15,000 square feet. The setback premium could
result in another 10,000 square feet increase. All in all,
the bonuses could stack up to provide, in conjunction with
the basic floor area allowance, 123,000 sq. ft. of rentable
area.
Instead of a squat five storey building with 100%
coverage and a FAR of 5, but with large 10,000 square feet
plazas, the developer could achieve a 25 storey tall building,
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with a standard floor size of less than 5,000 square feet.
The plaza premium would contribute ten of those floors.
By relinquishing the plaza bonus, large floors could be
achieved at the cost of lower total floor areas. Using the
arcade premium alone, the total floor area would be 65,000
sq. ft. Using the arcade premium and the setback premium
raised the total floor area to 75,000 sq. ft.
The first major American city, however, to enact
incentive zoning, was Chicago. The original premium idea
seems to have emerged from the 1954 Carson-Pirie Scott
competition for replanning the loop district. The award-
winning entry of Pace Associates, architects, Realtor
Graham Aldis, and Lawyer Robert Cushman proposed bulk
bonuses for buildings abutting open spaces and rivers. The
idea was then substantially modified and in its final form,
in large measure reflected the interests of leaders of the
real estate community. It became effective in July of
13
1957.
Apart from sharing the basic principle, the Chicago
law had little resemblance to the Philadelphia proposal. The
base level in the Chicago Central Business Districts was over
three times as high as that proposed for Philadelphia.
Chicago, long a city of high-walled streets, gave proportion-
ately more weight to covered arcades.
Richard A. Miller, in an article appropriately entitled
"A Key to Open Cities," attributes the higher arcade award
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rates to the widening of Congress Street, "Which gave the
14
city a taste of arcades."
Whereas Philadelphia allowed 50,000 square feet as-of-
right on a 10,000 square foot lot, Chicago allows a 16
storey building with 160,000 square feet as-of-right.
In addition, two floors could be earned by an arcade, bring-
ing the building upto a height of 19 floors, with standard
floors of 10,000 square feet. The overall height could be
increased to 24 floors through a 10,400 square foot setback
premium. The total floor area, however, would only climb by
10,400 square feet from 180,000 square feet to 190,400 square
feet. The setback would squeeze the bulk into a more slender
tower shape. A plaza premium of 27,200 square feet could
increase the FAR to 21.7. Whereas the 10,000 square foot
site in Philadelphia accommodated a 25 storey building, the
same sized site in Chicago accommodated a 45 storey building.
Whereas rentable floor space attributable to bonuses made
up considerably more than the Philadelphia building's total
bulk, in the case of the Chicago example, premium space
accounted only for somewhat more than a quarter of the
building's total area.
The plaza premium, although accounting for only
approximately 10% of the Chicago building's total bulk, had
a most striking impact on the building's shape.
Without the plaza, but utilizing the arcade and setback
premiums, the building could be 21 storeys lower, even though
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the total floor area remained as high as 190,400 square feet.
For both cities, the possibility of allowing bonuses
to be averaged over large, multi-ownership parcels, was
considered in order to encourage more cohesive civic design,
but Miller reports that "neither city could see its way
through the maze of legal and functional problems that such
averaging was likely to involve."
Chicago's zoning bonus program, in conjunction with its
high base level, was to endanger key landmark buildings
clustered in the downtown area, the Loop, such as the
Chicago Old Stock Exchange, a 13 storey structure, which
utilized less than one-third of the approximately forty-five
storeys attainable, if all bonuses were availed of.
"Ironically," Costonis observes, "the Exchange was as much
the victim of the city's own zoning regulations as of the
speculative motives of the building owners." Moreover,
Costonis reports that "by awarding enormous premiums for
projects occupying a half block or more, the zoning bonus
program has brought development on small lots to a stand-
still, and hastened the amalgamation of existing smaller
buildings into assemblages that can exploit the program to
15
best advantage."
The third major city to introduce incentive zoning
was to be New York.
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Appendix B
Bulk Controls in the R5, R6, R7, R8 Districts
The number of people who can live in a given area is
more directly related to the number of apartments provided,
than it is to the amount of floor space. If density controls
were expressed solely in terms of apartments, population
density could not be effectively controlled because of the
great variation in apartment sizes.
Voorhees, Walker, Smith and Smith had tried to avoid
this problem by varying the limits on the number of apart-
ments permitted according to the apartment size. Under their
proposal, a proportionately greater number of 2 room apart-
ments could be built on a given lot, for example, than 5
room apartments. Although this device provided a precise
and impartial control, architects and developers complained
to the Commission that it would be difficult to manipulate
in designing buildings. To overcome this, the Commission
introduced a factor of required lot area per room, which
varied according to district and building bulk. By dividing
the lot area (e.g. 10,000 sq. ft.) by the factor suited to
height of a desired structure (50 sq. ft. in a R8 District)
the result (200) is the maximum number of rooms permitted for
that building. The room count is based on 2* rooms for the
basic living space in an apartment -- living room, dining
area, kitchen, bath, foyer and balcony, with each additional
room counting as one.
- 616 -
In its Guide to the Proposed Comprehensive Amendment
of the Zoning Resolution, the City Planning Commission noted
that if bulk controls were merely expressed in limits on
density or floor area, there would be no assurance of
adequate open space. Therefore, a device for controlling
open space was introduced. It expressed the percentage of
total floor area that had to be provided in open space on
a 1L.
In Districts R5 through R9, every increase in the
Open Space Ratio also results in an increase in the number
of rooms permitted on the lot. For each one point rise in
the Open Space Ratio over an Open Space Ratio base figure,
there is a uniform reduction in the required lot area per
room, until a minimum requirement is reached.
If the Open Space Ratio is 20, for example, then the
amount of open space required on a lot would be 20% of the
total floor area of the structure. Where the Open Space
Ratio is 20, for example, a building whose floor area is
20,000 square feet calls for open space of 4,000 square
feet = 20% of 20,000.
Up to 50% of the open space might be used for off-
street parking.
Open space had to be accessible to all residents of
a building (except in R8 and R9 Districts, where roof
area used as required open space need not be accessible to
occupants.) Roof area can be counted as open space if it
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is not over building areas devoted to residential use, if
certain requirements are met.
In R5 through R9 Districts, the higher the building,
the greater the Open Space Ratio required. In each of these
Districts, every required increase in the Open Space Ratio
allows an increase in Floor Area Ratio -- until, at a certain
height, it begins to decline. The FAR at a given Height
Factor (floor area divided by lot coverage) and a given
Open Space Ratio, is established by the following formula:
1 = OSR + 1
F1 0i Height Factor
A tall, slimmer building in R5 to R9 Districts is
permitted a greater floor area ratio than a high coverage,
squat building.
In a R5 District, the maximum floor area ratio -- 1.27
-- could be achieved for buildings with a Height Factor of
six floors and a corollary OSR of 62.0. The most advantageous
relationship, from the point of view of maximizing achievable
densities, between FAR, Height Factor and Open Space Ratio
was:
- In R6, FAR 2.43, OSR 33.5, and a Height Factor of 13.
- In R7, FAR 3.44, OSR 22.0, and a Height Factor of 14.
- In R8, FAR 6.02, OSR 10.7, and a Height Factor of 17.
In its Guide, Rezoning New York City, the Commission
demonstrated the incentive effect of the interdependencies
between FAR, OSR, and Height Factor, by giving two examples
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in a R7 District:
- A six-storey building with an Open Space Ratio of 20.0
and a total floor area of 54,500 square feet, had a lot
area per room of 79. By dividing the total lot area
(20,000 square feet) by 79, a maximum of 253 rooms is
arrived at. However, if the same bulk is provided in a
nine-storey building, the Open Space Ratio rises to 25.5
and the required Lot Area per Room decreases to 72.
Dividing 20,000 by 72 gives a maximum of 278 rooms
permitted. Added open space in this case gives a bonus
of 10% more rooms.
- A six-storey building on a 20,000 square foot lot at
45% coverage has an Open Space Ratio of 20 and an FAR of
2.72. It provides 11,000 square feet of open space and
has a maximum permitted floor area of 54,400 square feet.
However, a ten-storey building at the same Open Space
Ratio of 20, provides 33% coverage and 13,400 square feet
of open space. For this, the builder receives a FAR of
3.33 and a maximum permitted floor area of 66,600 square
feet. In this case, providing 2,400 square feet more in
open space permits a bonus of 12,200 square feet in floor
area (two floors).
- In R5 districts, residential density ranged from FAR 1.00
with an OSR of 50 and 212 rooms per acre to FAR 1.25 with
an OSR of 62 and 252 rooms per acre.
- In R6 districts, FARs ranged between 2.00, with a corollary
OSR of 29.5 and 411 rooms.per acre to FAR 2.40, OSR 33.0
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and 454 rooms per acre.
- In R7 districts, between FAR 2.80, OSR 18.0 and 538 rooms
per acre to FAR 3.40, OSR 21.0 and 605 rooms per acre.
- In R8, between FAR 4.80, OSR 8.0 and 822 rooms per acre
to FAR 6.00, OSR 10.4 and 990 rooms per acre.
The 1960 residential mapping of Manhattan, distinguished
between the areas of investment building, such as Yorkville
and the East Side, the special character of Greenwich Village,
the low-rise interior-block enclaves of Murray Hill, Beekman
Place, Turtle Bay and, in the words of Friedman, the "more
amorphous and nondescript sections of the borough."
The Lower East Side was mapped R7, except for the
previously approved Seward Park Urban Renewal Area, which was
made R8. The basic philosophy was that R7 represented the
last district, which could provide adequately and economically,
residential amenities and facilities of space, scale, light
and air to low and middle-income families, particularly those
in publicly-aided housing.
Implicit in the philosophy was the idea that where
urban renewal write-down was used, subsidy should be
provided in such a manner that desirable density levels
I
would be possible.
Experience has demonstrated that the housing
equation, particularly as applied by HRB (The
Housing and Redevelopment Board) has sacrificed
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density and other planning considerations,
in favor of economics, as the prime determinant.
The outmoded concept of the highest and best use,
has been applied indiscriminately in many areas
and R8 has been forced, in some cases and embraced
in others by the Commission as in Seward Park
Extension, rooklyn Bridge Southwest, and Bellevue
South. In other cases, HRB proposes to use the
subterfuge of C5 and 06 designations to build at
R8 or higher densities, where planning consider-
ations and Commission decisions have previously
indicated R7 as being desirable.
Ed Friedman, a key Department of City Planning planner
at the time of rezoning, related the above. Friedman refers
to the various studies done by the Department of City
Planning and by Dr. Louis Winnick, former Director of
Research and Planning for HRB, that "conclusively demonstrated
that changes in density in Mitchell-Lama housing have little
or no appreciable effect on rental or carrying charges
where low, or even moderately-priced land, is involved."
2
Friedman continues:
The major impetus for higher density, therefore,
comes from the desire of the developer to maximize
his profit by having a greater number of units,
and from the operating agency to increase the
housing stock, regardless of marketability, as
well as other considerations less important but
more formidable than planning.
...Political pressure, the intricacies of financing
and the web of sponsor HRB interaction, has resulted
in a number of Mitchell-Lama projects going to R8.
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Appendix 0
The Rezoning Rationale in Brooklyn and the Bronx
In Brooklyn, approximately one quarter (26-4%) of the
borough had been zoned "unrestricted" or "business,"
despite the fact that the character of many of the areas was
predominantly residential.
Under the 1960 Zoning Proposal, the most widely mapped
zone in the borough was to be R6, with a maximum FAR of 2.4.
R6 permitted 6 storey development in semi-fireproof con-
struction, as opposed to more costly, fully fireproof
construction required above a height of 6 storeys. The area,
so mapped, was adequately served by mass transit and was
generally near to the Downtown Section of Brooklyn. The
area included most of the borough's slums, such as Bedford
Stuyvesant and East New York, which were later to become
Model City Areas.
In the Park Slope section, manufacturing uses, some as
large as one city block, were mapped residentially at R6,
even though they antedated the residential development by
several decades. The good quality of housing and the
proximity to Prospect Park were the determining factors.
While the former areas continued their downward spiral
of decline, Park Slope was to become an increasingly popular
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place of residence for the city's middle class.
In Brooklyn Heights, mapping followed fairly closely the
existing land use. R6 was.mapped along the promenade to
Hicks Street to preserve the historical buildings and, at
the same time, give access to breezes and not block the view
of the harbor for taller in-lying buildings.
R7 was chosen to accommodate Cadman Plaza housing, an
Urban Renewal area, then in planning, and to give redevelop-
ment incentive to the deteriorating housing to the north,
between the housing development and Hicks Street.
In the Bronx, R8 was mapped along the Concourse, as far
north as Mosholu Parkway, to recognize existing bulks. R7
was mapped on either side of it, for the same reason, and to
take advantage of two subway lines serving the area. R7
was also mapped along the length of Bronx Park, to maximize
its recreational advantages.
In the South Bronx, characterized by widespread physical
blight, a large proportion of its residential area was mapped
at R6, which recognized or went slightly beyond recognizing
existing bulks. At the time, it was recognized that this
mapping designation would probably discourage private renewal
attempts. Substantial R7 was mapped along the route of the
East Side IRT subway, near Westchester Avenue.
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Appendix D
The Ineffectiveness of the Sliding Scale Bonus Systems
As will be recalled, Voorhees, Walker, Smith and Smith
had not initially planned the bonus device to play a signi-
ficant role in increasing attainable bulks in the highest
residential bulk district. Only subsequently, with Felt
fighting the staff for increased density, was the bonus used
as a device to justify a 20% increase above the initially
envisaged maximum base level. RlO, without the 20% bonus,
permits 1452 rooms per acre.
Although considerable thought had gone into the prepara-
tion of the sliding scale bonus provisions, they were to be
singularly ineffective. Most private residential construction
occurred at RIO densities. Here the bonus had a striking
effect.
The sliding scale bonus idea, as initially described in
the Town Planning Review of October 1955, had been viewed as
a device with which to combat the problem of the "even
leveling upwards," of large contiguous areas undergoing
redevelopment, in central London. It was meant to encourage
developers to pool small sites so that large sites could be
developed, realizing the advantages of the open plan with
increased open space.
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In the New York case, the sliding scale was not a
sufficient incentive to stimulate private development
activity. For one reason, existing densities were
already quite high. Even if the maximum FAR allowed in a
specific district was availed of, the potentially achievable
intensity-of-use differential was not likely to be attractive
to conventional developers. Moreover, the maximum FAR would
only have been attainable with a high OSR, which would have
necessitated a certain amount of assemblage. On convention-
ally sized district lot sizes, the achievable FAR would be
a lot less. The maximum FAR in a R5 district was only 1.26.
This was for buildings six storeys high and a large open
space ratio. R5 was mapped mainly to recognize existing
bulk. The OSR which called for significantly enhanced open
space standards, worked together with a generally non-
existent achievable intensity-differential in a counter-
productive manner as a deterrent to redevelopment, whether
privately or publicly initiated.
To a considerable extent, basically similar building
types existed in R5, R6, R7 and R8 districts. Town houses
and brownstones were encountered in all these districts.
Typical Old and New Law tenements were encountered, not only
in R7, R8 and RIO districts, but also in R6 and R5 districts.
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As a consequence, potentially achievable density
differentials are usually higher in R7 and particularly Rb
districis. Nevertheless, even R7 and R8 mapping designations
were often applied, in a conscious attempt to thwart redevel-
opment to higher densities of Manhattan's "embassy rows,"
and to preserve existing residential character on side streets.
This gives some indication of how unlikely it is for redevelop-
ment to occur where R5 or R6 are mapped.
In R7 districts, FARs reached a maximum of 3.44, with a
minimum OSR of 22.0, given buildings with a height factor of
14. Assuming existing densities of FAR 2.50, in town houses,
there was little incentive to assemble large sites required
for 14 storey buildings requiring amalgamation of numerous
contiguous town house sites, merely to achieve a density
increase of less than one point.
What little chance there would have been for the sliding
scale bonus system to have been effective was further under-
mined when portions of blocks facing avenues were redesignated
from R8 to R7 densities as initially proposed by V.W.S. & S.
to R10. In this manner, options to assemble in R7 or R8
districts were greatly reduced. In R8 districts, the maximum
FAR, 6.02, could have led to buildings ranging in height from
17 to 20 storeys, with an OSR of between 10.7 and 11.6.
Such large buildings would have been more appropriate at the
end of blocks than in the interior block, because of the
advantages of benefiting from light and air above the streets
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and the avenue, wrapped around the end of the block.
End block sites were often occupied with high coverage,
high density tenements. While these might not permit achieve-
ment of particularly impressive density differentials, they
could, nevertheless, have resulted in handsome achievable
intensity-of-use differentials, by virtue of the fact that
a significant enhanced spatial environment became attainable.
To a considerable extent, then, the breaking up of
uniformly mapped, large, contiguous areas, initially
proposed by V.W.S. & S. and particularly the inclusion of
R10 districts on the same block as R7 and R8, worked
against the sliding scale bonus provisions having their
intending effect. In New York, the sliding scale bonus
system was, then, by and large, inoperative and thus
ineffective.
Nevertheless, the condition that had caused so much
concern in post-war London did not occur, namely the
"even levelling upwards" of densities.
The problem of light and air that had stimulated
the concept's initial formulation, was solved in another
way, namely through complete revision of Voorhees, Walker,
Smith and Smith's initial mapping proposal, in the
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manner described in Chapter 5. The sliding scale bonus
system is a valuable concept and its application in a
modified form should be actively explored.
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Appendix E
Some Effects of Zoning on Urban Renewal
In 1968, for the first time since the early 1940's,
low rise public housing began to be built in New York -- not
free standing on huge superblocks, but as infill along streets
-- in accord with the neighborhood development pattern and
with the wishes of the people who lived there.
The vest pocket housing program was the most extensive
program of its kind thus far undertaken. It was not a sub-
stitute for long range planning, but rather a solution to a
typical urban problem: the gradual replacement of worn-out
parts. It was, as Robert A. M. Stern eloquently stated:
...an affirmation that once again it is possible for
architects to contribute to the agglutinative process
of urban growth and to relate wholly modern buildings
to those of the past.
In a major way, the 1960 zoning was to be a source of
difficulties. There was a collision between the off-street
on site parking requirements and the useable open space
requirements. These were impossible to fulfill on the type
of sites that had been selected, without resorting to expen-
sive-to-build covered below-grade parking.
In the case of the public housing components of the pro-
gram, built by the Housing Authority, the problem was not
acute because a text amendment to the Zoning Resolution had
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reduced the required parking spaces by 25% on the grounds
that poor people allegedly had fewer cars. The Housing
Authority had, also, in general, secured the larger sites.
In the case of the moderate-income sites to be built under
the 221(d)3 program, however, there had been no similar
reduction in required parking spaces.
H.D.A. pushed for and got a lowered OSR requirement,
though car ownership is, if anything, higher in Model Cities
areas than in many areas where high parking requirements still
hold. Subsequently, H.D.A. pushed for permission to provide
common off-site parking for several vest pocket projects.
In the F4all of 1969, Alex Cooper, an early member of the
Urban Design Group, who had been appointed to head the newly
created Office of Design, within the Housing and Development
Administration, said he thought the practical impact of
increasing OSRs with increased building heights, through the
sliding scale bonus system, in R5 to R9 districts, "negligible,"
or at least, negligible when compared with the need for new
housing units. Cooper believed that a design analysis of
the bulk, height and setback regulations done by Rachel
2
Ramati bore him out.
Consequently, the Housing and Development Administration
does prefer, within any given zone, a single, high FAR and room
count, rather than a FAR and room count that varies with the
height factor as in R5 to R9. In some Urban Renewal Areas,
such as the West Side Urban Renewal Area, this has led to
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difficulties, because H.D.A. gave higher densities to developers
in the first stage, leaving little room for higher densities at
later stages, when total permitted bulk in the project area is
"averaged out."
Another difficulty resulted from the Zoning Resolution's
requirement that the entire site be cleared before new construction
can go up that takes advantage of the bulk redistribution
permissions in the large scale development sections. In
Urban Renewal projects, H.D.A. would prefer to have certain
buildings standing temporarily as a relocation resource.
Arguments in favor of the Zoning provision include the un-
desirability of living in "the middle of a construction site
4
and the tendency of temporary measures to be permanent."
H.D.A. will push for greater densities wherever possible.
The responsibility for considering the planning implications,
H.D.A. believes, rests with the City Planning Commission.
The most notable departure from the basic policies,
Edwin Friedman notes, "is, of course, the West Side Urban
Renewal Area, where a series of changes over the years, has
vitiated much of the original intent (of the Zoning Resolution)."
Sliding scale bonuses did not, however, apply to the
highest bulk residential district, which was generally mapped
in individual increments, bounded on three sides by street or
avenue lot lines, of approx. one acre.
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Appendix F
The Trend Away From the Thick Vertical Slab
Office Building Prototype
Gordon Bunshaft commented on the "shoe box on end"
prototype promulgated by the 1960 code: "I think the zoning
laws in this city have done more damage than any goddam
architect." Big corporate clients are increasingly willing
to absorb additional construction expense if this can give
their building a more distinguished look and thus more
advertising value. Harry Helmsley, for instance, contends that
it pays to add five percent to the budget to make an office
building something special. A case in point is the 52 storey
office building at 140 Broadway. The distinctive, finely
detailed building, surrounded by a travertine plaza with a
sculpture by Noguchi, a huge red cube balanced on one corner,
2
rented rapidly at $8 to $9 per square foot, high for 1966.
"If it had come on the market a year later, I could
have got $2 more per square foot."
Currently Bunshaft, the architect of 140 Broadway, is
designing office buildings that attempt to get away from the
angular style by curving the lower facades of his buildings
outward within the setback rules.
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Appendix G
The World Trade Center and the Envelope Requirements
of the Giant Highrise Office Building
The provisions of the Zoning Resolution militated
against the super highrise building. The larger the
building, the larger the site area needed for it. Without
very large sites, new buildings would not be able to rise
above the shoulders of other buildings built on typically
dimensioned sites in order, for instance, to secure outlook
and achieve prominence.
In order to be able to build the 10,000,000 square
feet of the World Trade Center it was necessary to build
on the extreme periphery of the financial district to
achieve a site of a size that could support the desired
floor space program and take advantage of the 40% coverage
provision. Although the building was at the extreme
periphery of the financial district its density increment
was an added burden to the district's various systems.
The Port Authority which built and operates the Trade Center,
was originally created to plan and develop a coordinated
system of transportation for the entire metropolitan area.
Its Trade Center is already creating more transportation
congestion than any other influence in the downtown area.
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The building has also been criticized because it
competes unfairly with privately owned buildings in that it
can afford to charge lower rents for space due to its special
status. Theodore W. Kheel says:
Let's face it. The P.A. has simply ignored its
mandate and moved into the business of providing
office space on the theory that its a good way
to make money.
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Appendix H
The Emergence of the Giant Highrlse
Tube-within-Tube and framed tube and bundled tube
structural systems have made it possible to package space
more economically in one extremely large building than the
same amount of space in several large buildings.
A case in point is the 52 storey One Shell Plaza
Building in Houston, Texas. The building, at 715 feet, is
1
the world's tallest reinforced concrete building. The
tube-in-tube concept made it possible at the unit price of
a 35 storey sheer wall structure. Houston does not have
zoning and consequently does not impose any density or
height limitations. Such a building would be very difficult
to build in New York City because of the limitations imposed
by zoning. Yet it is an economical prototype. Even larger
buildings have been erected in Chicago, e.g. the Sears Tower
and the Hancock Building, where density limitations are
less restrictive than they are in New York.
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Appendix I
Patterns of Influence
On Wednesday, September 27, 1961, Abraham "Bunny"
Lindenbaum, a member of the City Planning Commission, invited
43 major representatives of the real estate industry to a
luncheon in Sakeles Restaurant at 174 Montague Street in
Brooklyn. The guests found blank checks at their tables, and
Lindenbaum asked each developer individually how much money
he was going to contribute to Mayor Wagner's campaign for
1
re-election. Within 30 minutes, $25,000 was raised.
In an editorial, the Herald Tribune called the luncheon
"a shakedown." Within the week, Lindenbaum was forced off
the Commission.
In recent years, however, Lindenbaum's influence has
grown considerably. He is the lawyer-lobbyist for New York's
biggest real estate interests. He is the official counsel
to the Real Estate Board, presided over by banker Rexford
Tompkins. His clients include developers Harry Helmsley, Lew
Rudin, Charles Berenson and Peter Sharp.
He has won more zoning variances from the Board of
Standards and Appeals than any 10 other lawyers put together,
2
Jack Newfield reports in the Village Voice.
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Whenever developers have an item on the Board of Estimate
or Planning Commission calendar, Bunny -- or his son, Sandy
-- may be observed quietly lobbying in the corridors.
A case in point was the June 10, 1970 hearing before the
City Planning Commission, concerning the remapping of
several mid-blocks on the Upper East Side from R1O to R8.
R10 mapping permits the construction of high-density apartments
at FAR 12 and elsewhere, in Manhattan, is only mapped along
avenues. Lindenbaum requested an exception of East 88th Street
between Park and Madison, so his client, Peter Jay Sharp, could
build a luxury high-rise. In 1969, Sharp had contributed
3
over 050,000 to Lindsay's reelection campaign.
On August 12, 1970, the Planning Commission remapped the
midblocks to R8 but, despite intense community opposition,
exempted Peter Sharp's property. This decision caused the
demolition of three structurally sound buildings and the
eviction of 160 tenants.
A little more than a month later, the Board of Estimate
adopted amendments allowing for more flexible distribution of
bulk on highest density residential sites. In commenting on
the changes, Samuel H. Lindenbaum, Jr., Abraham Lindenbaum's
son, said that anything increasing the flexibility of zoning
"has to be helpful." The changes, however, would not lead to
more building, he felt, but they were "a first step in recon-
sidering the zoning and a sign that people are now thinking
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about these problems."
Since the changes were discretionary, a developer would
choose to build as he did previously, he felt. Wrapping
commercial space into a L shaped building would, in particular,
lead to a loss of valuable avenue frontage.
The only real incentive to developers, Lindenbaum
maintained, was to increase the floor area, "and the real clue
4
to building in Manhattan is to change the R8's to R1o."
In that R8s are typically mapped in midblock, he was advocat-
ing avenue densities of upto FAR 12 in midblock. In effect,
this would amount to large contiguous areas built up homogene-
ously at FAR 12. RIO permits up to 430 units per acre. At
RlO, a good-sized neighborhood, with 1,200 familiescould be
built on a single 200 by 600 foot block.
In July, 1970, Walter Thabit, President of Planners for
Equal Opportunity, wrote that the administration was taking
great liberty with the city's density standards. The City
Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate have approved
excessive densities for a number of major developments. He
cites Battery Park City, with 14,100 dwelling units. Most
planners believe this project will be built to R8 densities,
Thabit observes, but when net densities are examined, it
5
shows up at R10 levels.
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"Keeping a firm hold on the unearned increment gold
mine," Thabit argues, "the administration is using its power
to control densities to reward old friends and to make new
ones." Builders are encouraged to come down to "City Hall"
6
and see whether a deal can be made:
Behind a facade of public benefits, such as token
public housing, arcades, theaters, aesthetics,
development to the "highest and best use" and the
like, the administration has been selling high
densities to the highest bidder.
...The amount of money being made from these land
manipulations runs into the hundreds of millions of
dollars. In Battery Park City, for example, land
which is being filled at $40 per square foot, will
be valued at *100 per square foot when construction
is completed. This increase will be reflected in the
value of the buildings and in the rents; land profits
alone may reach $120 million.
In the United Nations Center, it has been estimated
that the extra building bulk permitted by the zoning variances
will net its investors $100 million over a period of 40 years.
The friendships cemented in these developments alone could
"finance a presidential campaign. A few smaller builders are
also getting a share of the gravy." Thabit then cites the
Special Third Avenue District as an example.
"Planning is designed to get political support,"
explained planner Edwin Friedman who left the Department of
City Planning to work with the New York State Office of
7
Planning Coordination. "While politicians agree that most
zoning changes involve patronage," Martin Tolchin writes,
"few divulge the quid pro quo, which is financial as often
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as it is political." He cites a planner, who said: "There
is no way of knowing what is behind the facade of zoning
changes. Payoffs occur two-three years later...sometimes in
the form of stock tips. We can't trace any wrongdoing in
8
paying off political debts...there is no tin box anymore."
Tolchin finds:
What does emerge clearly is a picture of zoning as a
big business and zoning as a particularly valuable
form of mayoral patronage, the political value of
which is only slightly dented when it encounters the
tragic and often futile opposition of the community.
Mayor Lindsay's campaign finance committee for his
reelection in 1969, included numerous real estate developers.
Harold Uris, a leading investment builder and president of
the Uris Corporation, acknowledged that he was a member of
9
the finance committee. The Uris Corporation had built one
of the first buildings under the Theater District legislation
of 1967.
In lower Manhattan, Uris interests benefited from street
closings and zoning changes facilitating construction of
the world's largest private office building. A special text
change was made (CP-20131) to permit elevated, rather than
street level plazas, to be counted for an open space bonus.
The bonus generated 1.45 million square feet of additional
floor area. The amenity provided was an open plaza, three
storeys above street level, accessible by escalator.
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The Executive Director of the Department of City Planning
also held the post of Director of the Lower Manhattan Office.
Subsequently he became a Vice-President of the Uris
10
Corporation.
In noting that he shouldn't have been listed among the
members of the finance committee, Harry Helmsley said, however,
that he did intend "to help the reelection campaign of
Mr. Lindsay." Prominent members of the investment building
community, such as Lewis Rudin, Robert Tisch, Seymour Durst,
Charles Berenson, and Litman and Schwarzman, gave large contri-
butions. Sam Minskoff, the developer of 1 Astor Plaza, at
11
Times Square, also contributed.
Other key members of Lindsay's finance committee included
several bankers, whose banks had deposits of city funds and
also supplied mortgage funds. They represented the Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company, with $2.2 million in city deposits;
First National City Bank with #93 million, Chemicals Bank;
New York Trust Company, with $2 million, the Bankers Trust
12
Company, with $6 million.
The district-initiating building of the Greenwich Street
Special District, backed by the Bankers Trust, also partici-
pated.
In 1969, Lindsay's campaign raised more than $2 million.
At the end, Lindsay had a $215,000 surplus. Much of that
13
money had come from banking and real estate Interests.
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Lindsay's opponents, Mario Procaccino and John Marchi,
by comparison, had each less than *600,000 at their disposal,
14
most of which was raised in small individual contributions.
Donald H. Elliott denied that a real estate developer's
campaign contributions had an effect on whether he obtained
a zoning change. "I deal with everything that comes before
15
me on the merits of the case, to the best of my ability."
16
On another occasion, he had said:
Every sophisticated person knows that the big money
contributors, the builders, the corporations, give
money to both sides, in a campaign in a city like
this -- not just. to the man in office.
And the New York Times, in a lead editorial on the Sunday
before the November, 1969, mayoral election, elatedly
acclaimed the Lindsay administration's record of accomplish-
ments in the broad and fundamental area of planning and
urban design, and commented on the proposal, by one of the
Mayor's opponents, that the Mayor's special development
offices, the Urban Design Group, and other planning efforts,
17
be abolished to save money:
Never in the city's history would false economy
exact a more formidable price.
The editorial concluded that at stake with the Lindsay
administration's urban policies, "is the future of New York
in the largest sense."
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FIG. 11
THE LINCOLN SQUARE SPECIAL DISTRICT
69th St
68th St
67th St
66th
65th
64th
62nd St
61st
60th
BR0WAY
I Lincoln Plaza
BROADWAY
I I
W.
We
W.
W.
W.
W.
W.
W.
W.
CENTRAL
PARK
H
C)
HWV~4
o~q-(
ovoc)
- 651 
-
am ae saam 14 St
13 St
12 St
11 St
9 St
St. Marks Place
FIG. 12
PROPOSED SPECIAL LOWER THIRD AVENUE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT
0
- 652 -
FIG. 13
THE SPECIAL GREENWICH STREET DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT
* * *Envisaged second level elevated district
pedestrian ciroulation system
Mandatory building
to street line
- 653 -
FIG. 14
ADJUSTED BASIC MAXIMUM
FLOOR AREA RATIO .
10.0 FAR 15.0
FIG. 15
BONUS FLOOR AREA
15.0 FAR
THE SPECIAL GREENWICH STREET DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT
FIG. 16
INCREASED TOWER COVERAGE
18.0 FAR 15.0
40% TOWER 55%
18.0
40%
IL\
FAR
TOWER
18.0
55%
18.0
- 654 -
THE SPECIAL GREENWICH STREET DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT:
FIG. 17
BONUSED REAANE
PlQ 18
PEDESTRIAN
BRIDGE
FIG. 18
OPEN
PEDESTRIAN
BRIDGE
FIG. 1.9
PEDESTRIAN
DECK
- 655 -
THIE SPECIAL GREENWICH STREET DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT
ELEVATED PLAZA
LOGGIA
>~r~r1 LFIG. 221 SHOPPING ARCADE
- 656 -
THE SPECIAL GREENWICH STREET DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT
FIG. 23
SITES 54N AND 54S
FIG. 24
SITE PLAN OF THE BANKERS TRUST BUILDING
WORLD
TRADE
CENTER
U.S.
STEEL
BUILDING
FIG. 25
THE SPECIAL GREENWICH STREET DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT:
THE FIRST INCREMENT
- 658 -
FIG. 26
FIFTH AVENUE SPECIAL DISTRICT:
PROTOTYPICAL MIXED USE
DEVELOPMENT - APARTMENTS,
OFFICES AND SHOPS
*
Q)
0
04
Emn)
0
4
0
El3
- 659 -
FIG* 27
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFERS:
A PROPOSAL TO TRANSFER DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS FROM.ABOVE GRAND CENTRAL STATION
TO AN ADJACENT SITE
- 660 -
FIG. 28
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFERS:
A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE TOWERt HEIGHTS BY TRANSFERRING
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS FROM MIDBLOCK TO AVENUE LOCATIONS
12 soreyAL
12 storey
transfer
30 storey
tower
R10 lot area - 20,000
sq. ft.
Typical floor - 8,000
sq. ft.
4o '
/
- 661 -
NOTES
Chapter 1 The 1916 Zoning Resolution
And the Context Within Which It Was Enacted
1. Earle Shultz and Walter Simmons, offices in the Sky,
(Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959),
p. 44-45.
2. Winston Weisman, "New York and the Problem of the First
Skyscraper," Journal of the Society of Architectural
Historians, XII (March, 1953).
3. Ibid.
4. New York Times, Feb. 9, 1896, p. 15, col. 1; Feb. 16,
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February 13, 1916, Section 5, p. 18, Col. 1 --
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article entitled "Chif of Big Skyscrapers Would Curb
Heights. President of the Equitable Office Building
Corporation Calls Absence of Restrictions Menace,":
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what unrestricted building means, to land values and
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"For all that one hears about the timidity of capital,
a new kind of investment seems to have a strong lure.
For, despite the risks, money kept flowing into the
construction of skyscrapers and it wasn't long before
there was a big over-supply. And that over-supply
still exists. Today a considerable proportion of the
floor space in downtown office buildings is vacant.
This condition has had a lot to do with convincing some
people who used to be opposed to regul ation that now
we should have it..."
"To ask how well an office building pays is something
like asking how big is a piece of string. Every one
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service and improvements of all sorts take tenants away
from the old ones, and therefore a new building is apt
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succeeds at the expense of the others in the same
district. For there are not enough tenants to go around.'
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